Now Is the Time for Texas to Seek a Writ of Prohibition

By Edwin Vieira, JD

March 5, 2024

The on-going conflict between the State of Texas and the Biden Administration over whether that State is entitled, on her own behalf and with her own resources, to repel the invasion of illegal aliens now flooding across her borders (and then advancing throughout the remaining several States) raises an host of constitutional conundra which Texas, the Administration, and the lower levels of the National Judiciary seem to comprehend only vaguely. One of these is whether the United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit — two of the “Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court” which the Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o constitute” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 9) — are authorized to exercise any of “[t]he judicial Power of the United States” (Article III, Section 1) in this particular matter, or in fact can claim no such “Power” (that is, “jurisdiction”) at all.

The authority of the State of Texas in the premises is beyond rational dispute. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 provides (in pertinent part) that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, * * * keep Troops * * * in time of Peace, * * * or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”. Plainly, this imports that each and every State may “engage in War[ when] actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”, and may “keep Troops * * * in [such] time of [War]”, “without the Consent of Congress” and therefore not subject to the absence of such “Consent” or to the “[Dis]sent of Congress” — howsoever Congress might attempt to withhold its “Consent” or to express its “[Dis]sent”. Unlike the somewhat vague reservation of undefined powers to the States within the Tenth Amendment, this power is reserved in the original Constitution to each and every State in explicit and unmistakable, indeed emphatic, language.

Precisely because this power is explicitly reserved to the States in the original Constitution, it cannot be nullified, negated, overridden, abridged, infringed upon, or otherwise impaired in its exercise by the exercise of any power the Constitution delegates to Congress. For all constitutional powers are of equal dignity. None is supreme over or superior to any other. Each must be exercised in harmony with all of the others. In this regard, Congress is not superior to the States, and the States are not superior to Congress, but each is situated on the selfsame constitutional plane.

For this reason, the statutes which Congress has enacted (or perhaps will enact) with respect to immigration and control of the National borders (pursuant, say, to its powers “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”, “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”, and “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”, under Article I, Section 8, Clauses 4, 3, and 18) cannot interfere with the constitutional power of the States under Article I, Section 10, Clause 3. Certainly the so-called “Supremacy Clause” (Article VI, Clause 2), upon which the Biden Administration sets such unjustifiable store, can have no effect whatsoever. That Clause provides (in pertinent part) that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”. Self-evidently, the “supremacy” being invoked on behalf of “the Laws of the United States” is over “the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary” — not some fictional, indeed logically and legally self-contradictory, “supremacy” of one provision of the Constitution of the United States over another provision of the selfsame Constitution. In short, the Supremacy Clause is irrelevant to matters arising under Article I, Section 10, Clause 3; and anyone contending otherwise is simply constitutionally illiterate (or astride some ideological hobbyhorse).

Now the peculiarity of the present situation, unknown in the tortuous course of constitutional law heretofore (as far as the present author is aware), is that both of the “Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court” with which Texas is now enmeshed in the toils of litigation are the mere statutory creatures of Congress. Neither of them has independent and self-sufficient constitutional provenance, existence, recognition, or authority of any sort. That being so, at least arguable is that these “Tribunals” neither enjoy authority of their own, nor can claim authority from Congress, either to withhold  “Consent” or to “[Dis]sent” from the exercise by Texas of the powers explicitly reserved to her in Article I, Section 10, Clause 3. Surely the Constitution affords these “Tribunals” no such authority directly, and Congress cannot delegate any such authority to them, because Congress itself enjoys no authority either to “Consent” (which option is irrelevant), or (conversely) to withhold “Consent” or express “[Dis]sent” (which alternatives are prohibited), with respect to the exercise by Texas of those powers. Thus, these “Tribunals” can claim no “jurisdiction” whatsoever in the premises, from any constitutional source, directly or indirectly. Therefore, they cannot issue any purported “judgements”, “rulings”, “orders”, decisions”, and so on in any litigation supposedly involving Texas (or any other State similarly situated) which arises under the “keep[ing] Troops” and “engag[ing] in War” provisions of Article I, Section 10, Clause 3.

So, what is to be done? The most direct course would be for Texas to present “a suggestion concerning absence of jurisdiction” to both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, respectfully but firmly requesting their recognition of their lack of jurisdiction. (A litigant can always bring to a court’s attention the court’s lack of jurisdiction, at any stage of the proceedings.) Simultaneously, Texas should file with the Supreme Court of the United States an emergency petition for an extraordinary writ in the nature of prohibition, to compel these lower courts to cease and desist from their improvident exercises of nonexistent jurisdiction, if they fail to do so on their own sua sponte.

This would not leave unaddressed the constitutional questions arising out of the State’s assertion of her powers under Article I, Section 10, Clause 3. No, indeed. For the United States (or some officers thereof) could sue Texas, or Texas could sue the United States (or some officers thereof), with respect to those issues in the “original Jurisdiction” of the Supreme Court, because any such suit would be a “Case[ ] * * * in which a State shall be a Party” (Article III, Section 2, Clause 2). This, of course, is precisely the venue in which all weighty matters of constitutional first principles involving the States should be heard — especially in this “Case[ ]”, given that it brings to the fore questions of constitutionally reserved State sovereignty stemming from no less than the Declaration of Independence itself, wherein the thirteen original “Free and Independent States” assumed for themselves (and for all other States later confederating with them) “full Power to levy War”, a power not relinquished outright in the Constitution, but only qualified in Article I, Section 10, Clause 3.

To be sure, the Supreme Court might attempt to evade its plain constitutional responsibility to hear such a “Case[ ]”, by invoking a supposed privilege to refuse to exercise its “original Jurisdiction” (as it did in the “Case[ ]” which Texas brought, raising the issue of voting irregularities in the 2020 Presidential election). One can hope that the well of judicial dereliction of duty is not so deep that two buckets of everlasting shame can be drawn from it in such a short span of time.

Whatever the Supreme Court might or might not do, it would behoove Texas to follow this course of action in order to bring to the public’s attention, in the sharpest focus possible, exactly how extremely serious constitutionally (as well as politically, economically, and socially) the invasion of this country by illegal aliens actually is. As always in matters of such grave consequence, time is running out. Pussy-footing around is no longer an option, if it ever was one.

© 2024 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




Trump, Insurrection, and Disqualification

By Edwin Vieira, JD

February 17, 2024

One is easily overwhelmed by the fatuity and even imbecility of the politically motivated drivel which has inundated, and continues to flood, the Internet concerning Mr. Trump’s supposed disqualification for the office of President of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States because of his alleged participation in the so-called “January Sixth Insurrection”. One wonders whether any of the self-satisfied gurus, talking-heads, and other pundits breathlessly pontificating on this subject have ever actually read, let alone carefully studied, the entire Constitution of the United States, or pondered how it must be construed and applied according to the tenets of constitutional interpretation with respect to this matter in particular. For, when all of that effort is expended, it becomes beyond dispute that, even if the “January Sixth Insurrection” were an “insurrection” (an extremely doubtful assumption at best), at this point in time Mr. Trump could not possibly, let alone even arguably, be disqualified for the office of President. And, one may confidently predict, the Supreme Court will soon so hold. Actually, the explanation for that expectation is easy to understand.

In pertinent part, the relevant portions of the Fourteenth Amendment read as follows:

“Section 3. No person shall * * * hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, * * * who, having previously taken an oath * * * as an officer of the United States * * * to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection * * * against the same * * * . But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.”

“Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”

I. First, in fairness to Mr. Trump’s opponents, it would be well to dispose of some really ridiculous contentions which a few of his more deluded supporters have advanced: namely, (i) that a President is not “an officer of the United States”; and (ii) that as President Mr. Trump never took “an oath as an officer” — so that even if he had actually “engaged in insurrection” during his first term in the Presidency he could not be disqualified from seeking election to, and serving in, a second term.

1. The Constitution — each of the provisions of which must be construed consistently in light of and in consonance with all of the others — itself eliminates any possible doubt that the Presidency is an “office” and the President is “an officer of the United States”:

a. Compare Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States”) with Article II, Section 4 (“The President * * * of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment”).

b. Consider Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years”).

c. Consider Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years”).

d. Consider Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 (“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of said Office, the Same shall devolve in the Vice President”). And

e. Consider Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 (“Before he enter into the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: — ‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States”).

When the Constitution, including all of the foregoing provisions, was ratified in 1788, “office” meant “a public employment”, and “officer” meant “a man in office”. Noah Webster, A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language (1806), at 207. So “office” and “officer” were inextricably linked. No basis exists for any contention that the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 radically transmogrified the English language so as to preclude (or even raise any doubt as to) the conclusion drawn from the original Constitution that an individual who holds an “Office” is an “Officer”, by definition. Moreover, Section 1 of Amendment XXV, ratified in 1967, also refers to the Presidency as an “office” (“In the case of the removal of the President from office”), proving that between 1788 and 1967 (at least) no one ever imagined that the Presidency might be something other than an “office”, and therefore the President someone other than the unique “officer” in that “office”.

2. It has also been contended that, the niceties of the English language aside, several provisions of the original Constitution do, in fact, indicate that the President, although incumbent in an “Office”, is nonetheless not an “Officer”. Namely,

a. Under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, [the President] shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law”. Apparently, the argument here is that, if the President “shall appoint * * * all other Officers”, he himself cannot be an “Officer” or he would have the self-contradictory power to appoint himself. This is an especially stupendous piece of self-evident stupidity, because the President need not and cannot appoint himself pursuant to the authority granted in Section 2 of Article II, in as much as his “Appointment[ ] * * * herein” (that is, within the Constitution) has “otherwise [been] provided for, and * * * established by Law” in Section 1 of that Article (which, of course, precedes Section 2).

b. Under Article II, Section 3, the President “shall Commission all the Officers of the United States”. Here, too, the contention is that, were the President an “Officer[ ]”, he would be authorized to “Commission” himself. The obvious rejoinder is that this Section, in the exercise of common sense, must be read as “all the Officers of the United States [other than himself]”, or it would directly conflict with Section 1 of that Article, which (as with any other purported conflicts among constitutional provisions) is a legal impossibility. And

c. Under Article II, Section 4, “The President * * * and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment”. This supposedly creates a dichotomy between the President and “all civil Officers”, excluding him from that class of persons. Besides not taking into account that precisely because the President “shall be removed from Office” he must be the “civil Officer[ ]” in that “Office” to begin with (as explained above), this contention requires one to disregard the obvious reading of the phrase “all civil Officers of the United States” to import “all [other] civil Officers of the United States” — that is, other than the President, he having already been explicitly singled out in that very sentence.

3. Finally, it has even been argued that Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution proves that the President is not an “Officer”, because that Clause mandates that “all executive * * * Officers * * * of the United States * * * shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution”, whereas the “Oath or Affirmation” of the President in Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 goes far beyond the simple words “support this Constitution” — and Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment refers simply to persons “who, having previously taken an oath * * * as an officer of the United States * * * to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection”. But why the expansive words of the President’s special “Oath or Affirmation”, being explicitly mandated by the Constitution, do not in substance constitute an “Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution” no one has ever explained. Surely to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States” (the “Oath or Affirmation” in Article II, Section 1, Clause 7) amounts to, and indeed greatly exceeds, “support[ing] this Constitution” (the “Oath or Affirmation” in Article VI, Clause 3). And surely someone who, as President, has taken the more extensive “Oath or Affirmation”, and then “engaged in insurrection”, is arguably even more blameworthy and subject to disqualification from office than someone who has taken only the simple “Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution”.

II. Second, having disposed of the absurdity that the President is not “an officer of the United States”, analysis can turn to the question of how, if at all at the present time, Mr. Trump could be disqualified for the office of President under Sections 3 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The answer to that question is that his disqualification is constitutionally impossible.

1. The key operative terms in Section 3 are “engaged in insurrection * * * against the [United States]”. Because the Fourteenth Amendment is a provision of the Constitution of the United States, not of the laws of any of the several States, the definitions of these terms must be uniquely constitutional –that is, to use the adjective common in legal parlance, uniquely “federal” in nature. Unless the Constitution is misconstrued as a formula for legal and political chaos, there cannot be up to fifty different definitions each of “insurrection” and “engaged in”, depending on the particular State in which the issue might arise, with any or all of such definitions being in one way or another inconsistent with “federal” definitions. For, under Article VI, Clause 2, “[t]his Constitution * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution and Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”. The several States’ constitutions, laws, and judicial decisions — let alone determinations by their administrative agencies — can have nothing whatsoever to do with it.

Plainly, too, these uniquely “federal” definitions must be derived from common legal usage as of July 9, 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. And as to “insurrection” specifically, the definition must be consistent with the meaning of that term as of June 21, 1788, when the Constitution was ratified, containing the delegation to Congress of the power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to * * * suppress Insurrections”, in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15. For there is no reason to believe that the Fourteenth Amendment adopted some new, idiosyncratic definition of “insurrection” at odds with the purport of that noun in the original Constitution. This, of course, excludes all of the politically motivated pseudo-definitions being proposed today to twist the Constitution out of shape in order to inculpate Mr. Trump.

Moreover, these uniquely “federal” definitions must be circumscribed by the Bill of Rights, which the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to disregard or limit (but rather, as the Supreme Court has long maintained, to “incorporate”). In particular here, these definitions must take into account the strictures of the First Amendment, which guarantees in principle and protects in practice the freedoms of speech, petition, assembly, and association, even with respect to advocacy and activities verging on a true “insurrection”. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (individual who advocates the violent overthrow of the government); and contrast Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), with Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (differently situated members of an organization which advocates the violent overthrow of the government).

2. The uniquely “federal” definitions of “insurrection” and “engaged in” must be applied by “federal” officials through some uniquely “federal” process, not potentially fifty or more different legislative, judicial, or even administrative processes conducted by various officials of the States (unless, perhaps, Congress were to provide otherwise through the exercise of its unique power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which it has not done).

a. “Insurrection” has always been deemed an “infamous crime” — that is, a “felonious offense”. For that reason, under “federal” law an alleged “insurrection” must always be the subject of a criminal prosecution, not mere civil litigation, let alone some administrative procedure.

b. Because “insurrection” is an “infamous crime”, under the Fifth Amendment an alleged perpetrator “shall [not] be held to answer * * * unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger”.

c. As to a “criminal prosecution[ ]” for alleged “insurrection”, under Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed in any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed”. Moreover, under the Sixth Amendment “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district where the crime shall have been committed, * * * and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses to his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense”. As the supposed “January Sixth Insurrection” occurred in the District of Columbia, obviously a trial cannot be held in any State (unless Congress were to so provide, which it has yet to do).

d. In any “federal” criminal trial involving “insurrection”, “federal” evidentiary substantive standards and procedural rules must apply as to: (i) which facts are relevant, (ii) discovery as to such facts, as for example under the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), (iii) how such facts may be proved to the jury or the court, (iv) the degree of certainty to which proof must rise (“beyond a reasonable doubt”), and so on.

e. All of this will require various “federal” statutes making “insurrection” a “federal” crime, to be enforced according to appropriate “federal” rules of Grand Jury practice, of criminal procedure at trial, of appellate review, and so on. These particulars must be provided by Congress, which under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment exercises the exclusive “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [Section 3]”. In principle, Congress could enact a statute which permitted the States’ courts to enforce the “federal” statute making “insurrection” a “federal” crime. In practice, however, Congress has done the very opposite. Specific “federal” statutes make “insurrection” a crime, and define it as a “felony”. Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2383 and 3559(a)(3). But these statutes cannot be enforced in the States’ courts. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3231.

3. In sum, as a matter of “federal” law applicable to Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Trump: (i) has not been arrested for the “federal” crime of “insurrection”, (ii) has not been formally charged with and arraigned for “insurrection”, (iii) has not been indicted by a “federal” Grand Jury for “insurrection”, (iv) has not been convicted of “insurrection” in a criminal prosecution in a “federal” court, and (v) has not unsuccessfully exhausted all possible appeals or other post-trial remedies which might result in reversal or negation of a conviction. Therefore, Mr. Trump is not, and cannot be, the subject of a disability which might derive from Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment that could prevent him from once again holding the office of President of the United States.

© 2023 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




The Absolute Right of Informed Consent

By Edwin Vieira, JD

January 21, 2022

At the center of public attention throughout the United States today are various “mandates” from public officials and even private parties aimed at forcing unwilling Americans to accept inoculations with so-called “vaccines” being touted as the best possible protections against infections with the “Covid-19” “virus”and its apparently endless “variants”. Of no little concern is that the people aggressively pushing these “mandates” are turning blind eyes to the adverse short-term reactions suffered by countless numbers of Americans already injected with these “vaccines”—and appear to be even more recklessly indifferent to whatever long-term dangers these “vaccinations” may pose in the unknowable future, not only to all Americans subjected to them, but even to their un-“vaccinated” countrymen. The most worrisome aspect of this situation, however, is that, although these “mandates” harken back to a dark period of very recent human history, they also confirm the old adage that “the only thing one learns from history is that no one ever learns anything from history”.

A- The essential lesson taught by relatively recent events derives from what has come to be called “the Nuremberg Code”. Immediately after the defeat of Germany in 1945, as the result of the exposure of “medical experiments” coercively conducted on human subjects by “Nazi doctors”, the Nuremberg Tribunals established that, with respect to such experimentation, “certain basic principles must be observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical, and legal concepts”. The very first and most important tenet of the Code is that

* * * [t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.

This means that the person involved should have the legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.

The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.

See Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuremberg, October 1946–April 1949 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1949-1953), Volume 2, at 181-182.

Sixteen “Nazi doctors” who had violated this “duty and responsibility” were tried for and convicted of, not mere medical malpractice, but rather crimes against humanity—with seven of them sentenced to death by hanging, and in due course executed.

As human history goes, these events happened just yesterday. Nonetheless, in certain circles in the United States today the rather stark lesson they teach has apparently already been consigned to Orwell’s “memory hole”. For “medical experiments”—from “lockdowns”; to “masking”; to “social distancing”; to “warp-speed” development of so-called “vaccines” against “Covid-19” based upon radically new and unproven technologies; to suppression of safe, effective, and inexpensive alternative treatments; to censoring of dissident medical practitioners and other scientists; and now to “‘vaccine’ mandates” imposed in this country since early 2020 through a concert of action among public-health bureaucrats and elected officeholders at every level of the federal system, certain pharmaceutical companies, the big “mainstream” media and Internet platforms, and even private businesses of all sorts—are proceeding apace, with scant evidence that anyone with “official” standing or influence intends or will prove able to put a pause, let alone a stop, to them.

B- In light of the source, the subject, and the seriousness of the Nuremberg Code, this situation is as truly ominous as it is amazing. For the Code is not an historically bounded set of principles applicable only to “medical experiments” performed specifically by “Nazi doctors” in the Nazi era. Rather, it defends the integrity of the human person against the assertions of any régime, at any time, that reduction of any human being to the level of an experimental animal for any reason is a matter merely of political expediency, whether the latter be cloaked in the mantle of “science” (in general) or of “medicine” (in particular).

It is easy enough to establish that the foremost “duty and responsibility” of the Nuremberg Code was not invented and applied as a compendium of “moral, ethical, and legal concepts” for the first time in human history as a product of mere “victors’ justice” in Germany by the Allied powers in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Quite the contrary.

1, The Nuremberg Code is an obvious extrapolation of some basic precepts of Natural Law. For, in general “[n]atural laws are those, which mankind are obliged to observe from their nature and constitution”, and specifically “[t]he rights which a man has to his life, to his liberty, to his health, to freedom from pain, to the integrity of his body * * * are natural ones”. Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius De Jure Belli Et Pacis (Cambridge, England: J. Bentham, 1754 and 1756), Volume the First, Chapter I, Section V, at 8; and Chapter II, Section VIII, at 36.

2, Not surprisingly, then, the “moral, ethical, and legal concepts” which the Nuremberg Code embodies in its reflection of Natural Law are inextricably part and parcel of America’s fundamental laws. To wit—

(a) The Declaration of Independence—the foundational human law of the entire American system at the present time, no less than in 1776—invokes “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” as “entitl[ing]” Americans “to assume among the powers of the earth” their own “separate and equal station”. Inasmuch as “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”—and nothing else—“entitle[d] the [Founders]” to that “station”, and were explicitly invoked and relied upon by them for that purpose, nothing which their descendants do in and as a consequence of that “station” today may violate those “Laws”.

Going further, the Declaration explained that, in order to “secure” the “certain unalienable Rights” with which “all men * * * are endowed by their Creator”, “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” authorize Americans to “institute[ ]” “Governments” which “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed”. Therefore, even the American people as a whole cannot “consent” to delegate “[un]just powers”—that is, “powers” which offend “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”—to any supposed “Government”. Indeed, a political establishment purporting to exercise “[un]just powers”—from any source supposedly derived—would as a consequence and to the extent of that misbehavior not be a “Government” at all. Being “[un]just”, those purported “powers” would be illegitimate. And because of their illegitimacy no one would be entitled to exercise them, nor would anyone be required to obey any purported exercise of them, whether legislative, executive, administrative, or judicial in nature.

As has been pointed out, the gist of the Nuremberg Code’s first “duty and responsibility” was a component of “the Law[ ] of Nature” throughout Western civilization long before the Declaration of Independence invoked that “Law[ ]”. For that reason, the substance of that principle bound even the entirety of the American people in their capacity as the human source of “Government” in 1776, continues to bind all Americans in that respect today, and limits their present “Government” to the exercise of “just powers” consistent therewith. Any denial or disregard of that “duty and responsibility” by contemporary public officials necessarily implies their arrogation to themselves of “[un]just powers”, which no public officials can ever be authorized or allowed to exercise, because no people can ever be entitled to delegate such “powers” to any “Government” or officials thereof.

The Declaration of Independence specifically posited that “among the[ certain unalienable Rights]” with which “all men * * * are endowed by their Creator”—and which “Governments are instituted among Men” “to secure”, as those institutions’ only reason for existence—are “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”. Plainly enough, an individual is deprived of “Life” when killed in the course of some “medical experiment” of which he becomes an unknowing or otherwise unwilling subject. No less clear, an individual is deprived of “Liberty” when coerced or cajoled to submit to a “medical experiment” by force, fear, fraud, or the lure of some favor. And an individual cannot engage in “the pursuit of Happiness” fully, or perhaps even at all, when crippled, afflicted with chronic pain, or condemned to a span of life seriously reduced as the result of a “medical experiment” in which he has been compelled or cajoled against his better judgment to participate. Self-evidently, then, Americans have not delegated—because they are utterly incapable of delegating—any “just powers” to any “Government” to inflict such effects upon anyone.

A subject’s unwillingness needs to be considered because, in abstract principle, a true “Government” might possibly be delegated a carefully constrained power to perform “medical experiments” to which the individual has freely and intelligently consented. But only on that condition, strictly and severely enforced against public officials in actual practice. For, in the very nature of a “medical experiment”, any adverse consequences are entirely personal to the subject alone. So he is the only party who in the exercise of logic, moral reasoning, and rational human law is entitled, and therefore who must enjoy the full legal capacity, to give (or withhold) his consent, alone and with finality.

(b) As the Preamble to the Constitution announced, “We the People * * * ordain[ed] and establish[ed] this Constitution” “in Order”, as one of their purposes, “to * * * establish Justice”. Inasmuch as under the Declaration of Independence We the People’s authority to “ordain and establish” any “Government” extended in 1788, and continues unto this very day, only to the delegation of “just powers” to that “Government”, no official under the Constitution can claim a prerogative, authority, or license, under any circumstances whatsoever, to exercise any “[un]just power[ ]”. For, obviously, no exercise of any “[un]just power[ ]” can “establish Justice” to any degree. Rather, every such exercise, howsoever rogue public officials may struggle to rationalize it, prevents the “establish[ment of] Justice”.

Presumably, the powers the Constitution delegates to the government of the United States are “just powers” in principle—provided of course that in practice they are not misconstrued or abused, and otherwise are executed for reasons and in the manners appropriate to their purposes. And the Bill of Rights was adopted precisely to secure as much. See Resolution of the First Congress Submitting Twelve Amendments to the Constitution (March 4, 1789), in Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States, House Document No. 398, 69th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1927), at 1063.

(c) Nonetheless, the question remains: What are the standards of “Justice” according to which “just powers” are to be evaluated in their definitions and judged in their applications? Plainly enough, these are never to be found in the platforms of political parties, in the promises of political candidates, in the propaganda of political campaigns, in the plebiscites which elevate candidates to public offices, or even in the policies and practices of public officials supposedly administering the “Government” according to their conceptions of “the public interest”. For all of these are as inevitably shifting in their positions as the sands of the Sahara, and all too often as shifty in their intentions as a confidence man playing upon the gullibility of a mark.

Unfortunately, the Constitution does not spell out the standards of “Justice” according to which exercises of its “powers” (and recognition of its “disabilities”, or absences of “powers”) are to be judged, whether in the courts of law or the court of public opinion. (Apparently, the Framers believed that Americans of their time, and into the future, would already know or would be willing and able to ascertain those standards on their own.) In any event, neither in 1788 nor today could those standards be conclusively presumed to be embodied even in public officials’ arguably honest exercises of those “powers”. For a public official might be scrupulously honest, yet entirely wrong about the rectitude of his actions. Even “powers” which the Constitution defines, and perforce of those definitions limits, can be accidentally misconstrued by careless or incompetent, or intentionally abused by dishonest, officials. And complex situations may create room for doubt and debate amongst men of good will as to what some “power” actually allows. So how, in the final analysis, can anyone tell whether someone’s exposition of a presumably “just power” is capable in legal logic of “establish[ing] Justice”, or whether some official’s exercise of that “power” has in fact “establish[ed] Justice” or done the very opposite?

The answer to this question should be self-evident. In the American system, the controlling standards of “Justice” are to be found within “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” to which the Declaration of Independence appealed, and upon which its efficacy in positive human law is based. Both in principle in their exposition and in practice in their exercise, all “just powers” must be consistent with those supreme “Laws”. All other purported “powers”—as well as all deviations from the parameters of admittedly “just powers”—are necessarily “[un]just”, and therefor unlawful in the most fundamental sense possible.

3. Now, echoing the Declaration of Independence, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides (in pertinent part) that no “person * * * shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”. And Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides (in pertinent part) that no State “shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”. What is “due process of law”, of course, takes into account all sources and aspects of “law” relevant to the situation at hand.

Obviously, a “medical experiment” performed at the behest of public officials—or by private parties who are required to conduct such an “experiment” by, or are working in complicity with, those officials—can in fact deprive a subject, not only of his “Life”, but also of his “Liberty”, as well as of his “pursuit of Happiness” to the fullest degree of which he might otherwise be capable. As a pertinent example, “[t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990). So, too, with respect to the “property” which a subject has in his own body , and through the use of which he lives his “Life” in “Liberty” and engages in his own “pursuit of Happiness”. For “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person”. Union Pacific Railway Company v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).

Obviously, too, a “medical experiment” cannot conform to any acceptable conception of “due process of law” when it denies “informed consent”, whether as to “information” or “consent” or both. For such a denial violates “the Law[ ] of Nature”, which, being the “Law[ ]” that through the Declaration of Independence subtends and justifies the Constitution of the United States (and the constitutions of every State as well), is the ultimate source and supplies the controlling substance of “due process of law”, no matter what political parties, candidates, electoral majorities, and public officials might insist to the contrary.

  1. To like effect is the command of the Fourth Amendment that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons * * * against unreasonable * * * seizures[ ] shall not be violated”. Every form of real or pretended “vaccination” involves a medical procedure which invades a person’s body. And the experimental nature of the present “Covid-19” “vaccines” maximizes the invasive nature of the process. Self-evidently, then, individuals are not “secure in their persons” when their own bodies can be effectively “seize[d]” through a “‘vaccine’ mandate” for a “medical experiment” the arguable “reasonable[ness]” of which will be determined, if at all, only after (and perhaps long after) the “seizures” have taken place—and likely too long after to do anything about the adverse effects the subjects will suffer. Obviously, too, such “unreasonable * * * seizure[s]” deprive the victims of “life” (possibly), “liberty” (surely), and the “property” which an individual has in his own body (also surely), “without due process of law”, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
  2. Moreover, with respect to the particular “due process” of “informed consent”, the Constitution goes beyond those two Amendments, to recognize “informed consent” as an individual’s absolute right.

(a) “Informed consent” with respect to any matter depends upon an individual’s personal beliefs concerning the “information” available to him. And under the First Amendment “freedom to believe * * * is absolute”. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (emphasis supplied). One cannot enjoy the freedoms enumerated in that Amendment—namely, to exercise his religion, to speak, to publish, to assemble and associate with others in order to petition the government for redress of grievances—unless he also partakes of the freedom to believe what his religion teaches, what he himself says, what he puts out through the press, and what his petitions assert. So, because the “freedom to believe” one set of facts, rather than another—that is, to be “informed” by what an individual himself understands and accepts, or rejects, as “information”—is “absolute”; and because “informed consent” is founded upon an individual’s own beliefs as to relevant facts, not the beliefs of anyone else; therefore the freedom to “consent” to (or to dissent from) any action for which necessary and sufficient “information” is the predicate, and for which “consent” vel non is necessary, must be “absolute” as well. “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in * * * matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (emphasis supplied). As far as “informed consent” is concerned, “to confess by word” relates to being “informed” and “to confess by * * * act” relates to giving “consent”—and as to neither can some “orthodox[y]” be “prescribe[d]” by any “official, high or petty”.

After all, whoever chooses which beliefs an individual can, may, or should hold determines the foundation for that individual’s “consent”. If an individual does not establish for himself which beliefs to accept, then (all appearances aside) he does not “consent”—someone else “consents” for (or, perhaps better put, against) him. No one freely “consents” to any action when his own beliefs relevant thereto can be disparaged, denied, and dismissed by someone else as “faulty”, “false”, “fictitious”, “fatuous”, “foolish”, “fantastic”, or even “fabricated”—and the individual then is required to “consent” to that action on the basis of beliefs which contradict his own.

(b) Right now, most objections to the “mandates” of experimental “Covid-19” “vaccines” based upon individuals’ freedom of belief involve demands for exemptions predicated on the prohibition in the First Amendment that “Congress shall make no law * * * prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]”, or the so-called “incorporation” of that disability into Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as against the States. This makes perfect practical, political, and legal sense. For every such “mandate” is (at least supposedly) the spawn of some “law” enacted by Congress or a State’s legislature, to be enforced by some executive official, bureaucrat, or judge. And no legislator, executive official, bureaucrat, or judge in the government of the United States or the government of any State can, under color of such a “mandate”, “prohibit the free exercise [of religion]”.

Self-evidently, “the free exercise [of religion]” depends for its efficacy upon an individual’s ability to form and hold religious beliefs, and to act upon them in appropriate manners under appropriate circumstances. Specifically, religious beliefs can provide the “information” upon which an individual relies to give (or withhold) “informed consent” to participation in some program of mass “vaccination”. Inasmuch as the “informed” component of “informed consent” is absolutely within the control of the individual perforce of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, so too must the “consent” component be (as the latter depends upon the former). So, because neither Congress nor a State’s legislature can enact any “law” which interferes with an individual’s formation of or adherence to religious beliefs, no “‘vaccine’ mandate” promulgated under color of law can require an individual to “consent” to a “vaccination” which his religious beliefs oppose.

An individual’s expression of “consent” to “vaccination” is itself an action, which then results in further action in the form of his submission to an injection of a “vaccine”—neither of which actions is specifically “religious” in nature in and of itself. Yet, although “mandates” for “vaccination” might not be intentionally designed to interfere with anyone’s free exercise of religion, and might have some arguably valid secular purpose, yet in compelling “consent” in violation of the individual’s religious beliefs they will surely interfere with that exercise—and are unconstitutional on that ground. Compare, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (compulsory public-school attendance law violates practice of the Amish religion).

(c) The principle of freedom to believe as one wills (that is, absolutely), and as a consequence to “consent” vel non as one wills (no less absolutely) in situations which involve the necessity of “consent”, extends beyond religious to all other beliefs within the ken of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

(i) Of principal concern here is the freedom to hold such scientific beliefs as—

  • That “Covid-19” is far less dangerous than public-health bureaucrats claim.
  • That safe, effective, and inexpensive alternatives to “vaccinations” are readily available (although unlawfully prohibited for that use by rogue “public-health” officials).
  • That the “vaccines” are experimental in nature, and have proven to be neither safe nor effective. And
  • That mass “vaccinations” through indiscriminate “mandates” threaten the health of “vaccinated” and un-“vaccinated” individuals alike, to the extent that “public health” in general is seriously endangered.

Necessarily, of course, for most Americans to form beliefs which they consider reliable with respect to such complex issues requires them to investigate, study, and accept the expert opinions of medical doctors and other scientists who more likely than not dissent from the official orthodoxies which “public-health” bureaucrats have spread throughout much of the federal system, the “mainstream” media, and the Internet. Although not explicitly mentioned in the First or the Fourteenth Amendment, the freedom of individuals to engage in associations of this sort in order to become “informed” about the exercise of their rights implicitly springs from the freedoms the First Amendment does catalog. “It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable part of the ‘liberty’ assured by * * * the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech”; and “it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters”. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). Accord, e.g., United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 578-579 (1971); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-523 (1960). This is particularly important with respect to expressions of “informed consent” (or, of more consequence, “informed dissent”) as to “vaccinations”, because with the advent of “mandates” these normally private decisions have become matters of intense public controversy. And “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as th[e Supreme] Court has more than once recognized by remarking on the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.” Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.

(ii) Also important with respect to “Covid-19”, “vaccines”, and “‘vaccine’ mandates” is each individual’s right to base “informed consent” (actually, “informed dissent”) on his own political beliefs. For example—

  • That the “Covid-19” narrative to which public-health bureaucrats and other officials have been exposing Americans is a species of unreliable, often intentionally deceptive, “political science” (that is, a scheme of pseudo-“science” defined and driven by politics) .
  • That this “political science” is the stalking horse for the entirely unscientific purpose of setting up, on both a national and an international scale, a system of pervasive police-state surveillance and control of individuals, using “‘vaccine’ mandates” administered through “‘vaccine’ passports” as the first step. And even
  • That an individual who “consents” to cooperate in such an unscientific and politically malicious “medical experiment” thereby becomes complicitous in a crime against humanity.

Of course, as with purely scientific beliefs, to become “informed” as to such political matters most Americans need to seek out and associate with experts in the field, as well as with other laymen.

(d) In all of these cases, individuals’ “informed consent” cannot be subjected to any “official” inquisition as to “truth” or “falsity”. For “under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). “Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth—whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials—and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker. * * * The constitutional protection does not turn upon ‘the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.’” New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964), quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963). “The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating * * * speech * * * . In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). And, of course, these principles apply even more insistently to beliefs than to speech—because beliefs typically precede and determine the content of speech.

Moreover, “‘[f]ree trade in ideas’ means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts. * * * Indeed, the whole history of the problem shows it is to the end of preventing action that repression is primarily directed and to preserving the right to urge it that the protections are given.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945), the first sentence quoted with approval in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963).

C. It should be kept squarely in mind that, in the final analysis, in every instance in which an individual asserts a constitutional exemption under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments from some “mandate” for compulsory “vaccination” against “Covid-19” (or any other experimental “medical treatment”) on the basis of beliefs which form the foundation for his “informed consent” (actually, “informed dissent”), his right derives from laws even higher than those Amendments. That is of vital concern, inasmuch as the Judiciary claims a license to override every one of these Amendments if it imagines that public officials have a “compelling interest” in doing so, and proceed in a manner “least restrictive” of the rights the Amendments are intended to secure. Of course, this theory amounts to nonsense on stilts, inasmuch as: (i) the government’s most “compelling interest” is to abide by the Constitution, not to expand its powers and evade its disabilities; and (ii) even the “least restrictive” abridgment of or infringement on someone’s rights remains a restriction which by hypothesis the Constitution disallows. In any event, to date no court has dared openly to invent a “compelling interest” which supposedly can override “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” to any degree.

  1. The most inclusive exemption from “‘vaccine’ mandates” rests upon the most obvious of “the Laws of Nature”—namely, the requirement of “informed consent” in aid of an individual’s right to “health, to freedom from pain, [and] to the integrity of his body”, now set out in the first “duty and responsibility” of the Nuremberg Code: namely that, no matter to what extent he has been “informed”, no individual can be required to “consent” to participate as a human guinea pig in what he believes to be a “medical experiment”.
  2. A specifically religious exemption obviously derives from “the Laws * * * of Nature’s God”—an individual’s religion being the source of “information” which precludes even the thought of his own “consent”, no matter to what degree some supposedly “scientific” data might support “consent” by other people.
  3. Other “Laws of Nature” also apply—the most prominent being: (i) the sciences which explain the workings of the natural world, thereby enabling the targets of “‘vaccine’ mandates” to assess the necessity, safety, and efficacy vel non of “vaccines”, as well as alternative treatments, for “Covid-19”; and (ii) the intellectual discipline called “political science” (that is, the science of human nature with respect to politics), which enables individuals to understand how these “mandates” are the products of innate and applied human psychology, and especially of various psycho-pathologies which are largely responsible for causing most of the conflicts and disorders which plague society. See, e.g., Andrew M. Lobaczewski, Political Ponerology: A Science on the Nature of Evil Adjusted for Political Purposes (Grande Prairie, Alberta, Canada: Red Pill Press, Second Edition, 2006). And
  4. Ultimately, when “the good People” of the United States finally recognize that modern-day “‘vaccine’ mandates” are the latest and most dangerous of “a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object[, which] evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism”, both “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” will (as the Declaration of Independence attests) justify the exercise of “their right” and “their duty[ ] to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security”. See T. Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, ante, Volume the Second, Chapter X, Section XI, at 663-668.

D. Perhaps, though, it is too early for “the good People” to contemplate “throw[ing] off such Government”, or even (as the Declaration of Independence also recognizes as their right) “to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government”. There still remains a slim chance that a critical mass of Americans will finally realize how the requirement of “informed consent” absolutely negates all “‘vaccine’ mandates”—and that mounting public resistance will pressure the clique controlling the present resident in the White House to abandon the “mandates”, will embolden Governors and Legislatures in at least some of the several States to invoke the doctrine of “interposition” in order to block the imposition of “mandates” on their own citizens, and even will nerve five Justices of the Supreme Court to strike down the “mandates” as violative at least of the Constitution, if not (better yet) of the Declaration of Independence and “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”.

The evident problem right now is that all too few Americans seem ready and willing to call a spade a spade—bluntly put, to recognize that, with respect to “Covid-19”, this country is not dealing with “science” at all, unless it be the science of criminology. Indeed, if Dostoevsky were writing a novel about the present “pandemic”, he would be compelled to entitle it, not Crime and Punishment, but Crime without Punishment, inasmuch as the perpetration of serious offenses by rogue public officials, attended by no fear of exposure let alone punishment, is endemic to Washington, D.C., and all too many of the States as well. It is against that “pandemic” that Americans need a “vaccination” which will open their eyes, clear their minds, and steel their wills. For if that “pandemic” is not soon eradicated, this country’s doom is assured.

© 2021 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




How the States Can Suppress Illegal Immigration

Dr. Edwin Vieira, Ph.D., JD

No reader of this commentary needs to be reminded that the United States are reeling under a continuous mass influx across the southern borders of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California

of aliens the vast majority of whom have no arguable, or even conceivable, legal right to enter let alone to remain in this country. Neither is any reader unaware of the superheated political controversy this situation now fuels—without, of course, any viable solution being bruted in the torrent of hot air emanating from Washington, D.C. Nor is any reader ignorant of the contention of those who promote unlimited immigration (both legal and illegal) that, notwithstanding the insouciance, fecklessness, or treachery of public officials in this Nation’s Capital, the several States, and even the authors and guardians of the Constitution, We the People themselves, are powerless to do anything on their own initiatives to stem the tide in their own defense.

According to the latter argument in particular, by enacting various statutes pertaining to “immigration” pursuant to its constitutional authority “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3), “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 4), and “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18), Congress has (as lawyers phrase it) “occupied the field” and “preëmpted” any contrary, supplementary, or even perfectly consistent laws which the States may purport to enact—this perforce of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding” (Article VI, Clause 2). Thus, because the present Congress and regime in the White House refuse to do anything effective to thwart “illegal immigration” under the laws of the United States (but instead are encouraging and facilitating it in defiance of those laws), nothing useful for that purpose can be done by the States through application of their own laws. Of course, this is a palpably perverse result, because the supposed “supremacy” of the Constitution is being twisted to frustrate every purpose of government set out in the Preamble to the Constitution. Ominously enough, however, this surreal line of reasoning actually finds support in the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), which held that the Supremacy Clause precluded Arizona from enacting her own laws aimed at the protection of her own citizens through suppression of “illegal immigration” within her own territory.

If, at first glance, it seems that the States and We the People have been outflanked with respect to “illegal immigration” by “preëmption”, Americans should recall what French General Doumenc reputedly responded when informed that the German Panzer formations had broken through the French defenses at Sedan in 1940: “Every war has its routs. We must look at the map and see what can be done.” In this case, although perhaps temporarily defeated on the field of “preëmption”, Americans can still look to the Constitution’s federal system of government to “see what can be done” elsewhere. And a calm review of the facts will reveal that, as a matter of law, the federal system is sufficiently compendious and resilient in terms of “separation of powers” to provide an effective, even audacious, remedy for the problem.

FIRST. What are the facts? The salient characteristics of this situation are familiar to all. Not to disparage or denigrate any of these people as human beings, or to deny that as legal immigrants they might make positive contributions to American society, nonetheless the realty remains that whether denoted “illegal aliens”, “undocumented immigrants”, or otherwise, they are intentional intruders, entering in a lawless fashion into the domain of actual citizens who alone rightfully possess this country according to the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and a plethora of statutes enacted pursuant to those documents. These actions not only violate, but also manifest hostility—even disdain, defiance, and derision—towards, this country’s laws. For every sentient adult among these aliens knows, should know, is willfully blind to, or is in reckless disregard of the obvious reality that he is breaking numerous laws, initially by crossing the border, then repetitively by remaining within this country every day thereafter.

Obviously, “undocumented immigrants” care not a whit that they are trampling upon the right of every American to control the composition of the population of his own country, the basic prerogative of every citizen of every independent sovereign nation since independent sovereign nations first came into existence. This is not only illegal, but also illogical. For, in usurping the right to inhabit American territory—by trespass as their means of entry—they contemptuously deny the essential nationality of the very country in the nationality of which they presumably desire to share.

“Illegal aliens’” hostility extends beyond this country’s laws to her citizenry as well. In extenuation of their misbehavior, apologists insist that these people merely want to better their and especially their offsprings’ own lives, which in principle is a praiseworthy endeavor. Special pleading of this sort, however, ignores the obvious retort that bettering one’s own life is, in both principle and practice, blatantly blameworthy when undertaken in a lawless fashion which worsens the lives of others. The very purpose and necessary effect of “illegal immigration” is to gain for the aliens economic, social, and eventually political benefits and advantages to which they are not entitled, and which must come at the expense of Americans to whom those benefits and advantages rightfully belong.

Because everyone is familiar with them, the many deleterious consequences arising out of “illegal immigration” need not be rehashed here. The essential points are that: (i) the extent and intractability of these problems are directly proportional to the number of aliens entering the country; (ii) even were the present level of immigration entirely legal, America’s socio-economic structure could not support it; and therefore (iii) a coldly realistic strategy for dealing effectively with the situation before it gets entirely out of hand demands, at the minimum, that the main source of the difficulty—the ingress of “illegal aliens”—be shut down.

SECOND. In light of these undeniable facts, how are Americans to describe this situation in the legally most relevant manner? Obviously, nouns such as “incursion”, “influx”, “inundation”, and the like are not only figurative at best, but even evasive of the real issue. Because of the international character of the traffic, its mass nature, and the hostile intent of the actors, the term which best describes “illegal immigration” is “invasion”.

To be charitable to the aliens involved, what is transpiring today may not amount to a “barbarian invasion” in the sense that phrase is commonly used in relation to events during the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. Nonetheless, it is, by definition, an “invasion” which is contributing significantly, if not decisively, to the decline and fall of the United States. For self-evidently it entails “[h]ostile encroachment upon the rights of another” [Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, First Edition (London, England: W. Strahan, 1755), and Fourth Edition (London, England: W. Strahan, 1773), definition 1 in both editions]—“hostile entrance” [Noah Webster, A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language (Hudson & Goodwin, Hartford, and Increase Cooke & Company, New Haven, Connecticut: 1806), at 164]—and “[t]he act of invading; the act of encroaching upon the rights or possessions of another; encroachment; trespass” [Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1913), at 784]. Accord, Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul, Minnesota: Thomson Reuters, Tenth Edition, 2014), at 952 (definition 1). To “invade” is “to make an hostile entrance” (S. Johnson, definition 1 in both editions)—“to enter or seize in a hostile manner” (Webster’s 1806, at 164)—“[t]o go into or upon; to pass within the confines of; to enter * * * used of forcible or rude ingress”; “[t]o enter with hostile intentions; to enter with a view to conquest or plunder”; “[t]o attack; to infringe; to encroach on; to violate; as, * * * invad[ing] the rights of the people”; and “[t]o grow or spread over; to affect injuriously and progressively” (Webster’s 1913, at 784, definitions 1 through 4). Accord, Black’s 2014, at 951 (definition 2). Therefore, by both common and legal definition, each and every sentient adult among the masses of “illegal aliens” who have crossed, who now are crossing, or who will cross America’s borders is an “invader”—that is, “[o]ne who enters with hostility into the possessions of another” (S. Johnson, definition 1 in both editions); “an * * * encroacher, intruder” (Webster’s 1806, at 164, and Webster’s 1913, at 784).

Whatever the possibly innocent purposes of alien invaders as individuals, the inevitable, inexorable collective consequence of their invasion should be plain enough: namely, the destruction of the United States. For every country is defined geographically by its borders—and its political, economic, and social character and integrity preserved by the security of its borders. Simply put, no secure borders, no country. America is no exception to that rule, but is well on her way to becoming an example of its operation.

THIRD. This peril extends, not only to the United States collectively, but to each of the several States individually. Not, to be sure, to the same degree and with the same immediacy. The southern borders of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California are now the front lines, because ingress by “illegal aliens” is easiest there. But if the present invasion cannot be repelled at the threatened borders of those States, “illegal immigration” likely soon will become a major problem for the States along America’s northen border and along the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. In any event, every State is exposed to the same eventual outcome. For once “illegal aliens” gain entry across the international border of any State, they migrate into States which have no international borders, “grow[ing] or spread[ing] over” and “affect[ing] injuriously and progressively” every community throughout America by a complex of inter- and intra-State “invasions”. (See Webster’s 1913, at 784, definition 4).

Moreover, the numbers of “illegal aliens” already within the United States will constantly increase through the natural process of human reproduction—although the children of the original aliens, and their offspring as well, will doubtlessly claim to be actual citizens, under color of the constitutionally absurd theory of “birthright citizenship”: namely, that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution confers on “illegal aliens”, who enjoy no right to enter or to remain within the United States at all, a privilege to bestow on their progeny the prerogatives of “citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside” by stealing into this country contrary to the laws thereof, and remaining long enough to bear those children on American soil. As a practical matter, the only way to frustrate the application of this theory until the true meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has been secured—whether by a decision of the Supreme Court, some Act of Congress promulgated pursuant to Section 5 of the Amendment, or otherwise—is to repel the invasion at the border or apprehend and deport the invaders as soon as possible, so that births within America do not occur and therefore “birthright citizenship” cannot be claimed.

FOURTH. Because “illegal immigration” inflicts palpable harms upon each of the several States, each and every one of them must enjoy a legal right to prevent, punish, and otherwise proceed against it. The ultimate source of this right is this country’s foundational law, from and upon which all of its other law derive and depend: namely, the Declaration of Independence.

In 1776, the Declaration established that the original thirteen “United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; * * * and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do”. By 1790, perforce of the Constitution all of them became components of a larger “Free and Independent State[ ]”, formed along federal lines, styled “the United States of America” (Preamble to the Constitution). As the initial conditions of membership among “the United States”, the founding States accepted certain constitutional limitations on their powers (particularly in Article I, Section 10, Clauses 1 through 3), while retaining all other powers which were neither delegated to the United States nor reserved to the people (Tenth Amendment). Later, other States were “admitted by the Congress into th[e] Union” (Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1) under the same terms as the original thirteen. Of consequence here, one of the inherent powers of “Free and Independent States” which the original thirteen and then other States did not cede to the United States is the “Power to levy War” under certain circumstances (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3).

Although subject to various constitutional limitations on her autonomy, each of the several States today remains “a free State” empowered in principle to guarantee—and, one would hope, capable in practice of providing for—her own “security” through “[a] well regulated Militia” predicated upon “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, as the Second Amendment attests. In particular, the “security” of each State’s own borders being an (if not the) essential component of “the security of a free State”, as “free State[s]” the States are entitled and may insist upon the right to preserve, protect, and maintain the existence and efficacy their own borders—and, insofar as some of their borders coincide with the borders of the United States, to preserve, protect, and maintain the existence and efficacy of those borders, too. Indeed, the States are not only entitled, but also are required to do so. For no State can stop being “a free State” within the federal system without repudiating not only the Constitution but also the Declaration of Independence. And such a dereliction of duty on the part of a State’s public officials would justify recourse to (in the Declaration’s words) “the Right of the People to alter or to abolish [the existing government], and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness”.

After all, it is the absolute duty of public officials within each State to enforce the laws which maintain her physical, legal, political, economic, and social integrity—the laws relating to her borders being first and foremost among them. True enough, rogue officeholders forfeits their legitimacy whenever they fail, neglect, or refuse to enforce those laws. But, at least for a while, a country can muddle through, although burdened with a governmental apparatus populated by fools, knaves, poseurs, and kindred political riffraff. By definition, however, no country can exist at all without enforceable borders. Is it worse to be ground under the heel of “absolute Despotism” in one’s own country, yet with some chance (no matter how slim) that some day “the People” might finally exercise what the Declaration described as “their right, * * * their duty, to throw off such Government”, or to have one’s country destroyed entirely and irretrievably?

FIFTH. Vindication of each State’s legal right to secure her own borders requires the existence of a legal remedy. That is, there must be a means by which this right can and will actually be enforced against the “illegal aliens” who are—by definition unlawfully—“invad[ing] the rights of the people”. (See Webster’s 1913, at 784, definition 3.) Obviously, “[a] right without a remedy is as if it were not. For every beneficial purpose it may be said not to exist.” United States ex rel. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) 535, 554 (1867). Accord, Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1885); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). In theory, this remedy could be provided by the United States on behalf of the States, or by each and every one of the several States on her own, or in the final analysis even by We the People themselves.

In what should be the normal course of events, the government of the United States would protect the borders of the United States, and of each of the States as well, without any separate involvement of the States acting on their own. Conversely, when (as today) rogue public officials of the government of the United States fail, neglect, or refuse to enforce in an effective manner, if at all, the laws of the United States which pertain to “illegal immigration”, it is left to each of the States to secure her own borders by asserting her own right to do so. In that event, because the borders of one or more States form parts of the borders of the United States, in protecting their own borders those States protect the borders of the United States, too. Under such factual circumstances the legal question becomes: “What specific constitutional authority—not subject to ‘preëmption’ or some other form of interference emanating from officialdom in the government of the United States—do the States enjoy to deal with this situation?”

The answer comes from recognition that the danger which confronts the States today is an actual “invasion” of their territories, and that the Constitution explicitly addresses the matter of “invasion” as far as the powers of the States are concerned—to wit, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, * * * engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay” (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3). Observe the precision of the constitutional language: “engage in War”, not “declare War”, so that no conflict can arise between the exercise of the States’ power in this regard, on the one hand, and the power of Congress (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11), on the other. Plainly enough, a State can “engage in War” without a “declar[ation of] War”, just as the United States has engaged on massive scales in undeclared wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. To “engage in War” means simply to employ operations and techniques justified by, suitable for, and familiar in “War” (although not necessarily all of them at the same time, or any of them to a particular degree). This is a broad mandate indeed. How far it might extend one may judge for himself by bringing to mind the precedents the government of the United States has established in its decades-long prosecutions of “the war on terror” and “the war on drugs”.

Also, observe that the Constitution does not limit the reach of the phrase “actually invaded”. The States on the southern border of the United States could be “actually invaded” by the regular armed forces of Mexico herself; by figurative armies of Mexican nationals intent upon the re-conquest of the southwestern United States through unlimited immigration; by cartels based in Mexico (whether or not in collusion with rogue officials there) which transport “illegal aliens” into the United States with as much facility and impunity as they smuggle illicit drugs; or by hordes of aliens from all over the world who somehow traverse the length and breadth of Mexico to arrive at, and then illegally traverse, the border of the United States without the Mexican government’s significantly interfering with the traffic. To the Constitution, it would all be of one and the same import.

Moreover, as the Constitution makes clear, no State needs “the Consent of Congress”, or is subject to a prohibition from Congress (a denial of its “Consent”), to “engage in War” when “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”. And logically Congress cannot withhold its “Consent” (whether by some explicit prohibition or the implicit restraint of “preëmption”) when its “Consent” is not necessary in the first place. So, because the Constitution explicitly reserves to the States the right, power, privilege, and duty to “engage in War” as an exception to and exclusion from every power of Congress, the States’ authority in that regard is supreme within its field of operation.

This, of course, makes perfect sense, because a State’s right of self-defense against an “invasion” by hordes of “illegal aliens” is no less absolute than an individual’s right of self-defense against an attack by a lone criminal. As Sir William Blackstone observed, if an individual be forcibly attacked in his person or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by force; and the breach of the peace, which happens, is chargeable upon him only who began the affray. For the law, in this case, respects the passions of the human mind; and (when external violence is offered to a man himself, or those to whom he bears a near connection) makes it lawful in him to do himself that immediate justice, to which he is prompted by nature, and which no prudential motives are strong enough to restrain. It considers that the future process of law is by no means an adequate remedy for injuries accompanied with force; since it is impossible to say, to what wanton lengths of rapine or cruelty outrages of this sort might be carried, unless it were permitted a man immediately to oppose one violence with another. Self-defence, therefore, as it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society.

Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Robert Bell, American Edition, 4 Volumes & Appendix, 1771-1773), Volume 3, at 3-4 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied). Thus, because her right of self-defense cannot be “taken away by the law of society”, a State does not need “the Consent of Congress” to exercise it against an invasion, perhaps the most serious threat to a State’s political life which can be imagined. Neither does a State need the permission of the President, judges, or any other public officials, the powers of which depend upon “Laws [enacted by Congress] which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the * * * Powers vested by th[e] Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18). Inasmuch as Congress cannot withhold “Consent” on its own behalf (because its “Consent” is unnecessary), it cannot enact “Laws” which purport to allow others to withhold such unnecessary “Consent” by proxy.

Moreover, the reserved right and power to “engage in War” when “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay” (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3), obviously entitles a State not situated along an international border of the United States to assist another State which is so situated and is being “actually invaded” by “illegal aliens”, so as to protect the former State against the “imminent Danger” of an “invasion” mounted by aliens from within the latter State. After all, under present conditions “illegal aliens” who “invade” (say) Texas can, within a matter of days (if not just hours) from the dates and times of their original incursions into that State, be transported to any location across the United States, “invading” not only the States of their initial entries and then final destinations, but sequentially all other States along the way.

To be sure, the Constitution does provide that “[t]he United States * * * shall protect each of th[e States in the Union] against Invasion” (Article IV, Section 4). But this duty cannot be performed in the absence of some “Laws * * * necessary and proper for carrying [it] into Execution” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18). And no such “Laws” can impose upon the States the constitutionally prohibited requirement to obtain explicit or implicit “Consent” from Congress before they “engage in War” when “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay” (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3). So the power of the States to “engage in War” in the event of invasion remains separate from and independent of the duty of the United States to “protect” the States “against Invasion”. Although parallel in purpose, that duty supplements, rather than supplants or constrains, the right, power, privilege, and duty of the States to defend themselves.

This must be self-evidently true when rogue public officials within the government of the United States fail, neglect, or refuse to perform their duty to “protect each of the[ States] against Invasion” (Article IV, Section 4) adequately, let alone at all. Such an abrogation of constitutional duty cannot be the product of “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof”, but is quite the opposite—cannot pretend to be “the supreme Law of the Land” (Article VI, Clause 2), or any “Law” for that matter—and therefore cannot “preëmpt” any State from protecting herself.

If such is plain enough at the constitutional level, how much more obvious is it when mere statutes are the subjects of concern? For purposes of argument, it may be conceded that, by statute, Congress has “occupied the field”—and thereby “preëmpted” any conflicting, or even merely supplementary, laws of every State—within the domain of “immigration”. But Congressional “immigration law” is not, and does not even pretend to be, “invasion law” of any sort—indeed, it presumes that “immigration” must proceed according to law, not in the lawless fashion of an “invasion”. So it is hard to see how any part of “immigration law” could “preëmpt” any State’s laws dealing with “invasion” enacted pursuant to a constitutional power explicitly reserved to the States for that purpose. Surely the Constitution prohibits rogue officials of the United States from deceitfully and surreptitiously misusing the laws related to “immigration” to enable, facilitate, promote, or even countenance an “invasion” of any State by “illegal aliens”, or to prevent any State from “engag[ing] in War” to resist such an “invasion” when the victimized State determines that such resistance is necessary. (Presumably, a State could “engage in War” if invaded even by alien forces openly supported by Congress, led in person by the President, and blessed by the Judiciary.)

SIXTH. How, in practical terms, might a State “engage in War” when “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”? Doubtlessly the first and foremost operation would be to secure the frontiers, and police the interior, of the State against the invaders. No invasion can succeed if the invaders are repelled at the border, or (if they somehow succeed in gaining entry) are subsequently apprehended within and then expelled from the State.

Such tasks, however, are “labor-intensive”: that is, they require for their performance the deployment of forces of sufficient size—and with adequate organization, armament, training, logistical support, and so on—to overwhelm the invaders. As these must be the State’s own forces, they must be raised within the State from amongst the State’s own citizens. But the constitutional authority to “engage in War” does not limit, nor in the nature of things could it constrain, a State’s right to employ any appropriate establishment already at hand or capable of being mobilized for that purpose.

Under present political conditions, though, it would be problematical for a State to call upon her National Guard or any so-called “defense force” she had established. Each State is allowed to “keep [these] Troops * * * in time of Peace”, but only “with[ ] the consent of Congress” (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3). See 32 U.S.C. § 109(a) through (c). Presumably, though, “in time of [War]” when “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”, the States could not only “keep” but could actually deploy these “Troops” without “the Consent of Congress”. Yet it is conceivable—most likely to be expected—that the present régime in the District of Columbia would prevent the use of these “Troops” for that purpose, by removing them from the States’ control under color of the statutes of the United States which (through “the Consent of Congress”) provide for their existence, lay out their duties, and regulate their operations. The Army National Guard and the Air National Guard are “reserve component[s]” of the regular Army and Air Force. See 32 U.S.C. § 101(3) through (7). As such, under the Constitution they are subject to be coöpted by the government of the United States at almost any time (Article I, Section 8, Clause 14).The States’ “defense forces” are in a somewhat ambiguous position. See 32 U.S.C. § 109(d) and (e). But, even were they left to the States to command, the complements of most of them are too small to be of much use against an “invasion” as extensive as “illegal aliens” are mounting today. See, e.g., Va. Code § 44-54.4 (“the Virginia Defense Force” has “a targeted membership of at least 1,200” volunteers).

Similar practical considerations militate against the States’ employment of their ordinary police forces. For were the police assigned in adequate numbers to repel an “invasion” by “illegal aliens” on the scale now taking place, too few would likely be left to secure thousands of Localities against ordinary crime.

The obvious solution for these difficulties derives from the precept of political science that the survival of any polity depends upon the successful defense of its borders, and from the axiom of American constitutional law that “necessary to the security of a free State” in all respects, including especially the integrity of her borders, is “[a] well regulated Militia” composed of “the people” who exercise “the right * * * to keep and bear Arms” (Second Amendment). These forces are what the Constitution denotes as “the Militia of the several States” (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). So today there are now fifty of them, one in, of, and for each State. Various States’ statutory codes call them “the unorganized militia”, “the reserve militia”, or some other kindred term which describes their largely inactive status. Yet, of critical importance to the problem of “illegal immigration”, among other constitutional authorities and responsibilities “the Militia of the several States” are assigned the duty to “repel Invasions” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 15), an authority explicitly vouchsafed by the Constitution to no other establishment. For this purpose, Congress may call them forth to be “employed in the Service of the United States” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 16). Or, of more interest here (because of the unreliability and fecklessness of Congress), the States may deploy them to that end in the States’ own service—without needing to obtain any “Consent” from Congress, because the Militia are “the Militia of the several States” not “of the United States”, and are “Militia” not “Troops”. So, for the purpose of repelling invasions of their territories, the States may raise their “unorganized militia” or “reserve militia” to, and maintain them in a condition of, readiness at all times (whether in peace or war), and may call forth whatever parts (or the entireties) of them they deem suitable for that task.

To be sure, one can imagine that the rogue Congress in session these days might attempt to prohibit the States’ use of their Militia for the particular purpose of “repel[ing] Invasions” by “illegal aliens”. Any such move, however, would be laughably unconstitutional, for at least two reasons: First, Congress’s power is to “provide for”, not against, “calling forth the Militia”; and to do so in order to “repel”, not promote, “Invasions”. Plainly enough, “the affirmative words of [a] clause [in the Constitution] giving one sort of jurisdiction, must imply a negative of any other sort of jurisdiction, because, otherwise, the words would be totally inoperative”. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheaton) 264, 401 (1821). Whether by verbal trickery or otherwise, “‘no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution’”. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877 (1975). And “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; * * * it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886). Second, the States’ exercise of their reserved power to employ their Militia to “engage in War” when “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay” (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3) cannot be thwarted by the exercise of any power of Congress, including its power to “provide for calling forth the Militia to * * * repel Invasions” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 15), because no one constitutional power can be misused to negate any other constitutional power. “These fundamental principles are of equal dignity, and neither must be so enforced as to nullify or substantially impair the other.” Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340, 353 (1908).

One can also imagine that a rogue President might order the Militia not to interfere with “illegal immigration”, under color of his status as “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States” (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). This, too, would be risible. For allowing “illegal immigration” to proceed unhindered could not, by any rational constitutional calculus, constitute “the actual Service of the United States”—not least because the President’s order would violate both his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” (Article II, Section 3) and his “Oath or Affirmation” that he “will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States” (Article I, Section 1, Clause 7). Indeed, for betraying the United States by aiding and abetting an “invasion” of illegal aliens” when hostile foreign nations were involved, a rogue President might be “removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason” (Article II, Section 4, and Article III, Section 3, Clause 1), and thereafter become “liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law” (Article I, Section 3, Clause 7), pursuant to the power of Congress “to declare the Punishment of Treason” (Article III, Clause 3, Section 2).

SEVENTH. Of course, for any of the foregoing to be more than merely theoretical, the States would have to call forth their “unorganized militia” or “reserve militia”. Generally, though, the States’ laws already provide for their Militia to repel invasions. See, e.g., Va. Code §§ 44-86 (“[t]he commander in chief [i.e., the Governor] may at any time, in order to * * * repel invasion, * * * order out * * * the whole or any part of the unorganized militia”), and 44-87 (“[t]he Governor shall, when ordering out the unorganized militia, designate the number to be so called” and “may order them out either by calling for volunteers or by draft”). So the problem would center around the practical fitness of the Militia for that assignment at that time, not their legal authority to perform it at the States’ behest, in their own interest, and pursuant to their own laws.

Obviously, the Militia would need to be suitably organized, armed, trained, and supplied before they could be deployed to deal with the “invasion” of “illegal aliens” under the particular circumstances which then obtained in each State. In principle, though, this should not be terribly difficult, because “the organized militia” or “the reserved militia” in most States are composed of the vast majority of the people. See, e.g., Va. Code §§ 44-1, 44-2, 44-4, 44-5, and 44-54.6 (“the unorganized militia” consists of “all able-bodied residents of the Commonwealth who are citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied persons resident in the Commonwealth who have declared their intentions to become citizens of the United States, who are at least 16 years of age and [with certain exceptions] not more than 55 years of age”, other than members of the National Guard and the Virginia Defense Force, and those few persons exempted by statute). And surely among the general population of able-bodied residents of suitable age could be found innumerable patriotic, enthusiastic, and talented individuals who already possessed some basic training, equipment, and even experience which could be put to work bringing the revitalized Militia “up to speed” in short order.

Unfortunately, in the normal course of events the general population of a State cannot call forth the Militia on its own recognizance. Statutes would need to be interpreted and applied, or perhaps amended or even enacted, by public officials in order to prepare “the unorganized militia” or “the reserve militia” to repel the “invasion” of “illegal aliens”.

In every State, public officials should already be taking action to extract “the unorganized militia” or “the reserve militia” from an “unorganized” or “reserve” status, and not just to repel the “invasion” by “illegal aliens” either (as vital as that task is at this time). Indeed, they should have been revitalizing the Militia during many decades past. To the present author’s knowledge, however, nothing along those lines is now being done, or even proposed, in any State. One can speculate about the reasons for this deplorable state of affairs. At base, of course, it must be attributed to most public officials’ abysmal ignorance of the Constitution—although how they could possibly square such an excuse with their mandatory “Oath[s] or Affirmation[s], to support th[e] Constitution” (Article VI, Clause 3) passes understanding. Beyond that, its cause might be traceable to officials’ insouciance, sloth, or indolence; incompetence sinking to the level of fecklessness; cowardice in the face of political or other pressure from powerful factions and special-interest groups which stand to gain, economically or politically, from unlimited immigration; desires to advance their careers in and out of politics by prostituting their offices to such groups; or even adherence to some goofy ideology which extols “open borders” as the quintessence of “libertarian” principles, but really serves the interests only of globalists and other avowed enemies of Americans’ independence, freedom, and prosperity.

Not to be overlooked, either, is the possibility of some rogue public officials’ criminal complicity with parties engaged in “illegal immigration”, particularly where trafficking in human beings is allied with smuggling of drugs. Most careful students of the subject recognize that “illegal immigration” serves various subversive political purposes. But to arguably an even greater degree so do illicit shipments of dangerous drugs into America (as they have for quite a long time already). See, e.g., Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America and the West, an exposé of long-term Russian and Chinese intelligence operations aimed at achieving the demoralisation and ultimate control of the West through drugs as a dimension of the continuing Leninist World Revolution (New York, New York: Edward Harle Limited, 1999). On the scales at which they exist today, both “illegal immigration” and the importation of illegal drugs constitute “invasions”—the first by aliens whose entry into this country destabilizes American society (even though that may not be their own avowed purpose), the second by chemicals the criminal commerce in which is surely intended to destroy society dose by dose. The combination of the two in a coöperative racketeering enterprise is explosively synergistic, especially when foreign nations promote, protect, participate in, and perhaps even plan these operations. Which would make rogue American officials’ involvement in the joint traffic sink to the level of “Treason”, through their “adher[ence] to the[ ] Enemies [of the United States], giving them Aid and Comfort” (Article III, Section 3, Clause 1).

Whatever the explanation for the present sorry situation may be, the continuation (let alone the chronic exacerbation) of such a mess can no longer be tolerated. Unrelenting pressure must be brought to bear on honest public officials who can be educated and prodded into taking constitutionally correct and effective action as soon as possible. Unfortunately, to carry out what will amount to the political equivalent of the labor of Hercules with the Augean Stables, Americans will have to rely largely on themselves.

EIGHTH. At the present point in the tortuous course of human events, it should be painfully apparent that Americans cannot depend upon either or both of the “two” major political parties (or any other party, for that matter), their leadership, or their most prominent figures (or figureheads, as the case may be) to serve as instruments for the performance of such a daunting task.

On the subject of political parties, George Washington’s Farewell Address—arguably the greatest compendium of practical political wisdom and foresight ever penned by an American statesman—should be every patriot’s guide. Warning his fellow countrymen “in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party”, he pointed out that “[i]t serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.” Washington’s Farewell Address to the People of the United States, Senate Document No. 106-21, 106th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), at 16, 17-18.

So today in spades with respect to “illegal immigration”. Only “the baneful effects of the spirit of party” in its most malignant form can explain: (i) the hysterical agitation for what amounts to “open borders”, which denies Americans the right to a sovereign nation of their own with “full Power * * * to do all * * * Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do” (Declaration of Independence)—(ii) the refusal to enforce long-standing statutes to secure the borders, which negates their existence—(iii) the creation of what are brazenly styled “sanctuary cities”, which asserts a right of secession from the Constitution’s goal of “form[ing] a more perfect Union” (Preamble), in aid of fomenting disarray and dissension within the citizenry—and, perhaps worst of all, (iv) for the willingness to countenance the support which certain other countries and supra-national organizations provide for “illegal immigration” into the United States, thus enabling foreigners to affect the size and composition of America’s population and the direction of her political devolution, tending inexorably unto her destruction. If anything could, this experience teaches that America’s “two” major political parties are not merely snares and delusions, veritable cornucopiae of conflicts and confusion amongst the citizenry, and ultimately the bane of constitutional government, but are actual existential threats to everything for which this country stands.

NINTH. Fortunately, the Constitution supplies common Americans with a potent means to take the initiative themselves, through its protection of “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (First Amendment). This embodies the understanding drawn from the first principles of American political science that “the Government” is initially the creation and then the continuing responsibility of “the people” themselves—indeed, that “the people” are their “Government” because they are the force controlling “the Government”, from beginning to end and from top to bottom. But this situation obtains only when their “petition[s]* * * for * * * redress of grievance[s]” are “redress[ed]”, quickly and completely, either by public officials or by “the people” themselves whenever officials fail, neglect, or refuse to act.

As the Declaration of Independence teaches, “whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of the[ proper] ends [of government], it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it”. How, though, are “the People” to know that “any Form of Government” has become so “destructive”? Surely, one key indicium of such a degenerate condition is that officialdom refuses to redress the grievances which “the People” bring to its attention through various forms of “petition”—including the electoral process, lobbying of legislators, litigation in the courts, exposure and criticism of rogue officials by way of free speech and a free press, mass demonstrations, and even “civil disobedience” against unconstitutional “laws” (which actually is “civil obedience” to the Constitution). But, for this process to be effective, “the People”—not public officials—must decide what constitutes a “grievance”, what form a “petition” concerning it should take, how “the people” should “peaceably * * * assemble” to present their “petition”, what provides adequate “redress” for their “grievance”, and whether officialdom proves sufficiently responsive to their demands for its behavior not to constitute yet a further “grievance”. Today, the efficacy of freedom to petition will be put to a severe test where the “invasion” of “illegal immigration” is concerned.

To be sure, Americans’ “grievances” are self-evident: namely, (i) the existence of the “invasion” itself, uncontrolled by the powers-that-be within the government of the United States, which have no viable plan (and apparently no intent, either) to control it; (ii) no understanding on the part of public officials of the States as to what effective constitutional action their States may take (and, hardly surprising in light of that ignorance, no commitment by those officials to take any such action); and especially (iii) the States’ lack of sufficient forces properly organized, armed, trained, and ready for deployment against the “invasion”, because most of their citizens eligible for service in their Militia are consigned by various statutes to the oxymoronic (indeed, constitutionally idiotic) and basically useless “unorganized militia” or “reserve militia”.

In contrast, setting out the means of “redress” for these “grievances” will require no little insight and effort on the part of “the people”. After all, to be taken seriously (let alone successfully to be put into practice), their “petitions” must present specific, detailed plans for “redress” which focus on exactly how “the unorganized militia” or “the reserve militia” are to be dissolved, on the one hand, and the true Militia of each State revitalized, on the other. Obviously, these plans must be devised, tested, and proved to be, not simply advisable in principle, but also workable in practice before “the people” submit their “petitions” to “the Government”. To that end, “the people” will need to “peaceably * * * assemble” for the purpose of determining through deliberation and discussion, and then by actual experimentation in the field, exactly what their “petitions” should demand by way of “redress”. The present author has set out one possible course of action in his book Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume One, The Nation in Arms: A Call for Americans To Revitalize “the Militia of the several States” (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., 2007), Chapters 3 through 12. Were some such approach adopted on a sufficiently expansive scale by citizens willing to put in the necessary time, effort, and expense, revitalized Militia could be largely ready for deployment to repel the “invasion” of “illegal aliens” almost as soon as amended or new statutes suitable for that purpose were enacted.

An important part of the “redress” “the people” will demand must be, not simply vague promises from typically two-faced spokesmen for “the Government”, but instead a schedule of specific steps to be carried out by particular officials within a set, and short, period of time, by which steps “the unorganized militia” and “the reserve militia” will be replaced, once and for all, by true constitutional Militia, as described in Article 13 of Virginia’s Declaration of Rights (June 12, 1776): that is, “a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms”. (See now Va. Const. art. I, § 13.) The point of decisive importance being actually “trained to arms”—so as to be ready to be deployed with “arms” for every purpose to which “arms” might be relevant.

In addition, it would not be amiss for “the people”to make crystal clear that public officials’ failure, neglect, or refusal to act immediately and effectively to obviate these “grievances” in exact accordance with the proposals for “redress” presented by the citizenry will constitute further “grievances”, leading inexorably to “redress” in the form of those officials’ removals from office—to be followed in due course by appropriate punishments for their derelictions of duty.

TENTH. True it may be that “the people” who at first might engage in this activity these days would not constitute a majority of America’s adult population. That possibility, though, is of no moment.

The Declaration of Independence was promulgated “in the Name, and by the Authority of the good People of the[ ] Colonies”, not on behalf of all of the Colonists (many of whom maintained their allegiance to the British Crown). Shortly thereafter, “the good People” became “We the People” who, as the Preamble to the Constitution attests, “ordain[ed] and establish[ed] this Constitution for the United States of America”. Today, “the good People” are those Americans who adhere to the precepts of the Declaration, and “We the People” those same Americans who continue to “ordain and establish th[e] Constitution” every day, and therefore are entitled to its protection, by being as faithful to its principles as ever were their forebears. And, just as in the past, when a political crisis casts their society into turmoil, it is inconsequential that “the good People” might not constitute a majority of the citizenry at a decisive moment. Or that “We the People” might find themselves confronted by a majority intent upon disregarding, perverting, or even setting aside the Constitution as well as the Declaration.

Legitimate “government”, after all, is not a matter of mere numbers. America is not an unfettered “democracy” in which “the majority rules”. As the Declaration makes clear, consistent with “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” even an overwhelming majority cannot invest “any Form of Government” with “[un]just powers”, either explicitly by delegation in so many words, or implicitly by tacit acquiescence in rogue public officials’ usurpation of such illicit authority. If nonetheless it purports to do so, that majority degenerates into a “faction”—what James Madison described as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”. The Federalist No. 10 (emphasis supplied). A “faction” composed of “a majority * * * of the whole” is more dangerous than any other, because it can easily imagine itself entitled by dint of numbers alone to ride roughshod over everyone else, and in the grip of that hubristic delusion be willing to support what the Declaration described as “a long train of abuses and usurpations” by rogue public officials who aim at “reduc[ing] the[ entire community] under absolute Despotism”. When it does so, such a majority exposes and condemns its members as “the bad people”, and forfeits whatever legitimacy to which it might once have laid an arithmetical claim.

Conversely, “the good People” (whatever their numbers) can never be a “faction”, because they represent “the permanent and aggregate interests of the [entire] community”, and respect “the rights of [all] other citizens”, including “the bad people” who might reside among them. And, inasmuch as “faction” is another word for “party” (perhaps always the more descriptive word, in light of the nature of the beast), in contrast to “the bad people” “the good People” are always antithetical to “the spirit of party”, transcend every political party, and are superior in moral, political, and legal authority to any party or system of parties.

ELEVENTH. Yet the question remains: Exactly who are “the good People” in this day and age, particularly with respect to repulsion of the on-going “invasion” of this country by “illegal aliens”? Just as in the Founding Era, “the good People” are defined by their beliefs and discerned by their actions.

On the one hand, among “the good People” in principle are all those Americans who want to live in “a free State”, with sovereignty, independence, liberty, and justice for every citizen—who adhere to the goals of the Preamble to, and the powers and disabilities of, the Constitution—who realize that, as the Second Amendment declares, “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”—who recognize an “invasion” by “illegal immigrants” as a frontal attack on that “security”—and who support the absolute right of the States to “engage in War” through the deployment of their Militia in order to repel such an “invasion”.

On the other hand, to be effective constituents of “the good People” in practice, Americans must actually reassert the authority of the Militia, revitalize the Militia, and then repel the “invasion” of “illegal aliens” by means of the Militia. This, because the Militia are the only establishments which physically embody and exert, and in the final analysis legally enforce, the will of “the good People”. The Militia are entrusted with the ultimate right, power, and duty to “execute the Laws of the Union”—which “Laws” include both the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, and ultimately “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” upon which “the good People” depend for their authority. So the Militia are the only institutions which can, to the “necessary” degree, provide “the good People” with “the security of a free State” against “illegal immigration” or any other threat. Because, after all, in “a free State” the Militia and “the good People” are the very same people.

“The good People” need to stop waiting for some rapturous event (whether of heavenly or human origin) the timing of which even the Scriptures deny that any man can predict. They must come to grips with the admonition that “God helps those who help themselves”. And, with that as their guide, they need to shoulder their responsibility, to organize themselves, and to plan, prepare, and act to save this country. No one else will do it for them.

A POSTSCRIPT. The present author has been publishing commentaries on NewsWithViews about the general subject of revitalizing the Militia since 6 May 2005. More than sixteen years is a long time. Too long. Among other calamities besetting this country, the on-going “invasion” by “illegal aliens” should inform anyone who cares to study the matter that America does not have another sixteen years to wait—and to waste—and throughout that time to wonder what should be or could be done, without doing what the Constitution makes very plain needs to be done. The way things are going, sixteen years from now this country will not exist as Americans know it today. And if you, the reader, will not be alive to witness it, your children will be. Be forewarned.

© 2021 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




Why Are Not Some People Quaking in Their Boots?

Dr. Edwin Vieira, JD

One wonders whether a hearing before some Congressional committee is the appropriate venue for determining what relationship (if any) certain officials and agencies of the government of the United States may have had to the emergence in Communist China of what is called “Covid 19”, and the subsequent transmission of that “virus” throughout the world. In principle, it would seem that a simple criminal investigation of this matter would be more straightforward, as well as far more consequential. Such an investigation would focus on four questions:

  1. Did any officials or employees of the government of the United States—whether individually or in concert with officials or employees of a State’s government, agency, or instrumentality; with private parties or organizations; or with any combination thereof—knowingly provide financial and/or technical assistance to an organization which is part or under the control of the government of Communist China, for the purpose of research and development aimed at increasing the transmissibility, infectivity, and lethality of some micro-organism, virus, or other infectious substance (whether this research and development happened to be labeled “gain of function” or was assigned some other designation)?
  2. Did those officials, employees, or individuals know, should they have known, or were they willfully blind to or recklessly indifferent towards the fact, that such financial and/or technical assistance could (and likely would) aid at some stage and to some degree in the development of a biological agent suitable for use as a weapon by the government of Communist China or some organization which is part of or subject to its control?
  3. Did those officials, employees, or individuals know, should they have known, or were they willfully blind to or recklessly indifferent towards the fact, that no controls, restrictions, safeguards, or other guarantees were in place to prevent such financial and/or technical assistance from being used to aid at some stage and to some degree in the development of a biological agent suitable for use as a weapon by the government of Communist China or some organization under its control?
  4. Did those officials, employees, or individuals know, should they have known, or were they willfully blind to or recklessly indifferent towards the fact, that from her inception Communist China has been, and remains today, an openly and even stridently avowed enemy of the United States?

If the answers to these questions are all “YES”, then any and every official, employee, or other individual involved in supplying such financial and/or technical assistance to Communist China through her officials, employees, agencies, instrumentalities, and so on under those circumstances is in deservedly serious peril, and should be quaking in his (or her) boots. Indeed, if the answers to only the first three questions are “YES” then that same result obtains.  For “[w]hoever knowingly develops, produces, * * * acquires, retains, or possesses any biological agent * * * for use as a weapon, or knowingly assists a foreign state or any organization to do so, shall be fined * * * or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both”. An Act To implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, by prohibiting certain conduct relating to biological weapons, and for other purposes, Act of May 22, 1990, Public Law 101-298, § 3, 104 Stat. 201, 201, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) (emphasis supplied). Surely, for liability to attach, one who “knowingly assists” at some important preliminary stage need not also be a party to the final “develop[ment]” or ultimate “produc[tion]” of an actual perfected “weapon” by an open enemy of the United States. Anyone and everyone who “knowingly assists” by providing the financial wherewithal and/or technical information supporting “develop[ment]” or “produc[tion]” of any “biological agent * * * for use as a weapon” by any “foreign state or any organization” (whether an enemy of the United States or not) in any way, to any degree, or at any stage in the process must be equally liable. For so the statute provides, without any exception.

In particular, too, by explicitly distinguishing between “develop[ment]” and “produc[tion]”. the statute recognizes that the former not only precedes the latter, but also can be carried on without the latter’s ever taking place. Therefore, an individual should be held liable if he (or she) “knowingly assists a foreign state or any organization” to “develop[ ]” “any biological agent * * * for use as a weapon” through laboratory research aimed at that goal, even if that “develop[ment]” never leaves the laboratory to result in actual “produc[tion]” of such a “biological agent” in some factory. This, of course, makes perfect sense, because by deterring “develop[ment]” the statute can render penalization of  “produc[tion]” a moot point. Certainly, as well, the “mad scientist” whose evil genius “develops” the “biological agent” in the first place must be held far more culpable than the ignorant factory hand who merely “produces” it according to the specifications supplied to him.

Under this law, “the term ‘biological agent’ means any micro-organism, virus, or infectious substance, capable of causing * * * death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a human”. Act of May 22, 1990, § 3, 104 Stat. at 202-203, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 178(1)(A). Obviously, “Covid 19” (at least as it has been presented by public-health officials throughout the world) is such a “biological agent”. And equally obvious is that at least one—if not the main—purpose, and certainly the effect, of the type of so-called “gain of function research” associated with the development of “Covid 19” is to enhance the evil characteristics of the underlying micro-organism, virus, or other infectious substance so as to render it more useful as a weapon than it originally was, or to employ it as a step or stage in the development of a weapon.

Thus it would appear beyond a reasonable doubt that:

(i) Any financial and/or technical assistance from the United States for “gain of function research” which might have contributed to the emergence of “Covid 19” would necessarily had to some degree to have “assist[ed]” Communist China in a long-term goal of developing “a biological agent * * * for use as a weapon”, because a leading (if not the primary) purpose of “gain of function research” is to enhance the particular attributes of “biological agent[s]” which make them of “use as * * * weapon[s]”.

(ii) Any citizen of the United States, public official or otherwise, who has “knowingly assist[ed]” the “foreign state [of Communist China] or any organization” in “develop[ing], produc[ing], * * * acquir[ing], retain[ing], or possess[ing] any biological agent * * * for use as a weapon” through the provision of financial and/or technical assistance at any point in the process of that “biological agent[’s]” “develop[ment]” “sh[ould] be fined * * * or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both”. This should not depend upon the “biological agent[’s]” actually having been created, either. For every step in the process aimed at its creation—including every experiment performed in a laboratory, whether successful or not—is part and parcel of its “develop[ment]”. And

(iii) It would seem indisputably the better part of justice that, given the consequences of the release of “Covid 19” (whether accidental or otherwise) throughout the United States and the rest of the world, every such citizen, whatever his (or her) public or private station, should be “imprisoned for life” rather than penalized in some less severe fashion.

The practical problem which the foregoing analysis presents, though, is: Who will investigate, prosecute, and convict any such errant citizens, when the FBI, the DOJ, and every other agency of the government of the United States appear to be utterly unwilling to execute, or incapable of executing, this particular criminal law of the United States (or, for that matter, any and every other criminal law relevant to this situation)? And when the States’ normal prosecutorial machines are powerless to enforce this or any other criminal statute of the United States? If crimes of such magnitude might be allowed to go unpunished, what is the usefulness of the government of the United States, the governments of the States, or even the federal system as a whole?

To be sure, one could point out (as has the present author on many occasions) that the Constitution of the United States explicitly and exclusively assigns the authority and responsibility “to execute the Laws of the Union” to certain establishments other than (and in the law-enforcement hierarchy of the federal system as a whole necessarily superior to) the FBI, the DOJ, or every other non-constitutional alphabet agency within the government of the United States. And one could point out that if these establishments had been functioning in the past in accordance with the obvious constitutional plan then the problem to which this commentary is directed—along with many other problems of serious magnitude—would never have arisen in the first place, or would already have been solved. Repetition of this tedious process of “public education”, however, would be akin to “beating a dead horse” in a literal sense. For, if one cannot convince Americans to pay attention to the Constitution even when their own lives have been and are being put at risk—increasingly with each day’s dawning—what purpose would be served by pointing out their predicament, or by specifying the most effective constitutional means for addressing it to which they have already proven themselves to be completely indifferent, if not overtly hostile?

Unfortunately, one must conclude (at least for now) that, although possible domestic malefactors in the development of “Covid 19” should be quaking in their boots, in actuality they are laughing up their sleeves at ordinary Americans—with good reason, and with a good prospect of never having to stop.

© 2021 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




The President’s Authority To Suppress Insurrections

Edwin Vieira, JD., Ph.D.

Recently, both the big “mainstream” media and hundreds of alternative sources on the Internet have overflowed with the opinions of commentators, pundits, bloggers, public officials at all levels of the federal system, retired military officers, sports stars, and assorted “celebrities”, concerning the authority (or lack thereof) of the President of the United States to intervene in the rampage of riots, looting, arson, and even killings which have plagued American cities following the homicide of Mr. George Floyd. The major lesson one learns from this palaver is that the writers and speakers generating it possess little to no real knowledge of the subject-matter, and apparently have no inclination to acquire any. That is both amazing and frightening. For, besides being of the highest importance, the subject-matter is so clear cut that anyone who has obtained a secondary-school education of the quality generally available prior to (say) 1970 should be able to understand it with a minimum of mental strain. The following points are intended to clarify the matter for anyone whose thinking needs clarification—

FIRST. Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 of the Constitution of the United States mandates that “[b]efore he enter on the Execution of his Office, [the President] shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’” Everything which follows in this analysis comes within the purview of this “Oath”.

SECOND. Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” That is, all “executive Power”, because the latter Clause recognizes no exceptions or exclusions.

THIRD. Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States[.]” The Constitution recognizes no one other than the President as the recipient of this status and authority.

FOURTH. Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution requires that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. This is not only a duty, but also a power and a right (in the strict legal senses of those terms). Self-evidently, one manner of fulfilling this duty, and exercising this right and power, is for the President to take appropriate actions as “Commander in Chief” of the forces the Constitution places within his control.

FIFTH. Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16 of the Constitution delegate to Congress the power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, [and] suppress Insurrections”, whereupon “such Part of the[ Militia]” as may be “call[ed] forth” is considered to “be employed in the Service of the United States”.

SIXTH. Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution delegates to Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” not only its own “Power[ ]” “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia”, but also “all other Powers vested by th[e] Constitution in * * * any * * * Officer thereof”, such as the “Power[ ]” of the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”.

SEVENTH. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides (in pertinent part) that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” And Section 5 of that Amendment provides that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”

EIGHTH. Pursuant to its powers recited above, Congress enacted the present Section 252 of Title 10 of the United States Code:

Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.

This is no novel contemporary piece of legislation, but derives from the Act of 29 July 1861, Chap. XXV, An Act to provide for the Suppression of Rebellion and Resistance to the Laws of the United States, and to amend the Act entitled “An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Law of the Union,” &c., passed February twenty-eight, seventeen hundred and ninety-five, 12 Stat. 281, and from the Act of 28 February 1795, Chap. XXXVI, An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; and to repeal the Act now in force for those purposes, § 2, 1 Stat. 424, 424.

Section 252, apparently, is what people who pontificate about the President’s authority are calling “The Insurrection Act”. If so, the contention of critics that President Trump cannot rely upon this statute is balderdash—inasmuch as Presidents before him have invoked it successfully, with no widespread (or, really, any significant) outcry against the legality of their actions. See Executive Order No. 10730, 24 September 1957, 22 Federal Register 7628 (President Eisenhower); Executive Order No. 11053, 30 September 1962, 27 Federal Register 9681 (President Kennedy); Executive Order No. 11111, 11 July 1963, 28 Federal Register 5709 (President Kennedy); Executive Order No. 11118, 10 September 1963, 28 Federal Register 9863 (President Kennedy).

NINTH. Although 10 U.S.C. § 252 could apply under some circumstances to some of the disorders which have occurred in various States in recent days, it is not the statute which President Trump—were he well advised—should invoke to deal with the generality of riots, looting, arson, and even killings which Americans in those places have suffered. The statute which better fits the situation is the present Section 253 of Title 10 of the United States Code:

The President, by using the militia * * * shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—

(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or

(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.

This, too, is no novel contemporary piece of legislation, but derives from the Act of 20 April 1871, chap. XXII, An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14. And its terms exactly describe the situation in those States in which civil unrest has broken out in recent days—namely, that “insurrection[s], domestic violence, unlawful combination[s], or conspirac[ies]” have terrorized the peaceful inhabitants, and “the constituted authorities of th[ose] State[s] are unable, fail, or refuse to protect th[e] right[s], privilege[s], immunit[ies], or to give the protection named in the Constitution and secured by law” for some “part[s] or class[es] of [those States’] people.

TENTH. Section 253 imposes no limits on the legal, let alone the commonplace, definitions of “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy” to which it applies. And the rioting, looting, arson, and killings which have taken place in various States surely fall within any acceptable definitions of those words.

ELEVENTH. Section 253 imposes no limit on what “militia” (or part thereof) the President may “us[e]”, so long (obviously) as that “militia” is recognized as such (i) by the Constitution itself—namely, “the Militia of the several States” (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1); or (ii) by a law of Congress which refers to some “Part of the[ Militia of the several States]” which “may be employed in the Service of the United States” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 16).

And pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15, 16, and 18 of the Constitution, for “employ[ment] in the Service of the United States” in aid of “execut[ing] the Laws of the Union, [and] suppress[ing] Insurrections” (among other responsibilities), Congress has defined “[t]he militia of the United States” as follows:

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, [with certain exceptions not relevant here], under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.

(b) The classes of the militia are—

(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and

(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.

10 U.S.C. § 246.

TWELFTH. Section 253 imposes no limits on “the measures” that the President may “consider[ ] necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy” to which that statute is addressed. So his statutory authority must include “using the militia” (as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 246) “to execute [whatever] Laws of the Union” may apply to the situation (which authority and responsibility the Constitution explicitly assigns to the Militia in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution), so as to fulfill his duty to “take Care that th[os]e Laws be faithfully executed” (under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution).

THIRTEENTH. As Section 253 provides, should the President determine that “any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy * * * so hinders the execution of the laws of [a] State, and of the United States within th[at] State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection”, he may “consider” that “the State * * * ha[s] denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.” In that regard, Section 253 is especially “appropriate legislation” through which Congress has empowered the President to “enforce” in the first instance the requirement that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”, perforce of Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. See the origin of 10 U.S.C. § 253 in Act of 20 April 1871, chap. XXII, An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14.

For instance, the President could determine that, in those States in which riots, looting, arson, and homicide have taken place with no adequate response from public officials—or, even worse, with their tacit acquiescence or approval—“part[s] or class[es] of [those States’] people” have been deprived of the rights to “property” and even “life” “named in the Constitution”, as well as the immunities “secured by law” from, for example, riots (18 U.S.C. § 2101), insurrections (18 U.S.C. § 2383), and sedition (18 U.S.C. § 2384).

To this, no disgruntled State or Local official (or anyone else, for that matter) can offer a legal objection, whether under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution or otherwise. After all, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment delegates to Congress a plenary supervisory power which it may wield in aid of Section 1 of that Amendment against the States perforce of Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution (“the Supremacy Clause”). Under the Supremacy Clause, Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, along with 10 U.S.C. § 253, are “the supreme Law of the Land” by which “the Judges in every State shall be bound * * * , any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” And, as required by Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, “the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers * * * of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support th[e] Constitution” in the foregoing regard, not to disregard let alone to defy it.

FOURTEENTH. Inasmuch as Section 253 reaches every “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy” which comes within its terms, the President need not deal solely with the rioters, looters, arsonists, insurrectionists, and killers to be found at the scenes of their crimes, but may also search out organizers, agitators and propagandists, logisticians, intermediaries, financiers, and other accomplices of any sort who have escaped to or who have always performed their nefarious operations in distant places. And the President’s authority in this regard embraces not only individuals, but also all ostensibly legitimate “foundations”, “think tanks”, and like institutions which fund, otherwise support, or encourage such criminal misbehavior.

FIFTEENTH. As appears on its face, Section 253 does not require the President to solicit or receive the approval of a State’s Legislature, Governor, or other official before he (the President) executes that statute in that State. In this respect, Section 253 differs from 10 U.S.C. § 251. See the origin of § 251 in the Act of 28 February 1795, Chap. XXXVI, An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; and to repeal the act in force for those purposes, § 1, 1 Stat. 424, 424.

SIXTEENTH. Were the Constitution and 10 U.S.C. § 253 by themselves not enough to drive the point home, the Supreme Court has in principle already opined that the President’s determinations under that statute must be accepted as conclusive by everyone else, including the Judiciary.

Pursuant to its constitutional power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia * * * to repel Invasions”, in 1795 Congress enacted legislation which provided in pertinent part

[t]hat whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth such number of the militia of the state, or states, most convenient the place of danger, or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to issue his orders for that purpose, to such officer or officers of the militia, as he shall think proper.

Act of 28 February 1795, Chap. XXXVI, An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; and to repeal the act in force for those purposes, § 1, 1 Stat. 424, 424.

Referring to the power so delegated by Congress to the President, the Supreme Court described it as

not a power which can be executed without a corresponding responsibility. It is, in its terms, a limited power, confined to cases of actual invasion, or of imminent danger of invasion. If it be a limited power, * * * by whom is the exigency to be judged of and decided? Is the president the sole and exclusive judge whether the exigency has arisen, or is it to be considered as an open question * * * ? We are all of opinion, that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the president, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons.

*     *     *     *     *

If we look at the language of the act of 1795, * * * [t]he power itself is confided to the executive of the Union, to him who is, by the constitution, “the commander in chief of the militia, when called into the actual service of the United States,” whose duty it is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and whose responsibility for an honest discharge of his official obligations is secured by the highest sanctions. He is necessarily constituted the judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance, and is bound to act according to his belief of the facts. If he does so act, and decides to call forth the militia, his orders for this purpose are in strict conformity with the provisions of the law; and it would seem to follow as a necessary consequence, that every act done by a subordinate officer, in obedience to such orders, is equally justifiable. The law contemplates that, under such circumstances, orders shall be given to carry the power into effect; and it cannot, therefore, be a correct inference, that any other person has a just right to disobey them. The law does not provide for any appeal from the judgment of the president, or for any right in subordinate officers to review his decision, and in effect defeat it. Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him, upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.

Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheaton) 19, 29-32 (1827) (Story, J., for the Court).

This legal analysis applies directly, and with decisive effect, to 10 U.S.C. § 253—

(i) Congress enacted the Act of 1795 pursuant to its power in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 “[to] provide for calling forth the Militia to * * * repel Invasions”. That very same Clause also authorizes Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, [and] suppress Insurrections”. Self-evidently, the principles Martin v. Mott invoked are equally applicable to all of the purposes for which the Militia may be called forth.

(ii) The Act of 1795 empowered the President “to call forth such number of the militia * * * as he may judge necessary”, and “to issue his orders for that purpose, to such officer or officers of the militia, as he shall think proper”. In like wise, 10 U.S.C. § 253 delegates to the President the broad authority “by using the militia * * * [to] take such measures as he considers necessary”. Thus, the latter statute is entitled to the same construction Martin v. Mott applied to the former one—namely, that “the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the president, and * * * his decision is conclusive upon all other persons”; and “that, under such circumstances, orders shall be given to carry the power into effect”, and no “other person has a just right to disobey them.” Indeed, as applied to 10 U.S.C. § 253, the principles of Martin v. Mott should extend far beyond the facts of that case. For there the President’s power could be directed only at actual members of the Militia; whereas, under Section 253, “such measures as [the President] considers necessary” are not confined to members of the Militia alone, but instead may reach essentially anyone and everyone whose behavior is in any way implicated, for good or for bad, in the “insurrection[s], domestic violence, unlawful combination[s], or conspirac[ies]” those “measures” are designed “to suppress”.

(iii) Martin v. Mott held that the Act of 1795 “d[id] not provide for any appeal from the judgment of the president, or for any right in subordinate officers to review his decision, and in effect defeat it”—whether through their own unaided efforts or by importuning the Judiciary to interject itself into the matter on their behalf (which the Supreme Court refused to do in that case). Neither does 10 U.S.C. § 253 “provide for any [such] appeal” or “right * * * to review” for a member of “the militia of the United States” called forth under the aegis of that statute. The modern-day Supreme Court has recognized that the Judiciary may not interfere with the President’s enforcement of discipline within the Militia. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1973). And other persons affected by the President’s “measures” are no better off. For whereas under the Act of 1795 the President’s power extended only to actual members of the Militia, under 10 U.S.C. § 253 “such measures as [the President] considers necessary” are not confined to members of the Militia alone, but instead may reach essentially anyone and everyone whose behavior is in any way involved in the perpetration of “insurrection[s], domestic violence, unlawful combination[s], or conspirac[ies]”.

(iv) In reference to the Act of 1795, Martin v. Mott observed that “[w]henever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him, upon his own opinion of certain facts, * * * the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.” No less than that Act, 10 U.S.C. § 253 delegates an equally “discretionary power” to the President to “take such measures as he considers necessary”. That being so, the President’s exercise of that power cannot be second-guessed by the Judiciary for any reason whatsoever. For “[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (Marshall, C.J., for the Court).

(v) And Martin v. Mott is not alone in this regard. As the Supreme Court held in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,

the final determination of * * * facts may be entrusted by Congress to executive officers; and in such a case, * * * in which a statute gives a discretionary power to an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own judgment of certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to reëxamine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.

142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892), citing inter alia Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheaton) 19, 31 (1827), and followed in Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 544 (1895).

(v) Finally, no matter how deeply “the Deep State’s” friends on the Bench despise President Trump and how desperately they desire to thwart him at every turn, unless and until the Supreme Court overrules Martin v. Mott the lower courts are required to adhere to its reasoning “no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be”. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982). Within the Judiciary, only the Supreme Court can overrule its own precedents. E.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997); State Oil Company v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).

IN SUM, those people who vociferously contend that the President has no authority to suppress the kinds of riots, looting, arson, and killings going on within the States these days know not whereof they speak. And if plain ignorance is not the explanation for their behavior, what is?

© 2020 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




When Will “Enough Is Enough” Become “This Is Too Much”?

Edwin Vieira, JD, Ph.D

The “covid-19” panic has emphasized in an unique manner the necessity for Americans to ask themselves the perennially relevant question: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”—“Who is to watch the watchmen?”—or, more colloquially descriptive of this country’s present dilemma, “Who is to govern the governors?”

Egged on by the “mainstream” media, elected and appointed public officials and public-health bureaucrats at every level of the federal system (especially certain high-profile Governors in the deepest “blue” of “blue” States) have literally run amok. For example—

On the medical front, they have misjudged the extent of the pandemic by reliance on faulty computer “models” and “projections”, rather than evidence drawn from the real world. They have exaggerated the lethality of the virus, encouraging and facilitating the “adjustment” (or perhaps “falsification” is the more accurate verb) of records so as to inflate the number of deaths attributed to “covid-19”. They have overestimated the need for hospital facilities to treat patients apparently suffering from “covid-19”, while delaying or even denying treatment to patients definitely suffering from other serious conditions. They have denied effective treatments to, or have imposed the wrong treatments on, people with actual or assumed “covid-19” infections, leading to unnecessary suffering and needless deaths. And in concert with their shills, megaphones, and apologists in the “mainstream” media, they have defamed, denounced, and censored medical doctors and scientists in related disciplines who have dared to disagree with their party line on “covid-19”.

On the social front, they have promulgated “shelter-in-place” orders to confine Americans in their homes for extended periods of time, oblivious to the adverse physical and psychological effects such “house arrests” would have, have had, and will continue to have on countless numbers of those so incarcerated—especially children, the elderly, and those Americans dashed against the rocks of depression and despair by the sudden loss of their businesses, jobs, and other sources of income. In addition, under color of highly questionable notions passed off as “settled science” they have required Americans to go masked in public, and to distance themselves physically one from another, thereby unquestionably imposing anti-social isolation on all, and inciting anti-social suspicion and hostility against those who rightly question these dictates. Beyond all this, they have announced their intentions to deploy multiple thousands of “tracers” to ferret out alleged carriers of “covid-19” and discover whomever they may have contacted, rendering potentially everyone’s social interactions subject to the official suspicion, scrutiny, exposure, and control of a full-blown police state.

On the economic front, they have shut down, locked down, worn down, and brought down wide swaths of the middle-class free market throughout this country, causing possibly irreparable damage on a scale certainly unimaginable hitherto. When their States’ tax-receipts contract as a result of this coerced cessation of commercial activity, they will importune Congress to furnish them with multi-billion-dollar “bailouts” courtesy of the Federal Reserve System’s engine of hyperinflation; or crush their citizens under the unbearable weight of new taxes, fees, and other levies; or (most likely) both. And,

On the political front, they have asserted, assumed, and arrogated to themselves unprecedented, draconian, even dictatorial—and often distinctly delusional—“emergency powers”. “Emergency powers” which supposedly override every provision of the Constitution of the United States, as well as of the constitutions of the several States, except (of course) for those provisions under color of which these officials and bureaucrats claim to hold their positions—and, most ominously, “emergency powers” which they clearly intend never, ever to give up.

Through these actions, they have exposed Americans not merely to Orwell’s literary picture of dystopia—that is, “a boot stamping on a human face forever”—but to the full political, economic, and social reality of a police state beyond even Orwell’s imagination. This they describe, with gleeful approval, as “the new normal”. Yet a striking historical parallel to today’s events exists in the situation which confronted Colonial Patriots in 1775, after the British Parliament had enacted the three so-called Coercive Acts (which the Colonists rightfully condemned under the style of “the Intolerable Acts”):

(i) The Boston Port Act closed the major seaport and trading-center in New England, inflicting intense economic hardship on common people throughout the region. Today, lockdowns in State after State have devastated the economy across this country to a degree which makes the Colonists’ plight pale in comparison.

(ii) The Government of Massachusetts Act wrenched political power from the Colonists’ hands, concentrating it in the grip of General Thomas Gage, King George III’s military Governor of Massachusetts. Today, various American Governors’ “executive orders” are doing precisely the same thing in principle, but with far greater sweep and effect in practice than anything General Gage actually attempted or ever contemplated. And,

(iii) The Administration of Justice Act licensed public officials loyal to the King to employ whatever measures of force they considered necessary to put down the Colonists’ resistance to Parliament’s decrees. Today, in addition to witnessing crackdowns on small businesses with the temerity to ignore the lockdowns imposed in various States, Americans have been informed that the Army will soon participate as a “partner” with the Department of Health and Human Services in “Operation Warp Speed”, which aims at vaccinating as many Americans as possible as soon as possible against “covid-19”—presumably, one must imagine, with whatever level of coercion the brass hats might consider necessary to that end.

Howsoever justified the Colonists’ ire at the Coercive Acts may have been, though, at least those measures had been enacted in due course of law by the British Parliament, which did exercise legislative jurisdiction over the Colonies. Today, “the new normal” of police-state oppression imposed under color of the “covid-19” panic is the product—not of statutes enacted by Congress or any State’s legislature—but of “executive orders” concocted by Governors purporting to wield more arbitrary power than even King George III imagined himself to possess.

In 1774 and 1775, the Coercive Acts followed a twisted trail from London, to Boston, to a fiery dénouement at Lexington and Concord, when the Embattled Farmers realized that they had suffered more than “enough” to tolerate any more. “Enough” had become “too much”. Today, that historical hindsight provides insight and foresight as to what might very well transpire if large numbers of Americans even passively refused to coöperate with “the new normal”, let alone actively resisted its demands most threatening to their welfare, such as mandatory injections of experimental vaccines the safety and efficacy of which cannot be rigorously verified.

Nonetheless, as the Declaration of Independence cautions, “[p]rudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes”. So, before “enough” becomes “too much” and things get out of hand as things tend to do, Americans need to demand unequivocal explanations from public officials and bureaucrats as to exactly why—and under what legitimate constitutional authority—they have implemented the policies which have so devastated this country. To wit,

(i) Americans need to know whether this mess is the result of, for example, officials’ and bureaucrats’ panic-driven overreactions to a situation they did not understand; their utter incompetence; their errors of judgment; their stubborn refusals to admit their inabilities and mistakes when admissions could have mitigated the damage their original errors had caused; their improper motives (ultimately implicating one sort of conspiracy or another); or permutations and combinations of the above.

(ii) Americans need to know what these public officials’ “defenses” to political and legal liability may  be—for instance, “I made a mistake”; “I did the best I could”; “No one could have done more or better than I did”; “I was following orders from my superiors”; “I was taking advice from people with more knowledge and experience than I had”; “I was implementing a plan which was good for the people, but which the people could not understand then and cannot understand now”; and (worst of all) “Whatever my demerits have been, I enjoy complete ‘immunity’ from civil lawsuits and criminal prosecution”.

(iii) Where various Governors’ “executive orders” are concerned, Americans need to know whether the Governors claim that these directives are justified under specific statutes enacted by their States’ legislatures. If so, are those statutes valid under some provisions of those States’ constitutions? If so, are those statutes or provisions valid under the Constitution of the United States? And if the answer to any of these questions is “no”, what penalties should be imposed upon the Governors and their henchmen for the misdeeds they have committed under color of these unlawful “executive orders”?

As things are under present conditions, none of these questions will be answered by the Governors, by public-health bureaucrats, by the States’ legislatures, by Congress, and perhaps even by the President of the United States. And although more accessible in principle by We the People than any of the latter institutions of government, in practice courts throughout the federal system,

with vanishingly few exceptions, can be expected to do little to nothing in a timely and effective fashion to ameliorate or rectify the mess which reckless “executive orders” have created. Indeed, the atmosphere in that domain has become rather ominous with the publication of Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U.S. ___ (29 May 2020). It is apparent that those ensconced in the highest echelons of the political class will never accept personal responsibility, and will always evade personal accountability, no matter the harms they may inflict upon Americans under color of responding to the “covid-19” panic which they themselves incited and exacerbated. So what can the Deplorables do, except to turn to other institutions?

At every level of the federal system, the Deplorables need to see to the appointment of Special Commissions of Inquiry which, through wide-ranging investigations, can address and answer all aspects of the question “Who is to govern the governors?” with respect not only to what has transpired during the current “covid-19” panic, but also to how public officials will be allowed to respond to any other purported “public-health emergencies” of this kind which might arise in the future.

Most importantly, these Special Commissions must, in both fact and law, actually be special,

in that they must be conducted in a different manner for a different purpose—namely, quickly and thoroughly to expose the truth rather than cover it up—and therefore must be composed of different people who command different authority from other investigatory commissions which have been set up following certain horrendous events of recent memory, and tasked with painting entirely false pictures of what had actually happened.

The most infamous of these, of course, was the Warren Commission, which whitewashed the murder of President Kennedy. To be sure, its Report was uniquely useful, because it revealed to Americans the existence of a miraculous Italian Carcano rifle of World War II vintage, which apparently could fire bullets that, although missing the target from behind, could turn around in flight and strike the target in front, quite contrary to the laws of exterior ballistics. This remarkable discovery aside, the Warren Commission held no one accountable for the crime except the self-described “patsy”, Lee Harvey Oswald, who, having himself been conveniently silenced through assassination, could thereafter always be described as “acting alone”, to the extent that many wags now treat those two words as part of his name. And it singled out for blame not a single high-ranking figure in public office, civilian or military, who had failed to detect the plot, let alone to take a single step to thwart it. Moreover, because JFK’s murder involved only one victim along with only one perpetrator, both of them deceased, somnolent Americans from the 1960s to today have disregarded it as a precedent which poses no threat to them.

More recently, the 9/11 Commission Report on the destruction of the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers and damage to the Pentagon, along with the ancillary NIST report on the demise of WTC Building Number 7, rationalized “the global war on terror”. To be sure, these Reports were useful, because they informed Americans that two ultra-modern, multi-story skyscrapers constructed to the highest architectural standards from ton upon ton of steel and concrete could suddenly collapse in their own footprints after each was hit by an aluminum airliner, and a smaller but no less well-designed office building could collapse in its own footprint even without being hit by an airplane of any sort, all quite contrary to the basic laws of physics. These astounding discoveries aside, the 9/11 Commission and NIST Reports propped up the tall tale that a gaggle of scruffy Middle-Eastern “terrorists”, all of whom had conveniently immolated themselves in their kamikaze attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, not only had outwitted every one of the United States’ national-security forces and intelligence agencies, but also had demonstrated the ability to fly jumbo jets in maneuvers beyond the competence of the world’s best pilots. And those Reports, too, managed to identify not one high-ranking figure in public office, civilian or military, even whose simple negligence (let alone whose criminal culpability) had contributed to the disaster. Moreover, notwithstanding that the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon caused the deaths of thousands, since then insouciant Americans have largely disregarded the possibility of future threats of that kind. To most people living today, those attacks were unique events in the distant past; the victims and the perpetrators are all dead and largely forgotten; and that is that.

Unfortunately, an official whitewashing of the “covid-19” panic akin to the fictions concocted by the Warren and 9/11 Commissions would arguably be easier to perpetrate today than ever before, and with far worse long-term effects.

First, in stark contrast to their doubts about  JFK’s assassination and the 9/11 Event, many Americans do not believe that they can afford to be skeptical about either the lethality of “covid-19” or the necessity of the supposed preventive measures which Governors and public-health officials have imposed upon them.

Second, although many Americans are sufficiently familiar with how a bullet behaves when fired from a high-powered rifle to dismiss as fiction the Warren Commission Report, and with the significance of an office building’s collapse at “free-fall speed” to describe as fantasies the 9/11 Commission and NIST Reports, few could critically analyze the report of a “covid-19” commission which “scientific” cover-up artists larded with the impenetrable mumbo jumbo of virology, epidemiology, molecular biology, and so on.

Third, obvious to everyone is that rogue public officials are using the “covid-19” panic as their opportunity and excuse to strip Americans of fundamental constitutional freedoms. Nonetheless, a “covid-19” commission backed up by rogue judges could easily fabricate and pass off facile legal apologies such as Chief Justice Roberts laid out in his concurring opinion in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom:

The precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement. Our Constitution principally entrusts “[t]he safety and health of the people” to the politically accountable officials of the States “to guard and protect.” Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905). When those officials “undertake[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,” their latitude “must be especially broad.” Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974). Where these broad limits are not exceeded, they should not be subject to second-guessing by an “unelected federal judiciary,” which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people. [590 U.S. at ___ .]

One wonders whether this passage was penned by someone—perhaps some law clerk recently brainwashed at an élitist law school—with little to no sound training in constitutional law.

It may be that “[t]he precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement”. But not “subject to reasonable disagreement” are the constitutional rights of tens of millions of Americans suffering from draconian “restrictions on [their] particular social activities” which amount to “house arrest” without even probable cause. Axiomatic is that

[i]n cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial power of the United States necessarily extends to the independent determination of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to the performance of that supreme function. The case of confiscation [of property] is illustrative, the ultimate conclusion almost invariably depending upon the decisions of questions of fact.

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932). Accord, Ohio Valley Water Company v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920); Saint Joseph Stock Yards Company v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51-52 (1936). And constitutional rights pertaining to “life” and “liberty”, of course, are no less—arguably are much more—important than those pertaining to “property”.

Why is it that “[w]hen [public] officials ‘undertake[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,’ their latitude ‘must be especially broad’”? On the one hand, if those “medical and scientific uncertainties” cannot be resolved at all (somehow being impenetrable mysteries), then how could the courts ever determine that “these broad limits [on public officials’ powers] have been exceeded” or not? Would not such a situation exclude “judicial review” altogether, and render “medical and scientific uncertainties”—that is, professed ignorance—blunt weapons with which power-hungry officials could always bludgeon the Constitution into submission? On the other hand, why cannot courts resolve those “medical and scientific uncertainties” which are resolvable just as they do all other factual conundra presented to them, by the production of evidence and the exercise of discursive reasoning?

Finally, why should public officials—whose motives, even more than their knowledge, should always be suspect—“not be subject to second-guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people”? Leave aside the obvious non sequitur that public officials are “accountable to the people” when they can regulate, restrict, and curtail entirely any and every “social activit[y]”; when their dictates cannot be effectively challenged in the courts; and when the people must wait sheepishly for the next election possibly to bring them relief, while they suffer irreparable damage in the interim. In a situation of this sort, are not the courts bound in legal duty to determine whether “politically accountable officials” actually have the necessary “background, competence, and expertise”, and are using their supposed education and experience properly to make the correct decisions? After all, “second guessing” implies disagreeing with someone who is himself of sufficient competence to come to a reasoned conclusion and of sufficient integrity make an honest decision.  Whether some public official satisfies those criteria is always the question to be answered, never the answer to be assumed.

Fourth, the assassination of JFK and the 9/11 Event were each of them unique. They will never happen again. But the “covid-19” panic can be run over and over, whenever power-hungry public officials and public-health bureaucrats need to invent a new “pandemic” horror-story as an excuse for usurpation and tyranny. The very same script, even many of the selfsame crisis-actors in official positions, will suffice—with just a different disease, or simply a different “strain” of “covid-19”, as the monster in the drama.

For these reasons, We the People cannot allow public officials to whitewash the “covid-19” panic in the manner employed by earlier official investigatory commissions. This will require, though, that “the usual suspects” not be put in charge of any investigation. We the People themselves must investigate what happened, why it happened, and especially through whose influence and at whose instigation it happened. We the People themselves must set up Special Commissions of Inquiry in each of the several States, along with one for the United States as a whole. These Special Commissions must be independent of the present-day political establishment in terms of both their mandates and their personnel. They must wield governmental authority fully adequate to compel the attendance of witnesses who have held or hold public office and the production of documents and other evidence in public records. And their findings must be used, not only to educate the American people, but also to compel enforcement of the laws of the States and the United States against whichever wrongdoers may be exposed.

What governmental institutions, though, can be expected, let alone trusted, to establish  these Special Commissions; to recruit all of the patriotic experts in various disciplines, all of the patriotic investigators, and all of the patriotic lawyers needed to perform the Commissions’ work; to assist in the widest-possible dissemination of the Commissions’ findings in the face of the “mainstream” media’s hostile propaganda; and especially to put into effect the Commissions’ recommendations with respect to enforcement of the laws against high mucky-mucks in the political establishment whom the Commissions may charge with wrongdoing? Not a single one, except the institutions which are not now involved in the thick of the “covid-19” monkey-business and thereby compromised—the institutions composed of We the People themselves who have the most vital personal interests in exposing the truth—the only institutions to which the Constitution explicitly assigns the authority and responsibility “to execute the Laws of the Union” against anyone and everyone who violates those “Laws”, without exception. That is, the Special Commissions have to be established and run by the Militia.

While the “covid-19” iron is still hot, President Trump could set up these Commissions in each State right now, under (say) the authority of Section 253 of Title 10 of the United States Code. If he did, he would bask in tidal waves of approval, applause, and active support from the Deplorables for doing so (and, one might surmise, be assured of re-election this coming November). As of right now, though, with respect to “covid-19” Mr. Trump seems akin to a tennis ball, being hit back and forth across the net by players drawn from different departments of the Deep State. With a stroke of a racket on one side of the net he flies off on a trajectory marginally favorable to the interests of the Deplorables, whereas the stroke of a racket on the other side impels him on a trajectory distinctly unfavorable to their interests. And being only a ball in someone else’s play, all his bounces, to and fro, remain squarely within the Deep State’s court.

Without President Trump’s leadership, and with various States’ Governors being the sources of the problem, We the People have to undertake the task under the auspices and with the protection of Local governments, in many places the only governmental institutions which enjoy any constitutional credence. The model for action should be the “Second Amendment Sanctuary” movement which sprang from the grass roots in Virginia in late 2019 and early 2020. That movement organized the Deplorables for a negative outcome—We the People’s and their Local Governments’ refusals to comply with supposed statutes which violate the Second Amendment. Now the People must organize for a positive outcome. They and their Local governments must band together to set up Special Commissions of Inquiry drawn from patriotic Americans within the so-called “unorganized militia” recognized by various statutes in the several States. Each State’s Commission will derive its constitutional existence and authority from Local public officials’ employment of whatever powers they may exercise for that purpose, in obedience to their oaths of office. But this action must be taken soon—before his faithless and feckless advisors trick President Trump into actually asserting some “emergency power” even more phantasmagorical and more likely to engender disastrous consequences than any invoked heretofore during the “covid-19” panic.

Few readers of this commentary have not watched the press conference held on 15 May 2020 in the White House Rose Garden, in which President Trump waxed triumphant over “Operation Warp Speed”.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=09dvAeAKp)U>

The plan is to deploy the Military in order, by early 2021, to be able to inject huge numbers of Americans with one or another admittedly experimental “covid-19” vaccine to be produced (in Mr. Trump’s own words) with “record, record, record speed”. Also, reason exists to believe that these vaccinations will be mandatory for every member of the population.

Obviously, this plan is extraordinarily unrealistic, if adequate testing for safety and efficacy is to precede actual injection of some novel vaccine into the bodies of tens of millions of ignorant recipients. (On questions of responses to “covid-19” in general and vaccinations in particular, See Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.’s web site, <https://childrenshealthdefense.org>.)

Worse yet, “Operation Warp Speed” is certainly irresponsible, and more than likely illegal, because it would amount to experimentation on human beings, doubtlessly without their informed consent—that is, consent neither coerced nor fraudulently obtained, but instead based upon full disclosure of the risks involved and of each individual’s right to refuse to participate in the program. (On the impermissibility of medical experiments performed on individuals without their informed consent, see, e.g., 12 Code of Federal Regulations §§ 50.1, 50.3, 50.20, 50.25, and 50.27.)

As an Army General told the reporters gathered in the Rose Garden, “Operation Warp Speed” is planned as a coöperative effort between the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Defense. According to him, the “mission is about defeating the enemy”. If that would not make any patriot’s blood run cold, what could? For it implicitly poses the question: “Who is really ‘the enemy’ here—a virus, or the American people?” That is a valid inquiry, because, as a general proposition of international law established by the United States and other nations in the aftermath of World War II, and still recognized by the United States, “medical” experiments conducted by rogue public officials on unwilling human beings are condemnable as crimes against humanity, for which no defense is allowable.

More specifically, employment of the Military to enforce such experiments on the civilian population within the United States through what amounts to “martial law” plainly violates not only the Constitution, but also the Declaration of Independence, which indicted King George III because (among other of his derelictions) “He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power”. As a practical matter, mandatory vaccinations of ordinary Americans effected through military coercion will, in the course of such an operation, necessarily “render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power”, because no “Civil power” at any level of the federal system will be able in fact (whatever its  authority in legal theory) to interpose itself between “the Military” and ordinary citizens dependent upon that “Civil power” for protection.

To be sure, apologists for the “vaccine lobby” contend that all constitutional questions relating to compulsory vaccinations have been decided in favor of compulsion. In support of this fantastic assertion they usually invoke the Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), which Chief Justice Roberts cited with approval in his concurring opinion in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (quoted above). One who critically parses the Court’s opinion in Jacobson, though, will realize that reliance on it would be ill-advised. With respect even to the arguments against compulsory vaccinations which it actually considered and rejected (on insufficient grounds), it holds about as much water as a sieve. And as to other arguments never presented to the Court, especially those which could be predicated on actual scientific research conducted since 1905, the opinion provides nothing but judicial silence. Detailed destructive analysis of the demerits of Jacobson must be left to another commentary, though.

In sum, the “covid-19” panic shows that the question is not: “When are Americans going to say ‘enough is enough’?”—for they seem to be saying that already, a few at a time. The question is: “When are Americans going to say ‘enough is too much to take anymore’?”—and then do something constitutionally effective about it. That question needs to be answered. Time is running out.

© 2020 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




Is The President An “Essential” Worker?

by Dr. Edwin Vieira, Ph.D., JD

During the course of the “covid-19” panic, masses of hot air, typescript, and electrons have been expended on what workers are, or are not, “essential”. On the one hand, in society’s estimation each and every worker in the free-market economy is “essential” in his particular job—otherwise, he would not be employed. On the other hand, from each individual’s perspective, his own employment is “essential” in order to meet his needs as well as the needs of others who depend upon him. Apparently, all too many elected public officials, bureaucrats, and judges imagine that, not only are they “essential” workers, but also they are licensed to determine which individuals in the private economy are “essential” workers whom they will allow to continue to work during the panic, and which individuals are “non-essential” workers whom they will prohibit from working through threats and even the imposition of fines and imprisonment. But average Americans entertain rather negative opinions as to whether many (if not most) politicians, public officials, bureaucrats, and judges are themselves “essential” workers (or even actual workers, as opposed to parasites). Beyond dispute, though, is that any individual who is not performing his job is, to the extent of his dereliction of duty, a “non-essential” worker (because, of course, to that extent he is not working at all).

What about the President of the United States? The key inquiry is: “What is his job?” Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” Thus, the President’s overall job is to employ “[t]he executive Power” for constitutional purposes—for, perforce of Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 of the Constitution, the President “‘solemnly swear[s] (or affirm[s]) that [he] will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Of most consequence, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution prescribes that “he [that is, the President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. If the President does not “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, to that extent he is not exercising “[t]he executive Power” and is not “preserv[ing], protect[ing] and defend[ing] the Constitution”. Thus, the President is an “essential” worker insofar as he performs his duty to “take Care”, and a “non-essential” worker insofar as he does not.

The “covid-19” panic presents numerous instances which raise the question of whether, to one degree or another, the President is proving himself to be an “essential”, or a “non-essential”, worker.

For purposes of a simple, yet highly important, illustration of the problem, consider the following set of questions, as to which the present author will remain noncommittal—leaving each reader to do his own research and supply his own answers:

  1. Is there credible evidence that, under the right circumstances, “covid-19” infections can be cured, and in a significant number of cases have been cured, through administration of a combination of hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin, and zinc sulphate (“HAZ”)?
  2. Is there credible evidence that certain officials in certain States have actually prohibited duly accredited and licensed medical doctors from administering HAZ to patients infected with “covid-19”, even though: (i) those doctors in their professional opinions considered such treatment to be necessary; (ii) those patients gave their informed consent to such treatment; and (iii) those officials knew or should have known of the effectiveness of HAZ, or were willfully blind or recklessly indifferent as to its efficacy?
  3. Is there credible evidence that public-health officials at various levels of the federal system have coerced, threatened, intimidated, or otherwise pressured or improperly influenced doctors not to administer HAZ to their patients infected with “covid-19”, even though: (i) those doctors in their professional opinions considered such treatment to be necessary; (ii) those patients gave their informed consent to such treatment; and (iii) those officials knew or should have known of the effectiveness of HAZ, or were willfully blind or recklessly indifferent as to its efficacy?
  4. Is there credible evidence that, as a result of such prohibitions, coercion, threats, intimidation, or other pressure or improper influence directed against those doctors, (i) those doctors have been prevented or deterred from practicing their professions in what in their professional opinions they considered to be the best interests of their patients; (ii) some of those doctors’ patients infected with “covid 19” have suffered more severely than they would have if they had been treated with HAZ; and (iii) some of those doctors’ patients infected with“covid-19” have died because they were not treated with HAZ?
  5. Is there a sound legal argument that, under the foregoing circumstances, both the doctors and their patients have been deprived of constitutional and civil rights by persons in public office acting under color of law? And do these constitutional and civil rights include: (i) in the case of the doctors, the “liberty” to practice medicine according to their professional discretion in the best interests of their patients and without outside interference; (ii) in the case of all of the patients, the “liberty” to choose which medical treatments to accept or to reject (in the popular phrase “the right to control their own bodies” as their own “property”); (iii) in the case of some of the patients the right to “life” unburdened by needless suffering; and (iv) in the case of other patients the right to “life” itself?
  6. Do Sections 241 and 242 of Title 18 of the United States Code impose criminal sanctions on persons who, acting under color of law, deprive others of such constitutional or civil rights, whether intentionally or with willful blindness or reckless indifference towards those others’ interests?
  7. If credible evidence and a sound legal argument exist with respect to the matters set out in Questions 1 through 6, should the President, in fulfillment of his duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, direct the Department of Justice (including the FBI) to conduct an immediate and thorough investigation of those public officials who prohibited doctors from administering HAZ to their patients or who coerced, threatened, intimidated, or otherwise pressured or improperly influenced doctors not to administer HAZ to their patients? And if the President, in the exercise of prudence, ought not to rely on the Department of Justice to conduct such an investigation, should he appoint for that purpose a special commission composed of suitably qualified scientific and legal experts, forensic investigators, and knowledgeable laymen who are citizens of the United States and completely independent of (i) the governments of the United States, of every State, and of every foreign nation; (ii) the World Health Organization, the United Nations, and every other international organization; (iii) every domestic or foreign pharmaceutical company; and (iv) every other private corporation, and every foundation, charity, philanthropic institution, and other non-governmental organization which provides financial or other support for work in any manner related to the prevention of or treatments for “covid-19” or like infections, whether by means of drugs, vaccinations, or other modalities?
  8. If, notwithstanding credible evidence and a sound legal argument for the matters set out in Questions 1 through 6, and notwithstanding his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, the President neglects, fails, or refuses either to direct the Department of Justice or to appoint a special commission to conduct such an investigation, should he be deemed to be, to that extent, a “non-essential” worker? Indeed, if the President knowingly fails to “take Care that [some of] the Laws be faithfully executed” when rogue public officials and bureaucrats force dissenting doctors to commit medical malpractice on their helpless patients, is it not arguable that he is entirely a “non-essential worker”? For his duty “to the best of [his] Ability, [to] preserve, protect and defend the Constitution” is comprehensive and indivisible. It cannot be fulfilled when it is performed only as to one part, while being evaded as to another part.

Of course, even with respect to “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, the President must rely to some degree on his advisors. In the final analysis, however, he and no one else is responsible for the choice of his advisors, and for adherence to their advice. As Harry Truman rightly observed with respect to the President’s desk in the Oval Office, “the buck stops here”, because from that place it cannot be passed to anyone else.

When he starred in show business, the President became famous for the line: “You’re fired!”

The old saying that “there’s no business like show business” is not true, though. Show business pales in comparison to the constitutional business of “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. If the President proves himself to be a “non-essential” worker with respect to this most essential of his constitutional duties during this most trying time, is “You’re fired!” not what voters might say to him this coming November?

© 2020 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




“Covid 19” and Three Discontinuities of Government

Edwin Vieira

As perusal of the Internet reveals, the most accurate characterization of this country’s response to the “covid-19” crisis is that America has become beset by confusion, controversy, contradictions, conflicting “narratives”, disputations as to the “facts”, unreliable predictions by self-styled “experts”, irresponsible reportage in the big mainstream media, shrill partisan-political invective and recriminations, a cascade of “conspiracy theories” (admittedly, some more truth than theory), and (worst of all) the institution of draconian executive decrees ostensibly aimed at fighting the virus by depriving ordinary Americans of their liberties, their property, and surely in some cases even their lives, with little if any semblance of “due process of law”.

If sanity ever returns to this rats’ nest of hysteria, it will surely be discovered that many people have died, wide swaths of the economy have been deranged or even destroyed, the Constitution has been assaulted, and the intelligence of ordinary Americans has been insulted—all more or less needlessly, because of negligent, improvident, and ill-advised actions and reactions by an interlocking directorate of public-health officials, political leaders, the mainstream media, and various special interests.

This spectacle should shatter once and for all ordinary Americans’ confidence in the competence, beneficent motives, and good faith not only of this country’s public-health establishment but also of the reigning political class in their entireties. One can anticipate, however, that public officials will exaggerate their accomplishments, minimize their mistakes, cover up their blunders, and shift to others the blame for whatever failures cannot be hidden. And still, many questions will remain to be answered, if officialdom ever condescends, or can somehow be compelled, to address them. See, e.g.,

<https://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2020/04/21/what-if/>.

This combination of tragedy and travesty has amply demonstrated that—if not for today (because it is probably too late) then certainly for tomorrow (before it becomes too late)—Americans need to put into practice measures not only long overdue but also demanded by both the Constitution and their own interests in self-preservation as citizens of an independent, free, and prosperous Republic. To do this, they must first analyze the problem confronting them. The approach adopted in this commentary consists of five points:.

Part One. The “covid-19” panic has exposed a basic discontinuity of government in the effective disestablishment of “the Militia of the several States”.

Part Two. A discontinuity of government through a military take-over has been threatened because of the “covid-19” crisis.

Part Three. The “covid-19” panic has rationalized a discontinuity of government through the seizure of supreme power by public-health “technocrats” in league with rogue public officials.

Part Four.. In large measure, the blame for these three discontinuities of government can be laid at the feet of the proponents of “the individual right to keep and bear arms”.

Part Five. Americans should reimpose true continuity of government by revitalizing “the Militia of the several States”.

Part One

The “covid-19” panic has exposed a basic discontinuity of government in the effective disestablishment of “the Militia of the several States”. Analysis must begin with a detailed explanation of this discontinuity, because it provides the underpinning necessary for understanding the other two discontinuities of government related to “covid-19”.

Undeniable is that, with vanishingly few exceptions, Americans do not recognize that the present nationwide is not the result merely of the wrong individuals, or even the wrong types of people being ensconced in the highest positions of National and State leadership. Rather, a major component of the federal system—in times such as these the most important component—is not functioning as the Constitution requires that it should. For this reason, there exists a long-standing, severe, and (if not soon remedied) fatal discontinuity in government. This is not a failure of the Constitution, in the sense that the Constitution provides no means to rectify the situation. Rather, it is the result of the stubborn, stupid, and even subversive refusal of public officials over many decades to apply the Constitution as it can, should, and must be applied—and, of greater consequence, a failure of We the People to demand as much.

In 1787, Benjamin Franklin warned both his contemporaries and all future generations that in and through the Constitution the Founding Fathers had established “a Republic, if you can keep it”. Today, Americans on the verge of losing it. The underlying causes of this looming political disaster are a lack of understanding of what “a Republic” is, and an unwillingness to bear the burdens of “keep[ing] it”, among the citizenry.

The “Republican Form of Government” which Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution commands “the United States [to] guarantee to every State in th[e] Union” is one in which We the People, not public officials, are the sovereigns. In the first and the final analysis, at every level in the federal system We the People are “the government”—because they are the source of “government” in the first instance, and its most important component and means of support ever after. We the People created “the government”; “the government” did not create the People. “The government” exists for the People; the People do not exist for “the government”. Any “government” may become expendable; the People are never expendable. As long as the People maintain control of “the government” through constitutional means, the continuity of government continues; but once they lose control it ends, whether pro tanto or altogether, depending on circumstances. And as long as the People act according the principles of the Declaration, they may alter or abolish an old continuity of government, or create an entirely new one, “as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness”—and public officials in the then-existing governmental apparatus will have nothing to say about it.

To maintain their control of their government, however, We the People must participate directly in its operations. Self-evidently, direct participation cannot be left to mere “representatives” who may prove incompetent or even disloyal, and whose “representation” may do the People a disservice or even may betray them to their enemies, foreign or domestic. Wisely, through “the Militia of the several States” the Founders secured the People’s direct participation in government at every level of the federal system. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 15 and 16; art. II, § 2, cl. 1; and amend. II. Those who are interested in explanations of these matters more detailed than can be presented in this commentary should consult the present author’s book The Sword and Sovereignty: The Constitutional Principles of “the Militia of the Several States” (Front Royal, Virginia: CD-ROM Edition, 2012).

Sufficient to observe here is that the power, authority, and responsibility of the Militia “to execute the Laws of the Union” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution is self-evidently a governmental power—indeed, “governing” in its most basic form for its most basic purpose. We the People’s exertion of this governmental power is direct, because the Militia are composed of the body of the People in each State. And the exercise of this governmental power is continuous, because “the Laws of the Union” are not to be set aside except through the enactment of statutes consistent with the Constitution or the adoption of constitutional Amendments consistent with the Declaration of Independence—which statutes and Amendments are themselves “Laws” the Militia are empowered “to execute”. (The same conclusions apply when the Militia are executing the laws of the several States.) Thus, the Militia are the only establishments constitutionally authorized and responsible for permanently securing the true continuity of government. For they are the only governmental institutions in which We the People themselves participate directly, continuously, and effectively with complete governmental authority. They are composed of Local citizens. They are the States’ own institutions (“the Militia of the several States”). See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis supplied). And they are empowered by “the supreme Law of the Land” “to execute the Laws of the Union”. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; and art. I, § 8,cl. 15. This, obviously, is the essence of—in the first place the only way to establish—and in the final analysis the only way to preserve—popular self-government in a federal system.

The constitutional continuity of government requires that “a Republican Form of Government” be maintained in every State (and, by extension, for the United States, too). For that reason, one of “the Laws of the Union” which the Militia are authorized “to execute” is Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution. This, of course, makes perfect sense, because in “a Republican Form of Government” We the People are sovereign, and the Militia are the means through which the People can maintain their sovereignty by their own efforts. It also ties in perfectly with the Second Amendment. For “a Republican Form” is the form of government characteristic of “a free State”. “[T]o the security of a free State” “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary”. So (of course) “[a] well regulated Militia” is necessary to maintain “a Republican Form of Government” in every State, and in the United States as a whole. And, not surprisingly, the Constitution empowers “the Militia of the several States” to perform that vital task by “execut[ing] the Law[ ] of the Union” which provides for “guarantee[ing] a Republican Form of Government to every State in th[e] Union”.

Moreover, for the Militia to provide “the security of a free State” and to “guarantee” “a Republican Form of Government” throughout this country involves more than “keep[ing] and bear[ing] Arms” (although under many circumstances that may prove to be of signal importance).

After all, “a Republican Form of Government” is to be “guarantee[d]” with no limitation on the otherwise constitutional methods which may be employed for that purpose. “A well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”—and therefore to the preservation of “a Republican Form of Government”—with no limitation on the type of “security” which may be involved. And the Militia are “to execute the Laws of the Union” in order to effectuate that guarantee and achieve that security with no limitation as to which “Laws” they are “to execute” or as to the otherwise constitutional means by which they may “execute” them. Thus, every “Law[ ] of the United States” (and every law of the States as well) which has any application to “the security of a free State” and the preservation of “a Republican Form of Government”—and what constitutional laws do not?—is within the jurisdiction of the Militia.

The subjects of these “Laws” include inter alia military, para-military, and police forces; fire, rescue, and kindred emergency services; social-welfare functions of all types; monetary and banking systems (to secure an economically and politically sound currency); the conduct of honest elections; public education (to focus students’ attention on constitutional studies, rather than cultural Marxist indoctrination); supervision of public officials (to ensure that they are performing their duties in a timely, loyal, and effective manner); and, most relevant to the “covid-19” panic, oversight of all public-health institutions, personnel, and operations.

Unfortunately, today We the People do not maintain their rightful ascendancy over the continuity of government, because they no longer participate in “the Militia of the several States” as the Constitution requires. Why is this? Already in 1833, Justice Joseph Story predicted the basic problem: namely, that “though * * * the importance of a well-regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised that, among the American people, there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense of its burdens, to be rid of all regulations. * * * There is certainly no small danger that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our national bill of rights.” Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown, and Company, Fifth Edition, 1891), Volume II, § 1897, at 646 (footnote omitted).

From Story’s time, decades’ upon decades’ worth of historical ignorance, political incompetence, and general stupidity concerning (as well as outright subversion of) the Constitution on the part of public officials at all levels of the federal system—and, worse yet, We the People’s unconscionable reluctance to fulfill their own constitutional duties—have resulted in most Americans’ being consigned, as matters of statute, to the so-called “unorganized militia”. At the National level see 10 U.S.C. § 246; and as an example of State laws, see Code of Virginia § 44-1. Amazingly, Americans in general are totally unaware of this situation, and therefore oblivious to its malign significance—and, if they knew, all too many would not care to take the steps necessary to rectify it.

Against this background the other two discontinuities of government specifically related to the “covid-19” panic stand out clearly.

Part Two

A discontinuity of government through a military take-over has been threatened because of the “covid-19” crisis.

As Part Three of this commentary will explain, the “covid-19” panic has enabled rogue public officials to impose a “technocratic” tyranny throughout the United States. The practical question is how such a tyranny could be enforced in the face of the widespread popular reaction and resistance which will arise when enough people finally stop swallowing the disinformation rogue public officials put out and the mainstream media amplify. That is, when disbelief begets distrust, distrust gestates disgust, and disgust gives birth to disobedience on such a massive scale that public officials cannot control the situation with the ordinary means at their disposal.

No one should entertain any doubt that the Powers That Be have designed and are ready to put into practice draconian measures to deal with such an eventuality—measures with a distinctly military cast to them. As part of a self-fulfilling prophecy , Americans are being told that the Armed Forces are ready to and will supply the necessary continuity of government in the course of the present panic, and presumably during any other “emergency”—real, imaginary, or even staged—which arises in the future and cripples the operations of the governmental apparatus in the District of Columbia. See, e.g.,

Newsweek.com
Dailymail.co,uk
Newsweek.com

Even without positing some “conspiracy theory”, a situation which might provoke a military take-over in order ostensibly to maintain a semblance of continuity of government is not too difficult to imagine. For example, if the sort of ill-advised and ham-handed measures which have been employed so far to “fight” “covid-19” were to continue in effect for too long, and if as a consequence the national economy were to collapse into chaos with attendant social upheavals breaking out on a massive scale, and if the National and State governments were to prove too indecisive, inept, impotent, and imbecilic to restore order (a not unlikely prospect), then the Armed Forces might be compelled to step in simply as a matter of self-preservation in order to secure the continued functioning of the military-industrial complex on which they depend.

More troubling yet, the sufficiency of the present “covid-19” (or any equivalent future) “emergency” to trigger a military take-over will presumably be decided by someone in the Armed Forces, no matter what some statute or regulation may say. For, by hypothesis, that decision will be made when and because the normal continuity of government will have so far broken down that whatever disjointed remnants of the government will still be functioning at all will be incapable of running the country. At that point, only the Armed Forces will retain the competence necessary to take on that task—supposedly because some unique innate superiority which military establishments enjoy over civilian institutions will guarantee that their “continuity of command” will not have been disrupted. For the same reason, the Armed Forces will also determine when and how, if at all, the normal continuity of government will be restored to civilian hands. Thus it is hardly difficult to foresee how, in a era of recurrent pandemics or other “emergencies” (real or otherwise), the Armed Forces could first assume a supporting, then a leading, then a controlling, then a dominating, and finally a permanently dictatorial rôle (whether in plain sight or behind the scenes).

In no way, though, could a transition—howsoever effected under color of any “emergency” whatsoever—from present-day civilian government to some form of military directorate maintain or even mimic continuity with the government of the United States or the governments of any of the several States established under the authority of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Under those documents, the Armed Forces can claim perforce of innate right, or can be delegated by civilian officials, no license whatsoever even temporarily to assume the powers of, to substitute for, or to replace—let alone indefinitely to displace and supplant—any constitutional government within this country’s federal system. In the face of both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the accession to power of some military junta would constitute a discontinuity of government as utterly unjustifiable in law as it would be unprecedented in history. See, in general, the present author’s By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., 2014, 2016).

The Declaration of Independence sets out the moral, legal, and political principles upon which the independence and governmental authority of the original Thirteen States—and, by logical and legal extension, the independence and governmental authority of all of the other States which followed them into the present-day Union, and of the United States as a whole—depended in the past, depend in the present, and will always depend in the future. From the beginning, the States’ and then the United States’ powers as independent governments were circumscribed, confined, and controlled by those principles, the legitimacy of their exercise always contingent upon the States’ and the United States’ adherence to them in both word and deed.

As “Governments instituted among Men”, the States and the United States “deriv[ed] * * * from the consent of the governed” “their just powers”—and only such powers as indeed were “just” because they conformed to the principles of the Declaration. For only such powers are “the governed” capable of delegating to a government conformably to “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”.

The Declaration indicted King George III as “unfit to be the ruler of a free people” because (among his other derelictions) “He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power”. Such an imposition of “martial law” was not the result of an out-and-out military take-over through a coup, Putsch, or golpe. Rather, the King and his Ministers—the ultimate civilian authorities in the British Empire—purported to authorize it in America precisely in order to maintain the continuity of government in the face of a rebellion by the Colonists which civil magistrates loyal to the Monarchy could not suppress. Nonetheless, that the Declaration lambasted the King’s imposition of “martial law” as one of the “repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny” over the Colonists establishes that a power to impose “martial law” “independent of and superior to the Civil Power” is not a “just power” which any government can “deriv[e] * * * from the consent of the governed” in conformity with “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”. A fortiori, it is not a “just power” for “the Military” to exercise on its own recognizance. Moreover, the Declaration recognized no possible “emergency power” through the exercise of which the King and his Ministers, let alone the British armed forces, could have fastened military rule on the Colonists. Indeed, by implication it denied the possibility that any “emergency” which could rationalize the exercise of such a power could ever arise in a free country.

Under the Declaration, control over the true continuity of government always remains in the hands of “the People” themselves, not of public officials and least of all of “the Military”. Ultimately, “the People” themselves—not public officials or members of “the Military”—decide when the proper continuity of government exists, when it has broken down, and when and how it must be restored or reconstructed anew. As the Declaration makes plain, “whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of the[ ] ends [for which it was instituted], it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness”. And “when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce the[ People] under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security”. (Emphases supplied).

After 1776, the American people could not create, and the States could not join, a National government with purported powers beyond the “just powers” which “the People” could delegate under the auspices of the Declaration of Independence. So, as the Preamble to the Constitution states, We the People “ordain[ed] and establish[ed] th[e] Constitution” “in Order to * * * establish Justice”—which, self-evidently, the government of the United States can accomplish only by exercising “just powers” in a just manner for just purposes. So, under the Constitution as well as the Declaration of Independence, true continuity of government excludes “render[ing] the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power”. Indeed, the Constitution provides explicitly for such exclusion with respect to the primary civilian officeholders whom a military take-over would supplant: namely, the President and Members of Congress.

As to the continuity of government with respect to the President, Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution provides that “the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of * * * Death, * * * or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.” Under this clause, “what Officer” arguably could be some military commander—but, having been so selected, that person “shall act accordingly [as President]”, not as a military officer.

Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution provides that: “[i]f, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.” Here, too, “who shall then act as President” arguably could be some military commander—but, having been so designated, that person “such person shall act accordingly [as President]”, not as a miliary officer.

The Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides:

Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.

Sec. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Sec. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

Sec. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representative their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon, Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

Here the Constitution specifies under what circumstances the Vice President shall assume, temporarily or permanently, the powers and duties of the President—lending no credence to the notion that some military commander, as such, could take over “the powers and duties of [the President’s] office”, inasmuch as no military commander, as such, could at that time be the Vice President.

Moreover, the notion that some military commander, as such, could assume those powers and duties makes no sense. After all, pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”. Thus, once some military commander were elevated to the office of President (presumably under the aegis of the laws quoted above), he would hold a constitutional rank above everyone in the Armed Forces. His former rank in the Armed Forces would be irrelevant and no longer effective. Any order he promulgated as President would derive its legitimacy from his status as “Commander in Chief”, not from his former rank (whatever it was) in the Armed Forces.

As to the continuity of government with respect to Congress, Article I, Section 1, Clause 4 of the Constitution provides that “[w]hen vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.” And the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[w]hen vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.” Nothing in these provisions suggests that military commanders, as such, can be the beneficiaries of “Writs of Election”, or that such persons so appointed as temporary Representatives or Senators can then exercise specifically military authority within or over Congress.

Plainly, then, no part of the Constitution which explicitly deals with the continuity of government even hints that some military commander, as such, could assume the office and powers of the President or Vice President, or that some gaggle of military commanders, as such, could infiltrate the House of Representatives, the Senate, or both, with the result that “the Military [becomes] independent of and superior to the Civil power”.

The Constitution delegates to Congress no explicit power to set up some sort of military rule (“martial law”) over society in general in the guise of maintaining the continuity of government. To be sure, with the approbation of Congress pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution the Armed Forces may enforce some just form of “martial law” on their own members. But neither on their own initiatives nor under color of some purported license from the civil government may the Armed Forces impose any form of “martial law” on ordinary citizens, even in supposed response to some purported “emergency”. See the present author’s By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., 2014, 2016). Indeed, the Constitution is so concerned with forefending the possibility that a rogue army with praetorian pretensions might try to set itself up as “independent of and superior to the Civil Power” that the power “[t]o raise and support Armies” which it delegates to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 includes the prohibition that “no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years”—thus enabling each new House of Representatives to disestablish then-existing “Armies” entirely by abolishing their funding. See also U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, and § 9, cl. 7.

The only governmental institutions with “martial” characteristics to which the Constitution assigns any law-enforcement authority and responsibility are “the Militia of the several States”, in the power it delegates to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16 “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union” when some “Part of them * * * may be employed in the Service of the United States”. In stark contrast, the Constitution delegates no power to Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth [the Armed Forces, whether in whole or in any part] to execute the Laws of the Union”, or to license any civil officer of the United States “to execute th[os]e Laws”, except to assist the President of the United States in fulfilling his own constitutional power and duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” pursuant to Article II, Section 3. And, of course, the President is also “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”, pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 1. So in this regard the power of Congress and the power of the President with respect to execution of “the Laws” are inextricably interlocked, whereas any pretensions of the Armed Forces to such a power are interdicted.

Article I, Section 18, Clause 18 of the Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [its enumerated] Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” Therefore, in aid of preserving or restoring the continuity of government, Congress may enact “Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union”, because the latter is one of its enumerated powers. And, for that purpose too, Congress may enact “Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution * * * [the] Power[ ] vested by [Article II, Section 3 of] th[e] Constitution” in the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, in his capacity under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 as “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”. But, even to secure the continuity of government, Congress is absolutely disabled from enacting any law “to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power” as a law-enforcement establishment, because Congress lacks an enumerated power “to call forth the Armed Forces to execute the Laws of the Union”. And, even with a baneful (because illegal) benediction from Congress, the President could not “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” by coöperating in some scheme “to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power” as a law-enforcement establishment. For, although he is the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States” under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, neither of those establishments is empowered “to execute the Laws of the Union” under that or any other provision of the Constitution.

Notwithstanding that this country’s foundational legal documents are pellucid on these points, the public officials (both civilian and military) and the bobble-heads in the big mainstream media who are conjuring the specter of a military take-over to preserve the continuity of government in the face of the “covid-19” panic have yet to be met with massive protests. Apparently, all too many Americans have been led to believe that “covid-19” could cause both the National and the States’ governmental apparatuses to fail in a manner more catastrophic than they have already failed in numerous ways to date—and that such failures could justify intervention by “the Military”.

These beliefs, of course, are not altogether unreasonable. One need not enjoy 20-20 political vision to discern that governments at every level of the federal system have been colonized by all too many incompetent, arrogant, self-aggrandizing, narcissistic, and thoroughly dishonest individuals whom no intelligent American would trust to drive his automobile to the neighborhood mechanic for an oil change. So, as political history records in case after case, people desperate for a modicum of reliable and effective leadership in the midst of a crisis which they do not understand will naturally look elsewhere, typically fixing their hopes on some uniformed and beribboned thaumaturge among the top brass in “the Military”—the legendary “man on a white horse”—who might be able forcibly to extract order out of chaos. Defying logic, though, is why a large segment of America’s population should entertain much confidence that “the Military” which has unsuccessfully waged an endless military conflict in Afghanistan against bunches of troglodytes armed with weapons of little better than World War II efficacy could control the United States even militarily, let alone politically and economically, in the face of widespread societal collapse that might devolve into something approaching civil war. Surely, if one’s neighborhood mechanic took over a decade to perform an oil change—and still left out the oil—one would seek better service elsewhere.

Rather amazingly, almost no one realizes that, if the Militia were organized according to constitutional standards, a collapse of the National and many or even all of the State governmental apparatuses would not be catastrophic—because We the People would be ready and able to take over full responsibility for “execut[ion] of the Laws of the Union” and of the States as well. As “execut[ion] of the Laws” is “government”, such a collapse would not occasion a discontinuity of government, but would merely transfer the continuity of government from agents to their principals—that is, from public officials to We the People themselves. In such a transition, of course, the Armed Forces would play no rôle whatsoever.

Part Three

Even the average “blogger” on the Internet realizes that the “covid-19” panic has rationalized a discontinuity of government through the effective seizure of supreme power by public-health “technocrats” in league with rogue public officials. See, e.g.,

blog.nomorefakenews.com

The depth of uncertainty in which their political “leaders” have submerged ordinary Americans in the course of the “covid-19” panic brings to mind the paradoxical saying popular during the Reagan era: “trust, but verify”. To be sure, verification can confirm trust. But unless one’s logic is schizophrenic he does not both “trust” and “verify” at the very same time. If he actually trusts, he need not verify. And if he needs to verify, it is because he does not trust. Today, though, ordinary Americans’ dilemma is that, as the hard school of experience teaches, they have no basis to trust public officials’ pronouncements and no ability to verify them. Rather, the public must take on faith whatever their faithless servants tell them, without any checks and balances in the process.

Officialdom controls the collection, collation, and storage of—and the general public’s access to—much or even most of the relevant data on “covid-19”. Some useful information is not collected or retained at all. Some is withheld entirely from the general public. And of that which is released, some is exaggerated, some minimized, some falsified in whole or in part, and some the product of “computer models” which are proven inaccurate only much later on when it is too late to do anything to correct the mistakes the “models” provoked. So for every unit of real information which ordinary Americans can obtain, they must wade through as much or more misinformation and even disinformation.

One absolute certainty, however, has arisen out of this jumble of hoopla, hyperbole, and even hysteria officially orchestrated and then amplified in the echo-chambers of the mass media: namely, that the “covid-19” panic has been and continues to be intentionally and quite cynically manipulated in order to keep ordinary Americans in a state of perplexity, trepidation, and even the mindless frenzy of toilet-paper hoarding, which has rendered all too many people willing to knuckle under to whatever “emergency powers” public officials have chosen to conjure out of nothing, supposedly in the name of “public health”, the Constitution and even common sense be damned. Whether by accident or by design, “covid-19” has provided the perfect opportunity for the Powers that Be to test the efficacy of the entire “emergency-powers network” which they have been assiduously setting up for the last three-quarters of a century or so—especially to gauge how many serious intrusions into their lives by “emergency powers” ordinary Americans will meekly suffer. To be sure, some Americans are beginning to wake up to what is going on. But their numbers so far are so insignificant that this test appears to be successful. In the name of “public health”, rogue public officials at every level of the federal system have, at an amazing speed and with striking uniformity in their methods, systematically undermined “the security of a free State” to which the Second Amendment to the Constitution refers, and rendered it increasingly difficult for ordinary Americans even to imagine how they might “secure the Blessings of Liberty to [them]selves and [their] Posterity” promised in the Preamble to the Constitution. Indeed, ordinary Americans have been plunged into a morass of constantly fluctuating insecurity, because they may now expect that on any day some new measure curtailing their freedoms may be imposed perforce of an executive dictate supposedly substantiated by the “scientific” findings, advice, and demands of unelected bureaucrats whose opinions average citizens are deemed unable to understand and thus incompetent to challenge, according to public officials and their allies among the talking heads of the mainstream media.

Events have amply demonstrated that a despotic “public-health technocracy” can be imposed relatively quickly and easily on a credulous and coöperative population. (“Technocracy” must be distinguished from “technology”. The former is a political system, the latter a body of knowledge. See Patrick Wood’s extensive oeuvre on this subject.) These circumstances have effectively negated America’s “Republican Form of Government”—the “Form of Government” in which the people are sovereign and which Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution requires the United States to “guarantee * * * to every State in th[e] Union”—and replaced it with a “technocratic” directorate under color of which unelected bureaucratic “experts” usurp sovereign authority in league with rogue elected officials who enforce the bureaucrats’ orders, regulations, and guidelines against the general populace. Worse yet, a “technocratic” directorate of this kind is not limited to matters of “public health”. In principle, any and every area of political, economic, and social concern as to which bureaucrats can claim “expert” knowledge beyond the ken of ordinary citizens can become the subject, and victim, of “technocracy”.

Of course, any manifestation of “technocracy” constitutes a discontinuity of government which is politically and legally impossible in America according to the principles of the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration states that all legitimate “Governments * * * deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed”. But if “the governed” cannot comprehend what the “experts” in their government supposedly understand, how are they competent to delegate to the “experts” the powers necessary and sufficient for the “experts” to exercise their expertise in an expert fashion? How in their ignorance can “the governed” know what powers to delegate, or to which supposed “experts” to delegate those powers? How, indeed, can “the governed” ever “consent” to any state of affairs which their minds are incapable of fathoming?

These conundra aside, it should be evident to even the dullest citizen that the novel “emergency” measures which have been put into operation in response to “covid-19” have a distinctly totalitarian police-state cast to them quite at odds with the physicians’ traditional dictum: “first, do no harm”. Certainly they fit the mold of what the Declaration denounced as “a long”—actually, today, a rather short but no less effective—“train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object [which] evinces a design to reduce the[ People] under absolute Despotism”. That this “Despotism” has arrived garbed in the raiment of “public health” makes it especially insidious as well as dangerous, because most people seem inclined to accept almost any limitation on their freedom of action when they imagine that their health is endangered. (Yet, although a supposedly supremely fatal virus said to be capable of infecting everyone in society may provide a sufficient excuse for rogue public officials’ imposition of “Despotism” throughout America, recent history teaches that it is not a necessary one. Not so long ago, after all, in the immediate aftermath of the Boston Marathon Bombing large numbers of people supinely acquiesced in rogue officials’ commands to “shelter in place” and submit to searches of their homes and seizures of their persons conducted in para-military fashion, simply because a single alleged criminal was supposedly at large in their neighborhoods.)

“Technocracy” in the domain of public health has been gestating for some time in this country. Although public health is as clear-cut a matter of national security as could be, since before World War II and continuing thereafter unto this very day, We the People have been unable to exercise proper surveillance of and supervision over either public-health officials and related agencies at any level of the federal system or public-health industries anywhere throughout the United States. Indeed, this deficiency has been and remains true with respect to just about all “administrative agencies” and their allied industries in this country. And for a very good reason (from the agencies’ and industries’ point of view) as well as an exceedingly bad one (from the People’s perspective).

Even if some constitutional apology could be offered for a few “administrative agencies” with very circumscribed powers, the basic rationale for most establishments of that sort is anti-constitutional. The underlying notion is that “popular sovereignty” and “democracy” are illusions, if not delusions, because this country is simply too complex to be run either directly by We the People themselves or indirectly by the People’s elected “representatives”. We the People are altogether too ignorant to do it on their own; and, even if their “representatives” were any more intelligent, the legislative process is far too contentious and unwieldy to enact the necessary laws in a timely fashion. Therefore, this country should be “administered” by “experts” set up in establishments styled as “agencies” of Congress and thus derivatively of the People, but in reality more or less independent of both. Congress should assign each area of national concern to a specific “administrative agency” staffed by special breeds of unelected career bureaucrats with permanent tenure (“technocrats”) to whom Congress should “delegate” sweeping quasi-legislative powers to promulgate regulations, rules, and other guidelines with the force of law (and in some instances to exercise quasi-executive and even quasi-judicial powers to enforce those directives). Thereafter, the People should simply participate in the side-show of “democracy”, electing “representatives” who will endlessly fund and enlarge the powers of the “agencies”.

Because by hypothesis very few individuals outside of an “agency” are sufficiently competent to deal with the matters assigned to its “technocrats”, and because no one (competent or not) outside of an “agency” can become conversant with the myriad details of its innermost operations, no one is qualified to supervise, criticize, or control the activities of an “agency’s” personnel other than its own personnel. That is, there can be no external, independent, and effective “checks and balances” on an “agency’s” actions. Only the “agencies” are capable of policing themselves. And even if the People’s “representatives” in Congress were competent and wanted to do so, they could not possibly oversee dozens of “agencies” filling thousands of pages of the Federal Register with new regulations every year. So everyone must suffer the “technocrats” to run this country more or less as they see fit.

Thus, although ostensibly parts of the National governmental apparatus, “administrative agencies” embody within themselves the veriest antithesis of “a Republican Form of Government”, because they have usurped We the People’s sovereignty and made a mockery of the mandate in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States” (not “delegated” to someone else). (And these defects obviously infect “agencies” attached to the States’ governments, too.)

The “covid-19” panic has enabled top-level personnel in “administrative agencies” assigned to deal with public health—particularly the CDC and the FDA—effectively to arrogate to themselves something akin to supreme authority over the entire United States, with everyone throughout the federal system obliged to dance to their tunes, no matter how discordant the music may be. Self-evidently, this is a most unsatisfactory—and dangerous—state of affairs. For no matter how educated, experienced, efficient, and effective public-health “technocrats” may be, they are not the only, or necessarily the best, educated, experienced, effective, and efficient people of their kind in society. Among the tens of millions of Americans who are not public-health bureaucrats pushing papers in some rabbit-warren of the federal system are people who are as, if not more, educated, experienced, effective, and efficient in terms of actual performance of public-health functions. And most of these are more open-minded, ready to listen and then “march to the beat of a different drummer”, than any “technocrat”.

True science, after all, advances through original, imaginative, innovative thinking and experimentation, not adherence to rote formulae and ossified procedures which require wending one’s way through labyrinths of rules while generating mounds of paperwork. True science is the opponent of every mind-numbing orthodoxy. In contrast, bureaucracies and bureaucrats are notorious for their stubborn adherence to institutional orthodoxies of the most stultified sort. The “agencies’” plans, principles of operation, protocols, and procedures seem always to take precedence over practical results.

Whatever their native and acquired skills, most middle- and high-level bureaucrats usually have worked their way up the carrierists’ ladder within their “agency”, demonstrating on each rung not just a sufficient level of personal competence but even more important the right level of compliance with their “agency’s” agenda and institutional culture—the right level of deference, even subservience, to their superiors—and the right level of blind loyalty to the bureaucracy in and for the special interests of which they serve. And bureaucrats at the highest levels all too often have obtained promotion or appointment through mere tenure, canny networking, political “pull”, or other forms of favoritism, not because they were the best candidates for their positions. So, in too many respects, the operations of public-health bureaucracies have become akin more to a sort of sorcery than to science. Their personnel must intone the right mantras; must perform the right rituals; must follow the right procedures (operating “by the book”); must always assert that they are right and everyone else presumptively wrong; must ignore, exclude, or downplay information which contradicts or even questions the “agency’s” current line; and must never admit error until denial of it becomes impossible, and then must try to pin on someone else the blame for any problems their own mistakes have caused.

Worst of all worlds in the bureaucratic universe is what is known as “agency capture”. “Administrative agencies” are supposed to regulate private special interests in the public interest. But as the special interests develop open working relationships or occult channels of influence with the “agencies” and their top-level officials, they bend the “agencies” toward agreement with their agenda, the public interest being slighted, ignored, or even damned in the process. Ultimately, under the guise of coöperation the “agencies” become mouthpieces for the special interests. For example, the FDA’s incestuous relationship with the big pharmaceutical companies is beyond dispute. Repeatedly the FDA has been accused of a bias towards the testing and promoting within the medical community of exotic new and highly expensive drugs of questionable efficacy, not because these substances are the best or the most cost-effective treatments for various diseases, but because their sales generate the greatest profits for “big pharma”.

One benefit of the mess which the ham-handed responses of this country’s “leaders” to the “covid-19” panic have created throughout the United States is that it has begun to shatter ordinary Americans’ naïve notion that politicians, public-health “technocrats”, greedy corporate executives, élitists dreaming of “global governance” in the form of worldwide medical regimentation of the masses, and the mainstream media which broadcast those miscreants’ propaganda would never sacrifice the livelihoods, the liberties, and even the lives of ordinary citizens in order to serve their own selfish interests. The other side of that coin, however, must be We the People’s recognition—not yet observable to any significant degree—that a pressing need exists to institute vigilant, thoroughgoing, and independent oversight of public officials in general, and of public-health “agencies”, their personnel, plans, policies, procedures, and protocols—and especially their proclamations and performance—in particular.

America needed such transparency in the past, because its absence surely contributed significantly to the present unpleasantness. Nothing can be done about that now, however. She needs such transparency in the present, in order to find the most expeditious means by which to extricate herself from the “covid-19” quagmire and its political, economic, and social aftermaths. As matters stand now, though, the People have little way of knowing, with a sufficient degree of confidence, what public officials and public-health “technocrats” are actually doing, why they are doing it, and whether they are right or wrong in doing so. Without transparency brought about by adequate surveillance there cannot be knowledge; and without knowledge there cannot be trust. Within a society awash in politically mandated ignorance, citizens become the victims of manipulation and conditioning by the organized lies of “fake news”, “fake politics”, and even “fake medicine”. The only solution is to put into proper logical order and then rigorously apply the slogan popular in the Reagan era, which should now read: “verify first, and only afterwards trust what has been verified”. For America will need transparency in the future, based on that formula, in order to prevent a recurrence of anything like the horrific situation now plaguing her. Fortunately, this can be had, if Americans will simply take into their own hands the constitutional authority and responsibility of the Militia “to execute the Laws of the Union”. But that will require revitalization of the Militia, because the “execut[ion] of the Laws” requires enforcement mechanisms in being and equal to the task.

The Militia are not mere “administrative agencies” created by Congressional whim, but instead are integral and permanent components of the Constitution’s federal system. And Congress cannot refuse to prepare and employ them as the Constitution mandates. For as general propositions of constitutional law, “[w]hatever functions Congress are by the Constitution authorized to perform, they are, when the public good requires it, bound to perform”; and “whenever a provision of the Constitution is applicable the duty to enforce it is imperative and all-embracing”. United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 Howard) 560, 567 (1850); and Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 196 (1915). Plainly enough, “the public good [always] requires”, without any conceivable exception, that “the security of a free State” be preserved for, and that “a Republican Form of Government” be “guarantee[d]” to, every State in the Union (as well as to the United States as a whole). No less plainly, in order to deal effectively with crises as severe as the “covid-19” panic Congress’s “duty to enforce [the Militia Clauses of the Constitution] is imperative and all-embracing”—in the strict legal sense of “duty” as being “obligatory”, “binding”, and “compulsory”; and in the common sense of “all-embracing” as “comprehend[ing]” circumstances of “any sort whatever”. See Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language (Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Company, Second Edition Unabridged, 1956), at 1248; and at 836 and 67. And because, as Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution describes them, the Militia are “the Militia of the several States”, these principles apply to the States as well as to the United States.

Perhaps the most important exercise of the constitutional authority and responsibility of the Militia to “execut[e] the Laws of the Union” is (in principle) and should always be (in practice) performance of the supervisory function of assuring that each and every component of the government of the United States—including especially every legitimate “administrative agency”—properly abides by “the Laws of the Union” pertaining to it. Bureaucrats in particular display a distinct penchant for disregarding, circumventing, even disobeying, “the Laws” except when strict compliance therewith is to their advantage. So opacity in their operations and cover-ups of their faults and failures, rather than transparency and exposure, are routinely their orders of the day, every day. Some of “the Laws of the Union”, of course, are addressed to “agencies” dealing with public heath, such as the FDA. Compliance with these “Laws” should require interminable and intense supervision, because the “technocrats” in those “agencies” are even more likely than other bureaucrats to succeed in disregarding, skirting, or even thwarting “the Laws”, inasmuch as the few of their misdeeds which somehow come to the attention of the general public the “technocrats”can explain away in dense pseudo-scientific jargon quite impenetrable by the average citizen.

Americans must demand that the Militia be allowed to exercise their authority and fulfill their responsibility “to execute the Laws of the Union” for several reasons. First, the Militia are invested with the explicit constitutional power and duty to ensure that personnel in the government of the United States obey those “Laws”. (Of course, this power and duty extend to public officials of the several States and their Localities as well, to the extent that various “Laws of the Union” apply to them.)

Second, employment of the Militia in such a supervisory capacity provides the best, if not the only, way to impose a true federal check and balance on personnel within the government of the United States. Because the Militia are “the Militia of the several States”, the people of the States will perform the check and balance themselves, not through perhaps insouciant, incompetent, or even disloyal “representatives”.

Third, the Militia have no institutional interest in allowing wayward officials in the government of the United States (or the governments of States and Localities, either) to escape scrutiny, exposure, and punishment for their misdeeds. The Militia owe no loyalty or deference to any of those people, but only to the Constitution at all times and to the President whom Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution designates as their Commander in Chief * * * when [they are] called into the actual Service of the United States” (but only then). As Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16 of the Constitution make clear, when “execut[ing] the Laws of the Union” the Militia are “employed in the Service of the United States”, not of the individuals who happen temporarily to occupy positions in the governmental apparatus thereof. For when those individuals neglect, fail, or refuse to perform their governmental functions in compliance with the Constitution and other “Laws of the Union”, then to that extent they act not at all as public officials but simply as private wrongdoers. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 287-292 (1885).

Fourth, the Militia have an institutional interest, and their members have personal interests, in subjecting officials of the government of the United States—whether elected “representatives” or appointed bureaucrats—to continuous, comprehensive, and critical surveillance. The Constitution sets no limits to the authority and responsibility of the Militia “to execute the Laws of the Union”, with respect either to what “Laws” may be involved or how the Militia may “execute” them. And no such limits can conceivably exist, because what may prove “necessary to the security of a free State” through “execut[ion of] the Laws” by “well regulated Militia” will depend upon circumstances as they arise. So the Militia must be fully prepared to exert their jurisdiction as to all of “the Laws of the Union” all of the time with respect to all of the myriad challenges which may confront them in the course of the unpredictable unfolding of future events. Today, of course, the “covid-19” panic has demonstrated beyond peradventure that rigorous policing of feckless or faithless “technocrats” is perhaps the most important task the Militia can and must perform if “the security of a free State” is to be preserved anywhere within, let alone everywhere throughout, America.

Moreover, members of the Militia—“the body of the people” in the words of Article 13 of Virginia’s Declaration of Rights of 1776—have their own interests in “execut[ing] the Laws of the Union” through the Militia, because they are the human victims of neglect, failures, and refusals by officials in the government of the United States to perform the duties assigned to them by the Constitution and other “Laws of the Union”. Each and every such delict thwarts one or more of the purposes of the Constitution listed in its Preamble, necessarily to We the People’s detriment. For the Constitution is We the People’s charter of government; and We the People are its intended beneficiaries. So every “technocrat’s” insult to the Constitution necessarily entails an injury to the People. Therefore, if the Militia did not exist as permanent constitutional establishments, the People would have to invent them.

Fifth, no establishments other than the Militia could possibly deploy sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to oversee the workings of the governmental apparatus of the United States. That machinery is composed of many thousands of politicians, “technocrats”, and other ordinary bureaucrats. Nonetheless, in a country with over 300 million inhabitants these officials and operatives are comparatively few in number. In addition, they are not necessarily “the best and the brightest” who could be found to fill their slots. Indeed, all too often just the opposite is true. If some of them have achieved their positions of power by desert, many more have entered and risen within the system through some accident of history, “networking” or other back-room connivance, or blind luck in line with Väinö Linna’s fictional beatitude that “blessed are the wooden headed, for they shall not sink”. In contrast, the Militia are “the body of the people”, composed of thousands upon thousands of Americans whose education, skills, and experience qualify them actually to perform any and every function in the governmental machinery—and certainly to supervise the workings of “administrative agencies”.

Sixth, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution imposes upon and delegates to the President the right, duty, and power to “take Care that the Laws of faithfully executed”. In the normal course of events as matters stand today, however, the President has little choice but to rely on “advisors” drawn from the very “agencies” under scrutiny (or suspicion, as the case may be). Yet he cannot expect the “agencies’” own personnel to investigate let alone to police themselves, or to provide him with accurate information for that purpose. However, as “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States” the President is explicitly authorized by Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, and Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution to employ the Militia “to execute the Laws of the Union” so as to fulfill his own duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. This means that one man on his own initiative can bring the full weight of “the body of the people” of the United States to bear against any and every “administrative agency”. In no other constitutionally legitimate manner can the President (or anyone else) apply such overwhelming force. See the present author’s By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., 2014, 2016).

In sum, were the Militia in operation as the Constitution requires, personnel throughout the governmental apparatus of the United States—and within “administrative agencies” in particular—would be subjected to continuous supervision, investigation, exposure, correction, discipline, and punishment by appropriately trained observers drawn from We the People themselves and invested with supreme governmental authority “to execute the Laws of the Union” in conjunction with the President’s exercise of his own constitutional right, power, and duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” as their “Commander in Chief”. The Militia’s resolute vigilance, healthy suspicion, and skillful detection of the facts would free Americans once and for all from the rumors, misinformation, and disinformation with which disloyal “leaders” and “representatives” now ply them.

In sum, only through mass organization coupled with supreme governmental authority in the Militia can Americans ever hope to smash the “technocrats” in the governmental apparatus, put paid to “technocracy”, and regain control over their own country.

Part Four.

To be sure, it is one thing to point out the obvious—namely, that the present situation is an unprecedented mess—whereas it is quite another to identify whom to blame for it. And as to all aspects of the “covid-19” panic and its allied effects taken together, there is surely quite enough blame to go around. But, if focus is had specifically on the absence of the Militia at the present time, one group must bear a particularly heavy weight of culpability.

To put this into historical context, in the late 1960s and early 1970s patriotic Americans finally realized that proponents of “gun control” were not merely isolated cranks and fanatics, but instead were sophisticated and dedicated enemies of the Constitution with not only a set purpose and plan to strip ordinary Americans of their possession of firearms, but also a great deal of political acumen and influence through the use of which to bring their schemes to fruition. For example, the Gun Control Act of 1968 eschewed an intent “to place any undue or unnecessary Federal restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of hunting, trap shooting, target shooting, personal protection, or any other lawful activity”. AN ACT To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for better control of the interstate traffic in firearms (“Gun Control Act of 1968”), Act of 22 October 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, § 101, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213-1214. Anyone with enough political savvy to parse legalistic jargon, though, well understood that this disclaimer would never have prevented future “restrictions” which “gun controllers” would have touted as “[ ]due or [ ]necessary”. And in any event it did not include “the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of [service in the Militia]”, notwithstanding Congress’s constitutional duty “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia” under Article I, Section 8, Clause 16. Even more ominously, “gun controllers” in lofty positions in the government of the United States around that time expressed the view that “we should not be involved in promoting general civilian use of firearms” at all. Statement of Robert E. Jordan, General Counsel of the Department of the Army, December, 1970, discussing the Director of Civilian Marksmanship program, quoted in Bruce N. Canfield, The M1 Garand Rifle (Woonsocket, Rhode Island: Andrew Mowbray Publishers, 2013), at 617-618. This, notwithstanding that the Director of Civilian Marksmanship program (now styled the Civilian Marksmanship Program) was obviously linked through constitutional cause and effect to Congress’s duty “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia”.

In order to defend against “gun control”, during the early 1970s champions of the Second Amendment seized on the exemption promised in the Gun Control Act of 1968 for “the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of * * * personal protection”, and began to engage in public education, lobbying, litigation, and the support of candidates for election to public office on behalf of what they called “the individual right to keep and bear arms”, which they located in the last fourteen words of the Second Amendment, with studied disregard for the Amendment’s first thirteen words. From then unto the present day this activism has continued, at ever-increasing levels of vehemence. During these almost fifty years, huge amounts of time, talk, travail, and treasure have been expended—and, if the truth be told, have been squandered to no long-term, lasting effect in aid of “the security of a free State”. For these efforts did nothing to explain, promote, or even acknowledge the existence of the Militia, let alone their constitutional “necess[ity] to the security of a free State” and what “Arms” “the people” had a “right * * * to keep and bear” for the purpose of Militia service. In fact, proponents of “the individual right to keep and bear arms” routinely disregarded, derided, denounced, and even demonized people who attempted to bring the Militia into the otherwise wide-ranging and strident national debate about “gun control”. At the same time, “gun controllers” devised one excuse after another for constricting the class of “firearms appropriate to the purpose of * * * personal protection”—until, in judicial decisions such as Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017), they popularized the notion that “weapons of war” are not “appropriate to the purpose of * * * personal protection”. Under this theory, no firearm which has been, is being, or could under any circumstances be used as a “weapon of war” in any sort of “war” would be so “appropriate”. And therefore every such firearm—including essentially every type of firearm produced since the late 1890s—could be subjected to “restrictions”.

Worse yet from the perspective of political inclusiveness and persuasiveness, by their narrow focus on firearms advocates of “the individual right to keep and bear arms” limited the natural and necessary constituency from which they could and should have drawn adherents to their cause. In declaring that “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”, the Second Amendment neither states nor suggests any limitation on the types of “security” which may be involved. So, if the opponents of “gun control” had drawn attention to the many possible responsibilities of the Militia other than the performance of military, para-military, and police functions involving firearms, they could have favorably influenced people indifferent to firearms, but who were willing to contribute their own efforts in some other manner towards thoroughgoing public preparedness at the Local level where they lived and worked. With such a broad-based constituency, a movement aimed at full enforcement of the Second Amendment could have made headway in many States, or in some States, or surely even in a single State, and thus have shown to some degree what could be done throughout this country. But what “could have happened” did not happen, because it was given no chance to happen.

To be sure, that was then, this is now. Nevertheless, with respect to the “covid-19” panic, le plus ça change le plus c’est la même chose. True enough, Americans of apparently all political persuasions are buying firearms and ammunition in record amounts for the purpose of personal protection. Nevertheless, this has not stopped, reversed, retarded, or deterred the systematic suppression of their constitutional freedoms (let alone preparations for a full-blown military takeover in the name of the continuity of government). Rather, under the gossamer-thin camouflage of politicians’ and “technocrats’” unctuous concerns for “public health”, one tyrannical edict after another has encroached on everyone’s “life, liberty, and property”. And “the individual right to keep and bear arms” has done nothing, because it is incapable of doing anything, about it.

To be fair to them, proponents of “the individual right to keep and bear arms” do not tout its defense specifically as a public-health measure—although perhaps they should, inasmuch as the most aggressive pseudo-scientific “gun controllers” argue that civilians’ possession of firearms constitutes a danger to public health, and should be prohibited on that ground alone. Yet, even before the emergence of “covid-19”, “the individual right to keep and bear arms” had proven itself incompetent to defeat old-fashioned, run-of-the-mill “gun control”.

Beyond dispute, throughout America “gun controllers” are more numerous, more organized, more fanatic, and more successful today than ever before. Rather than having been eliminated, they have “gone viral”. It seems that, on balance, We the People’s disloyal “representatives” are churning out far more legislation and judicial decisions in favor of “gun control” than against it—as evidenced by the recent sorry experience of Virginians in the 2020 Session of their General Assembly. And “gun controllers” are recording achievements far more consequential than what they attained in the Gun Control Act of 1968—achievements which would never have had a proverbial snowball’s chance in Hell of passage at that time.

Certainly the vaunted decision of the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), has not slowed, let alone stopped, the advance of “gun control”. To the contrary, in some instances Heller has aided, if not accelerated, it. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017). And, irony of ironies, notwithstanding Heller people in the District of Columbia cannot obtain the very firearms which Heller ruled that they have a constitutional right to possess. For as of this writing, the one actual federal firearms licensee in the District has refused to transfer firearms to residents of the District. And although the Mayor has designated the metropolitan police department as an ersatz FFL, residents of the District may take advantage of that dispensation to acquire only rifles or shotguns, not handguns. See, e.g.,

Dailycaller.com
Dcist.com

So (in Southey’s words) Heller “‘twas a famous victory” indeed! But one which, in its inapplicability in the very place where it should be applicable, proves the fecklessness of “the individual right to keep and bear arms”.

“The individual right to keep and bear arms” has failed to eliminate “gun control”, because it is incapable of eliminating “gun control”. After all, according to its own proponents, the ultimate defense of that right is litigation. (Endless litigation, too, because, as Heller evidences, even a decision of the Supreme Court favorable to “the individual right to keep and bear arms” will not necessarily secure that right for the class of people to whom the decision applies.) So, as soon as some egregious piece of “gun-control” legislation is enacted, the champions of “the individual right” announce that they will rectify the situation through a major “test case” in the courts. This is more a proof of their naïveté (or their desperation) than a “test” of anything. For what seasoned legal-cum-political strategist would consider it a wise operational plan to allow “gun controllers” both to take the strategic offensive in the legislatures and to adopt the tactical defensive in the courts?

All too often, going to “law” in contemporary America’s kangaroo courts in defense of basic constitutional freedoms is a fool’s errand. Certainly, proponents of “the individual right to keep and bear arms” can never hope to prevail decisively, once and for all, when the supposed “standard” for the constitutionality of each new “gun-control” measure is some so-called “compelling governmental interest” the existence of which legislators in the initial, judges in the final, analysis claim the authority to determine on a statute-by-statute, case-by-case basis, according to their own idiosyncratic notions of what appears “commonsensical” and “reasonable” to them at the time. No issue of “gun control” can ever be permanently settled on the basis of “the individual-right theory”, because a “compelling governmental interest” is not a scientific concept, subject to final verification or falsification through objective analysis. Rather, what some judges may opine is not a “compelling governmental interest” today other judges can (and probably will) find to be a “compelling governmental interest” tomorrow. As long as “gun control” is disputed on these terms, “gun controllers” will have the upper hand.

Worse yet, while proponents of “the individual right to keep and bear arms” serially contend with “gun controllers” in legislatures and courts over whether some new restrictions infringe on that right or not, the real task confronting patriotic Americans remains neglected. “The individual right” has done nothing to advance the Militia (or any other form of nationwide collectively organized public preparedness). Indeed, it has undermined the Militia by misidentifying “the core value” of the Second Amendment as personal (rather than community) self-defense. Its most prominent spokesmen ignore the Militia entirely, belittle the Militia, or treat the Militia as some sort of dangerous extremist conception. And if they support “militia” at all, it is as ad hoc self-selected groups of private individuals dispersed throughout the hinterlands and disconnected from one another, which supposedly somehow, somewhere, some day, and in some way (all unspecified) will be able to coalesce—to organize, equip, discipline, and train their members to act in unison—and then to defeat the centrally controlled, highly organized, well armed, firmly disciplined, and thoroughly trained forces of a nationwide tyranny.

If the truth be told in all of its depressing detail, “the individual right to keep and bear arms” is conceptually fantastic, because it utterly disregards the pre-constitutional history of the Colonial and State Militia which establishes what “[a] well regulated Militia” is, what the inextricable interrelationship between such a Militia and “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is, and therefore what the substance of that right is. It is constitutionally fallacious, because it separates the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment from the last fourteen words, in violation of logical, linguistic, and legal principles. It is fatuous, because the notion that isolated individuals, no matter what “rights” each of them may claim in theory, can in fact provide “the security of a free State” rests upon an ill-founded hope predicated upon a dearth of practical insight. It is futile, because it cannot protect itself against legislative and judicial aggression launched under color of such phony rubrics as “compelling governmental interest”, “public safety”, “for the children”, “commonsense regulation”, and so on ad nauseum. It is factious, because it enables “gun controllers” to incite one segment of society against another—namely, people who are suspicious of firearms versus owners of firearms—whereas promotion of the Militia would unite Americans of all persuasions as to the necessity for collectively organized security of every type in every Locality involving everyone throughout this country. It would surely be exposed as feckless in the face of attacks by the armed myrmidons of any usurpers or tyrants worthy of those names. And ultimately it will prove fatal to “the security of a free State”, because it cannot succeed on its own terms, and by its perverse misreading of the Second Amendment prevents revitalization of the Militia from succeeding.

Part Five

Even identifying who is largely to blame for this country’s present vulnerability to the imposition of a full-blown despotic “technocracy” does not specify what is to be done about this situation, however. For that, recourse must be had to the old adage that every cloud has a silver lining.

As the dark cloud of the “covid-19” panic has cast its shadow across this country, insightful Americans have come to realize that “technocracy” and allied tyranny in other forms—what could be described in the words of the Declaration of Independence as “a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object [which] evinces a design to reduce the[ People] under absolute Despotism”—are endemic and solidly entrenched within governmental apparatuses at every level of the federal system. To those with eyes to see, the panic has also exposed “the individual right to keep and bear arms” as useless against the dangers these “abuses and usurpations” pose.

The silver lining is that, because of this crisis, Americans can finally realize that fixation on “the individual right to keep and bear arms” has flushed some fifty years’ worth of misguided efforts down the soil-pipe of history, leaving them intellectually, politically, and legally bankrupt. Now, at last, they can see how everything which has gone wrong points out what must be done to set things right.

Patriots who do not die of fright induced by the pseudo-scientific scare-tactics of public-health “technocrats”, the threats of rogue public officials, and the rants of bobble-heads in the mainstream media can and should recognize the “covid-19” panic as an irrefutable reason to demand revitalization of the Militia. Indeed, the crisis must be so used, because America’s domestic enemies surely will rely upon it, again and again, as the precedent for pushing this country, faster and faster, farther and farther, along the path of totalitarianism, both within the United States and through the imposition of some “globalist” régime.

So, how are patriots to go about revitalizing the Militia? In outline—

(1) Patriots must put into the proper context the principles of popular sovereignty enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, “That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of the[ ] ends [for which Governments are instituted among Men], it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government”, and that “when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce the[ People] under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government”. We the People can invoke these rights, duties, and powers at any time the People deem their application to be appropriate. Today, however, to suppress “technocracy” and establish a full set of checks and balances enforceable against public officials by the People themselves requires neither that the People “alter”, “abolish”, or “throw off” any government existing within the federal system, nor that they “institute new Government” anywhere within America. For the “Form of Government” the Founders handed down to the People has not become destructive of the[ ] ends” for which it was originally instituted.

True enough, this country has suffered, and continues to suffer, from “a long train of abuses and usurpations”—of which the existence and operations of “administrative agencies” stuffed with “technocrats” are egregious examples. And, true enough, this “long train” has “become[ ] destructive of the[ ] ends” for which America’s federal system of government was instituted. The problem, however, is not this country’s “Form of Government”, but instead the “abuses and usurpations” which deform governmental apparatuses at the National, State, and even Local levels. By definition, these “abuses and usurpations” are not parts of the “Form of Government”. The “Form of Government” neither allows for nor approves of them. Inasmuch as We the People can “alter”, “abolish”, or even “throw off” an entire “Form of Government [which] becomes destructive of the[ ] ends” for which it was instituted, they surely can exercise the “just powers” their forebears originally delegated to that “Form of Government” so that it may continue to serve those “ends”. They surely can revitalize, rejuvenate, and renovate—in order to protect, preserve, and pass on to their posterity—“the [existing] Form of Government” by “abolish[ing]” or “throw[ing] off” all of the encrusted “abuses and usurpations” which have neither place nor purpose therein.

Notwithstanding what hysterical charges “technocrats” and their allies amongst rogue public officials can be expected to broadcast, calling and working for revitalization of the Militia—by constitutional means, of course—in order to put down “technocracy” and to establish, finally, a full set of checks and balances enforceable against public officials throughout the federal system by We the People themselves is not some sort of “rebellion” against established authority. Rather, the “long train of abuses and usurpations” in which “technocrats” and rogue public officials have engaged for decade upon decade constitutes open and obvious “rebellion” against American’s “Form of Government”. For under that “Form of Government” “technocrats” and rogue public officials can claim no authority whatsoever. See the present author’s book Three Rights (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., 2013)

(2) By carefully perusing the Constitution, patriots must come to the realization that the only way We the People can exercise their right, duty, and power to secure their “Form of Government” now and for the future is by revitalizing the Militia. Patriots must stop fixating on the last fourteen words of the Second Amendment and instead take into proper account its first thirteen words, too, along with the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution to which all twenty-seven words of the Amendment relate (that is, Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16, and Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). They must come to the conclusions that: (i) “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” so that “the people” will always be capable of serving in “well regulated Militia” and thereby providing “the security of a free State” to themselves through their own efforts; (ii) “the people” have a constitutional right “to keep and bear Arms” in “well regulated Militia”; and (iii) “well regulated Militia” in which “the people” can “keep and bear Arms”for Militia service must exist at all times. (And, of course, because “the people” in “well regulated Militia” have a constitutional right to “keep and bear Arms” of all types at all times, they obviously have an allied constitutional right to use those “Arms” for personal self-defense when that need arises.) See the present author’s book Thirteen Words (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., 2013).

(3) To prevent revitalization of the Militia from being perceived as some kind of warmed-over Second-Amendment confidence-game cooked up by the so-called “gun lobby” simply to promote the sales of firearms to America’s gullible “Deplorables”, its proponents must appeal to and recruit large numbers of Americans who heretofore have been outside of the set of typical owners of firearms, have been disinterested in or ambivalent towards that Amendment, and may even have been sympathetic to “gun control”. The “covid-19” crisis will prove invaluable in this endeavor. For, obviously, everyone is in the same boat with respect to the defense and maintenance of public health against “technocrats’” incompetence, arrogance, and lust for power. So everyone has the same interest in revitalization of the Militia on that score—which necessarily will result in revitalization of the Militia with respect to all of the other activities in which the Militia could, should, and would engage, whether involving firearms or not.

(4) America’s self-styled “élitists” being her most committed and (notwithstanding their relative paucity of numbers) most dangerous domestic enemies, the movement to revitalize the Militia must aim at organizing masses of ordinary Americans at “the grass roots”. Thirteen years ago, the present author described a plan to start the process at the Local level through individual citizens’ concerted efforts to form “citizens’ homeland security associations”. See Constitutional “Homeland Security”: The Nation in Arms (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., 2007). Unfortunately, next to no one has paid any attention to these suggestions—for thirteen years. Now, the “covid-19” panic has created an entirely different environment. On the one hand, so far through 2020 Americans have been shown how quickly despotic executive decrees can be promulgated and put into practice on the airy advice of public-health “technocrats”, in plain violation not only of the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, but also of all sorts of protections of individuals’ rights to be found in various statutes and judicial decisions. On the other hand, Virginia’s “Second Amendment Sanctuary” movement from late 2019 into early 2020 (and which, one hopes, will continue well into the future) has demonstrated how quickly Local governments prodded by Local citizens can generate official resolutions, remonstrances, and protests against—and refusals to comply with—acts of governmental “overreach” proposed at the State level. (To be sure, so far these Local initiatives have taken the form of words alone, not actions. But that they have occurred at all is singularly significant.)

(5) In line with the suggestions made in The Nation in Arms, now to be improved by insights and experience gained from the “covid-19” crisis, Local citizens should organize private “citizens’ homeland security associations” (under that or some other innocuous name), as much as possible in close conjunction with Local governments through liaison teams which will keep Local officials informed of what the citizenry is doing and why.

(6) As soon as practicable, citizens should encourage, prod, and pressure their Local governments to use whatever powers they possess to set up official “citizens’ emergency-preparedness teams” (under that or some other innocuous designation), initially by drawing upon the “citizens homeland security associations” already established in their Localities, then by recruiting as many other people as possible as quickly and expeditiously as possible. Although these teams will not be “Militia” in the constitutional sense, and should not be denominated as or considered to be “militia” in any sense, they probably can be assigned some (perhaps a great deal of) “militia”-like authority under the States’ “emergency-preparedness” statutes which authorize planning and action by Local governments. See, e.g., Code of Virginia § 44-146.19(E). And, in some jurisdictions, Sheriffs might organize such “citizens’ emergency-preparedness teams” as units of the posse comitatus (although this might prove problematical, inasmuch as in many places a posse comitatus may be organized only as an ad hoc response to a particular law-enforcement situation).

(7) From a position of strength obtained through widespread political and community organization already had, Local public officials should demand that State officials form Local, Regional, and State-wide investigatory commissions or committees to determine how—not “whether”, but how—full revitalization of the Militia should proceed throughout their State. And if State officials dawdle, tarry, neglect, fail, or refuse to take the necessary actions, Local governments should set up these commissions or committees for and amongst themselves on their own initiatives, all the while organizing, completing, perfecting, and when necessary deploying their own “citizens’ emergency preparedness teams”.

To these ends, Local officials should employ the “Second Amendment Sanctuary” approach made famous in Virginia—with the difference that, rather than “sanctuaries” established solely for defense of “the individual right to keep and bear arms” against the aggression of “gun controllers” in the State’s central government, “citizens’ emergency-preparedness teams” would be salients out of which counterattacks would be launched to win the big battle once and for all, through revitalization of the Militia.

(8) The commissions or committees recommended above would provide the information and impetus for State officials to begin the process of revitalizing the Militia at the State level with new statutes based upon the experience gained at the Local level (and delegating to officials at that level a great deal of autonomy for further experimentation and evaluation).

(9) Then States individually, or through interstate commissions, would demand that Congress proceed to revitalize the Militia at the National level in a manner consistent with and supportive of what the States have done. This work should be closely coördinated with the President of the United States, who has a direct personal interest in the project. See Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, and Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution; and, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 252 and 253.

(10) Finally, one should hope that leading individual and institutional proponents of “the individual right to keep and bear arms” will wake up and play at least a supportive rôle in this endeavor. To be sure, proponents of “the individual-right theory” are only half right—but even a halfwit is better than no wit at all. Some of these institutions—such as the NRA—are well organized and funded. Some have significant presences on the Internet and in the alternative media. Some can boast large numbers of members and hangers-on who will follow their leaders’ recommendations. Some have extensive experience in public relations, lobbying, litigation, and the election of candidates to public office. And, most realistically, right now they are all Americans have with which to work.

Suggestions such as these, though, are one thing, actions another. Unfortunately, time is fast running out. Bismarck is said to have quipped: “Let us leave a few problems for our children to solve; otherwise they might be so bored.” Americans cannot leave this problem for their children to solve. When, in his earlier commentaries, the present author urged his countrymen to revitalize the Militia “immediately, if not sooner”, he intended that quip to embody the quintessence of urgency. The way things are going now, however, the Militia had better be revitalized well before that.

© 2020 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




The Offensiveness of Taking Political Offense

Dr. Edwin Vieira, JD, Ph.D

Not long ago, in the course of an acrimonious debate over one radical “gun-control” bill under consideration in the 2020 session of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, a Republican Senator charged that “[e]very legislator that votes in favor of this bill is, in my opinion, a traitor to Virginia, a traitor to the Second Amendment, and traitor to our constitutional freedoms”. In response, a Democratic Senator intoned that “I would like her to know that I am deeply offended that she has accused anyone on this floor of treason”. See <https://wtvr.com/2020/01/22/virginia- senate-passes-red-flag-gun-law-over-fierce-opposition/>,  at 5.

Unfortunately, the Democratic Senator’s rejoinder was typical of a dismissive attitude towards political opposition which has become all too common these days: namely, that if the target of some criticism simply denounces it as subjectively “offensive” to her (or him), there is no need for her (or him) actually to refute it objectively by reference to matters of fact, by citations of rules of law, or even by appeals to the principles of logic. “Because I feel personally offended at what you say, you are wrong simply for saying it!” is supposed to suffice. The Democratic Senator would have done better, however, to have swallowed her “offense” until she had perused the relevant law.

Article IV, Section 9 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia provides that “Members of the General Assembly shall, in all cases except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the sessions of their respective houses; and for any speech or debate in either house shall not be questioned in any other place. They shall not be subject to arrest under any civil process during the sessions of the General Assembly, or during the fifteen days before the beginning or after the ending of any session.” (This is similar to the provision which applies to Members of Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.)

As Virginia’s Constitution thus plainly recognizes, it certainly is possible for a “Member[ ] of the General Assembly” to commit “treason”, and to be arrested under criminal process for “treason”, “during the sessions of the General Assembly”, even for some act which he (or she) has committed or is committing under color of his (or her) capacity as a legislator. Moreover, it is the duty of anyone and everyone who may know of a supposed act of “treason” committed by such Member to report it: “If any person knowing of * * * treason shall not, as soon as may be, give information thereof to the Governor, or some conservator of the peace, he shall be guilty of a Class 6 Felony.” Code of Virginia § 18.2-482.

Of course, “any speech or debate in either house” of Virginia’s General Assembly is absolutely privileged, because politicians’ mere words, even when they propose or endorse “treason”, are unlikely to harm anyone. And free and open debate—even, perhaps especially, when the speakers are half-witted legislators—is the best means to expose bad ideas for what they really are. But a legislator’s act of voting for a bill which, when enacted, imposes the baneful effects of “treason” on its subjects must itself be “treasonous”.

True enough, rogue legislators will always avoid enforcing such an ersatz “law” in the field with their own hands. Instead, they will despatch armed myrmidons to do their dirty work. Nonetheless, “if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors”. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 126 (1807) (emphasis supplied). As the Founding Fathers in Virginia (and elsewhere throughout America) well knew from their studies of English law, “a bare Conspiracy * * * cannot amount to Treason, unless it is actually levied; yet * * * in all Cases, if the Treason be actually compleated, the Conspirators * * * are Traitors as much as the Actors”; and “there can be no Doubt but that he, who by Command or Persuasion induces another to commit Treason, is himself a Traitor * * * and yet he does no Act but by Words”. William Hawkins, A Treatise of The Pleas of the Crown (London, England: E. and R. Nutt, and R. Gosling, Third Edition, 1739), Book I, Chapter 17, § 27, at 38; and § 39, at 39.

Under Virginia’s present law, “treason” is defined as: “(1) Levying war against the Commonwealth; (2) Adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort; (3) Establishing, without authority of the legislature, any government within its limits separate from the existing government; (4) Holding or executing, in such usurped government, any office, or professing allegiance or fidelity to it; or (5) Resisting the execution of the law under color of its authority.” Code of Virginia § 18.2-481.

The most obnoxious “gun-control” bills introduced in the 2020 session of the Commonwealth’s General Assembly have all aimed, by one means or another, directly or indirectly, at disarming ordinary Virginians of various types of firearms and accessories (in particular, so-called “assault firearms”), and at making it difficult for such Virginians to train with whatever firearms may be left to them. So, on their faces, these bills are obviously repugnant to Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Virginia, which provides (in pertinent part) “[t]hat a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”. (This, in addition to the bills’ violations of Article VI, Clauses 2 and 3 of, and the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to, the Constitution of the United States.)

Under Virginia’s law, “a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people” is not some private group outside and inddependent of and potentially antagonistic to the government, but instead is an integral part of the Commonwealth’s government, defined by statute: “The militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia shall consist of all able-bodied residents of the Commonwealth who are citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied persons resident in the Commonwealth who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, who are at least 16 years of age and, [with a few statutory exceptions], not more than 55 years of age. The militia shall be divided into three classes: the National Guard, which includes the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard; the Virginia Defense Force; and the unorganized militia.” Code of Virginia § 44-1. For purposes of simplicity, analysis here can focus solely on members of “the unorganized militia”—for these constitute “the body of the people” who make up the bulk of the Militia.

Notice that, although Virginia’s statute defines a class of “unorganized militia”, it does not describe this class as being “unarmed”, “disarmed”, or in any other manner prohibited, prevented, or otherwise precluded—or capable of being prohibited, prevented, or otherwise precluded—from “keep[ing] and bear[ing] arms” suitable for service in the Militia. As the Constitution of the United States plainly shows in the power of Congress “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 16), “organizing”, “arming”, and “disciplining” are distinct categories of authority and action. Therefore, a statute which declares some class of the Militia to be “unorganized” does not thereby imply that the members of that class are to remain “unarmed”, let alone that they are to be disarmed of whatever arms, whether of all types or only of certain types, they already possess, or to be prohibited from acquiring such arms in the free market. This, of course, makes perfect logistical sense, because it would self-evidently be far easier to organize into various units citizens who were already armed than to provide actual arms to citizens who happened merely to be already assigned on paper to such units.

As to the “arms” which members of the Militia may—indeed, must—keep and bear, the constitutional standard is clear enough. The “possession or use” of a firearm comes within “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” if that firearm “at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”, if that “weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment”, or if “its use could contribute to the common defense”. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). If the most egregious “gun-control” bills proposed in the 2020 session of Virginia’s General Assembly did not have the purpose of defying and nullifying this rule, had they been enacted into “law” they surely would have had that effect.

Now, if rogue Members of Virginia’s General Assembly (i) should enact some ersatz “law” which purported to confiscate firearms from members of “the unorganized militia”, or to prevent them from acquiring firearms in the free market, or to prohibit them from training with firearms—overall, to render them incapable of performing their governmental function as members of the Militia; and if (ii) those Members of the General Assembly should purport in that or some other “law” to authorize armed thugs to arrest, imprison, or perhaps even kill or wound members of “the body of the people” (i.e., ordinary Virginians) who resisted such confiscation, prevention, or prohibition; then (iii) as soon as those hirelings were despatched to oppress the populace through armed force (presumably, on and after the day the “law” became effective), those Members of the General Assembly as well as their hirelings could justifiably be described as “[l]evying war against the Commonwealth”. For inasmuch as “a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state”; and inasmuch as the Commonwealth of Virginia is “a free state”; then any armed attack against “the body of the people” which aimed at depriving them of the ability to function as “a well regulated militia” would necessarily amount to “[l]evying war against the Commonwealth”, and thus to “treason”.

To be sure, “treason” does require at some point “the actual employment of force”. “To complete the crime of levying war * * * , there must be an actual assemblage of men for the purpose of executing a treasonable design.” Nevertheless, “if a body of men be actually assembled, for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors”. So, although “‘some actual force or violence must be used, in pursuance of * * * [a] design to levy war’”, “‘it is altogether immaterial, whether the force used is sufficient to effectuate the object; any force connected with the intention will constitute the crime of levying war’”. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 128, 127, 126, and 128 (1807).

In short, no matter what subjective “offense” they might profess to take when criticized for their actions, those Members of Virginia’s General Assembly who voted for radical forms of “gun control” would thereby have objectively lain the groundwork for “[l]evying war against the Commonwealth”. Not only that. They would also objectively have lain the groundwork for “[a]dhering to [the Commonwealth’s] enemies”—both foreign and domestic—“giving them aid and comfort”. For what “enemies” would not find “aid and comfort” in policies which systematically deprived the Commonwealth of “the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state”?

In addition, inasmuch as “a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state”, such a Militia is in principle the most important (if perhaps today is in practice the most overlooked) component of the government of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Without the Militia in being, the constitutional government of Virginia would in principle fall into disarray, if not even cease pro tanto to exist, because, bereft of her “proper, natural, and safe defense”, Virginia would no longer qualify as “a free state”. What remained would be nothing less than an “usurped government”. For “usurpation” is the exercise of a power which the law denies to the person purporting to exercise it. Under Virginia’s Constitution, no Member of the General Assembly may wield a power to vote for any bill which “infringe[s]” “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” suitable for their service in the Militia. For if a bill is unconstitutional, a legislator’s vote for it to become an unconstitutional “law” can be no less unconstitutional. So, if majorities in the General Assembly should knowingly and intentionally defy this prohibition, to that extent they would act as an “usurped government”—which also constitutes “treason” under Virginia’s law. It should further be noted that any persons who maneuvered behind the scenes to instigate renegade Members of the General Assembly so to misbehave—such as carpet-bagging multi-billionaires from out of State who promoted “gun control” through monetary contributions to candidates’ campaigns and grants to various special-interest groups which plumped for forcible disarmament of “the body of the people”—would also be guilty. For “[i]f any person attempt to establish any * * * usurped government and commit any overt act therefor or by writing or speaking endeavor to instigate others to establish such government, he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.” Code of Virginia § 18.2-483.

Contemporary “gun control” being touted by legislators in Virginia (and elsewhere throughout the United States) must be recognized as objectively a multifaceted manifestation of “treason” (and other crimes allied thereto), because it inevitably and inexorably paves the way for every other sort of oppression that psychopathic domestic “rulers”, no less than foreign conquerors, are capable of perpetrating. No one can deny that “gun control” intentionally aims at depriving the people of precisely those arms most suitable today for military, para-military, and police service in “a well regulated militia” (such as the semi-automatic rifles of otherwise standard military patterns which “gun controllers” mislabel as “assault firearms”)—and, ultimately, of all arms of whatever types that could be employed for any service in the Militia. Worse yet, because “a well regulated militia” is always “the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state”—most especially (as the Declaration of Independence points out) “when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce the [People] under absolute Despotism”, so that it becomes “their right” and “their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new guards for their future security”—the inevitable result of “gun control” enforced to the extreme degree which “gun-control” fanatics desire must be to render “the safe defense of a free state” impossible, to deprive the people of the means to “throw off [an abusive] Government”, and thereby to expose them to all of the ravages of “absolute Despotism” bereft of the wherewithal to protect themselves.

But what is so new about all that? In the hands of its knowing practitioners, “gun control” is not now, just as it has never been, an end in and of itself. Just as it has always been, it remains today an effective means to the most pernicious of all political ends: namely, stripping ordinary people of the ability collectively to assert and defend their sovereignty—that is, their ultimate governmental authority—so that they can be exposed to unlimited oppression by a faux “government” composed of usurpers and tyrants.

Nevertheless, in charity one should not conclusively presume that any Members of Virginia’s present General Assembly who propose or support “gun control” are being subjectively “treasonous”, in the sense that they are fully aware of the true nature of “gun control” and intend to impose it on their constituents nonetheless. The simplest explanation for their behavior is that their minds are devoid of any conception of what the consequences of “gun control” have always been in the past and must inevitably be in the future. They are, in short, what Lenin derisively described as “useful idiots”—dupes, dullards, and dopes who advance the revolutionary agenda of others without understanding that they are doing as much, or even that a revolution is going on, because their minds have become saturated with the trendy political nostrums and ideological nitwitticisms of “gun control” popularized on Twitter, Facebook, and Big Tech’s other brainwashing “platforms”.

If an explanation, however, that is no excuse, let alone a reason for those legislators’ exoneration. Indeed,  “useful idiocy” becomes a wholly implausible diagnosis when it is apparent that a legislator is willfully blind or recklessly indifferent towards the facts. So, such legislators need to stop defending themselves through their knee-jerk assertions of “offense” at criticisms of their aberrant positions, and instead start investigating whether those criticisms are cogent, and (if so) what corrective actions they should take to conform their own behavior to constitutional norms. Public officials’ feigning personal “offense” as a tactic for short-circuiting necessary political debate about their misbehavior has become too offensive to be endured any longer, whether by Virginians or any other Americans.

© 2020 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




“Gun Control” Is A “Badge And Incident Of Slavery”

Dr. Edwin Vieira, JD, PhD

As most politically observant readers of this commentary are all too well aware, in the elections of 2019 the Democratic Party gained an ascendancy in both Houses of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Inasmuch as the Democrats also control the Governorship of Virginia, beginning in 2020 they will be able—if they maintain their party discipline or enlist enough turncoat Republicans as allies—to advance the sort of “gun-control” agenda long and loudly promoted by such zealots as Dianne Feinstein, Charles Schumer, and Michael Bloomberg. The Democrats’ goal in this regard will not be to enact what men of good will and legal insight might consider “reasonable” or “common-sense” legislation. No, indeed. One can expect that Virginia’s Democratic lawmakers will propose bills that any normal American will recognize as radical, extremist, fanatical, hysterical, even lunatic in character.

PART I. An early example of such “gun-control” proposals is Virginia Senate Bill No. 16 (pre-filed on 18 November 2019, and to be offered on 8 January 2020). In pertinent part, this Bill defines an “assault firearm” as inter alia “[a] semi-automatic center-fire rifle * * * that has the ability to accept a detachable magazine and has one of the following characteristics: (i) a folding or telescoping stock; (ii) a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the rifle; (iii) a thumbhole stock; (iv) a second handgrip or a protruding grip that can be held by the non-trigger hand; (v) a bayonet mount; (vi) a grenade launcher; (vii) a flare launcher; (viii) a silencer; (ix) a flash suppressor; (x) a muzzle brake; (xi) a muzzle compensator; (xii) a threaded barrel capable of accepting (a) a silencer; (b) a flash suppressor; (c) a muzzle brake; or (d) a muzzle compensator; or (xiii) any characteristic of like kind as enumerated in clauses (i) through (xii).”

The Bill also provides that “‘[a]ssault firearm’ includes any part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert, modify, or otherwise alter a firearm into an assault firearm, or any combination of parts that may be readily assembled into an assault firearm.”

And the Bill makes it “unlawful for any person to import, sell, transfer, manufacture, purchase, possess, or transport an assault firearm. A violation of this section is punishable as a Class 6 felony.”

So, with but a few imaginable exceptions, Senate Bill No. 16 seeks to outlaw the possession by Virginians of most common semi-automatic rifles with detachable magazines—and essentially all such rifles of the AR and AK patterns—along with an host of parts typically associated with rifles of these types. Upon enactment of this Bill into “law”, all of these rifles and parts will become contraband, as well as evidence of the commission of “a Class 6 felony” by whoever possesses them.

One could justifiably challenge the sponsor and proponents of this Bill to provide proof that any one of the enumerated evil “characteristics” has caused a single “semi-automatic center-fire rifle * * * that has the ability to accept a detachable magazine”, and that has been used in the commission of some crime, to have brought about greater harm to “public safety” than that rifle would have been capable of doing had it lacked those “characteristics”. Exactly when, where, and how, for instance, has “a bayonet mount”, “a grenade launcher”, “a flare launcher”, “a silencer”, “a flash suppressor”, “a muzzle brake”, or “a muzzle compensator” ever been the key, a salient, or even an incidental factor in the perpetration of a crime committed with a “semi-automatic center-fire rifle * * * that has the ability to accept a detachable magazine”? Predictably, no answer will be forthcoming.

An even more vexing conundrum is how a Virginian’s mere possession of any one of the mere parts which the Bill labels an “assault firearm” in and of itself—even without that individual’s possession of a semi-automatic rifle to which such a part could be attached—could be so dangerous to “public safety” as to justify rendering all of those items contraband, and to make the possession of any one of them evidence of the commission of a crime. An reply to this question is even less to be expected than is a response to the previous query.

PART II. It should be obvious to everyone that, on its face, Senate Bill No. 16 is an unconstitutional infringement upon “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” under the supreme laws of both the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia.

FIRST.  The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” And Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Virginia provides “[t]hat a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”. In the Second Amendment “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” refers to that right with respect to Americans in general; whereas in Article I, Section 13 “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” refers to the selfsame right with respect to Virginians in particular. (Hypothetically, it is possible, albeit implausible, to contend that the “right” in Article I, Section 13 is more extensive than the “right” in the Second Amendment. But under no legal logic could it be less so.)

The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in United States v. Miller that a firearm is protected by the Second Amendment if there is “any evidence that possession or use” of such firearm “at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, * * * that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.” 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).

Tested by Miller’s reasoning, the substance of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is exactly the same in both the Second Amendment and Article I, Section 13. For in Miller the Court correctly defined that right “in the light of the law as it existed at the time [the Second Amendment] was adopted”. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (stating the rule of constitutional construction). The Miller Court explicitly relied upon Virginia’s pre-constitutional Militia law of 1785. 307 U.S. at 181-182. And the words “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” now present in Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Virginia derive from the selfsame verbiage in Article 13 of Virginia’s pre-constitutional Declaration of Rights of 1776.

Everyone who understands the capabilities of “semi-automatic center-fire rifle[s] * * * that ha[ve] the ability to accept a detachable magazine and ha[ve] one [or more] of the * * * characteristics” listed in Senate Bill No. 16 knows that such rifles (to apply Miller’s test) could “ha[ve] some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” could easily be “part of the ordinary military equipment” of such a “militia”, and “could contribute to the common defense”. As to this, no doubt is possible. Indeed, the preceding statement would be even more accurate than it is if it read: “such rifles do ‘ha[ve] some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,’ are easily capable of being ‘part of the ordinary military equipment’ of such a ‘militia’, and ‘therefore do contribute to the common defense’”. For such rifles have already been held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit—the jurisdiction of which includes Virginia—to be “‘firearms designed for the battlefield’” and “weapons * * * most useful in military service”. Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 121, 124-125, 144 (4th Cir. 2017). Whatever the defects and demerits of Kolbe may be on matters of law (and many there are), that finding of fact places those firearms squarely within the set of arms protected under Miller.

SECOND. United States v. Miller held that “[t]he signification attributed to the term Militia” in the Constitution of the United States is “that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense” and “that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.” 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939). Here, once again, the Court relied on Virginia’s Militia law of 1785. Id. at 181-182. Moreover, to the very same effect it could have drawn from the far more extensive historical record of Militia laws in the Commonwealth extending from the 1600s throughout the 1700s. See the present author’s The Sword and Sovereignty: The Constitutional Principles of “the Militia of the Several States” (Front Royal, Virginia: CD-ROM Edition, 2013).

The contemporary laws of the United States and of Virginia follow this pattern, unchanged since the late 1700s. Through the exercise of its power in Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution of the United States “[t]o provide for organizing * * * the Militia”, in Section 246 of Title 10 of the United States Code Congress has defined “the unorganized militia” within “[t]he militia of the United States” as consisting of “all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and * * * under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration to become, citizens of the United States”, and “who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia”. And pursuant to Sections 44-1, 44-4, and 44-5 of the Code of Virginia, “the unorganized militia” of “[t]he Militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia” consists “of all able-bodied residents of the Commonwealth who are citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied persons resident in the Commonwealth who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, who are at least 16 years of age and * * *. not more than 55 years of age”, who are not members of the National Guard, the Naval Militia, or the Virginia Defense Force, and who are not statutorily exempted from militia duty.

So, under United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939), beyond a shadow of a constitutional doubt all individuals who are members of “the unorganized militia” within “[t]he militia of the United States” (including all those who reside within the Commonwealth of Virginia), and all individuals who are members of “the unorganized militia” within “[t]he Militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia” enjoy a right under the Second Amendment to possess any and every firearm with respect to which there is “any evidence that possession or use” of such firearm “at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, * * * that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.” And all members of “the unorganized militia” of Virginia enjoy a cognate right under Article I, Section 13. As a practical matter, these rights embrace all of the modern-day “assault firearms” which Senate Bill No. 16 aims to prohibit Virginians from possessing.

Inasmuch as 10 U.S.C. § 246 declares the National Guard and the Naval Militia to be the “the organized militia” within “[t]he militia of the United States”—and inasmuch as Code of Virginia § 44-1 declares the National Guard, the Naval Militia, and the Virginia Defense Force to be “classes” within “[t]he Militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia”—the members of those establishments, too, presumably enjoy the same rights with respect to firearms as do all members of “the unorganized militia” within both “[t]he militia of the United States” and “[t]he Militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia”. Nonetheless, as a matter of constitutional exactitude it should be noted that the National Guard, the Naval Militia, and various State Defense Forces, including Virginia’s, are not true constitutional “Militia” at all—in the sense in which that term is used in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16, and Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States. Instead, they are the “Troops, or Ships of War” which the States may “keep * * * in time of Peace” “with[ ] the Consent of Congress” pursuant to Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution. This, however, can have no adverse effect on the types of firearms which the members of these establishments may of right possess. For, surely, individuals who make up constitutionally authorized State “Troops, or [Sailors on] Ships of War” need “weapon[s]” in their possession which are “part of the ordinary military equipment or * * * [the] use [of which] could contribute to the common defense” no less than do members of the actual constitutional “Militia of the several States”. So, for the purposes of rough analysis here, the National Guard, the Naval Militia, and Virginia’s Defense Force can be assimilated to “Militia”, on the grounds that this simplification is “good enough for government work”.

THIRD. Under the Second Amendment, every State in the Union, including the Commonwealth of Virginia, is “a free State”. Under Article I, Section 13 Virginia is “a free state”.  And for the Constitution of Virginia to be consistent with the Constitution of the United States, the meanings of those terms must be exactly the same.

The “security of a free State” (in the Second Amendment) and the “defense of a free state” (in Article I, Section 13) aim ultimately at the security and defense of each individual residing within the State—obviously because, although individuals in isolation or in groups can exist without a “State” (“free” or otherwise), no “State” can exist without one or more individuals.

In the final analysis, just as “the security of a free State” and the “defense of a free state” depend upon the ability of individuals to participate in the protection of their community through the collective efforts of a Militia, so do the security and defense of each individual as an individual depend upon his own ability to provide his own security and engage in his own defense through his own efforts.

And for that reason each individual residing within the Commonwealth of Virginia, whether or not a member of either “[t]he militia of the United States” or “[t]he Militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia” enjoys a right under both the Second Amendment and Article I, Section 13 to possess for purposes of self-defense whatever firearms members of a Militia may possess under the holding in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939), in addition to the types of firearms at issue in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). The only qualification to this rule is that the individual must be an adult (that is, at least of the age at which he or she would be eligible for enrollment in the Militia), of sound mind, and not under a legal disability imposed as the consequence of a conviction for the commission of a serious crime. (The right of a child temporarily to possess a firearm in order to engage in self-defense is a special case beyond the scope of this commentary.)

FOURTH. Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution of the United States one of the responsibilities of “the Militia” is “to execute the Laws of the Union.”

Inasmuch as one of “the Laws of the Union” is the law of personal self-defense, even those individuals who are not members of “[t]he militia of the United States” perform a “militia” function with respect to those “Laws” when they engage in self-defense. Moreover, inasmuch as the law of personal self-defense is also one of the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, even those individuals who are not members of “[t]he Militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia” perform a “militia” function with respect to the Commonwealth’s laws when they engage in self-defense. Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise anywhere within the United States. For individual self-defense is a “natural right” of all men which allows for immediate and direct execution of the laws by a victim of aggression against its perpetrator—indeed, “it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society.” William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (American Edition, 1771-1773), Volume 3, at 3-4. Thus, by defending himself, an individual also defends his community pro tanto under the aegis of the highest of all laws. In executing “the primary law of nature”, such an individual is acting, as it were, as “a Militia of one”—exercising a right which cannot be “taken away by the law of society”.

For that reason, all individuals enjoy a right to possess whatever firearms, capable of being employed for personal self-defense, members of “[t]he militia of the United States” or members of “[t]he Militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia” may possess under the holding in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939), in addition to the types of firearms at issue in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Again, the only qualification to this rule is that the individual must be an adult (that is, at least of the age at which he or she would be eligible for enrollment in the Militia), of sound mind, and not under a legal disability imposed as the consequence of a conviction for the commission of a serious crime.

IN SUM. Any statute, ordinance, executive order, judicial decision, or other directive or action with the purported force of law promulgated within the Commonwealth of Virginia which would infringe upon, deny, abridge, or otherwise restrict the rights of individuals within “[t]he militia of the United States and “[t]he Militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia”—or even outside of those establishments—to acquire and possess any of the types of firearms described in United States v. Miller is invalid and of no effect perforce of the Second Amendment and of Article I, Clause 13. Virginia Senate Bill No. 16 is such a proposed statute. So, even if enacted, it would be a nullity. For the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled: (i) in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1880), that “[a]n unconstitutional act is void, and is as no law. An offence committed by it is not a crime”—(ii) in Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886), that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties * * * ; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed”—and (iii) in Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97, 101-102 (1887), that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it binds no one and protects no one.”

PART III. The foregoing is what the present author considers to be a trivial solution to the question of whether Virginia Senate Bill No. 16 violates “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”. Certainly less obvious, and arguably more important, is the repugnance of that Bill to the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

If rogue public officials in Virginia should succeed in prohibiting the possession by people eligible for service in the Militia of firearms suitable for use in the Militia, they would  render “the security of a free State” (Second Amendment) and “the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state” (Article I, Section 13) impossible of achievement. Then in what sort of “State” would Virginians live? Various adjectives could be employed to describe that situation—“a police State”, “a totalitarian State”, and so on. In American history, however, the arguably most obvious opposite of “free” is “slave”. So, were the Militia effectively suppressed because their members were disarmed, Virginiana would subsist in “a slave State”, a State in the grip of slavery.

The Constitution of the United States deals with this possibility in the Thirteenth Amendment, which provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” The purpose of this Amendment is not simply to outlaw slavery as an institution, but also to suppress all of “the badges and incidents of slavery” whatever they might be and wherever they might still be found within the United States. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 392 U.S. 409, 438-441 (1968).

During slavery times, the primary “badges and incidents” of the Peculiar Institution—many of which vexed minimally “free” persons of color as well as actual slaves—were well known. Such people were debarred from holding public office; from voting; from serving as jurors; from testifying against White people in judicial proceedings—and from possessing firearms except under the most rigorous restrictions. Prohibitions against the slaves’ possession of firearms was from the slave owners’ vantage point the most crucial, and from the slaves’ perspective the very worst, disability of all the “badges and incidents”, because only with firearms in their own hands, or in the hands of others fighting on their behalf, could the bondsmen have hoped ever to escape their servitude. The history of this point in pre-constitutional Virginia is clear enough:

[1680] “[I]t shall not be lawfull for any negroe or other slave to carry or arme himselfe with any club, staffe, gunn, sword or any other weapon of defence or offence[.]”ACT X, An act for preventing Negroes Insurrections, AT A GENERALL ASSEMBLIE, BEGUNNE AT JAMES CITTIE THE EIGHTH DAY OF JUNE, 1680, in William Waller Hening, The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619 (hereinafter cited as “Laws of Virginia”), Volume 2, at 481.

[1705 and 1709] “That no slave go armed with gun, sword, club, staff, or other weapon * * * : And if any slave shall be found offending herein, it shall be lawful for any person or persons to apprehend and deliver such slave to the next constable or head-borough, who is hereby * * * required, without further order or warrant, to give such slave twenty lashes on his or her bare back, well laid on, and so send him or her home[.]” CHAP. XLIX, An act concerning Servants and Slaves, § XXXV, AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BEGUN AT THE CAPITOL, IN THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG, THE TWENTY-THIRD DAY OF OCTOBER, 1705, in Laws of Virginia, Volume 3, at 459.

Violations of this statute were to be “prosecuted according to the Strictest Severity & Rigor of the Common Law as such Disobedience requires”. A Proclamation (21 March 1709 [1709/10]), in EXECUTIVE JOURNALS OF THE Council of Colonial Virginia, Volume III (May 1, 1705–October 23, 1721), H.R. McIlwaine, Editor (Richmond, Virginia: The Virginia State Library, 1928), at 574.

[1723] “[N]o negro, mulatto, or Indian whatsoever; (except as hereafter excepted,) shall * * * presume to keep, or carry any gun, powder, shot, or any club, or other weapon whatsoever, offensive or defensive; but that every gun, and all powder and shot, and every such club or weapon * * * found or taken in the hands, custody, or possession of any such negro, mulatto, or Indian, shall be taken away; and * * * be forfeited to the seisor and informer, and moreover, every such negro, mulatto, or Indian, in whose hands, custody, or possession, the same shall be found, shall * * * receive any number of lashes, not exceeding thirty-nine, well laid on, on his or her bare back, for every such offence.

“ * * * Provided nevertheless, That every free negro, mullatto, or indian, being a house-keeper, or listed in the militia, may be permitted to keep one gun, powder, and shot; and that those who are not house-keepers, nor listed in the militia * * * , who are now possessed of any gun, powder, shot, or any weapon, offensive or defensive, may sell and dispose thereof, at any time before the last day of October next ensuing. And that all negros, mullattos, or indians, bond or free, living at any frontier plantation, be permitted to keep and use guns, powder, and shot, or other weapons, offensive or defensive; having first obtained a license for the same, from some justice of the peace of the county wherein such plantations lie * * * upon the application of such free negros, mullattos, or indians, or of the owner or owners of such as are slaves[.]” CHAP. IV, An act directing the trial of Slaves, committing capital crimes; and for the more effectual punishing conspiracies and insurrections of them; and for the better government of Negros, Mulattos, and Indians, bond or free, §§ XIV and XV, AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SUMMONED TO BE HELD AT Williamsburg, the fifth day of December, 1722, and by writ of prorogation, begun and holden on the ninth day of May, 1723, in Laws of Virginia, Volume 4, at 131.

[1748] “[N]o negroe, mulattoe, or Indian whatsoever, shall keep, or carry any gun, powder, shot, club, or other weapon, whatsoever, offensive, or defensive, but all and every gun, weapon, and ammunition, found in the custody or possession of any negroe, mulattoe, or Indian, may be seized by any person, and * * * be forfeited to the seizor, for his own use; and moreover, every such offender shall * * * receive * * * any number of lashes, not exceeding thirty nine, on his, or her bare back, well laid on, for every such offence.

“ * * * Provided nevertheless, That every free negroe, mulattoe, or Indian, being a house keeper, may be permitted to keep one gun, powder, and shot: And all negroes, mulattoes, and Indians, bond or free, living at any frontier plantation, may be permitted to keep and use guns, powder, shot, and weapons, offensive, or defensive, by license, from a justice of peace, of the county wherein such plantations lie, to be obtained upon the application of free negroes, mulattoes, or Indians, or of the owners of such as are slaves[.]” CHAP. XXXVIII, An Act directing the trial of Slaves committing capital crimes; and for the more effectual punishing conspiracies and insurrections of them; and for the better government of negroes, mulattoes, and Indians, bond or free, §§ XVIII and XIX, AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BEGUN AND HELD AT The College in Williamsburg, the twenty-seventh day of October, 1748, in Laws of Virginia, Volume 6, at 109-110.

[1785] “No slave shall keep any arms whatever, nor pass unless with written orders from his master or employer, or in his company with arms, from one place to another. Arms in possession of a slave contrary to this prohibition, shall be forfeited to him who will seize them.” CHAP. LXXVII, An act concerning slaves, § IV, AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BEGUN AND HELD At the Public Buildings in the City of Richmond, on Monday the seventeenth day of October[,] one thousand seven hundred and eighty-five, in Laws of Virginia, Volume 12, at 182.

As tyrannical as these pre-constitutional statutes were, in the post-constitutional antebellum period such abuses became even worse. For example:

[1832] “No free negro or mulatto shall be suffered to keep or carry any firelock of any kind, any military weapon, or any powder or lead; and any free negro or mulatto who shall so offend, shall * * * forfeit all such arms and ammunition to the use of the informer; and shall moreover be punished with stripes * * * , not exceeding thirty lashes. And [an earlier Act] * * * authorizing justices of the peace, in certain cases, to permit slaves to keep and use guns or other weapons, powder and shot; and so much of th[at] * * * act as authorizes the county and corporation courts to grant licenses to free negroes and mulattoes to keep or carry any firelock of any kind, any military weapon, or any powder or lead, * * * are hereby repealed.” CHAP. XXII, An act to amend an act entitled, “an act reducing into one the several acts concerning slaves, free negroes and mulattoes, and for other purposes” [Passed March 15th, 1832], § 4, ACTS PASSED AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, BEGUN AND HELD AT THE CAPITOL, IN THE CITY OF RICHMOND, ON MONDAY, THE FIFTH DAY OF DECEMBER, ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND THIRTY-ONE (Richmond, Virginia: Thomas Ritchie, 1832), at 21.

Today, Senate Bill No. 16 aims to set up a system of “gun control” more extensive and draconian than what existed in slavery times. Its iron broom of prohibitions will sweep up far more victims than did the corresponding “badge and incident of slavery” in antebellum Virginia. For now all Virginians—whether Black, White, or of any other race; and supposedly completely “free” men and women to boot—are to be precluded from possessing the very “assault firearms” which are particularly suitable for use in the Militia, even if those people are house-keepers, are listed in the Militia, or can wrangle a license from some justice of the peace. And whatever one’s opinion of the severity of a penalty of twenty, thirty, or thirty-nine lashes “well laid on” for violations of Virginia’s pre-constitutional “gun-control” laws, the punishment for commission of a contemporary “Class 6 felony” is worse: namely, “a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five years, or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without a jury, confinement in jail for not more than 12 months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either or both.” Code of Virginia § 18.2-10(f).

In sum, Virginia Senate Bill No. 16 would be repugnant to the Thirteenth Amendment even if the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Virginia had never been enacted. For, under the Thirteenth Amendment, slavery shall not exist within the United States. Slavery exists pro tanto whenever and wherever any of its “badges and incidents” exist. So no “badge and incident” of slavery shall exist anywhere within the United States, even in Virginia. The scheme of “gun control” embodied in Senate Bill No. 16 seeks to impose on all Virginians “the badge and incident of slavery” most obnoxious to slaves because most necessary to the maintenance of slavery—and does so in a manner more egregious than did “gun control” on people of color during slavery times. Therefore, Bill No. 16 shall not exist—or at least should not exist. What will become of it, however, only time will tell.

© 2019 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




The 9-11 Event, The President, And The Militia

Edwin Vieira

One need not have earned an advanced degree in the natural sciences, in engineering, in law, or in any of the disciplines related to the art of politics to be able to recognize that, first, with regard to what this study denotes as “the 9-11 Event”, it is not just some proverbial rotten Danish cheese which smells to high heaven in this country—and that, second, no matter what difficulties may need to be overcome, something drastic must be done to correct this stinking state of affairs, immediately if not sooner. In the present author’s estimation, the one and only sure way to unearth the definitive truth of the 9-11 Event is to enlist a patriotic President of the United States along with “the Militia of the several States” in the inquiry.

1- The 9-11 Event abounds with anomalies which cast serious doubt upon, if they do not disprove altogether, the conspiracy theory public officials have put forward to explain what happened.

Anomalies—that is, matters of proven fact which are abnormal, incongruous, deviant, or extremely peculiar—often provide the best circumstantial evidence that a purported explication of an event is faulty, fictitious, fantastic, or even fraudulent. This is especially the case when interested parties attempt to dispose of those anomalies with conspiracy theories which contradict fundamental principles of scientific, legal, and political analysis. The 9-11 Event and its aftermath are replete with just such anomalies, which render the official conspiracy theory of that horrendous crime not simply problematic and implausible, but even gravely suspicious; and which leave open to doubt whether that theory can be adequately tested through employment of the normal legal and political means available to the American people.[1] To wit—

  • Anomalous disregard of, and even disdain for, proper application of the scientific method and protocols in such disciplines as physics, engineering, and forensics to investigation of the 9-11 Event on the part of public officials in multiple instances. These anomalies insult the laws of nature.
  • Anomalous acts of omission and commission by public officials and private parties concerting with them in connection with various governmental investigations, or with failures or refusals to conduct such inquiries, related to the 9-11 Event. These anomalies violate the laws of the United States.
  • Anomalous failures or refusals to demote or dismiss from their positions, let alone to punish, any of the civilian or military officials who proved woefully derelict in the fulfillment of their duties to expose the plot hatched, or to prevent the attacks launched, by “the terrorists” whom the official conspiracy theory identified as the perpetrators of the 9-11 Event. These anomalies set at naught the principles of sound administration, not just of the government of the United States, but of any organization, public or private, charged with a responsibility to protect Americans’ lives.
  • Anomalous nonfeasance and misfeasance by the big “mainstream media” with respect to the absence of true investigative journalism, including a general disinclination to go behind or beyond the obviously flawed official explanation of the 9-11 Event, as well as a general disregard for, and even orchestrated disparagement, denunciation, and demonization of, the so-called “9-11 truthers” who do convincingly challenge that explanation. These anomalies run contrary to both the moral responsibility and the institutional self-interest which should direct the course of a truly free press in relation to the elucidation of a matter of grave National importance.[2]

And, perhaps worst of all,

  • Anomalous disinterest on the part of a sizable portion of the general public as to whether the cartoonish conspiracy theory of the 9-11 Event put forward by public officials and echoed by the big media is a bona fide explanation at all, or is (in the jargon of intelligence operatives) merely “an old grey mare”—as well as anomalous disregard for whether even the possibility of some more plausible explanation should be entertained. Whatever their source—be it the rank ignorance and insouciance of a “dumbed down” population, the naïve credence all too many citizens carelessly tend to afford to governmental pronouncements, cognitive dissonance, or some combination of such causes—these anomalies offend the first principle of “a Republican Form of Government”.[3] For such a “Government is * * * one constructed on th[e] principle, that the Supreme Power resides in the body of the people”.[4] And where the people themselves are sovereign, they must recognize, accept, and tirelessly labor under the ultimate—indeed, the absolute—responsibility to ensure the enforcement of the laws which derive from their delegation of “just powers” to their government.[5]

These peculiarities are simply too numerous, too notorious, too improbable, too much the products of demonstrable human actions, and too consequential to be explained by recourse to “chaos theory” rather than to a “conspiracy theory”. Obviously, something is grievously wrong here, and not just accidentally and inexplicably so. The question remains, though: “What can be done to rectify this situation?”

2- Numerous difficulties will beset any investigation of the 9-11 Event which might be capable of bringing the salient facts to light and the principal perpetrators to justice.

Every politically perceptive American suspects with moral certainty that the individuals whom the official narrative of the 9-11 Event has fingered as its perpetrators were no more a mere “handful of terrorists” who by themselves brought it about than Lee Harvey Oswald was “the lone gunman” who shot President John F. Kennedy. Plainly, the particular individuals identified as the guilty parties in the official history of the 9-11 Event were not the only, and certainly not the central and directing, figures either in the fantastic conspiracy theory of the commission of the crime to which officialdom subscribes; or in the real conspiracy the existence of which officialdom denies, which consists of the evasions, cover-ups, lies, and floods of disinformation that followed the 9-11 Event and continue to this very day.

The problem, however, is that Americans’ moral certitude by itself cannot translate directly into exposure, arrests, indictments, and criminal convictions of the actual guilty parties. No matter how much evidence may be marshaled in the court of public opinion to prove that the official explanations of various aspects of the 9-11 Event are false (and on the part of some participants in official investigations knowingly so), nothing can be done to conduct a thoroughgoing and conclusive inquiry, let alone to bring to justice in a court of law the individuals culpable for the complex of crimes encompassed within that Event, unless some public officials—possessed not only of sufficient authority but also of the necessary personal independence, integrity, and courage—take up this matter.

Moreover, those Americans in private station who are intent upon getting to the bottom of the 9-11 Event, letting the chips fall where they may, are not now in possession of all of the requisite evidence, do not now have access to most of that evidence, do not now know the even the nature let alone the extent of much of the evidence being withheld from them, and can never hope to obtain such knowledge, access, and possession without more substantial assistance from public officials than has been made available to date. Consider, for example, the following alternatives:

  • The Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law * * * abridging * * * the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”.[6] Nonetheless, freedom of petition is useful only if the public officials to whom “the people” direct their petitions exercise the authority—and, more important, exhibit the willingness—to respond in a timely and effective manner. These days, however, apparently so few (if any) such officials exist with respect to citizens’ demands for governmental inquiries into the 9-11 Event that the lament in the Declaration of Independence is applicable: “In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury”—including officials’ dissemination of rank disinformation, when disregard of and disdain for the petitioners are not their only responses.
  • Civil lawsuits—such as could be initiated by survivors of the 9-11 Event or the relatives of its victims—depend, not only upon the willingness of suitable plaintiffs to come forward, but also upon their possession of evidence sufficient to charge named defendants with violations of law which will withstand the defendants’ inevitable motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Such lawsuits are notoriously complex, expensive, and time-consuming. And they can provide the plaintiffs with only a limited ability to discover further relevant evidence in the face of orchestrated and skillful obstruction, not only by the defendants’ counsel, but especially by hostile judges who can intentionally frustrate the necessary inquiries with supposed absolute immunity from civil liability for their misbehavior.
  • No less problematic are quasi-public lawsuits which seek to enforce the Freedom of Information Act of the United States and similar statutes in those States in which parts of the 9-11 Event occurred. Anyone familiar with the process is aware that FOIA applicants do not necessarily know in the first instance which specific documents to request, or within which of the numerous rabbit-warrens of governmental bureaucracies to search for them. Moreover, sophisticated applicants must presume that the custodians of the records held by these agencies may falsely deny the existence of sensitive documents. And even if the custodians admit the documents’ existence, they may invoke privileges (whether statutory or spurious) which supposedly preclude disclosure, and be upheld by the courts in that regard. Thus, parties invoking the FOIA can never be certain that disclosure of actual public records has been, or can be made, complete. In addition, even the most experienced practitioners in FOIA litigation can never be confident that the bureaucrats have finally disclosed true copies of original documents, rather than artfully concocted forgeries, plants, “old grey mares”, and so on. For private parties do not have the advantage of being able to invoke 18 U.S.C. § 1001 against public officials who lie to FOIA applicants, or to invoke 18 U.S.C. § 2071 against public officials who secrete, destroy, or falsify the records which are the subjects of such applications.
  • Finally, private parties cannot by themselves perform criminal investigations (at least not in any official capacity) let alone conduct actual criminal prosecutions. For those purposes, they must depend upon honest and competent criminal investigators, prosecutors, and grand juries, along with the executive officials and judges who control and preside over such proceedings. They must also depend upon the availability of credible witnesses to the crime—which in the case of a conspiracy usually means one or more of the conspirators.[7] In the present political climate in general, and especially with respect to the 9-11 Event in particular, the likelihood that this dependence will be rewarded with success is akin to the chance of coming off unscathed when playing Russian roulette with a semi-automatic pistol.[8]

Thus, hardly surprising is that, so far, none of these approaches has succeeded, or even has shown much promise of doing so, to anything approaching the necessary and sufficient degree.

The search for truth with respect to the 9-11 Event absolutely requires someone in a high public office, vested with the requisite plenitude of responsibility and authority, to take charge of the investigation, to compel custodians of public records to disgorge those materials from their hiding places, to direct investigators to investigate, and to command prosecutors to prosecute.[9] The obvious fly in the ointment is that all too many of the custodians, investigators, and prosecutors now in office are political appointees or professional bureaucrats whose loyalties (if not their competencies in their particular fields) are subject to question. So the practical question is: “Which public official is capable of conducting on his own initiative a thoroughgoing investigation of the 9-11 Event with the aid of sufficient numbers of competent personnel whom he can trust not to be compromised or subject to being compromised?”

3- The difficulties surrounding full exposure of the 9-11 Event are not insuperable, because the Constitution and laws of the United States provide an effective solution to the problem.

A. The only practical—indeed, perhaps even the only conceivable—answer to the foregoing question is: “the next President of the United States, with the assistance of ‘the Militia of the several States’”.[10] For the President has both: (i) a general responsibility to act, perforce of his “Oath or Affirmation * * * that [he] will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States”;[11] and (ii) a specific constitutional duty that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”.[12] The Constitution invests him with the unique status of “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”.[13] And the Constitution assigns to “the Militia of the several States” the authority and responsibility “to execute the Laws of the Union” when “call[ed] forth” for that purpose [14] which perfectly complements the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, by providing him with the necessary and sufficient instruments for the enforcement of those “Laws”.

Anyone actually capable of fulfilling the duties of “the Office of President” fully understands the political lay of the land today, both within and outside of the government of the United States. Within that government, during the first two years of his Administration a new President who makes clear his intent “to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” cannot expect to control, or even to influence in his favor, a hostile Congress to the end of enacting the sort of legislation which the 9-11 Event should immediately have called into being, but which no Congress since then has ever even considered. Similarly, a new President cannot hope to appeal to a largely intractable Judiciary, and certainly to change its composition to any marked degree through the tedious process by which “he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint” new judges to the courts of the United States when vacancies adventitiously occur on the Bench.[15]

Outside of the government, although such a President may enjoy “the bully pulpit” of his office from which to address the American people directly, and may expect support from much of “the alternative media” operating through the Internet, he must surely expect to be vilified by the big “mainstream media” in direct proportion to the emphasis he places on exposure of the true genesis, nature, and consequences of the 9-11 Event. Moreover, he must steel himself to contend with the clandestine machinations of “the shadow government” (or “deep state”). For exposure of the reality of the 9-11 Event as a “state crime against democracy” will provide him, along with all other all patriotic Americans, with sufficient reason and the necessary means to bring to light and then to put down “the shadow government” once and for all.[16]

In this analysis, the vast bureaucracy in the Executive Branch has been left to last, because that apparatus is, in theory at least, subject in no small measure to the President’s direct control. In principle, by employing the threat (or, perhaps better put, the guarantee) of criminal prosecution, he can compel the bureaucrats to disclose whatever information the public archives contain with respect to the 9-11 Event.[17] And with his own Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice, and trustworthy United States Attorneys assigned to key States, he can investigate, expose, arrest, indict, prosecute, convict, and punish the principal offenders behind the 9-11 Event whom death has yet to carry beyond the reach of human justice.

Yet, in actual practice, a single Attorney General and a smattering of United States Attorneys will surely prove insufficient if the bureaucracy to any significant degree remains opposed to, refuses to coöperate with, and even endeavors to sabotage the President’s program at its every turn. To overcome such a veritable army of obstructionists, the President must deploy an host of faithful and competent individuals outside of and with no loyalty to the bureaucracy and the secret factions and special interests it serves. To find such individuals in the requisite number he must look to the federal system—in particular, to employ “the Militia of the several States” in order “to execute the Laws of the Union”.

Getting to the bottom of the 9-11 Event will require extensive, exhaustive, and relentless execution of those “Laws”. The Constitution imposes on the President the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”.[18] The Constitution delegates to the Militia the authority and responsibility “to execute the Laws of the Union” when Congress “provide[s] for calling [them] forth” for that reason.[19] And perforce of his status as “Commander in Chief”, the President exercises direct authority over “the Militia of the several States, when [they are] called into the actual Service of the United States”.[20] So the President may employ “the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union” with respect to the 9-11 Event by “calling [them] forth” in whatever manner Congress has authorized pursuant to whatever statutes it has enacted for that crucial constitutional purpose.

Not only may the President employ “the Militia of the several States” to this end, but also he should and must do so, for two reasons:

  • First, the Constitution declares that “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”[21] not Congress, not the Judiciary, not the regular Armed Forces, not even the President himself, but only “[a] well regulated Militia”. The 9-11 Event and its aftermath provide compelling evidence that “a free State” is in jeopardy, here and now, at every level of the federal system. So employment of the Militia is not just uniquely but even desperately “necessary” to deal with the situation.[22]
  • Second, the 9-11 Event poured the foundation for the erection in the Department of Homeland Security of a National para-militarized police-state apparatus supposedly intended to aid in the prosecution of the so-called “global war on terrorism”. “Homeland security” within the United States, however, is the constitutional responsibility primarily of the Militia. After all, “to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” constitute the central, critical tasks of National “homeland security”. Yet the Constitution explicitly assigns the authority and responsibility to perform these functions exclusively to the Militia.[23] The Constitution may implicitly empower Congress to impose duties of this sort on other institutions it specifically names.[24] Even if so, the constitutional priority must always favor the Militia.[25]

By employing the Militia “to execute the Laws of the Union” with regard to the 9-11 Event, the President can begin to demolish the foundations of the National police-state apparatus which that Event spawned, and can do so with the assistance of the very institutions which the Constitution describes as “necessary to the security of a free State”. This is not only highly appropriate but also arguably mandatory—for, inasmuch as a “police state” is the very contradiction of “a free State”, the specific constitutional means for disestablishing a “police state” in this country must be the only institutions which the Constitution itself declares to be “necessary to the security of a free State”: namely, “well regulated Militia”.[26]

Finally, the President can trust “the Militia of the several States” faithfully “to execute the Laws of the Union” for two reasons:

  • First, because the Militia are actual governmental institutions of and within their own respective States,[27] they are subject to control neither by possibly disloyal bureaucrats,[28] nor by errant judges,[29] ensconced in seats of power within the government of the United States.
  • Second, because within every Local community throughout this country the Militia consist of essentially every able-bodied adult who is not specifically exempted by statute for some constitutionally sufficient reason,[30] their being controlled or even substantially influenced by the “shadow government” (or “deep state”) lies beyond the realm of reasonable possibility.
  • B- The specific legal justification for employing “the Militia of the several States” with respect to the 9-11 Event is found in the power of Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union”,[31] where “the Militia” are “the Militia of the several States”, as to which the President of the United States is the “Commander in Chief * * * when [they are] called into the actual Service of the United States”.[32] The Constitution neither itself recognizes, nor licenses Congress or the States to create, any other “militia”.
  • 1. This being the constitutional predicate, some statutory history is in order. Congress first exercised its power “to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union” as early as 1792, when it mandated that,

whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in [United States] marshals * * * , it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia of such state to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed. And if the militia of a state, where such combinations may happen, shall refuse, or be insufficient to suppress the same, it shall be lawful for the President, if the legislature of the United States be not in session, to call forth and employ such numbers of the militia of any other state or states most convenient thereto, as may be necessary, and the use of militia, so to be called forth, may be continued, if necessary, until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of the ensuing session.[33]

Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted a superseding statute which mandated that,

whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the [United States] marshals * * * , it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, to call forth the militia of such state, or of any other state or states, as may be necessary to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed; and the use of militia so called forth may be continued, if necessary, until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of the then next session of Congress.[34]

These statutes recognized the explicit constitutional authority of the Militia, and only the Militia, “to execute the Laws of the Union”.

Some twelve years later, Congress employed its implied powers to license the use of the regular Armed Forces, in addition to the Militia, for that purpose:

That in all cases of insurrection, or obstruction of the laws, either of the United States, or of any individual state or territory, where it is lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection, or of causing the laws to be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ, for the same purposes, such part of the land or naval force of the United States, as shall be judged necessary, having first observed all the pre-requisites of the law in that respect.[35]

During the Civil War, Congress enacted a new statute which provided (in pertinent part)

[t]hat whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages of persons, or rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, it shall become impracticable, in the judgment of the President of the United States, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United States within any State or Territory of the United States, it shall be lawful for the President * * * to call forth the militia of any or all the States of the Union, and to employ such parts of the land and naval forces of the United States as he may deem necessary to enforce the faithful execution of the laws of the United States, or to suppress such rebellion in whatever State or Territory thereof the laws of the United States may be forcibly opposed, or the execution thereof forcibly obstructed.[36]

And the statute now in force for this purpose specifies (in pertinent part) that

[w]henever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into * * * [the] service [of the United States] such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.[37]

Observe in particular that the statutory standard is merely “that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings”. Impracticality does not require impossibility; and “the ordinary course” does not exclude the possibility that an “extraordinary course” need not be invoked, even though it might also be effective.

After the Civil War, two provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment—to wit, (i) that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”, or “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”; and (ii) that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article”[38] expanded Congress’s power to authorize the President to call forth the Militia. The relevant statute now in force provides (in pertinent part) that

[t]he President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—

(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or

(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.[39]

  1. Those two contemporary statutes plainly can, should, and indeed must be applied to the 9-11 Event. For before, during, and after its perpetration down to the present day, the 9-11 Event has involved “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages * * * against the authority of the United States, [which have] ma[d]e it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in [m]any State[s] by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings”—as proven by the success of these “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages” in avoiding “enforce[ment of] the laws of the United States * * * by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings” everywhere within the United States. In addition, these “unlawful combination[s], or conspirac[ies]” have “so hinder[ed] the execution of the laws of [many] State[s], and of the United States within th[os]e State[s], that * * * part[s] or class[es] of [the] people [of those States have been and are being] deprived of * * * right[s], privilege[s], immunit[ies], or protection[s] named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of th[ose] State[s] are unable, fail, or refuse to protect th[ose] right[s], privilege[s], or immunit[ies], or to give that protection”. Moreover, those “unlawful obstructions”, “combination[s], or conspirac[ies]” have systematically “oppose[d] or obstruct[ed] the execution of the laws of the United States or impede[d] the course of justice under those laws”—and unless exposed and suppressed will continue to do so indefinitely. After some fifteen years, it should be undeniable by anyone that the public officials (whether investigators, prosecutors, or judges) who have conducted “the ordinary course of judicial proceedings” in this country in the past or who direct it in the present have not dealt honestly, effectively, or even competently with these “unlawful obstructions”, “combination[s], or conspirac[ies]”—doubtlessly because many of the latter cabals have sunk their roots too deeply within the governmental apparatus of both the United States and all too many of the several States to be dug out by the run-of-the-mill politicians, appointees, and careerist bureaucrats now in charge.

Everyone is aware that these “unlawful obstructions”, “combination[s], or conspirac[ies]” deprived thousands of Americans of life itself in the course of the 9-11 Event or as a direct consequence thereof; and that many thousands more suffered the loss of other valuable “right[s], privilege[s], or immunit[ies]”. Those who were killed or injured when the 9-11 Event occurred were denied physical, as well as legal, “protection”; and both they and other victims have yet to receive full, or in numerous cases any significant, legal redress. These people have been divested, not only of the full measure of justice due to them, but also of even the mere “course of justice” promised, under the laws of the United States and the several States.

In stark contrast, no one in any high official position in the government of the United States or of any State has been publically punished, demoted, censured, reprimanded, or otherwise called on the carpet for incompetence, let alone charged with possible criminal complicity, in relation to the 9-11 Event. And the main perpetrators (other than those patsies alleged to have been the hijackers of the airliners), let alone the true masterminds, of that crime have yet to be identified officially.[40] Self-evidently, unless all of the major investigatory agencies of the United States and the several States have been and remain staffed with veritable nincompoops, some (and doubtlessly not just a few) individuals in high-level positions of public authority have been and remain willing and able to prevent, frustrate, or subvert the necessary inquiries, or to conceal from ordinary Americans what information has been obtained—and thereby have successfully “oppose[d] or obstruct[ed] the execution of the laws of the United States or impede[d] the course of justice under those laws”, and will continue to do so unless and until exposed. These individuals have constituted “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages * * * against the authority of the United States, [which have] ma[d]e it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in [m]any State[s] by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings”, and will continue to do so unless and until brought to heel.

Then, too, as a consequence of the 9-11 Event, America has been subjected to propaganda and agitation orchestrated by public officials intent on instilling an hysterical fear of “terrorism” in average citizens; to pervasive surveillance of the population by numerous “intelligence” and “law-enforcement” agencies; to rampant para-militarization of State and Local police forces; and to other manifestations of what can accurately be described only as apparent preparations for systematic oppression of ordinary Americans through a domestic police-state apparatus modeled on the Reichssicherheitshauptamt of Nazi Germany, or the Stasi of Communist East Germany.[41] This has resulted in large “part[s] or class[es]” within the population of this country being “deprived of [numerous] right[s], privilege[s], immunit[ies], or protection[s] named in the Constitution and secured by law”, under circumstances in which “the constituted authorities of th[e] State[s] are unable, fail, or refuse to protect th[ose] right[s], privilege[s], or immunit[ies], or to give that protection”.

  1. Although it is obvious that, pursuant to the authority vested in him by the contemporary statutes described above, the President can, and under present circumstances should, deploy “the militia” to deal with these “unlawful obstructions, combinations, * * * assemblages”, and “conspirac[ies]”, the question remains: “Whom can the President call forth as ‘the militia’ under the aegis of those statutes?”

Once again, statutory history provides the answer. In 1792, Congress provided

[t]hat each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years [with certain exceptions] * * * shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia by the captain or commanding officer of the company, within whose bounds such citizen shall reside, and that within twelve months after the passing of this act.[42]

If this did not embrace every last American who was physically capable of (and therefore constitutionally liable for) service in the Militia, it did include the large majority of the qualified adult population.[43] Then, in 1873 Congress reiterated the mandate that “[e]very able-bodied male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years, shall be enrolled in the militia”.[44] Finally, as the result of the series of statutes from 1903 through 1916 which created the modern National Guard and Naval Militia,[45] under the present law Congress has purported to divide “[t]he militia of the United States” into two categories:

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and * * * under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.

(b) The classes of the militia are—

(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and

(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.[46]

Now, this statute is gravely problematic, for several reasons. First, on its face the Constitution provides for no such thing as an unitary “militia of the United States”, only for the plural “Militia of the several States” which “may be employed in the Service of the United States” for certain specific and therefore limited purposes.[47] Second, in contrast to “Armies” and “a Navy”, which are establishments “of the United States”,[48] the Constitution delegates to Congress no power to create a “militia of the United States”. Even the Constitution did not create “the Militia of the several States”, but instead incorporated these establishments, as they existed at the time (and had existed for generations theretofore), into its federal system. Third, the National Guard and the Naval Militia are not “militia” at all, but instead are the “Troops, or Ships of War” which the States may “keep * * * in time of Peace” “with[ ] the Consent of Congress”.[49] And fourth, the “well regulated Militia” which the Constitution declares to be “necessary to the security of a free State” can never be “unorganized”[50] as is manifested most obviously in the Constitution’s delegation to Congress of the power “[t]o provide for organizing * * * the Militia” (not for “unorganizing” or “disorganizing” them).[51] Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that there exists some valid interpretation of the statute just quoted,[52] “the unorganized militia” as defined therein today plainly corresponds to a significant degree to “the militia” as originally understood in the statutes in force from 1792 to 1903. And, as the old saying has it, “close enough suffices for government work”.

So, if the National Guard and the Naval Militia can be taken arguendo to be parts of “the militia” embraced by the statutes which now authorize the President to call forth “the militia”, simply because Congress has described them as “the organized militia”, then so too must “the unorganized militia” be considered no less equally part of “the militia” as a whole for the purposes of those statutes, again simply because Congress has so described it. Moreover, because the statutes which provide for calling forth “the militia” do not limit the President’s authority to any particular part of “the militia”, whether “organized” or “unorganized”, he may choose to call forth promiscuously from, call forth selectively from, and indeed call forth exclusively from “the unorganized militia” such personnel as he may deem necessary, and in any manner and to any degree which he may see fit.[53]

Of course, both of those statutes also provide that the President may employ for their purposes the regular Armed Forces; and one allows for even “any other means”, which today might arguably include the Department of Homeland Security and other civilian bureaucracies under the President’s authority.[54] The President should use “the unorganized militia”, and only “the unorganized militia”, in preference to the regular Armed Forces, however, because: First, the Constitution does not expressly delegate to the Armed Forces the authority and responsibility “to execute the Laws of the Union”.[55] Second, if at all possible, a “standing army” should never be deployed to enforce domestic laws.[56] And third, as observed above, the National Guard and the Naval Militia are not any sort of “militia” at all, but instead are the “Troops, or Ships of War” which the States may “keep * * * in time of Peace” “with[ ] the Consent of Congress”, and thus are components of a “standing army”. Furthermore, the President should use “the unorganized militia”, and only “the unorganized militia”, in preference to some civilian bureaucracy with investigatory and law-enforcement powers, simply because, during the last fifteen years, not a single one of the latter agencies has provided the least evidence that it is willing, trustworthy, diligent, or even competent enough to do the job—for otherwise the job would already have been done, or would be well on its way to being completed.

C- Because “the unorganized militia” consists of the bulk of this country’s adult population,[57] no particularly taxing effort would be required to find within “such of the militia of any State * * * as [t]he [President] consider[ed] necessary to enforce th[ ]e laws [of the United States]”[58] a superfluity of individuals who had the appropriate types of education, skills, experiences, and temperaments with regard to criminal investigations, prosecutions, and related matters to perform or oversee proper and thoroughgoing inquiries into the 9-11 Event. In each State, “the unorganized militia”, more than any other group within society because it consists of individuals drawn from all groups, should be keenly interested in seeing to the suppression of every “unlawful combination, or conspiracy” connected with that crime which “hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within th[at] State” or “opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws”.[59] And because “the unorganized militia” would supply such an extensive pool from which the President could draw the necessary and sufficient personnel, those “unlawful combination[s], or conspirac[ies]” intent upon preventing exposure of the dark facts which lie at the base of the 9-11 Event would find it utterly impossible to coöpt, corrupt, or coerce enough of those personnel to divert from their course, let alone to subvert altogether, the investigations “the unorganized militia” would conduct or supervise under the President’s direction.

In practice, the President could call forth annually from each of the several States an average (say) of 1,000 individuals who were then members of “the unorganized militia”. (Some States might provide more, some States less, in proportion to their populations, as convenience dictated.) This would make available to the President a total yearly force of 50,000 militiamen. These individuals would be selected by the Governors of the several States (the commanders in chief of the States’ “unorganized militia”),[60] according to criteria promulgated by the President as “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”,[61] and therefore the “Commander in Chief” of the Governors as well. The criteria for selection would relate to the militiamen’s qualifications relevant to the technical, legal, and other tasks that would be involved in investigating the 9-11 Event. Because so few members of “the unorganized militia” would be called forth, and in light of the seriousness of the matter, the Governors would likely be able to rely on large numbers of volunteers, as well as to draft without difficulty sufficient qualified individuals to fulfill the States’ quotas.[62] In any event, there could be no question of the Governors’ authority, and enforceable duty, to implement the President’s directive to call forth “the unorganized militia”,[63] or of each eligible citizen’s equally enforceable duty to report for active service when so summoned.[64]

Financial support for members of “the unorganized militia” “call[ed] forth * * * to execute the Laws of the Union” with respect to the 9-11 Event could be drawn from such moneys in general tax revenues as have been, or would be, allocated by the governments of the United States and of the several States to “the Militia of the several States” when they were “employed in the Service of the United States”.[65] But, in keeping with constitutional principles of “well regulated Militia”, the necessary funds could also—and should preferably—be drawn from those members of “the unorganized militia” who, although not called forth for active service, could be required to subsidize their fellow militiamen’s activities, these fees being the quid pro quo for their exemptions from the active service otherwise incumbent upon them.[66]

A simple example demonstrates the practicality of the latter approach: As of this writing, in Virginia the total number of males and females of ages 18 through 45 in households, who would qualify in principle for “the unorganized militia”, is approximately 2,816,000. Subtracting (say) ten percent of these who would be ineligible for any service in practice due to some serious disability leaves 2,534,400. Subtracting the 1,000 called forth for active duty leaves 2,533,400. Were each of these remaining individuals required to pay a fee of merely $20 for an annual exemption from active duty under the President’s call, “the unorganized militia” in Virginia would have available a yearly renewable fund of $50,668,000. Allocated amongst the 1,000 citizens who were drafted into, or who volunteered for, active duty, this would provide $50,668 per capita per annum—certainly an amount sufficient to support each such individual for that length of time.[67] (Of course, it could also be expected that not a few members of “the unorganized militia” especially qualified and eager to participate in an investigation of the 9-11 Event would be willing and able to provide their services without an expectation of full compensation, given the importance of the task at hand.)

4- Both exposure of the 9-11 Event and revitalization of “the Militia of the several States” would be well served by cultivating a symbiotic relationship between the two.

As just explained, “the Militia of the several States” could materially assist in the final solution of the 9-11 Event—indeed, they are arguably the only institutions capable of doing so to the requisite degree under present conditions. And that particular employment of the Militia could materially assist the Militia to reassert their rightful position of authority throughout America’s federal system.

Today, “the Militia of the several States” are “the orphan children” in that system—primarily because the very last thing “the shadow government” wants is for the American people even to recognize their constitutional authority “to execute the Laws of the Union” (and the laws of the States, as well), let alone to exercise that authority under circumstances in which the members of “the shadow government” would become the ultimate targets. Fear of the great mass of ordinary Americans caused “the shadow government” at the turn of the Twentieth Century to invent the oxymoronic and anti-constitutional fantasy of “the unorganized militia” in the first place, just as it causes “the shadow government” today not only to perpetuate that fiction but also viciously to denounce, defame, and politically marginalize anyone and everyone who dares to advocate the revitalization of the properly organized—and thus fully empowered—Militia which the Constitution requires. For an “unorganized militia” could hardly “execute the Laws” unless and until in one way or another it became “organized”, which (in the absence of an immediately pre-revolutionary state of affairs[68]) would necessitate the action of some high public official (such as a patriotic President or State’s Governor) not beholden to or cowed by “the shadow government”. In addition, even a patriotic and independent President would need to put forward some urgent and notable reason to call forth “the unorganized militia” from amongst a population largely unfamiliar with the constitutional place, purpose, and practical rôle of “the Militia of the several States” as America’s ultimate law-enforcement agencies.

Although many justifications now exist for calling forth “the Militia of the several States”,[69] the need for a thoroughgoing and transparent inquiry into the 9-11 Event may be the single issue which is being sufficiently developed and publicized to catch the public’s attention and inspire large numbers of ordinary Americans to take action. Once enough people realize the necessity for such an investigation, they can be convinced that the success of that undertaking demands the participation of the Militia.

None of this can ever take place, however, unless and until those who advocate complete examination and exposure of the 9-11 Event realize that they can never succeed in their endeavor without the assistance of the Militia. To be sure, along with millions of other Americans who have been subjected to relentless brainwashing by “the mainstream media” over the last several decades, they may be leery of advocating anything even tangentially connected with the noun “militia”, lest they be rhetorically brutalized as dangerous “extremists” who advocate measures beyond the pale marked out by the surveyors of “political correctness”. Yet how could those who reject the official conspiracy theory of the 9-11 Event and call for an honest and competent investigation be derided as any more “extreme” than they already are by the media, simply because they proposed the involvement in such an inquiry of the Militia, the only governmental establishments to which the Constitution explicitly delegates the authority and responsibility “to execute the Laws of the Union”? Are those laws never to be enforced at all (as they have not been enforced to date) with respect to the 9-11 Event? Or are they not to be enforced specifically by the Militia, even though enforcement by the Militia is likely the only efficacious means for their enforcement? And which, after all, requires more courage: to point out the glaring falsity of the official conspiracy theory of the 9-11 Event, with all that implies as to the criminal character of the originators of and subsequent apologists for that concoction; or, in the search for the truth of the matter, to demand the employment of the statutes described above, which have been on the books in one form or another for over a hundred or even two hundred years, and which obviously apply in spades to the complex of issues surrounding the 9-11 Event as if they had been enacted just yesterday?

5- Enlisting “the Militia of the several States” in the investigation of the 9-11 Event will begin the process of restoring “the security of a free State” throughout America.

The official conspiracy theory of the 9-11 Event has rationalized numerous actions by public officials which have systematically undermined “the security of a free State” everywhere within this country—and not as a matter of unintended consequences, either.[70] The Constitution identifies as “necessary to the security of a free State” only a single institution: namely, “[a] well regulated Militia”.[71] Therefore, if examination of and exposure of the truth about the 9-11 Event are, in their own way, fully to serve the purpose of restoring “the security of a free State” in the full constitutional sense of that phrase, they should—indeed, they must—employ the Militia.

Calling forth the Militia “to execute the Laws of the Union” with respect to the 9-11 Event will constitute a precedent for their employment too conspicuous for “the mainstream media” to disregard and too efficacious for them to gainsay. Once the Militia have proven themselves invaluable in that endeavor, they will be recognized by every patriotic American as no less useful with respect to other issues as well. Thus, the final solution of the mystery cloaking the 9-11 Event through the intervention of the Militia will promote the step- by-step restoration of “the security of a free State” across the board. For the Militia are supremely powerful tools which can be employed for scouring out each and every one of the dark, dank, and dirty holes in which rogue public officials have hidden the evidence of every sort of their wrongdoing. Even if in the final analysis only the Shadow knows “what evil lurks in the hearts of men”, the Militia will bring to light whatever evils the minds of such impious men have concocted and their hands have wrought. Only such a veritable lustration of this country through the systematic, thoroughgoing, and uncompromising “execut[ion of] the Laws of the Union” by the Militia can finally ensure fulfillment of the Constitution’s purpose to “establish Justice”[72] with respect, not only to the 9-11 Event, but also to every other complex of criminal iniquity in high places which now plagues America.

© 2019 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com

Footnotes:

   1 This situation, of course, is not unique to the 9-11 Event. The same could be, and by many credible investigators has been, maintained with respect to the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, and Martin Luther King; to the Oklahoma City Bombing; and to other shocking crimes of national import which have left Americans capable of critical thought in disbelief, disarray, and dismay.

   2 It could even be charged that these anomalies represent outright malfeasance: namely, a cynically calculated refusal on the part of most of the press to perform the duty inherent in the Constitution’s guarantee of “freedom * * * of the press” to investigate and expose wrongdoing by public officials. See U.S. Const. amend. I. After all, it would be absurd to construe the Constitution as protecting “freedom * * * of the press” so that the press could collude with rogue officials in order to deceive and delude the public in aid of those officials’ misbehavior. Indeed, these anomalies could very well evidence the complicity of segments of the press in the real conspiracy underlying the 9-11 Event—as perhaps exemplified by the BCC’s televised on-the-scene report of the collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 long before it occurred or any innocent party could have known that it would occur.

   3 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.

   4 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 419, 457 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.).

   5 As the Declaration of Independence asserts, under “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”. The people cannot consent to public officials’ refusals to exercise the “just powers” delegated to them, let alone acquiesce in rogue officials’ claims to exercise “unjust powers” which the people are incapable of delegating in the first place. And, under the Constitution, no public official can assert a personal license either to disregard the “just powers” delegated to him or to arrogate “unjust powers” to himself, because no public official is the source of any real or imaginary governmental power, “just” or “unjust”. Rather, “We the People of the United States * * * do ordain and establish th[e] Constitution”—not just once upon a time in the distant past, but, as the present tense of the verb “do” indicates, even today and every day hereafter as well. U.S. Const. preamble.

   6 U.S. Const. amend. I.

   7 The real conspiracy which brought about the destruction at the World Trade Center did not end when the clouds of toxic debris that spewed forth from the demolished buildings finally settled. It has continued and will continue, to this very day and into the indefinite future, in the form of a cover-up both extensive and intensive, designed to throw the dust of disinformation into Americans’ eyes in order to prevent them from ever discovering what really happened and who was to blame. For such a cover-up to have been effective for so long, though, untold numbers of rogue public officials must have participated in one way, to one degree, and for one reason or another—whether knowingly and willfully, through willful blindness, or as the result of reckless disregard of the facts. Skeptics may ask how all of these people could have been expected to hold their tongues for so long? The answer is plain enough. Even if not planned from the very beginning, the cover-up immediately became an integral part of the original conspiracy, and transformed the conspiracy which might have ended with the actual 9-11 attack into a continuing conspiracy for which no statute of limitations will ever toll as long as the cover-up goes on. Through their participation in the cover-up these rogue officials allied with the original conspirators and thus rendered themselves answerable for each and every one of the crimes committed by those villains in the course of both the cover-up and the underlying conspiracy, including the murders of several thousand Americans. Self-evidently, these murders deprived the victims of their fundamental constitutional rights to life itself. So all of the malefactors, whether in public office or private station, or whether complicitous in the original conspiracy or only in the cover-up, are liable to prosecution under (for example) 18 U.S.C. § 241, which provides (in pertinent part) that “[i]f two or more persons conspire to injure * * * any person in any State * * * in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right * * * secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, * * * if death results from the acts committed * * * they shall be fined * * * or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death”. Therefore, unless he could secure immunity by agreeing to testify as a witness for the prosecution, no participant in the cover-up would ever be likely to speak up (even were he not afraid of being assassinated by some arm of the conspiracy as soon as he attempted to make such a deal).

   8 The FBI’s recent scandalous refusal to recommend criminal prosecution of Mrs. Hillary Clinton for her alleged mishandling of classified information during her tenure as Secretary of State provides an example of the problem of having to depend upon the investigators to investigate themselves almost trivial in comparison to the 9-11 Event.

   9 Ideally, this official should also be a person imbued with courage, integrity, determination, and no little intelligence. But none of those characteristics will be of much moment if the one who exhibits them does not occupy an official position possessed of sufficient legal and political power to compel obedience to his directives.

   10 To some extent, the tasks proposed here for the President could be undertaken by the Governors in those States which were directly affected by the 9-11 Event. That, however, would provide at best only a partial and disjointed solution.

In addition, this study refers specifically to “the next President of the United States” (rather than indefinitely to “some future President”), because time is rapidly running out—not only for exposure of the miscreants responsible for the 9-11 Event, but also for restoration of constitutional government in this country, the foundations of which the 9-11 Event and its sequelae have undermined to near the point of collapse.

   11 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.

   12 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.

   13 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

   14 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.

   15 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

   16 For a general introduction to the concept of “state crimes against democracy”, see the articles collected in American Behavioral Scientist, Volume 53, Number 6 (February 2010).

   17 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1505, 1512, 1513, 1515, and 2071.

   18 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.

   19 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.

   20 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

   21 U.S. Const. amend. II.

   22 History has made this “necess[ity]” manifest. For both the regular Armed Forces and the national-security bureaucracy erected since World War II proved themselves incompetent to prevent the 9-11 Event. And neither Congress, nor the Judiciary, nor any President to date has demonstrated either the willingness or the ability to investigate the matter to the degree its seriousness warrants.

   23 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.

   24 Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 12 through 14 (“Armies”, “a Navy”, and “the land and naval Forces”) with cl. 18. This rationale would perhaps not be controversial as applied to armed “Insurrections” and actual “Invasions”. But it would incur justifiable disagreement with respect to general “execut[ion of] the Laws of the Union”. For one of the charges the Declaration of Independence lodged against King George III was that “[h]e has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power”. Being in the final analysis a product of the Declaration, the Constitution surely does not license Congress to permit America’s Armed Forces to exercise anything akin to the same abusive authority which this country’s Founders put forward as a justification for the War of Independence.

   25 See generally Edwin Vieira, Jr., Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume Three, By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., Revised & Expanded Second Edition, 2014, 2016).

   26 U.S. Const. amend. II.

   27 See Edwin Vieira, Jr., Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume Two, The Sword and Sovereignty: The Constitutional Principles of “the Militia of the Several States” (Front Royal, Virginia: CD-ROM Edition, 2012), Chapters Four, Fifteen, and Thirty-one.

   28 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (the Constitution “reserv[es] to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers [in the Militia]”) and amend. X (“[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively * * * ”). What the Constitution explicitly “reserve[s] to the States” cannot conceivably be “delegated to the United States”.

   29 See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1973).

   30 See E. Vieira, Jr., The Sword and Sovereignty, ante note 27, Chapters Five, Sixteen, and Thirty-five.

   31 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.

   32 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

   33 An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions, Act of 2 May 1792, Chap. XXVIII, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264.

   34 An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; and to repeal the Act now in force for those purposes, Act of 28 February 1795, Chap. XXXVI, § 2, 1 Stat. 424, 424. Note that this statute, in contradistinction to its predecessor, imposed no time-limits on the President’s deployment of the Militia. This set the pattern for all future legislation on the subject.

   35 An Act authorizing the employment of the land and naval forces of the United States, in cases of insurrections, Act of 3 March 1807, Chap. XXXIX, 2 Stat. 443, 443.

   36 An Act to provide for the Suppression of Rebellion against and Resistance to the Laws of the United States, and to amend the Act entitled “An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,” &c., passed February twenty-eight, seventeen hundred and ninety-five, Act of 29 July 1861, Chap. XXV, 12 Stat. 281, 281; later substantially incorporated in Revised Statutes of the United States (1873-1874), TITLE LXIX, insurrection, § 5298, 18 Stat. 1029, 1029.

   37 10 U.S.C. § 252. As to “the armed forces”, this statute is an exception to the so-called “posse comitatus act”. 18 U.S.C. § 1385, originally An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, and for other purposes, Act of 18 June 1878, chap. 263, § 15, 120 Stat. 145, 142.

   38 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §§ 1 and 5.

   39 10 U.S.C. § 253. This is also an exception to “the posse comitatus act”. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385.

   40 Various lists of plausible suspects, of course, have been compiled in unofficial studies. See, e.g., Kevin Robert Ryan, Another Nineteen: Investigating Legitimate 9/11 Suspects (Microbloom, 2013).

   41 See generally Edwin Vieira, Jr., Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume Three, By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., Revised & Expanded Second Edition, 2014, 2016).

   42 An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States, Act of 8 May 1792, Chap. XXXIII, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271.

   43 Congress put forth this definition, of course, for the sole purpose of identifying whom it had decided the United States was entitled and needed to “call forth[ ]” to perform one or more of the three functions the Constitution stipulates for the Militia “when called into the actual Service of the United States”. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 15 and 16, and art. II, § 2, cl. 1. This was a sufficient statutory definition for Congress’s purpose at the time; but it did not, because it could not, purport to define constitutionally the total possible enrollment of the Militia for that or any other time. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920). In that or some other statute, Congress could have “provide[d] for calling forth” younger as well as older Americans. Moreover, the several States were then and are today not bound by this or any other Congressional definition with respect to the individuals whom they might call forth in their own Militia for their own purposes not connected with “the actual Service of the United States”.

   44 Revised Statutes of the United States (1873-1874), TITLE XVI, the Militia, § 1625, 18 Stat. 285, 285.

   45 An Act To promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes, Act of 21 January 1903, chap. 196, 32 Stat. 775; An Act To further amend the Act entitled “An Act to promote the efficiency of the Militia, and for other purposes,” approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, Act of 27 May 1908, chap. 204, 35 Stat. 399; An Act To provide for raising the volunteer forces of the United States in time of actual or threatened war, Act of 25 April 1914, chap. 71, 38 Stat. 347; and An Act For making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes, Act of 3 June 1916, chap. 134, 39 Stat. 166.

   46 10 U.S.C. § 246.

   47 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and art. I, § 8, cls. 16 and 15, respectively (emphases supplied). In the statutory phrase “the militia of the United States”, “militia” is a singular noun, as the singular verb “consists” attests; whereas, in the constitutional phrase “the Militia of the several States”, “Militia” is a plural noun. Compare U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 with art. I, § 8, cls. 15 and 16, especially cl. 16 (“such Part of them”). Furthermore, a true “militia of the United States” would always be subject to the control of the United States, in the same manner as are “the Army and Navy of the United States”; whereas “the Militia of the several States” must be “called into the actual Service of the United States” from their own States before they become subject to the expressly limited power of Congress “[t]o provide * * * for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States”. Compare U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 with art. I, § 8, cl. 16.

   48 See U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cls. 12 and 13, and art. II, § 2, cl. 1..

   49 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Although this has largely been forgotten today, it was recognized at the time creation of the National Guard began. See, e.g., Elihu Root, “addresses at the fifth annual convention of the interstate national guard association of the united states, columbus, ohio, may 4, 1903, in THE MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, addresses and reports (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1916), 137, especially at 149. Of course, the true constitutional character of the National Guard is also evident upon the faces of the statutes which created it. See An Act To promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes, Act of 21 January 1903, chap. 196, 32 Stat. 775; An Act To further amend the Act entitled “An Act to promote the efficiency of the Militia, and for other purposes,” approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, Act of 27 May 1908, chap. 204, 35 Stat. 399; An Act To provide for raising the volunteer forces of the United States in time of actual or threatened war, Act of 25 April 1914, chap. 71, 38 Stat. 347; and An Act For making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes, Act of 3 June 1916,  chap. 134, 39 Stat. 166.

   50 Compare U.S. Const. amend. II with E. Vieira, Jr., ante note 27, Chapters Five, Ten, Sixteen, Twenty-one, Thirty-four, and Thirty-seven.

   51 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. Self-evidently, the selfsame constitutional provision cannot empower Congress to provide both for the fulfillment of some purpose and for its negation. “The rule of construction of the Constitution being, that affirmative words in the Constitution * * * must be construed negatively as to all other cases.” Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wallace) 243, 252 (1864) (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted). Accord, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803); and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheaton) 264, 394-395 (1821).

   52 See Edwin Vieira, Jr., Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume One, The Nation in Arms (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., 2007), at 50-54.

   53 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (emphasis supplied): The Constitution delegates to Congress the power “[t]o provide * * * for governing such Part of them [i.e., the Militia] as may be employed in the Service of the United States”. And the statutes leave to the President the discretion to employ such “Part of them” as he deems necessary and proper under the circumstances then extant.

   54 This assumes, of course, that these “any other means” may themselves be constitutionally and statutorily employed for that purpose.

   55 Contrast U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 with cls. 12 and 13.

   56 See generally Edwin Vieira, Jr., Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume Three, By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., Revised & Expanded Second Edition, 2014, 2016).

   57 See 10 U.S.C. § 246(b)(2). See, e.g., Code of Virginia §§ 44-1 and 44-4. Virginia is cited as an example only because the present author happens to live in that Commonwealth. A search of other States’ codes can discover equivalent provisions which equally support the analysis provided here.

   58 See 10 U.S.C. § 252.

   59 See 10 U.S.C. § 253.

   60 See, e.g., Code of Virginia § 44-8.

   61 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

   62 See, e.g., Code of Virginia §§ 44-87 and 44-89.

   63 See, e.g., Code of Virginia §§ 44-9; 44-75.1(A)(2) and (7); 44-80; 44-81; 44-86; and 44-87.

   64 See, e.g., Code of Virginia § 44-90. To be sure, the crazy-quilt nature of ostensible “militia” laws extant today in various States’ codes would not preclude the possibility of peculiar situations arising under those laws. For example, Code of Virginia § 44-54.4 establishes “[t]he Virginia Defense Force with a targeted membership of at least 1,200”. It further provides that, “[w]hen called to active duty, the mission of the Virginia Defense Force shall be to * * * provide a military force to respond to the call of the Governor in those circumstances described in [Code of Virginia] § 44-75.1”. The latter section of the Code would authorize the Governor to call forth “the unorganized militia” in response to a directive from the President under 10 U.S.C. §§ 252 or 253 or both. Nonetheless, Code of Virginia § 44-54.4 also mandates that “[n]othing in this article shall be construed as authorizing the Virginia Defense Force or any part thereof to be called, ordered, or in any manner drafted by federal authorities into the military service of the United States”. And Code of Virginia § 44-88 directs that, “[w]henever the Governor orders out the unorganized militia or any part thereof, it shall be incorporated into the Virginia Defense Force until relieved from service”. So, were the President to order the Governor to call forth “the unorganized militia”, the latter two statutes would supposedly prevent the individuals called forth from being employed in the service of the United States for which they were called forth! Obviously, though, the apparent conflict between 10 U.S.C. §§ 252 and 253, on the one hand, and Code of Virginia §§ 44-54.4 and 44-88, on the other hand, must be resolved in favor of the former statutes. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cls. 2 and 3.

   65 See, e.g., Code of Virginia §§ 44-11.1(A)(1), 44-14, and 44-76. See generally U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“[t]he Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to * * * provide for the common defence * * * of the United States”).

   66 See E. Vieira, Jr., The Sword and Sovereignty, ante note 27, Chapters Eleven, Twenty-two, and Thirty-six. For example, Code of Virginia § 44-5(11) “exempt[s] from military duty under a state call * * * [s]uch * * * persons as may be designated by the Governor in the best interests of the public and of the Commonwealth”. In coöperation with the President, the Governor could determine that it would be “in the best interests of the public and of the Commonwealth” to exempt all persons eligible for “duty under a state call”, other than the 1,000 who volunteered or were specially selected, if those to be exempted paid a fixed fee for that privilege.

   67 Alternatively, it might be considered equitable to pay each Militiaman an amount approximating the regular income from the private employment he would have to forego as the consequence of his service. In that event, some Militiamen might be paid more, some less, than the average amount calculated in the text. Moreover, if an exemption fee of $20 per capita proved insufficient, the toll could easily be raised to $40 or $60. What patriot could complain that an exaction of $60 per annum was “too much” to pay to bring the perpetrators of the 9-11 Event to justice, howsoever belatedly?

   68 See E. Vieira, Jr., The Sword and Sovereignty, ante note 27, Chapter Twenty-one, Part J.

   69 See, e.g., id., Chapter Forty-two, Part E.

   70 See, e.g., id., Chapter Forty-eight, and Edwin Vieira, Jr., Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume Three, By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., Revised & Expanded Second Edition, 2014, 2016).

   71 U.S. Const. amend. II.

   72 U.S. Const. preamble.




What “Right To Keep And Bear Arms” Is That?

Edwin Vieira

A short while ago, a friend of mine who is an ardent advocate in “social media” of the entire Second Amendment—including its first thirteen words, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”—related a verbal altercation he had with a proponent of the so-called “individual-right theory” of the Amendment, which focuses exclusively on its last fourteen words, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” This fellow chided my friend on the grounds that, were “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” tied in any manner whatsoever to the Militia, tens of millions of Americans now capable of exercising “the individual right” with respect to some (albeit not all) kinds of firearms could (and probably would) be denied a right to possess any firearms whatsoever, because they could (and probably would) be excluded from the Militia. Recognizing this complaint as the product of a variety of industrial-strength ignorance that afflicts all too many Americans today, I felt it incumbent upon me to post a rejoinder.

A. To put it most charitably, “the individual-right theory” of the Second Amendment is a linguistic and legalistic delusion of people who suffer from a peculiar sort of illiteracy. For, inasmuch as it derives from the last fourteen words of the Amendment, without reference to the first thirteen, it violates the fundamental—indeed, the very first—rule of constitutional law (as well as of English grammar), that all the words and phrases in each provision of the Constitution (or in an ordinary English sentence) must be construed together and interdependently, as a coherent whole.

Humans being the aggressively argumentative animals they are, it is surely possible for someone to contend that no inextricable relationship—whether linguistic, logical, or legal—should be taken to exist between the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment, on the one hand, and the last fourteen words, on the other. The plausibility of any such contention would be nil, however, inasmuch as it would compel the conclusion that America’s Founders were extraordinarily poor draftsmen (or perhaps that English was not their native language). Worse yet, to say (as my friend’s antagonist did) that the Amendment’s first thirteen words should not be considered at all, would defame the Founders as brainless bumpkins indeed. If one is entitled to deride Judge Harvey Wilkinson’s arrogantly asinine attribution of “profound ambiguities” to the Second Amendment in Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 150 (4th Cir. 2017) (concurring opinion), how much more should one ridicule the assertion of touts for “the individual-right theory” that the Second Amendment in its entirety is confused to the point of self-contradiction, and that only by editorially excising its first thirteen words can the recondite “true” meaning of the last fourteen be discovered and correctly applied? Confronted by such a claim, one is entitled to ask: “What ‘right to keep and bear arms’ is that, which is to be found, not by heeding all the words of the Constitution, but by disregarding some of them?”

Many Americans, however, are less interested in parsing the niceties of constitutional law and penetrating the arcana of history than in preventing the rude practicalities of modern-day “gun control” from being visited upon themselves. They are willing to swallow “the individual-right theory”—its intellectually indigestible horns, hide, and hooves included—because they assume that theory to be more useful to their goal of preserving for themselves an imaginary “right of the people to keep and bear Arms” under present political and social conditions than is the strictly constitutional construction of the Second Amendment which ties that “right” to “[a] well regulated Militia”. Having explored in great depth the historical foundations and legal intricacies of the Second Amendment in my book The Sword and Sovereignty: The Constitutional Principles of “the Militia of the Several States” (Front Royal, Virginia: CD-Rom Version, 2012), I need not rehearse here the constitutional conclusions laid out there. It would be useful, though, to compare and contrast the truncated fourteen-word version of the Second Amendment upon which “the individual-right theory” relies with the full twenty-seven word version of the Amendment which actually appears in the Constitution, so as to demonstrate in practical terms under which version Americans would be better off.

B. Because of such defective opinions as District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), at the level of the Supreme Court the vaunted “individual right” of ordinary Americans “to keep and bear Arms” extends no farther than to certain types of handguns which some individuals may possess in their homes for purposes of personal self-defense. Not all firearms—and, presumably, not even all types of handguns—are the beneficiaries of Heller and McDonald. So at the very threshold “the individual-right theory” stumbles over the question of which “Arms” the Second Amendment protects.

Furthermore, the class of individuals protected in their possession of handguns under Heller and McDonald presumably does not include anyone less than twenty-one years of age. That number does not derive from the Constitution (quite the contrary), but instead from various “gun-control” statutes enacted by Congress and legislatures of the several States the legitimacy of which both Heller and McDonald took for granted. So, again at the very threshold, “the individual-right theory” stumbles over the question of which “people” the Second Amendment includes in “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”.

Moreover, “the individual right” recognized in Heller and McDonald has not nullified numerous existing “gun-control” regulations of the United States and the several States (and even Localities) with respect to (i) what firearms and accessories individuals (of whatever ages) may or may not “keep” (such as so-called “assault firearms”, “machine guns”, “short-barreled” rifles and shotguns, “high-capacity magazines”, and so on), and (ii) where and how individuals (of whatever ages) may or may not “bear” such firearms as they happen lawfully to possess (such as in so-called “sensitive places”, whether by “open carry” or “concealed carry”, and so on).

Neither does “the individual right”preclude extensions of any existing regulations of firearms (other than those actually at issue in Heller and McDonald), or prohibit the enactment of new ones, by legislators. Nor does it disable judges from upholding old or new regulations on the basis that they satisfy so-called “strict scrutiny” (the “compelling governmental interest” and “least-restrictive alternative” tests), or some other even less demanding judicial excuses for abridging freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights (such as the theory of “reasonable regulation” advanced by Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion in Heller). Certainly neither Heller nor McDonald has supplied an effective prophylactic against legislative enactment—and judicial approval—of all sorts of radical “gun-control” schemes in Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and California (to name a few of the offending States) since those decisions were handed down.

To the contrary, the Supreme Court saw fit not to review the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Kolbe v. Hogan, notwithstanding that Kolbe relied explicitly on Heller for its absurd ruling that so-called “assault rifles”, being akin to “weapons of war”, fall outside of the guarantee of the Second Amendment:

We conclude * * * that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are not protected by the Second Amendment. * * * [They] are among the arms that are “like” “M-16 rifles”—“weapons that are most useful in military service”—which the Heller Court singled out as being beyond the Second Amendment’s reach. * * * [W]e have no power to extend Second Amendment protection to the weapons of war that the Heller decision explicitly excluded from such coverage. [849 F.3d at 121.]

As much as one may justifiably guffaw at Judge Wilkinson who claimed to discern “profound ambiguities” in the Second Amendment, and as much as one may righteously denounce for plain dishonesty the majority of Judges in Kolbe who seized upon irresponsible dicta in Heller to serve their nefarious purpose, at the end of the day one must lay this pernicious result at Heller’s door—at the doors of the people who “successfully” litigated that case—at the doors of those who subsequently treated (and still treat) Heller as the Holy Grail of Second-Amendment jurisprudence, rather than as the kiss of Judas which it actually is—and especially at the doors of the Justices of the Supreme Court who let Kolbe stand. Although a minority of the Court is capable of granting a petition for a writ of certiorari, not even four Justices could muster the courage, the conviction, yea the common courtesy to their country to stand up for the Court’s own “landmark” decision in Heller when it was so callously and cynically perverted. This alone proves how worthless “the individual right” is as a guarantor of anything, when its own judicial creator suffers it to be so crudely prostituted before the eyes of the entire world. Worse yet, one can expect Kolbe’s reasoning, and the Supreme Court’s retreat, to embolden “gun-control” fanatics to urge upon legislatures and lower courts throughout the United States the notion that every firearm which ever has been or ever could be employed as a “weapon of war”—whether in conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, and so on—is, by dint of that description alone, excluded from the protection of the Second Amendment.

No less is one entitled to ask whether “the individual-right theory” has proven any more efficacious outside the lairs of rogue legislators and lower-court judges than within them. The answer, of course, is “no”. For the most notorious recent example, did that theory preclude the BATFE’s pernicious, and plainly unconstitutional, misconstruction of the National Firearms Act of 1934, which imposed a ban on so-called “bump stocks” by falsely assimilating such devices to actual “machine guns”? And did not President Trump himself—whose candidacy was promoted and whose incumbency has been praised by that champion of “the individual-right theory”, the NRA—propose, egg on, and approve the BATFE’s action, “the individual right” be damned? And what of “red-flag laws” which muster anonymous accusers—along with police, prosecutors, and judges playing at pop-psychology—to violate not only the Second Amendment but also the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments? What effect will “the individual right” have on these enactments? The all-too-predictable answer is “none”.

“The individual-right theory” has not disabled, it has not deterred, it has not discouraged—in fact, it has encouraged and even facilitated—“gun-control” fanatics in legislatures, courts, the mass media, and subversive special-interest groups in their jihad aimed at forcibly disarming as many ordinary Americans as possible, of as many firearms as possible, in as many places as possible, as soon as possible, for as many reasons as possible—while affording the victims of this aggression as little recourse as possible. Indeed, “the individual-right theory” is of inestimable propagandistic value to “gun controllers”, precisely because by its own terms it juxtaposes the right of a selfish individual to act in his own personal interest against the power and duty of a benevolent government to act altruistically in the public interest. On the basis of that politically loaded dichotomy, “gun controllers” can claim in the name of “common sense” that “the individual right” must be subjected to judicial “balancing tests” and other arguments sounding in “reasonable regulation” predicated on the “findings” of modern practitioners of “sociological jurisprudence” and other pseudo-intellectual mumbo jumbo peddled by Cultural Marxists. Not surprisingly, then, the most “progressive” contemporary “gun controllers” are ranging far beyond traditional proposals for ad hoc regulation of firearms to demand instead the systematic elimination of private possession of most if not all firearms, based on some politicians’ or special-interest groups’ tendentious notions of ordinary Americans’ lack of any “need” to possess this or that type of firearm (in particular, “assault rifles”); on the peculiar “danger” to the public which some types of firearms supposedly pose in private hands (such as mass shootings perpetrated with semi-automatic pistols and rifles equipped with “high-capacity magazines”); on the number of deaths per annum which can be attributed to firearms in general (the actual circumstances of those fatalities conveniently left unconsidered); on whether a firearm can be defamed as an “assault rifle” or “weapon of war”, or demonized with some other bad name (as if constitutional rights turned on mere labels); and so on.

For example, if the “gun controllers’” “compelling governmental interest” were to prevent homicides effected with firearms in the hands of private citizens to the greatest degree possible (a goal the importance of which no one would gainsay in principle), a plausible “least-restrictive alternative” that preserved a “right” (perhaps only vestigial in substance, but a “right” in form nonetheless) for individuals to employ firearms for target-shooting, hunting, and other governmentally approved “sporting purposes” would be for all privately owned firearms and ammunition to be kept in governmentally supervised arsenals to be withdrawn only for those uses at specified locations and times by individuals who had passed suitably comprehensive “background checks” immediately prior to being allowed access to those arms. As for personal protection, ordinary citizens could depend on Local police, or on private security firms properly licensed and regulated by the government, just as do large numbers of people who choose not to be armed today, or who live in jurisdictions in which the laws prevent them from being armed. As draconian as this may appear to be, it preserves the appearances of judicial “strict scrutiny” which most proponents of “the individual-right theory” not only accept as legitimate but even themselves attempt at every opportunity to importune the courts to apply to the latest “gun-control” scheme.

An additional demerit of “the individual-right theory” is that it concerns itself exclusively with the claim of an individual simply to possess his own firearm. But because one’s mere possession of a firearm does not guarantee his proficiency with it, “the individual right” does not even pretend to insure that someone who possesses a firearm will train, or be trained, sufficiently in its use, even for personal protection in his own home (let alone on the street). This fuels the fire of “gun controllers’” propaganda that many, if not most, ordinary Americans who possess firearms are ignorant red necks or incompetent bozos who—because of their deplorable lack of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes requisite for the safe handling of arms—pose significant dangers to themselves as well as to others.

Moreover, by the implication of its own terms, “the individual right” neither requires nor even encourages an individual to prepare—along with members of his own family, neighbors, and other Local citizens—to engage in concerted action with firearms should that become necessary for the defense of their community against (say) criminal gangs. Of course, advocates of “the individual right” such as the NRA promote the exalted notion that each armed American is a brick in a bulwark raised up against usurpation, oppression, and tyranny at the hands of the worst of all criminals, rogue public officials. A patriot’s beautiful dream, this, to be sure. But a realist recognizes it as a cruel delusion. Being a thoroughly individualistic conception predicated exclusively on the last fourteen words of the Second Amendment, “the individual right” has, and can have, nothing to do with the kind of collective action by ordinary Americans with respect to firearms to which the Amendment’s first thirteen words refer—that is, providing “security” for “a free State” through the “necessary” efforts of “well regulated Militia”.

The history of tyrannies in one country after another during modern times is a collection of horrific facts. In contrast, that Americans exercising “the individual right to keep and bear arms” in mutual isolation could forefend the advent of tyranny in this country, let alone fight off a tyranny once ensconced in power, is a childish fantasy. Usurpation does not give birth to oppression, and oppression mature into tyranny, unless the aspiring usurpers, oppressors, and tyrants can call upon well-armed, -organized, and -trained contingents of myrmidons to stifle public criticism of, frighten political opposition to, and put down actual physical resistance against their rule. So, even with an AR-15 rifle and several thousand rounds of ammunition loaded into 30-round magazines at his side, a lone individual cowering in his cellar cannot hope, solely through his own actions, to defeat the forces of any tyranny worthy of that name. He cannot hope even to defend himself against it for any appreciable length of time. And therefore he cannot reasonably expect to deter it from attacking, enslaving, or murdering him or anyone else.

In sum—

  • “The individual-right theory” is illiterate, illogical, and illegitimate, because it disregards the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment (a fatal demerit in constitutional analysis).
  • “The individual-right theory” radically contracts the scope of the “Arms” the Second Amendment protects, because “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” which it posits is independent of any relationship between those “Arms” and “[a] well regulated Militia”. If the “Arms” at issue were those suitable for any conceivable type of service in the Militia, it would be impossible to identify any “Arms” the Second Amendment would not protect. But if (according to “the individual-right theory”) the “Arms” at issue are only those suitable for personal protection by an isolated individual, then the Amendment can protect only those “Arms” which such an individual reasonably needs for that purpose under the particular circumstances confronting him—which is a matter, not of straightforward and intelligible constitutional principle, but of conjecture, controversy, and the frothy crappuccino ladled out by “gun-control” fanatics.
  • “The individual-right theory” acquiesces in unconstitutional limitations on which “people” may exercise “the right * * * to keep and bear Arms”—denying those “people” sixteen and seventeen years of age a right to possess either handguns or long guns, and those “people” eighteen through twenty years of age a right to possess handguns.
  • “The individual-right theory” exposes ordinary Americans to perpetual legislative, judicial, and executive harassment by “gun controllers”, because it pits the mere private interests of individuals against the public interest the government serves—and in this contest the government always has the final say. Experience teaches that “the individual-right theory” cannot prevent “gun control” from being imposed throughout this country step by step, because “gun controllers” will always be able—in the future as they have been in the past—to conjure some “compelling governmental interest” which their latest “reasonable regulation” serves, and to convince the courts that “common sense” commends that “regulation” as imposing “the least-restrictive alternative” on the individuals being “regulated”.
  • “The individual-right theory” deludes ordinary Americans into imagining that, with respect to firearms, individual action is sufficient, collective action unnecessary—when, as history repetitively evidences, only collective action offers any hope of successful deterrence, let alone resistance, against usurpers, oppressors, and tyrants. By inducing inactivity this mental intoxication is particularly pernicious, because in the realm of politics evildoers never sleep, but good men all too often do.
  • Finally, “the individual right” is a right of an ordinary private citizen, asserting personal interests, not a right of a member of a governmental establishment, exercising governmental authority. This enables “gun controllers” to portray “gun control” as a policy proposed in the public interest, and to berate those Americans who oppose “gun control” as “anti-government extremists” acting against the general welfare.

C. The true “right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is to be found in two places: First, in the full wording of the Second Amendment. The overarching goal of the Amendment is to guarantee the survival of “a free State”. This requires the provision of “security”. “[N]ecessary to the security of a free State” is “[a] well regulated Militia”. And to ensure that “[a] well regulated Militia” always exists in every “free State” in the Union, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”. The obvious, unavoidable, conclusion is that the purpose of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is to guarantee that “the people” will always be capable of serving in —and therefore of always having at their own disposal—“well regulated Militia”, through which they themselves can provide “the security of a free State”.

Second, constitutional exegesis should not stop with the obvious. For the Second Amendment does not stand alone. It relates directly to provisions in the original Constitution which also deal with “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”.

To ensure that public officials would always adhere to the correct construction of the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, consisting of “further declaratory and restrictive clauses”, was grafted onto the Constitution “in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers”. Resolution of the First Congress Submitting Twelve Amendments to the Constitution (4 March 1789), in Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States, House Document No. 398, 69th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1927), at 1063. Now, obviously, a “misconstruction * * * of [the] powers” which the original Constitution delegated to the General Government would involve a misreading, misinterpretation, or mistaken application of those “powers”—stemming, presumably, from an inadvertent and honest misunderstanding of some sort. Conversely, an “abuse of [the original Constitution’s] powers” would involve an intentional and dishonest extension (or perhaps an intentional and dishonest contraction) of those “powers” in derogation of their legitimate purpose and scope. In either case, the Bill of Rights was adopted, not on the premiss that the various actions which its Articles discountenanced were actually permitted by the original Constitution, but rather to ensure that the correct construction of the Constitution—which disallowed those actions in the first place—would be pellucid. Indeed, that the Bill of Rights added “further declaratory and restrictive clauses” plainly indicated that the original Constitution already contained some “declaratory and restrictive clauses” (whether express or implied) with respect to the subjects the Bill of Rights addressed. In this regard, Alexander Hamilton was correct to write that “the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, a BILL OF RIGHTS”. The Federalist No. 84.

Plainly enough, as its reference to “well regulated Militia” proves, the Second Amendment contains “further declaratory and restrictive clauses” which were added to the original Constitution “in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers” with respect to the Militia—namely, Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16; and Article II, Section 2, Clause 1. According to the logic of the Bill of Rights, if these powers were always properly construed and applied by Congress, the President, and the States, Americans would not need the Second Amendment. But because the enemies of “a free State” are always at work undermining its foundations, the Second Amendment exists to ensure that these powers will be so construed and applied no matter what.

Of no small moment is that “the individual-right theory” cannot point to any sentence, clause, or word in the original Constitution which might plausibly need the Second Amendment “in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of [that sentence’s, clause’s, or word’s] power[ ]” with respect to personal self-defense. As the Founders well knew, “[s]elf defence * * * , as it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society.” William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Robert Bell, American Edition, 4 Volumes & Appendix, 1771-1773), Volume 3, at 4. There being no imaginable provision of the Constitution which by any “misconstruction or abuse” could purport to “take[ ] away” “the primary law of nature” which cannot be “taken away by the law of society”, there could be no need for an article in the Bill of Rights to prevent such an impossible “misconstruction or abuse”. Thus, the very purpose of the Bill of Rights excludes “the individual-right theory” as an arguable exegesis of the Second Amendment.

As an aside, it is more than merely arguable that the Ninth Amendment protects “the individual right” to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense under some circumstances. The Ninth Amendment provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” Plainly, no provision in the original Constitution relates to (let alone enumerates) the right of personal self-defense, Therefore, the Ninth Amendment would not be necessary “in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of [some nonexistent] power[ ]” relevant thereto. But it would be useful to establish that, notwithstanding the original Constitution’s silence on the subject of personal self-defense, “the people” retain that right in general, in addition to a specific right to employ for that purpose the “Arms” they possess for Militia service.

In any event, anyone who has perused The Sword and Sovereignty or has carefully studied the matter in some other manner understands what “the Militia of the several States” were when the original Constitution incorporated them as such as permanent institutions of government within its federal system in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16, and in Article II, Section 2, Clause 1. Similarly, every such person understands what the power delegated to Congress “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia” entailed at that time (Article I, Section 8, Clause 16). Furthermore, every such person understands that the States retained their own powers “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the[ir own] Militia”, because the Militia are “the Militia of the several States” (that is, separate governmental establishments of and within each of the States), not “the Militia of the United States”. That is, “Militia” in the original Constitution is a plural not a singular noun. Moreover, every such person understands that the powers the original Constitution delegated to Congress, and reserved for the States, were then (and are now) simultaneously duties. For “[w]hatever functions Congress are by the Constitution authorized to perform they are, when the public good requires it, bound to perform”. United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 Howard) 560, 567 (1850). And even beyond the application of this general principle to the States, just as it does today the Supremacy Clause of the original Constitution (Article VI, Clause 2) disabled them from so disorganizing, disarming, or impairing the discipline of their Militia that the latter would be incapable of being “call[ed] forth [by Congress] to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 15), or of being deployed by the States themselves for the States’ own purposes beyond what the Constitution allows for Congress, such as “engag[ing] in War” when “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”, which the States may do “without the Consent of Congress” (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3).

Any student of this matter also knows that, from their inceptions in Colonial times, “the Militia of the several States” were institutions memberships in which were compulsory—that is, every individual eligible for service in the Militia was under a legal duty to serve. And for every such individual the duty to serve necessarily implied a corresponding right to serve as against anyone who might attempt to interfere with the performance of that duty. Inasmuch as everyone in the Militia (other than conscientious objectors) was required to acquire and possess throughout his time in service one or more firearms, suitable ammunition, and various accouterments, the duty to serve encompassed an absolute “right * * * to keep and bear Arms” of no less longevity. No “compelling governmental interest” could ever have interfered with that right, because service in the Militia was itself the highest of all “compelling governmental interest[s]”, being “necessary to the security of a free State”. In contrast, although “the individual-right theory” does promote a right to acquire and possess firearms, it does not impose, suggest, or even pose the possibility of a duty to do so. Neither does “the individual-right theory” require or encourage anyone to acquire a firearm for the specific purpose of serving in “[a] well regulated Militia”. Indeed, almost all of the proponents of “the individual-right theory” recoil from the word “militia” with the terror that garlic inspires in vampires.

Because the original Constitution incorporated “the Militia of the several States” as such as permanent institutions of government within its federal system (in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16, and in Article II, Section 2, Clause 1), neither the States, nor Congress, nor the President, and certainly not the Judiciary, can dispense or interfere with them. In particular, because no “unarmed Militia” or “disarmed Militia” ever existed, or were ever even contemplated, in American pre-constitutional history, there can be no “gun control” of the modern sort which could injuriously affect the Militia, or any members thereof. To the contrary: Where the Militia are concerned, “gun control” involves the provision of firearms to everyone (other than conscientious objectors), not the withholding of as many firearms from as many ordinary Americans as quickly as possible, which is the ulterior, and often even the announced, goal of all contemporary “gun-control” fanatics.

The Constitution delegates to Congress the power “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia” in order to enable them to be “call[ed] forth to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” (Article I, Section 8, Clauses 16 and 15)—not “[t]o provide [against] * * * arming * * * the Militia”, or “[t]o provide for * * * [dis]arming” them, so that those purposes cannot be served. Congress cannot disarm the Militia of the several States, because the Militia must be armed by the States or by the members of the Militia themselves (if Congress does not “provide for * * * arming” them), so as always to be ready to perform, not only those three constitutional functions, but also whatever functions their States may require of them (with which Congress generally nothing to do). The States cannot disarm their own Militia, not only because there are no such things as “disarmed Militia”, but also because disarming their Militia would unconstitutionally interfere with the powers, duties, and rights of Congress to arm the selfsame Militia and to call those armed Militia forth. Moreover, in general, for any State to disarm her Militia would leave the people of that State incapable of providing “the security of a free State” within their State, because the “necessary” means—“[a] well regulated Militia”—would not exist. In particular, such a State would disable herself from “engag[ing] in War” even when “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay” (Article I, Section 10, Clause 3), a consequence the absurdity of which needs only to be enunciated to be appreciated.

Beyond this, the Declaration of Independence asserts that, “when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce the[ People] under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.” In practice, however, the people could never enforce this “right” and fulfill this “duty” unless they were, not simply armed as isolated individuals, but instead armed, organized, trained, and disciplined collectively in appropriate Militia units infused with governmental authority as manifestations of the people’s sovereignty. So, unless Americans are ready to dismiss the Declaration of Independence as a childish fantasy, they must demand—and against any and all opposition must enforce their demand—that the Militia always be armed.

Because the Militia must be armed, the people who serve in the Militia must be armed. But who are those people? Everyone familiar with the pre-constitutional Militia—that is, the Militia incorporated into the original Constitution as “the Militia of the several States”—knows that, in general, all free males from 16 upwards to 45, 50, 55, or even 60 years of age (excluding those who were severely physically disabled, who were mentally defective, or in some cases who had been convicted of serious criminal offenses) were required to enroll in the Militia. The lower age-limit turned on the idea that a sixteen-year-old was sufficiently mature to be expected to participate in protection of the community. The upper limit (actually, an exemption rather than an exclusion) turned on the reality that in those days most superannuated individuals suffered from illnesses or disabilities beyond treatment or correction, which excused them from trying to fulfill the para-military duties the Militia typically performed. Although at some point compelled today by the constitutional consideration that one cannot be required to serve if he is simply unable to do so, the upper age-limit remains subject to statutory adjustment, just as it was in pre-constitutional times, on the basis of practicality. Today, however, society having advanced in complexity, the Militia would be responsible for many more functions than they were in the Founding Era, functions which could easily be performed by elderly or partially disabled individuals, especially where technical expertise acquired over a lifetime were required. Thus, the people who would exercise “the right * * * to keep and bear Arms” in the Militia would include those from 16 years of age to those just under the age at which they were more or less incapable of “keep[ing] and bear[ing] Arms” at all. Women having been legally emancipated since the Founding Era, this set would include them as well, under conditions appropriately tailored to their peculiar needs.

Analysis must now turn to the question of what sort of “Arms” people enrolled in the Militia would have the right, and the duty, “to keep and bear”. Although many vocal proponents of “the individual-right theory” claim that the Second Amendment entitles all law-abiding individuals “to keep and bear Arms”—or at least firearms—of all sorts, that theory itself advances no objective standard in this regard. Rather, it loosely refers to “Arms” which an ordinary individual, under circumstances typical in contemporary society, would be likely to have at hand to use for personal self-defense. (That, after all, is the gist of the Heller decision, at least as far as some handguns are concerned.) All of these matters, of course, are subject to sufficient doubt, debate, disagreement, and dissension to foster arguments that some “compelling governmental interests” exist for banning this or that type of firearm, or even all firearms, from private citizens’ possession. Indeed, “the individual-right theory” has not prevented lower courts from venturing even more deeply into the thickets of judicial absurdity, to rule that broad categories of “Arms” which undoubtedly could be used for self-defense are not protected by the Second Amendment at all—in particular, as in the Kolbe case, so-called “assault firearms” (such as AR-15 rifles) which the Judges denounced as akin to “weapons of war”.

How does this compare to the “Arms” people enrolled in the Militia would be, not only entitled, but also required by law, “to keep and bear”? Other than conscientious objectors, everyone enrolled in the Militia would be obliged to possess firearms suitable for the various types of Militia duty he (or she) might perform. For just about all persons not suffering from a disqualifying physical disability, this would mandate possession of at least one military-grade “assault rifle” and a military- or police-grade semiautomatic pistol (with ammunition and various accessories). Not Heller, not McDonald, but United States v. Miller provides the applicable principle: A firearm comes within the ken of the Second Amendment if “at this time [it] has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”, such that “this weapon is part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.” 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1937). So, contrary to the Judges who mangled Kolbe, “weapons of war” form the very first rank of the “Arms” which the Second Amendment protects—which should be obvious (even to those Judges) simply from the constitutional authority and responsibility of the Militia to “repel Invasions” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 15). Actually, each member of the Militia could—and would be encouraged to—acquire in the free market as many firearms of as many types as might be useful for any and every sort of Militia service to which that individual might be assigned by specific orders or in which he might be caught up through adventitious circumstances. That being the case, it would be impossible to imagine any working firearm which could not be included in this set of “Arms”. That, of course, is not the case where “the individual right” is under scrutiny—to which any American who cannot easily acquire an automatic rifle (or even a silly “bump stock”) in the open market will attest.

“The individual-right theory” is also defective because, by its own terms, it applies only to private citizens acting as such, with only the rights, powers, privileges, and immunities which pertain to such individuals. In contrast, at all times individuals enrolled in the Militia are members of governmental institutions—“the Militia of the several States”—exercising the rights, powers, privileges, and immunities which pertain to those institutions. And at some times members of “the Militia of the several States” may be “call[ed] forth to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” in “the actual Service of the United States” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 15, and Article II, Section 2, Clause 1)—then to exercise the rights, powers, privileges, and immunities which pertain to persons “employed in the Service of the United States” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 16). Thus, where the Militia are concerned, no dichotomy or disjunction exists between mere “private citizens” and “the government”. The Militia are components of the governments of each of the several States all of the time and of the United States some of the time. At no time are they not governmental entities. So individual members of the Militia are always public officials, because within the Militia they exercise public authority for public purposes—indeed, for the most important public purpose of all, because the highest statement of public authority (the Constitution itself) deems them “necessary to the security of a free State”.

Champions of “the individual-right theory” will doubtlessly complain that law-abiding individuals not enrolled in the Militia will not be assured of a “right * * * to keep and bear Arms”. This fear is wildly overblown. To be sure, some individuals not subject to enrollment in the Militia will not be assured of that right—and rightly so. Those who, being less than 16 years of age, are too young to serve in the Militia can claim no “individual right” with respect to firearms today. No responsible person advocates allowing children to purchase firearms on their own accounts, or to possess firearms even for legitimate uses, without close parental or other adult supervision. On the other hand, individuals who became too old or too infirm to continue to serve in the Militia could not be dispossessed of the firearms they had acquired when enrolled in the Militia, because these are their own private property subject to the general constitutional protections of Due Process (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). And the very few individuals who for some innocent reasons were never eligible for service in the Militia could not be prohibited from acquiring firearms suitable for purposes of self-defense (Ninth Amendment).

It should be obvious, too, that the absolute “right of the people to keep and bear Arms” in order to facilitate their service in the Militia is perfectly compatible with—indeed, is the very best way to effectuate—“the individual right” “to keep and bear Arms” for personal self-defense. Americans today should be as well aware as were the Founders in their own time that self-defense constitutes execution of “the primary law of nature”. The law of society “considers that the future process of law is by no means an adequate remedy for injuries accompanied with force; since it is impossible to say, to what wanton lengths of rapine or cruelty outrages of this sort would be carried, unless it were permitted a man immediately to oppose one violence with another.” William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Robert Bell, American Edition, 4 Volumes & Appendix, 1771-1773), Volume 3, at 4. So self-defense is, at its very foundation, a Militia function: namely, the execution of “the primary law of nature” when no law of society can be brought to bear to prevent some irremediable harm. And, self-evidently, as a practical matter everyone who is required to possess firearms suitable for Militia service can also employ those firearms for self-protection (or the protection of others) should the need arise. Thus considered in the correct constitutional context, “the individual right” of self-defense becomes inseparable from Americans’ rights and duties pertaining to the Militia. Moreover, as an aspect of executing the law, self-defense implies an absolute right derived from service in the Militia “to keep and bear Arms” useful for that purpose—which “Arms” will inevitably include numerous types of firearms perfectly adequate for self-defense even if not usually deemed suitable for “execut[ing other] Laws”, “suppress[ing] Insurrections”, or “repel[ling] Invasions” (Article I, Section 8, Clause 15).

For this commentary to go further than it has would bring owls to Athens. It is enough to ask which the reader would have: the illlogical mish-mash which “the individual-right theory” imposes upon a truncated Second Amendment of only fourteen words; or the coherent construction of that Amendment which reliance on all of its twenty-seven words makes possible? The choice is yours. I, however, am under the distinct impression that the exponents of “the individual-right theory” will cling to it no matter what. The reason is subject to conjecture: ignorance, willful blindness, reckless disregard of the facts, a stubborn refusal to admit error? What difference, though, can the reason make now? “No matter what” will all too soon be upon us. Give the “gun-control” fanatics their heads in the 2020 elections, and they will destroy this country in very short order, as sure as shooting. And “the individual-right theory” of the Second Amendment will do nothing to stop them.

© 2019 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




Three Questions About The Second Amendment

Recently, some friends of the Second Amendment posed three questions to me, the answers to which I consider of great importance—

I. Why is the recent ban on “bump stocks” so important?

First, in “the bump-stock ban” the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“BATFE”) has jury rigged a precedent for its “redefinition” of whatever statutory terms, originally defined by Congress, the unelected bureaucrats haunting the agency’s offices want to expand, contract, or otherwise twist out of shape by linguistic tricks. It would be effrontery enough for any mere “administrative agency” to arrogate unto itself in any degree—worse yet, to usurp outright—the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress to rewrite the laws of the United States. But in the case of the BATFE in particular it is intolerable. For the BATFE has proven itself to be a rogue establishment with a strong, persistent, and often irrational bias against ordinary Americans’ exercise of their rights under the Second Amendment. (The recent scandal of so-called “gun walking” under the agency’s code-name “Fast and Furious” is merely the most notorious of these outrages.) So the BATFE can be expected to spew out more “redefinitions” of this ilk as time goes by—especially if (or perhaps when) the Democratic Party gains control of the White House in the 2020 elections.

Second, the “bump-stock ban” can easily be extended far beyond “bump stocks” themselves. In pertinent part, the BATFE’s new regulation reads as follows:

The term “machine gun” includes a bump-stock-type device, i.e., a device that allows a semiautomatic firearm to shoot more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger by harnessing the recoil energy of the semiautomatic firearm to which it is affixed so that the trigger resets and continues firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter. [See 27 C.F.R. ¶¶ 447.11, 478.11, and 479.11, as modified perforce of 83 Federal Register at 66553 to 66554.]

On the face of it, the BATFE has “redefined” the statutory term “machine gun” simply in order to prevent certain semiautomatic firearms—such as AR-15 type rifles—from being “bump fired”. Plainly enough, however, the agency’s ultimate goal is not just to ban “bump-stock-type device[s]”—and not just to outlaw “bump fire” effectuated through the employment of such “device[s]”—but instead to ban all firearms capable of “bump fire” by any means, on the grounds that all such firearms, so usable, are effectively “machine guns”.

After all, the ostensible reason for the present attack on “bump-stock-type device[s]” is that “bump fire” itself is deemed to be somehow equivalent to (fully) automatic fire. So, because the BATFE has set out to prohibit a general effect, it does not matter that the actual mechanisms of “bump fire” with a semiautomatic firearm on the one hand, and of automatic fire with an actual “machine gun” on the other hand, are distinctly different, and have hitherto always been recognized as such by Congress and the BATFE itself, as well as by every firearms expert worthy of that designation. To the BATFE, to a benighted President Trump, and to “gun-control” fanatics in Congress, State legislatures, the courts, and the big “mainstream media”—as well as to all too many credulous Americans—simplistic appearances are of greater consequence than the complex technical realities of how disparate types of firearms actually function.

To accomplish that end, following up on the ban of “bump-stock-type device[s]” the BATFE could simply declare “bump fire” to be an inherent capability of certain semiautomatic firearms—because, self-evidently, no “bump-stock-type device” could cause any firearm to “bump fire” unless that firearm were already capable of being “bump fired”. So every semiautomatic firearm capable of “bump fire” by any means could be mischaracterized as inherently a “machine gun”. To employ the BATFE’s terminology, “bump fire” simply “harness[es] the recoil energy of the semiautomatic firearm” (an inherent characteristic), in conjunction with the firearm’s existing mechanism (also an inherent characteristic), so as to allow “the trigger [to] reset[ ] and continue[ ] firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter”. A semiautomatic firearm which can be demonstrated to be capable of “bump fire” by any means is, perforce of that capability, “designed to shoot * * * automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger”. Inherent in the design of such a firearm is “a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple rounds through a single function of the trigger”, where a “‘single function of the trigger’ means a single pull of the trigger and analogous motions”, those “motions” being caused in whatever effective manner. The “single function of the trigger” is the first pull by the conscious action of the shooter, after which “harnessing the recoil energy” of the firearm “automatically”, through “analogous motions”, results in firing “more than one shot, without manual reloading” and without a further conscious “pull of the trigger” by the shooter (thus being practically akin to a “machine gun”). Q.E.D.

On the basis of that reasoning, the BATFE could ban the private possession of every semiautomatic rifle—and probably every semiautomatic handgun and shotgun as well—which the agency’s technical staff could demonstrate to be capable of “bump fire” by any means whatsoever.

In the minds of politicians, legislators, judges, the big “mainstream media”, goofy “celebrities”, and a not inconsiderable percentage of the general public unfavorably disposed to the Second Amendment, this could be a very potent argument for banning just about all semiautomatic firearms.

II. What were the Founders trying to achieve when they adopted the Second Amendment?

The Founders certainly did not have in mind the contemporary misinterpretation of the last fourteen words of the Second Amendment which focuses on a so-called “individual right” to “keep and bear Arms” for the purpose of personal self-defense alone. They knew perfectly well that the right of self-defense did not need a constitutional Amendment for its recognition, protection, or exercise. For, in the words of Sir William Blackstone, the preëminent commentator on the laws of England at that time, “[s]elf defense * * * is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society.” Commentaries on the Laws of England (American Edition, 1772), Volume 3, at 4.

Furthermore, the Founders would have interpreted the Second Amendment in just the way they wrote it: namely, treating all of its twenty-seven words as inextricable parts of a single coherent sentence. Read in that way (as every sentence in the English language must be read), the Amendment’s meaning is self-evident. Its goal is “a free State”. To achieve this end, “security” is indispensable. The “necessary” means to provide “security” is “[a] well regulated Militia”. “[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is of central instrumentality in the operation of “[a] well regulated Militia”, and through the Militia is “necessary to the security of a free State”. For which reason that “right * * * shall not be infringed”—and without any exception, too, inasmuch as what the Constitution declares to be “necessary” can never be deemed to be “unnecessary”. Thus, the Second Amendment guarantees not only “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, but also, through the people’s permanent possession of suitable “Arms”, their right at all times to serve in “well regulated Militia” as the defenders of “a free State”.

The Founders’ primary concern was that Congress might default on its duty in Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia”. But the Second Amendment also covered the possibility that the States themselves might be no less remiss. As is all too evident today, the Founders’ fears have been proven prescient as to both Congress and the States.

The contemporary “individual right” “to keep and bear Arms” concerns itself entirely with the needs and actions of individuals as such, not with “well regulated Militia”. Ordinary Americans’ exercise of the.”individual right” does not establish “[a] well regulated Militia”, or secure its existence, or aid in its operations. Indeed, proponents of “the individual right” turn logical and linguistic somersaults in their bootless attempts to prove that, notwithstanding the actual wording of the Second Amendment, “the individual right” has nothing whatsoever to do with the Militia.

Moreover, Americans who exercise merely “the individual right” cannot fulfill any of the responsibilities assigned to the Militia. Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”. But—

  • People exercising “the individual right” in isolation or ad hoc groups can neither “repel Invasions” by foreign nations capable of invading the United States, nor “suppress Insurrections” on any scale worthy of that name. For such people can draw on no collective organization, training, discipline, governance, or extensive logistical support equal to those tasks.
  • Being burdened with similar deficiencies which prevent them from functioning as competent law-enforcement officers, people exercising merely “the individual right” are incapable in fact of “execut[ing] the Laws of the Union” (or of their own States, either). Of even more consequence, mere individuals have no governmental authority to execute any laws other than those few encompassed within the law of personal self-defense.

To be sure, the National Rifle Association and its co-thinkers claim that “the individual right” protects ordinary Americans against tyranny. This is wishful thinking. Even if armed, mere individuals or ad hoc groups cannot be expected to fend off by themselves the well organized and equipped forces of an ensconced tyrannical régime, any more than they can be expected to “repel Invasions” or “suppress Insurrections” on their own.

Although “the individual-right” misinterpretation of the Second Amendment does not support the Militia—and therefore does next to nothing for “the security of a free State”—the Militia interpretation of the Amendment guarantees “the individual right” as part of “the security of a free State”. An individual’s exercise of the right of personal self-defense always executes some law—whether against murder, manslaughter, mayhem, rape, battery, assault, armed robbery, and so on—under circumstances in which no other means of law enforcement is available. In that situation, the individual performs a function constitutionally assigned to the Militia: namely, executing the laws applicable in such circumstances. Thus, when the Second Amendment is properly interpreted so as to guarantee the existence of “well regulated Militia”, “the individual right” to personal self-defense receives the maximum amount of protection, too.

Similarly as to “Arms”. By its own terms, the “individual-right” theory embraces only “Arms” suitable for personal self-defense. This limitation enables proponents of “gun control” to deny that so-called “weapons of war”, “assault firearms”, and firearms capable of “bump fire” are entitled to any protection at all from the Second Amendment. One need peruse only the infamous decision in the recent case Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017), to see how convincing this denial can be for contemporary judges intent upon to reducing the Second Amendment to a vestigial organ in the constitutional corpus juris.

Were the suitability of “Arms” for service in the Militia the legal standard, however, all conceivable “Arms” would be protected, including “weapons of war”, “assault firearms”, and firearms capable of being “bump fired” (not to mention true “machine guns”). Within that extensive array would surely be found “Arms” useful in any imaginable situation involving personal self-defense.

III. Why is the fixation on “it’s our right” insufficient to achieve the true purpose of the Second Amendment?

“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms” may be “our right” in principle. But what good is that naked assertion when some “gun-control” statute is enacted or some judicial decision is handed down which purports to deny “our right” in practice?

Any competent lawyer will advise his client that “a right without a remedy is nonexistent”. So what is the sure, certain, and final remedy for modern-day “gun control”?

Beyond doubt, it is not “the individual right”. Reliance on “the individual right” exposes ordinary Americans to “gun control” to the maximum degree possible, because the legal contest is between mere private citizens, on the one side, and public officials, on the other. Under what passes for constitutional law today, “the individual right” can always be overridden by a so-called “compelling governmental interest”—which is whatever judges hostile to the Second Amendment say it is. Thus, “our right” is held hostage to their prejudices.

If, however, people exercising “the right * * * to keep and bear Arms” were active members of “well regulated Militia”—as all able-bodied Americans from sixteen years of age upwards should be—then contemporary “gun control” would necessarily pit one part of the government—a legislature or a court—against another part of the government—the Militia. This, of course, would create a logically as well as a legally untenable situation. For no conceivable “governmental interest” could exist for one part of the government to prevent another part of the government from performing its constitutional tasks. For example, Congress obviously cannot fulfill its constitutional duty “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia” by “[dis]arming * * * the Militia”. Neither can the States nullify that duty of Congress by themselves disarming their Militia. Thus, were the Militia in full constitutional operation, “gun control” of the contemporary sort would be impossible in both principle and practice. If that is not a compelling reason to pay close attention to all twenty-seven words of the Second Amendment (as well as the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution), one cannot imagine what could be.

© 2019 NWV – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




Censorship By Internet Corporations Is Still Censorship

The present brouhaha convulsing the Internet over the “banning”, “shadow banning”, “demonetizing”, and “censoring” of various so-called “conservative” or “right-wing” personalities, web sites, and blogs by Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google, and so forth has generated far more uninformed talk than systematic analysis. For the prime example, many observers put forward the simplistic apology that, although “free speech” in a general sense is being curtailed, and particular political, ideological, religious, and other points of view are being discriminated against and penalized, by these “social media” and “search engines”, nevertheless Facebook and the rest are not governmental entities but only private companies which as such have no constitutional or other legal duty to respect any but their own idiosyncratic conceptions of “free speech” (as embodied in the exceedingly vague and plastic “terms of service” and “community standards” in accord with which they police the speech allowed on their “platforms”). “Censorship” by such private corporations, so the argument goes, is not really “censorship” at all. This contention, however, is about as porous as a sieve.

First, as ostensibly private corporations, Facebook and the like surely expect that, were their “terms of service” and “community standards” to be challenged by the persons against whom they are discriminating, the courts of the several States, and perhaps of the United States as well, would uphold and see to the enforcement of those “terms” and “standards” as parts of private contracts. In fact, however, these “terms of service” and “community standards” are quintessential examples of “contracts of adhesion” which, because they evidently allow for (and arguably are intended to facilitate) invidiously discriminatory practices plainly subversive of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts should think more than twice before approving. See Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

Second, although perhaps “private corporations” in form (a question to be addressed below), these Internet “platforms” in fact were designed to serve, and now actually function, as “public fora” of the widest scope imaginable—certainly to a far greater degree than even the “company town” involved in the Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), was intended to and did serve as an effective “municipality” for its residents. In Marsh, the Court held that

[w]hether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free. * * * [T]he [company] town * * * does not function differently from any other town. The “business block” serves as the community shopping center and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing through. The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees [in the First and Fourteenth Amendments] * * * .

Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and country. Just as all other free citizens they must make decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their information must be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen.

* * * [T]he circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty * * * took place[ ] were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State’s permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a state statute. [326 U.S. at 507-509 (footnotes omitted).]

In principle, the “public fora” established by Facebook et alia are no different from other “public fora”, including those in “company towns”. (It could even be said that the denizens of Facebook and Twitter, for instance, live in electronic “company towns” distinguishable from old-fashioned “company towns” only with respect to their absence of geographic borders.) In practice, though, “public fora” on the Internet are much more extensive in scope and intensive in use by the general public than any “public fora” in existence heretofore. Indeed, far more people use, and even rely for personal and other purposes on, Facebook and other Internet “platforms” than now live, or have ever lived, in “company towns” in this country. And in attempting to enforce their “terms of service” and “community standards” in aid of invidious discrimination, Facebook and the like will doubtlessly invoke on their behalf State laws, or even the laws of the United States, which apply to “corporations” and “contracts”. So it would seem that the principles invoked in Marsh squarely apply to them.

Third, the excuse put forward by Facebook et alia for their discriminatory practices is that their “terms of service” and “community standards” are aimed only at so-called “hate speech”, “offensive speech”, “fake news”, and “conspiracy theories”. Perhaps it is enough to point out that neither Mr. Zuckerberg of Facebook nor any other guru in the “tech community” has a plausible, let alone a legitimate, claim to set himself up as the arbiter of what constitutes “goodspeaking” or “goodthinking” (in the Orwellian sense). After all, Mr. Zuckerberg’s “expertise” (such as it may be) relates to the arcana of computer codes, not to the code of laws which define “free speech”.

More specifically, terminology such as “hate speech” and “offensive speech” has no basis anywhere within the corpus of constitutional law, least of all with respect to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Simply put, the enjoyment of one’s constitutional rights—of any sort—cannot be made to turn on the invocation of tendentious labels. See, e.g., Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Peters) 410, 433 (1830); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963); New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-269 & notes 7 to 12 (1964); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); City of Madison, Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167, 173-174 & note 5 (1976).

Fourth, Facebook and other Internet “platforms” have grown into abusive corporate monopolies, which should be curtailed with respect to all of their excesses for that reason alone, under the antitrust laws. After all, much of what flows through the Internet under the auspices of these “platforms” is “interstate commerce” or undoubtedly “affects interstate commerce”, some of which “commerce” the “platforms” are openly attempting to suppress. And as the Supreme Court explained by way of analogy in Marsh,

[s]ince these facilities are built and operated primarily to the benefit of the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation. And * * * such regulation may not result in an operation of these facilities, even by privately owned companies, which unconstitutionally interferes with and discriminates against interstate commerce. [326 U.S. at 506 (footnote omitted).]

Fifth, the question arises: Why is the government of the United States not applying the antitrust laws to break up these obnoxious Internet monopolies? Besides tried and true explanations bottomed on the insouciance, incompetence, or venality of public officials, two plausible answers come to mind—

(1) Certain dark forces within the General Government want to present to the public the monopolistic character of Facebook and other Internet “platforms” as a “problem” for which the “solution” will be artfully crafted “regulation”. Not “regulation” in honest aid of untrammeled free speech, to be sure; but “regulation” which will enable those forces to employ those “platforms” to suppress indirectly, through ostensibly “private” action, speech which certain public officials disfavor but dare not suppress directly. Presumably, the “platforms” will actually welcome such “regulation”, because (as their present misconduct evidences) they are equally desirous of and intent upon suppressing such speech. “Regulation” will simply protect and perpetuate their anti-constitutional activities under the deceptive color of law—with credulous Americans lulled into acquiescence by the fairy tale that “regulation” has magically transformed vicious monopolies once controlled by self-serving corporate executives into virtuous “public/private partnerships” newly controlled by no less self-serving bureaucrats acting in league with no less self-serving corporate executives.

(2) The even more disturbing explanation for public officials’ reluctance to enforce the antitrust laws against the big Internet “platforms” is that those “platforms” never were, and are not now, really “private” endeavors at all. Rather, as many informed people believe with more than probable cause, they were originally inspired, invented, initiated, infused with capital, or otherwise encouraged and aided by the CIA, DARPA, or other entities lurking within the shadows of the Deep State. The goal (which evidently has succeeded) was to set up ostensibly “private” companies as surreptitious agents or allies of the Deep State for the dissemination of propaganda, for political and cultural subversion, for thoroughgoing surveillance of the population—and ultimately for the regimentation of common Americans’ minds at such a depressed  level of triviality, infantilism, and even stupefaction that it would become virtually impossible for them to function as informed, competent citizens within the “Republican Form of Government” which Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution guarantees. One may recall that, when asked what sort of government the Federal Convention of 1787 proposed, Benjamin Franklin responded: “A republic, if you can keep it.” No one can expect to “keep” a “republic” in existence for very long, though, if such as Facebook and Twitter significantly affect, let alone determine, the quality of public discourse.

In sum, there can be no question that “censorship”—in the constitutional sense of that term—is at work on the Internet.  And the Internet giants cannot shelter behind the flimsy façades

of their “corporate” charters. Honest and competent public officials, intent on serving the public interest, could bring this situation under control. Whether such officials exist in sufficient numbers to do the job remains to be seen.

© 2018 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




How To End The Assault On Assault Firearms

In recent years, “gun-control” fanatics have been anything but idle. In all too many States, they have succeeded in promoting draconian legislation directed at what they call “assault firearms” or “military-style firearms”. Typically, these statutes ban or impose onerous restrictions on private possession of “assault firearms” (i) specified by the manufacturers’ model names, as well as (ii) identifiable by one or more general “features” (such as the capability of semiautomatic fire, a detachable box magazine, a muzzle brake or flash suppressor, a folding or otherwise adjustable stock, a pistol grip, a barrel shroud, and so on). In addition, these statutes promiscuously outlaw so-called “high-capacity magazines” (usually defined as those capable of holding more than ten cartridges), whether or not used in conjunction with some “assault firearm”.

One need not be a psychologist well versed in the twisted workings of the politically psychopathic mind to realize that “gun-control” fanatics’ long-range goal is to ban private individuals’ possession of all firearms of every type, so as to render Americans defenseless against oppression by a totalitarian police state. Although at the present time these fanatics cannot convince more than a tiny minority of Americans of the desirability of their ultimate aim, they have hit upon a strategy to achieve it step-by-step through plays on words. Their approach is based upon the old adage that “to kill a dog you must first call it mad”. To be sure, even they recognize that any firearm can be used to commit an “assault”, just as any firearm can be used for the purpose of “defense”; and that the capacity of any magazine designed to hold more even than two cartridges can be deemed “high” in comparison to a magazine holding only that many. The point of the rhetorical exercise is not to talk sense, however, but through the use of seemingly plausible propaganda to make sequential progress in banning from private possession as many firearms as possible, in as much of this country as possible, as soon as possible.

So one need not be a certified fortune-teller to predict that “gun-control” fanatics will steadily expand the definition of “military-style” and “assault” rifles to include all semiautomatic rifles, on the grounds that semiautomatic rifles of any sort are not meaningfully distinct in operation in the field from the fully automatic or burst-fire arms employed by the regular Armed Forces. (Indeed, even the Army—long addicted to the wasteful “spray-and-pray” theory of marksmanship—now increasingly trains its personnel in controlled semiautomatic fire.) Then the demand will arise to ban or severely regulate private possession of all pump-action firearms, on the theory that these are routinely employed by police and other law-enforcement personnel who are organized, equipped, and trained on a para-military basis. Next will come bolt-action rifles which can use “high-capacity magazines” (with the definition of “high capacity” constantly being lowered). For “gun-control” fanatics will surely contend that the mere ability of any rifle (or any pistol or shotgun, for that matter) to use a “high-capacity magazine” by itself renders that firearm an “assault firearm”.

This scheme has already received initial judicial support in the notorious case Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), which held that:

(i) because of their general “military style” and operation, “assault firearms” are “weapons of war”, or at least are sufficiently akin to “weapons of war” to be treated as such;

(ii) being effectively “weapons of war”, “assault firearms” are excessively dangerous in private hands, as evidenced by their employment in various recent mass shootings;

(iii) as a class, “weapons of war” (or their functional equivalents) are not needed for individuals’ self-defense; and therefore

(iv) “assault weapons” are not protected by the Second Amendment to any degree, because, according to “the individual-right theory” adopted in the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Second Amendment is primarily (if not exclusively) concerned with firearms judicially distinguishable from “weapons of war”.

Unfortunately, as Kolbe demonstrates, “the individual-right theory” of the Second Amendment promoted by the National Rifle Association and its co-thinkers—which focuses exclusively on the last fourteen words of the Amendment—cannot even address, let alone defeat, this “weapons-of-war” theory. The NRA’s approach has been, first, to lobby State legislatures in attempts to prevent statutory bans on or stringent regulations of private individuals’ possession of “assault firearms” and “high-capacity magazines” from being enacted into law. Then, when these efforts have failed, to mount equally bootless judicial challenges to such laws, based on “the individual-right theory”. And thereafter to repeat this feckless process in robotic fashion, always hoping in the face of contrary evidence for a different result. See Worman v. Healey, Civil Action No. 1:17-10107-WGY (D. Mass. 2018), particularly at pages 26-34 and 46-47 (relying on Kolbe). This approach has proven to be ineffective in, for example, California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York. And it surely will garner no greater success in other States in which “gun-control” fanatics contrive to gain the upper hand in State legislatures and the courts, with the big “mainstream” media’s massive propaganda apparatus cheering them on.

If the NRA can learn from its own sorry experience, it should redirect its efforts to Congress and the President, urging them to take action pursuant to Article VI, Clauses 2 and 3 of the Constitution, which (in pertinent part) provide that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof * * * , shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”, and that “the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers * * * of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution”.

A. There can be no doubt that Congress is empowered under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 (the Commerce Power) to enact a “Law[ ] of the United States” to protect common Americans’ possession of “assault firearms” and “high-capacity magazines” against State prohibitions or regulations. In pertinent part, the Commerce Power authorizes Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce * * * among the several States”. As construed in numerous decisions of the Supreme Court, this power reaches all items which move or have ever moved in, or which otherwise arguably “affect”, “Commerce * * * among the several States”.

With respect to firarms in particular, perforce of this understanding of the Commerce Power Congress has asserted its right inter alia: to define which firearms are subject to regulation by the General Government (see 18 U.S.C. § 921); to grant or withhold permission to manufacture or deal commercially in firearms (see 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)); to set age-limits for the sale, purchase, and possession of firearms (see 18 U.S.C. § 922(b) and (x)); to control the sale, transfer, or other disposition of firearms to persons it prohibits from possessing them (see 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)); to restrict classes of persons from possessing, receiving, or transporting firearms at all (see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), (m), and (n)); to regulate the assembly of firearms from parts (see 18 U.S.C. § 922(r)); and to require“background checks” of persons seeking to purchase firearms (see 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) and (t)).

Congress has also made it clear that it can leave operable and abide by, or overrule and exclude entirely (in legal terminology “preëmpt”), State laws relating to the purchase or possession of firearms which “affect” “Commerce * * * among the several States”(see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(2) and 927).

Moreover, at one point in time, Congress took it upon itself to control traffic in and possession of what it then deemed to be “assault firearms” (see the former 18 U.S.C. § 922(v) and (w), which expired on 13 September 2004). This statute was negative in one sense, because it prohibited possession of some “assault firearms” in certain circumstances; but it was positive in another sense, because it allowed such possession in different circumstances. And it was clear at the time that no State law could have interfered with the operation of this statute.

Thus, pursuant to the broad authority it has heretofore exercised perforce of the Commerce Power, Congress could now enact a statute which protects against contrary State laws the manufacture, transportation, receipt, sale, purchase, transfer, ownership, and possession of “assault firearms” and “high-capacity magazines”—defined as various obnoxious State laws define them , or as Congress may more broadly define them—for all individuals (i) who are citizens of the United States or legally resident aliens who have made a declaration of intention to become such citizens, (ii) who are at least of some minimum age, and (iii) who are not prohibited by some law of the General Government from so dealing with firearms.

Through the effect of “preëmption”, such a statute would disable every elected or appointed official, department, or agency, and every county, municipality, or other political subdivision, of any State from enacting, enforcing, or affording legal recognition or effect for any purpose to any statute, ordinance, executive order, administrative regulation, or judicial decision operative in such State which purported to ban, to require licensing for or registration of, or otherwise to regulate the manufacture, transportation, receipt, sale, purchase, transfer, ownership, or possession of “assault firearms” or “high-capacity magazines” contrary, in addition, or supplementary to any law of the General Government applicable to such firearms or magazines.

Even without specific penalties stipulated in such a statute for State actors who dared to violate it, it would automatically override all contrary State and Local laws, and subject those malefactors to criminal prosecutions (under, say, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242) and civil actions (under, say, 42 U.S.C. § 1983) in the General Government’s courts.

Moreover, because Congress’s authority to “regulate Commerce [in firearms] * * * among the several States” reaches firearms of any and every sort or description, the Congressional statute posited here would essentially overrule aberrant judicial decisions such as Kolbe. Although Kolbe sustained Maryland’s statutory ban on “assault firearms” by means of the judicial sophistry that the Second Amendment’s guarantee does not embrace such firearms, the proposed statute would render Maryland’s law undeniably unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 and Article VI, Clauses 2 and 3 of the Constitution, simply because the Commerce Power undoubtedly applies to all firearms which “affect” “Commerce * * * among the several States” whether or not they are protected by that Amendment, and the said statute would undoubtedly be a “Law[ ] of the United States * * * made in Pursuance” of the Commerce Power.

B. Some champions of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” guaranteed by the Second Amendment might object that a general invocation of the Commerce Power—even though specifically on behalf of protecting Americans’ possession of “assault firearms” and “high-capacity magazines”—might be taken to concede sub silentio the presumptive validity of many highly questionable restrictions on Americans’ acquisition and possession of firearms which Congress has previously enacted under color of that power. The short answer to this is: “one thing at a time”. Although the General Government’s entire regulatory scheme relating to firearms surely needs comprehensive reëvaluation and overhaul, attempting a thoroughgoing reform at this juncture would only throw up unnecessary and perhaps insurmountable political roadblocks to any reform. Although limited in scope, the statute posited here would certainly be an improvement on the present situation. And something is better than nothing.

Nonetheless, it would not be amiss to consider for purposes of argument a statute with a greater degree of constitutional particularity. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides (in pertinent part) that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States”. And Section 5 of that Amendment provides that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” Notwithstanding Kolbe, common Americans’ access to and possession of “assault firearms” and “high-capacity magazines” are protected by the Second Amendment—particularly in consideration of the first thirteen words thereof—and as such are among “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States”. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howard) 393, 403, 416-417 (1857), particularly in light of the analysis in William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), Volume II, Chapter XXXI. So it would undoubtedly be constitutional for Congress to determine as much, and on that basis to enact the statute posited here, in order “to enforce” those “privileges and immunities” against any “State [which] shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge th[os]e privileges and immunities”. And a statute predicated upon the Second and Fourteenth Amendments could not be faulted for tacitly accepting the possibility that Congress itself might have “abridge[d] th[os]e privileges and immunities” through legislation enacted under color of the Commerce Power in years past.

The evident problem with this approach, however, is that rogue judges might—nay, surely would—attempt to void such a statute on the specious basis that Congress’s assertions that “assault firearms” are protected under the Second Amendment, or that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is within “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States”, or both are wrong, and in any event are not bonding upon the Judiciary. After all, the errant judges who decided Kolbe held, as a matter of their absurdly twisted misconception of the Second Amendment, that “assault firearms” are not within the ambit of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”. See 849 F.3d at 121, relying on dicta in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627-628 (2008). And if that reasoning were constitutionally cogent, on what basis could Americans’ acquisition and possession of such firearms be found among those “privileges and immunities”? Therefore, in light of the proclivity of such jurists to declare that their (mis)interpretations of the Constitution are the Constitution, to which everyone else in the entire world must give credence and obedience, reliance on only the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to solve the problem posed by State laws which ban “assault firearms” would simply create another problem: namely, how are Congress and the President to enforce the remedial statute in the face of obstruction from courts staffed by partisans of “gun control” intoxicated by the pernicious doctrine of “judicial supremacy”?

The obvious answer is that, because no one can doubt that “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” include statutory rights created by Congress, the posited statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Power which recognized the rights of common Americans to acquire and possess “assault firearms” notwithstanding any contrary State law could be enforced through the Fourteenth Amendment, no matter what idiotic notions about the inapplicability of the Second Amendment rogue judges might entertain. This solution, however, raises once again the question of whether the Commerce Power is the most suitable constitutional vehicle for the purpose at hand.

In addition, by the Fourteenth Amendment’s very terms, “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” do not apply to aliens legally resident in this country who have made declarations of their intentions to become citizens—and on that basis should have some equitable claim to acquire and possess “assault firearms”.

C. All of these difficulties and inconveniences could be obviated if the statute posited here were premissed on Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution, which (in pertinent part) delegates to Congress the power “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia”. This power is not dependent upon the Commerce Power, the Second Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, or any other provision of the Constitution. It is purely a Congressional power, in the exercise of which the Judiciary plays no rôle whatsoever save acquiescence. For Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the * * * Powers [in Clauses 1 through 17]”. And “the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316, 420 (1819). Thus, Congress alone is entitled to decide what may be “necessary and proper” in the exercise of its power “[t]o provide for * * * arming the Militia”—including whom it will arm, with what firearms they will be provided, and what disabilities Congress may impose upon the States to ensure that its decisions in those particulars are effectuated.

A tremendous amount of legal-historical material is available to answer the question of what “arming the Militia” in Article I, Section 18, Clause 16 means in terms of the types of “arm[s]” which may be involved, as well as how that phrase relates to the phrases “[a] well regulated Militia” and “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” in the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Edwin Vieira, Jr., The Sword and Sovereignty: The Constitutional Principles of “the Militia of the Several States” (Front Royal, Virginia: CD-ROM Edition, 2012). For the purposes of this commentary, though, a detailed review of the documentary record is not required. For in United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court made it clear that the Second Amendment protects every firearm which “has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”, which is “any part of * * * ordinary military equipment”, and the “use [of which] could contribute to the common defense”. 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). In light of the holding in Kolbe that contemporary “assault firearms” (together with “high-capacity magazines”) are equivalent or akin to “weapons of war”—which, of course, do “ha[ve] some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”, which are “part of * * * ordinary military equipment”, and the “use [of which] could contribute to the common defense”—it follows that Congress may “provide for * * * arming the Militia” with such firearms (along with all other firearms which might satisfy the broad standards set out in Miller).

Who, though, are the members of “the Militia” whom Congress may arm? In pertinent part, the relevant statute now provides that:

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32 [of the United States Code], under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States, and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.
(b) The classes of the militia are—

(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.

10 U.S.C. § 246. Therefore, in the exercise of its power “[t]o provide for * * * arming the Militia” Congress may enact a statute which stipulates that all members of “the unorganized militia”—at this time, “all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and * * * under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States” and “who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia”—shall have the right to acquire and possess “assault firearms” and “high-capacity magazines”, notwithstanding any State statute, ordinance, or other law, or any decree or decision of any court, to the contrary.

Inasmuch as the present statutory age-limits for “[t]he militia of the United States” do not adequately protect many Americans for whom the possession of “assault weapons” should be guaranteed by law, as part of the reform proposed here the statute quoted above should be amended to provide as follows:

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied male and female individuals who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States.
(b) The classes of the militia are—

(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia, with (i) those at least 17 years of age and under 45 years of age to be included in the active unorganized militia, and (ii) those at least 45 years of age and older to be included in the reserve unorganized militia.

Repelling the contemporary assault on “assault firearms” in this manner would have two benefits. First, it would immediately frustrate the “gun-control” fanatics’ plans to disarm Americans by “the death of a thousand cuts”. Second, it would at least begin the necessarily lengthy process of constitutionally revitalizing “the Militia” throughout the United States. Eventually, of course, Congress would have to exercise to the full its power “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia” to that end. For this, systematic governmental direction, oversight, and assistance by both the General Government and the States would be required. At the present time, though, it would suffice for Congress to enable members of “the unorganized militia” to arm themselves through the free market with the type of firearms arguably most suitable for “contribut[ing] to the common defense”—that is, modern “assault firearms”—free from interference by rogue public officials in the States, and rogue judges in the courts of the United States.

Readers of this commentary should not expect the NRA to promote this proposal on its own initiative, though. Rather, in light of that organization’s stubborn adherence to “the individual-right theory” of the Second Amendment, as well as its studied indifference if not hostility to anything to do with the Militia, they should anticipate not only reluctance but even resistance on its part. To put the matter in the most charitable light, the NRA will need to be prompted to take an active and constructive part in this endeavor. A good start might be for readers of this commentary—especially those who are NRA members—to write to the NRA’s new President, Oliver North, urging him to encourage the organization’s staff to look into this matter with an open mind.

© 2018 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




Who Is In Charge Here?

The on-going circus of the “Russian collusion” investigation is often described by its detractors as a modern-day “witch hunt” in comparison with which the proceedings in colonial Salem appear as models of social decorum, rational thinking, and due process of law. This, however, is an unjustifiable slur on America’s colonial ancestors. For if one takes seriously the claims of contemporary “Wiccans” and the like, there may very well have been actual “witches” in Salem. In contrast, the various contentions put forward in support of the “Russian collusion” matter in principle, as well as the manner in which the investigation is being conducted in practice, lack even this minimal level of credibility.

Take, for a prime example, the argument asserted by propagandists for “Russian collusion” to the effect that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are “independent” agencies which can refuse to coöperate with Congress with respect to its requests for production of unredacted public records and other information vital to the performance of its undoubted constitutional power of oversight. These “agencies”, such apologists brazenly contend, are so “independent” that they can even refuse to comply with directives from their immediate constitutional superior, the President of the United States himself. As a constitutional matter, such contentions amount to the acme of legalistic “black magic”, which even the three “Weird Sisters” in the first act of Macbeth would have been proud to conjure. For incantations of “independence” by the DOJ and the FBI invert and subvert the very rule of law which those “agencies” are supposed to uphold within themselves as well as to enforce against malefactors in the general population. After all, as the general law of “agency” provides, “agency” constitutes a fiduciary relationship established by law under which “the principal” (in this case, the President) enjoys a right to control the conduct of his “agents”, and each “agent” labors under a duty to obey the directives of “the principal”. See, e.g, Warren A. Seavey, Handbook of the Law of Agency (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1964), § 3. Moreover, the rule of law surely demands responsibility, accountability, and even transparency first and foremost from “law-enforcement agencies”. In that regard, such “agencies” must always be “purer than Caesar’s wife”.

True enough, the three constitutional Branches of the General Government—Congress (Article I), the President (Article II), and the Judiciary (Article III)—are, to a large extent, independent of one another. In particular, this principle applies to the Executive Branch:

The theory of the constitution undoubtedly is, that the great powers of the government are divided into separate departments; and so far as these powers are derived from the constitution, the departments may be regarded as independent of each other. * * *

The executive power is vested in a president; and so far as his powers are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power.

Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Peters) 524, 610 (1838).

The Constitution nowhere provides, however, for any “agencies” (under whatever labels) which are, or can rationally claim to be, “independent” of Congress, the President, and the Judiciary. Plainly enough on the face of the Constitution, Congress enjoys no explicit power to create any such “agency”. Neither does the Constitution invest Congress with any power to render “independent” any of the “agencies” actually enumerated in Article I. Quite the contrary: The “Armies” which the Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o raise and support” and the “Navy” which the Constitution authorizes it “[t]o provide and maintain” are subject to the supreme power of Congress “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”, typically to be enforced in the final analysis by the President in his capacity as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 12 through 14; and art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Subjection to “Rules” is the very antithesis of “independence”. As to “the Treasury”, the Constitution unequivocally commands that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from [it], but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Thus no “independence” is to be found here, either. The Constitution also empowers Congress “[t]o establish Post Offices”, albeit without any mention of regulation thereof. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. Yet no one in his right mind has ever contended, or would be suffered to contend today, that after Congress had once “establish[ed] Post Offices”, those “Offices” and their officials and employees could thereafter do whatsoever they desired in the exercise of some imaginary “independence”. And the Constitution further delegates to Congress the power “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court”. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. But in the creation of these “Tribunals”—which Article III, Section 1 describes as “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”—Congress is constrained by the specific terms of that Article, which allows for its delegation to those “Tribunals”, and therefore their enjoyment, of only such “independence” as may be appropriate for their limited exercise of what the Constitution calls “[t]he judicial power of the United States”.

The Constitution does delegate to Congress the implied power to create various other unnamed “agencies”, but only such as “shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the [other enumerated] Powers [of Congress], and all other Powers vested by th[e] Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department of Officer thereof”. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. So, in the particular case of the Executive Branch, Congress may create “agencies” in order to aid the President in the performance of his own constitutional “Powers”. This, of course, is a matter of practical necessity. For the President cannot be required to become the actual day-to-day administrator of every “Department” which Congress creates. “The President’s duty in general requires his superintendence of the administration; yet this duty cannot require of him to become the administrative officer of every department and bureau, and to perform in person the numerous details incident to services which, nevertheless, he is, in a correct sense, by the Constitution and laws required and expected to perform.” Williams v. United States, 42 U.S. (1 Howard) 290, 297 (1843).

On the other hand, Congress cannot misemploy any of its powers to create in the Executive Branch any “agency” through which it so transfers, divides, or qualifies “[t]he executive Power * * * vested in [the] President” pursuant to Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 that no effective “executive Power” remains for the President himself to exercise in those instances, the real power having been ostensibly assigned to others. For, as just noted, “[t]he President’s duty in general requires his superintendence of the administration” at all times—of or from which responsibility neither Congress nor the Judiciary can either deprive or excuse him.

Of all of “[t]he executive Power[s] * * * vested in [the] President” arguably the most important is his power—and absolute duty—to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, the Constitution itself foremost amongst those “Laws”. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 and § 1, cl. 7; and art. VI, cl. 2. This power being of constitutional, not merely statutory, provenance, no authority which Congress may purport to assign either (i) to those “Officers of the United States [whom the President himself may appoint], whose Appointments are not otherwise provided for [in the Constitution], and which shall be established by Law”, or (ii) to those “inferior Officers” the “Appointment” of which “Congress may by Law vest * * * in the Heads of Departments”, can detract from the President’s plenary supervisory authority. For, self-evidently, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution does not contradict Article II, Section 3. Therefore, any “Officers” of whatever rank created by Congress to assist the President in his performance of his duty and power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” cannot be “independent” of, but must be directly responsible to, him; and that responsibility can neither be negated in the first instance, nor later removed, by Congress. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-166 (1803).

To be sure, the President enjoys the constitutional prerogative to remove any “Officer” whom he appoints, and (“with the Advice and Consent of the Senate”) to appoint a replacement. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, as construed in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106-107, 109, 122, 126-127, 134-135, 162-163 (1926). That, however, can be a cumbersome, time-consuming process subject to the vicissitudes of political controversy. And the President’s power of removal may not apply, or may be restricted with respect, to certain “inferior Officers” who exercise “quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers, or [who act] as an agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the government.” Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). “Officers” in the DOJ and the FBI, however, do not exercise “quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers, or [act] as an agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the government.”

Now, the power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” obviously does not license the President himself to forbid, circumvent, or simply disregard the execution of any valid “Law[ ]”. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Peters) 524, 613 (1838) (dictum). That being so, the power to “take Care” undoubtedly authorizes him, not only to remove “inferior Officers” within the Executive Branch who fail in their duties to execute any such “Laws” pursuant to his directions, but also peremptorily to order such “Officers” to execute those “Laws” sine die, and if necessary to compel their obedience to his commands by any and all means available to him, even—and particularly—when the execution of those “Laws” applies to themselves. The Oval Office is where not only President Truman’s proverbial “buck”, but also the insubordination of “Officers” in the Executive Branch, stops.

Thus, with respect to the present “Russian collusion” inquisition, the real issue is not whether President Trump can remove from office Attorney General Sessions (who in any event ought to resign sua sponte on account of his own fecklessness), or Mr. Sessions’ underling Mr. Rosenstein, or Special Counsel Mueller, or any of their collaborators, partisans, and hangers-on. Of the President’s authority in that regard there can be no doubt. The real issue is two-fold: First, why has the President so far seen fit—or been woefully ill advised—not to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” by putting the screws to certain “Officers” who remain ensconced in the DOJ and the FBI even while they refuse to coöperate with Congress as well as the President under color of the specious claim that they are somehow “independent” of both of them? Second, what should he do at this juncture in order to correct this situation?

The nonfeasance and misfeasance of some of these people may be matters of merely the incompetence, sloth, and hubris which are all too typical of entrenched careerist bureaucrats. But the prepensed malfeasance of others manifests their specific intent, not only to assail Mr. Trump personally, but also—especially—to attack the Presidency of the United States as an institution. By attempting to prevent President Trump from “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” against wayward “Officials” in the DOJ and the FBI (among other swampy backwaters of the Deep State, such as various “intelligence agencies”), these subversives are mounting a cold coup d’état against the Constitution. Mr. Trump himself is merely the ostensible, America’s “Republican Form of Government” the real, target of this political aggression. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.True enough, overt violence has yet to be employed in furtherance of this seditious conspiracy. Contrast, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2382 and 2385. Yet, for that very reason, most Americans—perhaps including the President himself—remain unaware of the true malignancy of the situation. See generally, e.g., [Link 1], [Link 2], [Link 3] and [Link 4].

So, confronted by this guerrilla insurrection within the primary “law-enforcement agencies” of the Executive Branch, what is President Trump to do?

  • First, he must recognize that Congress did not create, and could not have created, the DOJ and the FBI in order to prevent or otherwise hinder him, or any President, from himself “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. For that is an institutional duty imposed by the Constitution on the President himself. Those “agencies” (and all others within the Executive Branch) exist solely to assist the President in the fulfillment of this duty to “take Care”—not to prevent, frustrate, delay, or compromise “the execution of the Laws” through their “Officers’” and employees’ incompetence, insouciance, or inadvertence—and surely not to recruit, harbor, and excuse subversive “Officers” and employees intent upon violating “the Laws” under color of “the Laws”.

For those reasons, President Trump cannot be required by any statute or judicial decision to rely blindly and mechanically upon personnel within these “agencies” if, for whatever reason, he believes that they are actively or passively obstructing his compliance with the duty to “take Care”. Because the Constitution itself imposes that duty upon him personally, Congress cannot divest, relieve, or absolve him of it. Neither can Congress tell him how to perform it. For President Trump has taken the constitutional “‘Oath or Affirmation * * * that [he, not Congress,] will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of [his, not anyone else’s,] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. Nor can the Judiciary cabin, crib, or confine him in the day-to-day fulfillment of his duty to “take Care”. For the performance of that duty in various situations obviously entails a wide swath of discretion. And “[t]he province of the [Supreme C]ourt is * * * not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive can never be made in th[e Supreme C]ourt” (or in any other court for that matter). Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).

  • Second, President Trump must realize that, under present conditions, he is dangerously ignorant of “who is who” and “what is what” with respect to the internal machinations of the DOJ and the FBI. He does not know whom to trust—or, perhaps of greater consequence, whom to distrust (other than the hapless Mr. Sessions and a few notorious ringleaders in the anti-Trump camp). Indeed, he does not know whether anyone in those “agencies” can be employed with confidence on his behalf, even circumspectly at arms’ length. For it is apparent that all too many of these “agencies’” personnel operate according to the mafiosi code of omertà, while the few potential “whistleblowers” fear to come forward, apparently because they believe that neither Congress, nor the courts, nor even the President himself can protect them from retaliation by the Deep State.

In this regard, as disturbing as they are illuminating are the recent reports by Kerry Picket, entitled “Sources: FBI Agents Want Congress To Issue Them Subpoenas So They Can Reveal The Bureau’s Dirt” and “Sources: FBI Agents Afraid To Testify, Say Congress Likely Won’t Protect Them” at <dailycaller.com> (22 and 28 May 2018). Apparently, a few honest and patriotic FBI agents want to expose how widespread is the corruption among that “agency’s” middle- and top-level leadership cadres, how that errant leadership is intentionally impeding Congressional investigations, and how that leadership’s systematic politicization of the FBI is obstructing law enforcement and even endangering national security. These agents are reluctant to expose themselves as “whistleblowers”, however, because they fear becoming the targets of political retaliation, personal reprisals, and professional ruination at the hands of their vindictive superiors. Some of these agents say that a subpoena from Congress could possibly fend off attacks against themselves, their families, and their friends by the corrupt higher-ups within the FBI and the DOJ. Others deny even that a Congressional subpoena would afford them sufficient protection. In addition, they all seem to agree that any attempts to enforce in some judicial forum the laws designed to protect “whistleblowers” would offer scant, if any, recourse. But if the situation within the FBI and the DOJ has so deteriorated that both Congress and the Judiciary are effectively powerless to protect these agents, then to whom can they turn for succor? Their only hope is that the one man constitutionally in charge of those “agencies”—the President of the United States—will himself root out the miscreants against whom these agents are willing to testify.

  • Third, inasmuch as he cannot depend upon the vast majority of the personnel within the DOJ and the FBI, President Trump must take matters into his own hands, if the non-, mis-, and malfeasance endemic within those “agencies”—and the parties responsible for such wrongdoing—are ever to be exposed and excised.

President Trump’s first step must be to enforce thoroughgoing transparency on the DOJ and the FBI. Both he and the American people whom he represents must be apprised of exactly what is actually going on in the bowels of those bureaucracies.

Recent events have established that, being largely corrupt or willing to countenance corruption, most if not all of the high-level leadership in the DOJ and the FBI will never come clean either of their own volition or at the request of Congress, and surely will never investigate and prosecute themselves or their co-workers through the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. So President Trump must peremptorily command those “agencies” to deliver to him personally sine die all of the documents: (i) which Congress wants to review, as well as (ii) all of the documents to which the latter documents relate in any way, together with (iii) all other documents which he desires to scrutinize for whatever reasons sufficient unto himself—with no redactions whatsoever in any of them. He is empowered to issue such an order on at least three constitutional grounds:

  1. “The President * * * may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices[.]” U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The Constitution imposes no exception, limitation, or qualification as to any such “require[ment]”. So, with regard to “principal Officer[s]”, Presidential “require[ments]” in this case would reach both the feckless Mr. Sessions and whoever might be filling his empty suit from time to time in the DOJ, as well as whoever the Director of the FBI might be. And with regard to “Subject[s]”, those “require[ments]” would encompass everything relating, not only to “the old grey mare” of “Russian collusion”, but also to actual violations of the laws (as outlined below), as well as to intimidation of and retaliation against honest personnel in the DOJ and the FBI (as described above). Obviously, too, Mr. Trump could—and should—append to each such “require[ment]” an order for the production of all underlying documents related in any manner to the substance and preparation of each such “Opinion”.
  2. The President “shall from time to time * * * recommend to the[ ] Consideration [of Congress] such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient[.]” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Self-evidently, Mr. Trump cannot make any such “recommend[ation]” with respect to cleaning up the present rats’ nest in the DOJ and the FBI without full knowledge of what has been and is now going on within those “agencies”—which, of course, requires complete disclosure to him of the entire pertinent documentary record.
  3. The President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed[.]” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. The “Laws” potentially involved include (but surely are not limited to): (i) violations of their oaths of office by “Officials” and employees of the United States, under Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution and 5 U.S.C. § 3331; (ii) such “Officials’” and employees’ participation in improper actions designed to influence the election of the President of the United States (that is, Mr. Trump), under 18 U.S.C. § 595; (iii) “interfering with or affecting the result of [that] election” on the part of such “Officials” and employees, under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7323(a)(1) and 7326; (iv) denial by such “Officials” and employees of the full benefit of Mr. Trump’s constitutional and other civil rights to win election as President of the United States and thereafter to execute that office to its full constitutional degree, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242; (v) attempts on the part of such “Officials” and employees to defraud the United States out of the American people’s and the States’ choice of the President of the United States by popular and electoral vote, both before and after the election, under 18 U.S.C. § 371; (vi) attempts by such “Officials” and employees to overturn the duly-elected Government of the United States in the persons of Mr. Trump as the President of the United States and of those whom he has chosen to work in his Administration, through the perpetrators’ creation and operation of an ad hoc “organization” set up as an “insurance policy” for that criminal purpose, under 5 U.S.C. § 7311 and 18 U.S.C. § 1918; (vii) numerous false statements made by such “Officials” and employees to other “Officials” of the United States, under 18 U.S.C. § 1001; (vii) obstruction of proceedings in Congress or any Department or “agency” of the Government of the United States by such “Officials” or employees, under 18 U.S.C. § 1505; (viii) retaliation by such “Officials” or employees against individuals willing to provide truthful information to law-enforcement officers, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b) and (d), and 1513(e) and (f); and possibly even (ix) such “Officials’” and employees’ complicity in the demise of one or more individuals who may have possessed intimate knowledge of what has been going on, under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) and (3)(A).

Once these documents have been produced, President Trump himself will determine what shall be disclosed to Congress and the American people directly, and then to the Judiciary through the normal processes of criminal investigation, indictment, and prosecution. Presumably, this disclosure will encompass most if not all of the documents.

President Trump can anticipate, of course, that the “Officials” and employees whose wrongdoing these documents will expose will attempt (as they have already attempted) to interpose bogus claims of “national security” in order to stifle disclosure. Such a “national-security” dodge would be unavailing, for at least three reasons:

  1. “The privilege [to withhold information on the grounds of ‘national security’] belongs to the Government and must be asserted by it; it can n[ot ] be claimed * * * by a private party.” United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953) (footnotes omitted). Because in the course of their illicit activities wrongdoers within the Government are not acting in the capacity of “the Government”, they cannot assert that “privilege” on its (let alone on their own) behalf. Indeed, any attempt on their part to do so should constitute further proof of their wrongdoing, and be treated as such by the President, as well as by Congress and the Judiciary.
  2. In any event, the privilege of “national security” “is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer.” United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953) (footnote omitted). Constitutionally speaking, with respect to the DOJ the President himself is “the head of the department which has control over the matter”; and therefore he himself can and should determine whether “national security” is truly involved “after [his own] actual personal consideration” of the information the documents contain. Self-evidently, “national security” can never be a plausible ground for suppression of disclosure of systematic wrongdoing within the DOJ and the FBI. Quite the opposite. Complete exposure and ultimate eradication of the cold coup d’état now festering behind the scenes in those “agencies” is a matter of “national security” in the very highest degree.
  3. To be sure, some of the documentary record which the President will obtain may contain material which some bureaucratic underlings have labeled “classified”. The President, however, is empowered to declassify whatever theretofore “classified” documents he deems should be disclosed to Congress, to the Judiciary, and especially to the American people. The President, after all, is the “‘Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.’ U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2. His authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national security * * * flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). And, being of constitutional provenance, the President’s power to classify and control access to information bearing on “national security”—including the power to declassify and provide the general public with “access to [such] information”—is beyond Congressional or Judicial control, let alone interdiction by the very persons whose actions endanger “national security”.

Nonetheless, the practical problem remains: How can President Trump ensure that all of the documentary record will be produced, when he can trust next to no one in the upper reaches of the DOJ and the FBI to whom he will direct his initial demands for disclosure? If he commands the malefactors to produce documents which incriminate them, some may brazenly refuse, resign their positions in the Government of the United States, and then shelter behind the Fifth Amendment (as is their constitutional right to do). That will be all to the good—for it will expose those malefactors, remove them sua sponte from the Government they are betraying, and (one hopes) bring them before a Grand Jury where they belong. Yet other unconfessed wrongdoers will remain in public office to persist in their clandestine program of opposition and subversion. And the very fact that the situation within the DOJ and the FBI has devolved into the present sordid mess indicates that the extent of incompetence and insouciance among even ostensibly honest “Officials” and employees of those “agencies” is so great that little can be expected of them, either.

To defeat continued intentional or inadvertent obstruction of justice by these people will not require the appointment of some “special counsel” who might himself turn out to be unequal to the task or (worse yet) a secret partisan of or apologist for the criminal cabal. The present regulations provide that:

The Attorney General, or in cases in which the Attorney General is recused, the Acting Attorney General, will appoint a Special Counsel when he or she determines that criminal investigation of a person or matter is warranted and—

(a) That investigation or prosecution of that person or matter by a United States Attorney’s Office or litigating Division of the Department of Justice would present a conflict of interest for the Department or other extraordinary circumstances; and

(b) That under the circumstances, it would be in the public interest to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume responsibility for the matter.

28 C.F.R. 600.1. As on-going events in the “Russian collusion” inquisition have demonstrated, though, employment of a “special counsel” under the auspices of the DOJ to oversee disclosure of documents which would potentially incriminate the upper-level leadership of that “agency” and of the FBI would itself raise numerous, more than likely insuperable, “conflicts of interest”.

Whether predicated on the particulars of some statute or on the generalities of “legal ethics”, no claim of some supposed “conflict of interest” can impose any limitation on the President’s constitutional duty and power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Moreover, it must be presumed that, in the execution of his “Oath or Affirmation * * * ‘faithfully [to] execute the Office of President of the United States, and * * * to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States’”, Mr. Trump would not be diverted from the constitutionally proper course by any supposed “conflict of interest” in that (or any other) regard. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. Plainly enough, no conceivable “conflict of interest” could exist in principle between the President’s duty to “take Care” and his discovery and disclosure of documents which would incriminate wrongdoers within the Executive Branch of the Government of the United States. Indeed, in practical fulfillment of his “Oath or Affirmation” in his capacity as President, absent a claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment he would have to disclose even whatever in those documents tended to incriminate himself in his personal capacity! And if some arguably serious “conflict of interest” involving Mr. Trump could be made out, it would behoove Congress to consider exercising its exclusive authority to “remove[ him] from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, * * * high Crimes and Misdemeanors”. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.

Yet the effort required to get to the bottom of the sump of corruption within the DOJ and the FBI will be too great for any one man to expend. President Trump will need all the help he can muster. Sufficient help is at hand, though. As long as the cold coup d’état in the District of Columbia continues unabated, the President will find it increasingly difficult to enforce the laws of the United States, not only in that benighted enclave, but also in every State throughout this country. Fortunately, Congress long ago provided a means, perhaps not directed in so many words at such a coup d’état, but surely capable of thwarting its effects:

Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages * * * make it impractical to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State * * * as he considers necessary to enforce those laws * * * .

10 U.S.C. § 252. The complaints of potential “whistleblowers” in the FBI that “the ordinary course of judicial proceedings” even in the courts of the United States will not protect them against retaliation from “combinations[ ] or assemblages” of miscreants at the highest levels of the FBI and the DOJ (described above) establish a sufficient predicate for the President to invoke this authority in order to deal with the cold coup d’état.

Because this statute does not limit the President with respect to “such of the militia” as he may employ for these purposes, “he may call into Federal service” whatever personnel he “considers necessary” from “the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia”. 10 U.S.C. § 246(b)(2). These individuals include “all [such] able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and [with certain exceptions not relevant here] under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States”. 10 U.S.C. § 246(a). This “class[ ] of the militia” undoubtedly contains sufficient attorneys and other personnel with “law-enforcement” training and experience who could ably assist the President in conducting pervasive discovery of documents against the DOJ and the FBI, in analyzing the documents so obtained, in determining which of those documents should be released to Congress, the courts, and the general public, and thereby in finally making it “[ ]practical to enforce the laws of the United States in [every] State” within this country.

Obviously, the wrongdoers in those “agencies” would have no legal or moral standing to object. Congress should welcome the President’s action, inasmuch as it has invested him with this authority pursuant to its constitutional power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union”, and surely desires violations of “th[os]e Laws” in the DOJ and the FBI to be thoroughly exposed and punished as soon as possible. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. And (perhaps of greatest consequence) rogue members of the Judiciary would be powerless to interfere.

Beyond doubt, no “judicial power to assume continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the activities of the * * * National Guard” exists; for “[i]t would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches directly responsible—as the Judicial Branch is not—to the electoral process.” Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5, 10 (1973). Accord, Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (no judicial authority “to revise duty orders as to one lawfully in the [regular Army]”). Under Gilligan, this rule applies explicitly to the National Guard. But both “the organized militia” (the National Guard and the Naval Militia) and “the unorganized militia” (everyone else eligible for “the militia”) are components of what the relevant statute calls “the militia of the United States”. 10 U.S.C. § 246(a). This statute makes no differentiation between “the organized militia” and “the unorganized militia” as to that status. And the statute which empowers the President to “call into Federal service such of the militia of any State * * * as he considers necessary to enforce th[e] laws [of the United States]” makes no differentiation between “the organized militia” and “the unorganized militia” either. See 10 U.S.C. § 252. (Typically, too, the States’ statutes which define within their jurisdictions what the Constitution calls “the Militia of the several States” follow the Congressional pattern of providing for both “the organized militia” and “the unorganized militia”, and for “calling forth the Militia” in whatever “Part of them” and to whatever degree Congress or the States may deem necessary. Compare U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 and art. I, § 8, cls. 15 and 16 with, e.g., Code of Virginia §§ 44-1, 44-2, 44-3, 44-4, 44-80. 44-81, 44-86, 44-87, 44-89, and 44-90.)

In numerous previous commentaries, I have addressed this subject in detail. See “How the President Can Secure the Borders” (18 August 2015), “Donald Trump and the Militia” (20 February 2016), “9-11 and the Militia” (14 September 2016), “Why the Militia” (18 November 2016), “Trump on Law Enforcement” (23 February 2017), “The Boyars” (20 March 2017), and “Militia and Gun-Free Schools” (19 March 2018). So no more need be added here. All that remains, then, is for President Trump to take this counsel to heart and marshal a group of advisors who will put it into operation.

Unfortunately, what appears to be President Trump’s present strategy of playing for time while “tweeting” for effect is running out of time with no discernible effect. And it is childish for him to assume that what has proven less than useful in the past will somehow become useful in the future. Further delay in adopting the strategy outlined here can only play into the hands of the President’s—and this country’s—implacable enemies. To deal effectively with extraordinary situations requires extraordinary measures to be taken—and extraordinary men to take them. Whether Mr. Trump will measure up remains to be seen.

© 2018 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




How To Bank On The Second Amendment

It seems that, almost every day, new evidence emerges to validate as prescient the warnings I put forth most recently in my NewsWithViews commentaries “The Irrelevant Second Amendment” and “Another Oracular Pronouncement”—namely, that: (i) in the “weapons-of-war” theory applied in the Kolbe v. Hogan and Worman v. Healey decisions “gun-control” fanatics have hit upon a rhetorically powerful rationalization for actually banning (not simply “regulating”) the very types of firearms which the Second Amendment should most emphatically protect; and (ii) as those decisions prove, the “individual-right” theory of the Amendment provides only an impotent (indeed, an irrelevant) counter-argument.

The latest manifestation of this unsettling development appears in a recent report that Bank of America has announced that it will no longer make loans to, underwrite securities for, and (presumably) otherwise conduct normal banking business with manufacturers which produce and sell so-called “military-style” firearms for civilians’ use. See, e.g., [Link]

To be sure, it is conceivable that Bank of America might determine that a particular manufacturer of firearms under particular circumstances fell so far short of meeting generally recognized standards of (say) solvency, profitability, and sound corporate management as to justify the Bank’s denial of various banking services in that case pursuant to normal banking policy applicable to everyone else. It is self-evidently absurd to assume, however, that Bank of America (or anyone else) could possibly make such a negative determination in the present as to all manufacturers of “military-style” firearms as a class and with respect to every imaginable set of circumstances which might arise in the future. Therefore, Bank of America must be predicating its action, not on a contingently commercial, but on a fixedly ideological, decision. Bank of America has apparently concluded, not that “military-style” firearms for civilian sale can never be manufactured so as to earn profits sufficient to justify the Bank’s conducting normal business with such manufacturers—but (i) that such firearms should not be manufactured and sold at all for civilians’ use, notwithstanding that a significant part of the general public is ready, willing, and able, both legally and economically, to purchase these firearms in the free market; and (ii) that Bank of America should and will do whatever it can to discourage, hinder, and even eliminate such manufacture and sale.

Plainly enough, Bank of America has set out to interfere with, curtail, and even stifle entirely a particular form of legitimate and profitable commerce. If Bank of America can take such economically arbitrary action with respect to the manufacture and sale of certain types of firearms desired by many ordinary Americans, then all banks can do so, with respect not only to those firearms, but also to any and all others. And if banks as a class can take such action with respect to the manufacture and sale of firearms, they can do so with respect to the products and services of any and every legitimate business. Thus, relying on the old adage that “money talks”, Bank of America is declaring no less than that banks are entitled to behave as the veritable arbiters of American domestic commerce—today, with respect to certain firearms which bankers particularly disfavor; tomorrow, with respect to anything and everything that may fall afoul of their peculiar ideological notions.

So what is to be done about this situation?

I. The naïve patriotic response of Americans concerned with preserving “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” would be to appeal to Bank of America’s concern for the Constitution—in general, for “the Blessings of Liberty” which the Preamble identifies as one of the Constitution’s permanent goals; and, in particular, for “the right of the people to keep and bear [specifically ‘military-style’] Arms” for defense of their “Libert[ies]” which the Second Amendment guarantees against “infringe[ment]”. This approach would surely prove to be futile, though. For it is an observation as accurate as it is hoary that merchants—and especially bankers—have no country. And having no country they have no fixed concern for any country’s constitution or laws. Merchants—and especially bankers—respect a nation’s constitution and laws only to the extent that the legal principles they embody can be bent to serve the merchants’ special interests. Indeed, if America’s bankers gave a tinker’s dam about this country’s Constitution, they would refuse to operate as member-banks in the Federal Reserve System—arguably as gross an affront to the Constitution as can be imagined. See my book Pieces of Eight: The Monetary Powers and Disabilities of the United States Constitution (GoldMoney Foundation Special Edition [2011] of the Second Revised Edition, 2002).

II. The naïve economic response of Americans concerned with preserving “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” against economic sabotage would be to employ the supposed restraining and retributive powers of “the free market” by organizing a sustained nationwide boycott of Bank of America (and every other bank which followed its lead). Such a boycott would, of course, be constitutionally protected. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). But it, too, would likely turn out to be no more than an exercise in wishful thinking. After all, as far as banks in general are concerned, Americans are not blessed with a “free market”. Unfortunately, under contemporary conditions banks are necessary evils which most Americans are not really “free” to refrain from using. Banks are necessary, because ordinary Americans have no practical choice but to employ some bank for business or personal purposes. And with respect to “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” all too many banks are evils, because all too many bankers (at least in the uppermost tiers of that business) are generally anything but friends of that “right”. In aid of attacks on the Second Amendment banks are free to exercise the immense financial power that derives from their oligopolistic position. Ordinary Americans, on the other hand, are “free” only to like it or lump it, but in any event to learn to live with it.

In particular, buoyed by its immense resources Bank of America is probably willing to forego doing nickle-and-dime business with those “deplorable” American “gun nuts” who might opt to boycott it. No doubt the Bank already has evaluated the possible economic downside from a boycott, and discounted it.

Moreover, whatever the possibility of organizing a suitably punishing boycott of Bank of America alone, a boycott would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to sustain should other banks in large numbers align themselves with Bank of America. By acting more or less in unison, the bankers would predictably be able to apply far more financial pressure against owners of firearms among the general public than those Americans could apply to the banks.

III. Obviously, a legislative response to Bank of America’s actions would offer a better chance of success than either a quixotic appeal to bankers’ patriotism or a problematic boycott. Bank of America has set out to dam the stream of legitimate commerce in certain firearms on a nationwide scale. Such is not its, or any bank’s, prerogative, however. In Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 (the Commerce Clause) the Constitution empowers Congress, not Bank of America (or any bank), “[t]o regulate Commerce * * * among the several States”. So how might a Congress concerned with protecting “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” employ the Commerce Clause to thwart Bank of America’s obnoxious new policy?

A. The first inquiry must be “What has Congress already done which might now be thought to be potentially useful?” For one thing, Congress has enacted antitrust laws. If, as might be expected, banks agreed in unison to deny their services to manufacturers of “military-style” firearms supplied to the civilian market, then the Sherman Act’s prohibition of “contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade” could come into play, at least in principle.

In practice, however, proving actual collusion among those banks would likely pose a daunting problem. For, tutored in subterranean machinations by skulks of vulpine lawyers adept at secreting the evidence of their clients’ questionable activities, bankers driven more by ideology than by profits could successfully contrive to act in an ostensibly “independent” manner. Perhaps a sufficiently aggressive investigation would shine enough light into the banks’ dark corners to expose the truth. But, even were actual collusion made evident, would typical prosecutors in today’s Department of Justice and judges in the General Government’s courts—all too many of whom are as antagonistic to “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” as they are well disposed towards the banks—be expected to do anything about it? Hardly.

B. The next inquiry is “What new legislation might Congress enact under the Commerce Clause in order to bring errant banks to heel? History provides an answer.

Although they were then (as they are now) private businesses, places of so-called “public accommodation” (such as hotels, motels, restaurants, and so on) were considered so vital to unimpeded “Commerce * * * among the several States” that in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Congress employed the Commerce Clause to prohibit them from engaging in racial discrimination. This was perhaps not a wholly surprising development even at that time, inasmuch as Americans’ right to be protected against racial discrimination had long been and was then (as it is now) guaranteed by the Constitution in other areas. But “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”—including especially “military-style” firearms, according to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)—is no less constitutionally secured. And although they too are private businesses, banks are self-evidently enterprises of “public accommodation” which are so much more vital to unimpeded “Commerce * * * among the several States” than run-of-the-mill hotels, motels, and restaurants that Congress could fairly prohibit them from engaging in discrimination driven by the bankers’ ideological disapproval of manufacturers of “military-style” firearms for ultimate sale to ordinary civilians under the aegis of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”.

Interestingly enough, Congress’s employment of the Commerce Clause for that purpose would not need to be explicitly linked to that “right” at all. For, as lawyers know, in most instances a statute enacted under the Commerce Clause is constitutionally valid if any so-called “rational basis” for the legislation can be adduced. And, even leaving “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” aside, surely a “rational basis” exists for concluding that “Commerce * * * among the several States” would be seriously impaired were banks allowed to refuse to provide their services to any manufacturers of any legitimate products, not on the grounds of some generally accepted commercial or other economic standard applicable to all of the banks’ customers without distinction, but solely on the basis of a peculiar ideological hobbyhorse (no matter what it may be) which the bankers were riding at the time to the detriment of some disfavored class of customers.

Whatever Congress’s rationale for employment of the Commerce Clause, the banks should not be suffered to complain about such a statutory restriction on their invidiously discriminatory misbehavior. For they are already highly regulated under the Commerce Clause, mainly for the perverse purpose of supplying them with abusive special privileges more than merely arguably against the public interest—including the entire Federal Reserve System, “deposit insurance” designed to prop up their use of the inherently unsound scheme of “fractional reserves”, and periodic “bail outs” with taxpayers’ money when their imprudent business practices give rise to nationwide financial crises. If the Commerce Clause licenses Congress to lavish such unmerited and highly questionable favors on banks, it undoubtedly authorizes Congress to deprive the bankers of the ability to withhold their services from legitimate businesses which happen to arouse their ideological displeasure.

IV. Although legislation enacted pursuant to the Constitution’s general grant of power in the Commerce Clause could suffice to bring arrogant “virtue-signaling” bankers to heel, the better, because more constitutionally specific, remedy would be for Congress to protect “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” against economic subversion by focusing on the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment—namely, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”—implemented through Congress’s power in Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia”.

At the present time, a Congressional statute asserts that everyone eligible for “the militia of the United States” who is not a member of the National Guard is automatically enrolled in “the unorganized militia”. 10 U.S.C. § 246. For “[a] well regulated Militia” to function as the Constitution requires, Congress must guarantee at least that all citizens eligible for the Militia have ready access to “Arms” suitable for Militia service—amongst which class of “Arms” “military-style” firearms are self-evidently of the greatest potential importance, in light of the responsibility of the Militia “to * * * repel Invasions” set out in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution.

The Constitution does not specify exactly how Congress is “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia”. In keeping with the pre-constitutional practices which defined the concepts of “arming” and “Arms” at the times of ratification of the Constitution (1788) and the Second Amendment (1791), today Congress could direct some agency in the General Government to disburse suitable “Arms” to “the people” eligible for the Militia. Or it could direct the States to provide such “Arms”. Or it could direct those individuals to supply themselves with particular “Arms” through the free market. Or it could simply allow all such Americans to purchase from domestic manufacturers whatever “Arms” they themselves deemed sufficient—in practical effect, the situation which obtains today (albeit only imperfectly so). See my book Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume Two, The Sword and Sovereignty: The Constitutional Principles of “the Militia of the Several States” (Front Royal, Virginia: CD-ROM Edition, 2012).

Obviously, however, Congress could not “provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia” by inhibiting citizens eligible for the Militia from procuring—if in no way other than through their own efforts—“Arms” which would enable them to perform one or another form of Militia service to which Congress has made them liable by statutorily enrolling them in “the unorganized militia”. Neither may it sit idly by while private special-interest groups such as banks attempt to frustrate the constitutional mandate that the Militia be “arm[ed]”. The Constitution, after all, is not a schizophrenic screed. By no conceivable rational reading does it allow Congress to apply the Commerce Clause to underwrite the economic power of banks, so that bankers through their misuse of that power can intentionally set about to defeat the Militia Clauses, and thereby undermine “the security of a free State”. Therefore, Congress can, should, and must regulate banks so as to ensure that they do not interfere in the operation of the free market for firearms, and are suitably punished if they attempt to do so.

A statute sufficient for that purpose would prohibit banks from denying their services to any present or potential customer solely because that customer were a manufacturer, distributor, retailer, or purchaser of “military-style” firearms offered for sale to civilians. The statute would create a civil cause of action for any such customer against whom a bank so discriminated. And the statute would establish a presumption that a bank’s denial of any of its services in such a case were for the purpose of illicit discrimination, would provide for significant statutory damages in every case in which discrimination were established (in addition to whatever compensatory damages might be proven in each particular case), and would mandate the assessment of attorneys’ fees and costs in favor of the complainant.

The advantage of a statute bottomed explicitly on protection of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” suitable for Militia service would be its disapprobation of the obnoxious theory put forward in Kolbe v. Hogan and Worman v. Healey that ordinary Americans enjoy no constitutional right to possess firearms which rogue judges denounce as “weapons of war”. The constitutional authority of Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to * * * repel Invasions” self-evidently foresees the necessity for citizens statutorily enrolled in the Militia to be armed precisely with “weapons of war”. And the necessity for citizens statutorily enrolled in the Militia to be armed with “weapons of war” self-evidently defines the most important class of “Arms” which the Second Amendment—read in its entirety—protects against “infringe[ment]”. The sooner the American people, through the efforts of their loyal representatives in Congress, ram that reality down rogue judges’ throats the better.

In sum, this would be a relatively straightforward, and undeniably constitutional, means to thwart what will prove to be—if nothing is done to prevent it—a deadly serious inroad by banks on “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”. Moreover, in light of the orchestrated hysteria in favor of “gun control” now sweeping this country in the wake of the school shooting in Parkland, Florida, one can anticipate that, if banks are suffered to misuse their privileged positions to attack that “right”—first against manufacturers of “military-style” firearms, then against distributors, retailers, and even private citizens desirous of purchasing such “Arms” with bank-issued credit cards—other centers of private economic power will soon follow suit. Insurers will deny, or radically increase the cost of, coverage to homeowners who possess such “Arms”. Health-care plans will claim that the possession of such “Arms” by their subscribers so imperils the subscribers’ physical or psychological well-being that onerous additional charges must be levied for the plans’ services, if they are made available at all. Prestigious private schools at every level in this country’s educational system will exclude from enrollment present or prospective students who live in homes in which such “Arms” are kept. And so on—with no discernible limit, until private citizens’ possession of “military-style” firearms becomes a thing of the past, and with it “the security of a free State”, too.

These possibilities present a clear and present danger to “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” which cannot be met by rote invocation of the “individual right” to possess “military-style” firearms, which Kolbe v. Hogan and Worman v. Healey held not to be protected by the Second Amendment at all. Only by asserting Americans’ “Militia right” to possess such “Arms” can such possession be adequately secured against “gun control” fanatics and the rogue jurists who dance to their discordant tune. Time for bringing this assertion to the forefront of the countrywide shouting-match over “gun control” is rapidly running out, however.

I should hate to have to say “I told you so” when it was too late for effective action to be taken. But I have told you so, more than once—and it may soon be too late for anything else to be said.

© 2018 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




Another Oracular Pronouncement

It is said that “no man is taken for a prophet in his own country”. Yet sometimes evidence overcomes this negative presumption. In my recent NewsWithViews commentary entitled “The Irrelevant Second Amendment”, I predicted that the decision in Kolbe v. Hogan—that so-called “assault firearms” such as the AR-15 are not protected by the Second Amendment in any way, shape, or form—would become “gun-control” fanatics’ legalistic weapon of choice for banning possession of those firearms, and much more besides, by average Americans. So was it written; and so has it come to pass.

On 5 April 2018, William G. Young, a United States District Judge in Massachusetts, upheld that State’s “assault-firearms” statute on precisely that ground. Worman v. Healey, Civil Action No. 1:17-10107-WGY, opinion reproduced, particularly at pages 26-34 and 46-47.

No doubt this decision will be appealed. But I anticipate that any appeal will be unsuccessful, just as was the ultimate appeal in Kolbe, and for the selfsame reason. One cannot hope to win a Second -Amendment case against Kolbe’s and Worman’s “weapons-of-war” theory without relying on: (i) the whole Second Amendment (not just its last fourteen words), (ii) the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution (and the Fifth Amendment, too), (iii) Militia statutes of the General Government such as 10 U.S.C. §§ 252 and 253, (iv) the Militia clauses of the constitution and statutes of the particular State involved in the controversy (in Kolbe, Maryland; in Worman, Massachusetts), and (v) the Supreme Court’s oft-neglected but nonetheless controlling decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). Judge Young’s opinion in Worman deals with none of these matters, which evidences that the plaintiffs did not raise them. And if they were not raised in the District Court, it will be devilishly difficult for the plaintiffs-appellants to assert them for the first time on appeal. Of course, being inured to taking up what seem to be lost causes, I might not be averse to being asked to provide whatever assistance I could offer in prosecuting an appeal, just as I did on my own initiative in a brief amici curiae when the litigants in Kolbe unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in their case. But I should hardly anticipate being requested to consult on the future course of litigation in Worman, any more than the Prophets in the Old Testament were heeded with respect to the even-more-weighty subjects on which they discoursed.

This, however, does not dissuade me from prophesying once more. Ever since former Justice of the Supreme Court John Paul Stevens dipped his oar into the murky waters of contemporary Second-Amendment jurisprudence, plumping for repeal of the Amendment, a veritable cottage industry on that score has emerged among “gun-control” fanatics.

Having successfully litigated in the Supreme Court a seminal constitutional case in which Justice Stevens himself wrote the majority opinion—Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986)—and having some little self-taught expertise with respect to “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, I am probably more qualified than most other NewsWithViews commentators to opine that Justice Stevens’ understanding of the Constitution in general and the Second Amendment in particular leaves a great deal to be desired. For example, as I pointed out in “The Irrelevant Second Amendment”, that Amendment is intimately related to the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution. So, if the Second Amendment were to be repealed with the effect which Justice Stevens apparently envisions—such that average Americans would be dispossessed of “assault firearms”, or perhaps of most or even all firearms, whether at one fell swoop or by “the death of a thousand cuts” through a parade of ever-more-onerous  statutory “regulations”—the Militia Clauses would have to be repealed or significantly amended, too (along with the reference to the Militia in the Fifth Amendment). As of now, proponents of repeal of the Second Amendment have not thought this complexity through (or, from what I have read in their rants, even considered it). So I suspect (perhaps “hope” is the more accurate verb) that the propaganda and agitation for the Amendment’s repeal will ultimately fizzle out as a result of their own incoherence. While this controversy continues to sizzle in its own hot grease like an overdone sausage cooking in the mass media’s frying pan, though, self-styled champions of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” will find themselves constantly on the strategic defensive—a disadvantageous position which will compel them to make one self-defeating compromise after another with “gun-control” fanatics over “common-sense regulations” (that is, actual “infringe[ments]”) of that “right”.

A particularly ominous straw in the wind is that some defenders of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” are already conceding defeat as to the Second Amendment by arguing that, as a “natural right”, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” can be secured under the aegis of the Ninth Amendment, even were the Second Amendment repealed. This makes little sense, both as a matter of constitutional law and as a matter of political realism.

First, the Ninth Amendment provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”. Now, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is one of the “certain rights” explicitly “enumerat[ed] in the Constitution”—in the Second Amendment. So, by the very terms of the Ninth Amendment, that “right” is not now one of the “other[ rights] retained by the people” perforce of the latter Amendment. Therefore, if the Second Amendment were repealed, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” could not be shoe-horned into the Ninth Amendment in keeping with the original understanding of that Amendment. Perhaps invocation of “the living Constitution” could suffice to square this circle—which I doubt, inasmuch as “the living Constitution” has always been “gun-control” fanatics’ primary device for circumventing and undermining the Second Amendment. Certainly no judge antagonistic to “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” will ever employ “the living Constitution” to breathe new life through the Ninth Amendment into the principles of the Second Amendment after that Amendment’s demise by way of repeal.

Second, the obvious political conclusion to which every half-educated American would come were the Second Amendment repealed would be that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” had thus been entirely excised from the Constitution. For if, as most self-deluded champions of the Second Amendment contend, the Amendment’s last fourteen words by themselves alone guarantee that “right”, then the Amendment’s repeal would be fatal for whatever “right” those words might be taken to cover. After all, for such as Justice Stevens, that would be the point of repealing the Second Amendment—which, I am confident, judges such as those who decided Kolbe and Worman would be quick to hold.

By now, I am sick unto death of reminding readers of my NewsWithViews commentaries and various books (and, I fear, my readers may be becoming tired of being reminded) that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” cannot be properly construed outside of the total constitutional context in which it resides. That context emphasizes the inextricable connection of that “right” with the Militia, not with some largely imaginary anarchic “individual right” located in the last fourteen words of the Second Amendment, let alone in so-called “penumbras and emanations” of the Constitution wholly unrelated to the Militia. Had that not always been apparent, at this juncture it surely has been made crystal clear by Kolbe and Worman.

If this lesson is not heeded, and soon, one will not need the special benefit of the gift of prophecy to foresee to what disastrous climax these developments will inexorably lead.

© 2018 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




The Irrelevant Second Amendment

To the question “What provision of the Constitution guarantees average Americans the right to posses a firearm?” almost everyone, whether in favor of or opposed to that “right”, would reflexively answer “the Second Amendment”. In point of constitutional fact, however, this is the wrong answer. In reality: (i) Three provisions of the original Constitution guarantee the right—and, of greater consequence, recognize the duty—of average Americans to possess firearms. (ii) The Second Amendment merely echoes and emphasizes this guarantee, which would be just as effective if that Amendment did not exist at all. And (iii) the most influential contemporary misinterpretation of the Second Amendment, which myopically focuses solely on the so-called ”individual right” to posses firearms for the particular purpose of personal self-defense, actually threatens “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”.

I. To ensure that public officials would always adhere to the correct construction of the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, consisting of “further declaratory and restrictive clauses”, was grafted onto the Constitution “in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers”. RESOLUTION OF THE FIRST CONGRESS SUBMITTING TWELVE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (4 March 1789), in Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States, House Document No. 398, 69th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1927), at 1063. Now, obviously, a “misconstruction * * * of [the] powers” which the original Constitution delegated to the General Government would involve a misreading, misinterpretation, or mistaken application of those “powers”—stemming, presumably, from an inadvertent and honest misunderstanding of some sort. Conversely, an “abuse of [the original Constitution’s] powers” would involve an intentional and dishonest extension (or perhaps an intentional and dishonest contraction) of those “powers” in derogation of their legitimate purpose and scope. In either case, the Bill of Rights was adopted, not on the premiss that the various actions which its Articles discountenanced were actually permitted by the original Constitution, but rather to ensure that the correct construction of the Constitution—which disallowed those actions—would be pellucid. Indeed, that the Bill of Rights added “further declaratory and restrictive clauses” plainly indicated that the original Constitution already contained some “declaratory and restrictive clauses” (whether express or implied) with respect to the subjects the Bill of Rights addressed.

Thus, the purpose of the Second Amendment’s guarantee that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” is not to negate some imaginary provision in the original Constitution which if it existed would license the General Government to “infringe[ ]” that “right” ad libitum, but instead is to reiterate and reinforce the absence of any such provision. Any claim which rogue public officials might assert—whether by dint of some deficiency in either their competence or their integrity—in favor of such a license is a “misconstruction or abuse of [the General Government’s] powers [in the original Constitution]”, not an even arguably valid exercise of those “powers”.

II. Of course, if the original Constitution contained no provision which dealt in any manner with “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, the Second Amendment would be highly relevant. For it is obvious that certain powers the original Constitution delegates to Congress—such as the powers “[t]o lay and collect Taxes” and “[t]o regulate Commerce * * * among the several States” in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1 and 3, respectively—could conceivably be subjected to “misconstruction or abuse” by invincibly ignorant or rogue public officials in derogation of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”. Indeed, since the 1930s those Clauses have repeatedly been misconstrued and abused in favor of unconstitutional “gun control”. See, e.g., AN ACT To provide for the taxation of manufacturers, importers, and dealers in certain firearms and machine guns, to tax the sale or other disposal of such weapons, and to restrict importation and regulate interstate transportation thereof (“National Firearms Act”), Act of 26 June 1934, chapter 757, 48 Stat. 1236; AN ACT To regulate commerce in firearms (“Federal Firearms Act”), Act of 30 June 1938, chapter 850, 52 Stat. 1250; AN ACT To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for better control of the interstate traffic in firearms (“Gun Control Act of 1968”), Act of 22 October 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213; An Act To control crime (“Crime Control Act of 1990”), Act of 29 November 1990, Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789; An Act To control and prevent crime (“Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994”), Act of 13 September 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.

In fact, though, the original Constitution contains provisions which, applied by honest and competent public officials, plainly secure and effectuate the “right of the people to keep and bear Arms”—either positively, by asserting the existence of that “right” for We the People in general; or negatively, by denying the General Government (and the States as well) any authority to “infringe[ ]” it. These provisions include:

Article I, Section 8, Clause 15—The power of Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions[.]”

Article I, Section 8, Clause 16—The power of Congress “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress[.]”

Article II, Section 2, Clause 1—“The President shall be Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States[.]”

And it should be self-evident that, for example, the general powers of Congress “[t]o lay and collect Taxes” and “[t]o regulate Commerce * * * among the several States” cannot be misemployed to negate the specific power of Congress “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia”, or to disable the States from arming their own Militia—“the Militia of the several States”—should Congress default on its own responsibility. The Constitution, after all, is not internally self-contradictory or otherwise incoherent.

Although the principles, standards, and required outcomes that govern the exercise of these powers of Congress and the President (and the cognate powers of the States) with respect to “the right of he people to keep and bear Arms” are nowhere explicitly set out in the original Constitution, they are obviously implicit in its incorporation of “the Militia of the several States” into the federal system. These are the only “Militia” the Constitution recognizes. These are uniquely “the Militia” to which the powers of Congress, the position of the President as “Commander in Chief”, and the “powers * * * reserved to the States respectively, or to the people” under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution pertain. Even more to the point, these were not merely theoretical “militia” when the Constitution was ratified in 1788. Rather, they were actual institutions—indeed, the only institutions of their kind—which had existed for generations theretofore throughout America, settled and regulated pursuant to ordinances, acts, and statutes of the thirteen Colonies and then the independent States. So, from the very beginning, Congress’s power was limited to “organizing, arming, and disciplining, the[se and only these] Militia”, and in such wise as to guarantee the continued existence of such “Militia” under the style of “the Militia of the several States”. Congress labored under a complete disability (an absence of power) as to any other conceivable “militia”. So, too, for the States. And, in the absence of a constitutional Amendment on this subject, this situation still obtains.

To be sure, because of invincible ignorance or for maleficent political purposes, some people might attempt to deny or obscure the obvious, in order to float the notion that the original Constitution licenses Members of Congress to define the phrase “organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia”—and even the noun “Militia” itself—in any manner that suits their fancy. Contrast District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599-600 (2008) (Scalia, J., for the Court) (where that sort of nonsense finds voice, albeit only in irresponsible dicta), with Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920) (stating the correct rule). Certainly this would be the perverse tack taken by rogue public officials intent on disregarding, hamstringing, or even destroying the Militia entirely. So, to ensure that both the General Government and the governments of the States would always adhere to the correct interpretation and application of the original Constitution with respect specifically to the Militia, the Second Amendment, consisting of “further declaratory and restrictive clauses”, was added to the original Constitution “in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers”.

The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The term “well regulated Militia” obviously takes as implicit examples “the Militia of the several States” which existed at the time of the Amendment’s ratification (1791)—for these “Militia” would never have been incorporated into the original Constitution only a few years earlier (1788) had they been considered to be other than “well regulated”. The power of Congress “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States”—that is, for “execut[ing] the Laws of the Union, suppress[ing] Insurrections and repel[ling] Invasions”—outlines in what particulars and for what purposes the Militia are to be “well regulated” by Congress. So too for the States, when they “regulate[ ]” their own Militia for their own purposes (or for the purposes the Constitution entrusts to Congress, should Congress default on that duty). And these powers of “regulat[ion]” are to be construed and exercised in accordance with the principles of “well regulated Militia” understood at the time the original Constitution and then the Second Amendment were ratified—which principles must be derived from the pre-constitutional Militia laws of the Colonies and independent States, there having been no other principles of “well regulated Militia” generally known, accepted, and enacted into law within America during that era. After all, to understand it, the Constitution must be perused “in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted”. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). See generally the present author’s book Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume Two, The Sword and Sovereignty: The Constitutional Principles of “the Militia of the Several States” (Front Royal, Virginia: CD-ROM Edition, 2012). Thus, contrary to the general misconception, the Second Amendment restates a constitutional rule which applies to both the General Government and the States, because in its Militia Clauses the original Constitution sets out powers and disabilities which pertain to both levels of government.

As the principles of the pre-constitutional American Militia laws make clear, “the Militia of the several States” today are to consist of every able-bodied citizen from sixteen years of age upwards. Indeed, with only limited exemptions, every such citizen has a legally enforceable duty to serve unless and until some physical or mental disability occasioned by advanced age, disease, or accident precludes his further useful participation. Under Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16 of the original Constitution, Congress may “provide for calling forth” “such Part of the[ Militia] as may be employed in the Service of the United States”, and may “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining[ such Part of] the Militia” as Congress may deem necessary for “execut[ing the Laws of the Union, suppress[ing] Insurrections, and repel[ling] Invasions”. But neither Congress nor the States may confine membership and active participation in the Militia as a whole to some set of Americans less inclusive than the pre-constitutional Militia laws required.

As the pre-constitutional American “Militia” laws also teach, every member of the Militia (other than conscientious objectors) is to be provided with “Arms” suitable for Militia service. Thus, not surprisingly, the Constitution delegates to Congress the power “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia”, not for “disarming” them. The three purposes for which Congress may “provide for calling forth the Militia” indicates what types of “Arms” should be provided. “[T]o execute the Laws of the Union” naturally implies “Arms” suitable for the work of typical law-enforcement agencies. “[T]o * * * repel Invasions” naturally implies “Arms” identical or equivalent to those the regular Armed Forces employ. And “to * * * suppress Insurrections” naturally implies “Arms” which can be employed for one or the other of the latter purposes, depending on the type, extent, and severity of the particular “Insurrection[ ]” at hand.

Inasmuch as the Militia are “the Militia of the several States”, and inasmuch as every member of any constitutional “Militia” (other than conscientious objectors) must be suitably armed for that service, each of the several States, no less than Congress, must provide for arming her Militia, not for disarming them. For their own part, the States may require their Militia to execute their own laws, to suppress insurrections within their own territories, to repel invasions of those territories, and to perform whatever other functions they may choose to assign to their “Militia” for which the use of “Arms” may be indicated. Thus the types of “Arms” which the States may require (or simply expect) the members of their Militia to keep and bear for the States’ own purposes could conceivably be more—but never less—extensive than the types of “Arms” required (or simply expected) by Congress for “the Militia of the several States” when they are “employed in the Service of the United States”.

The original Constitution does not specify how Congress is “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia”. In keeping with the pre-constitutional practices which define the concept of “arming”, Congress could direct some agency in the General Government to disburse suitable “Arms”. Or it could direct the States to provide such “Arms”. Or it could direct the members of the Militia to supply themselves with particular “Arms” through the free market. Or it could simply allow all Americans eligible for the Militia to purchase such “Arms” as they saw fit (which, in effect, is the situation today to a certain, albeit not sufficient, extent). Or it could employ some combination of these means (for example, crew-served weapons would be supplied by the government, individual “Arms” provided by members of the Militia themselves). Similarly for the States. But, obviously, neither Congress nor the States can “provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia” by prohibiting citizens eligible for the Militia from in some manner procuring whatever types of “Arms” would enable them to perform one or another Militia service. Thus, for a prime example, if the particular task is to “repel Invasions”, neither Congress nor the States may prohibit citizens eligible for the Militia from possessing at least semi-automatic so-called “assault rifles” of military calibers, closely akin to the fully automatic rifles the regular Armed Forces employ to “repel Invasions” by foreign aggressors also equipped with such rifles.

Both Congress and the States have the constitutional power to arm the Militia. And, as a general proposition, “[w]hatever functions Congress [and the States] are by the Constitution authorized to perform they are, when the public good requires it, bound to perform”. United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 Howard) 560, 567 (1850). One of the Constitution’s purposes is to “provide for the common defence”, which self-evidently “the public good [always] requires”. See U.S. Const. preamble; art. I, § 8, cl. 1. A critical responsibility of the Militia is to “provide for the common defence”, first and foremost by “repel[ling] Invasions” and to a lesser degree by “suppress[ing large-scale] Insurrections”. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. See also U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4, and art. I, § 10, cl. 3. So the power of Congress and the States to arm the Militia for that purpose (as well as others) implies a corresponding duty, too. And because Congress and the States have a governmental duty to arm the Militia, and every American eligible for Militia service (other than conscientious objectors) has a personal duty to be armed, every such American enjoys a corresponding absolute right as against both the General Government and the States “to keep and bear Arms” suitable for such service—such as semi-automatic “assault rifles” with which to “repel Invasions” and “suppress [large-scale] Insurrections”, or various types of semi-automatic pistols, revolvers, rifles, shotguns, and so on with which to “execute the Laws” and “suppress [small-scale] Insurrections”.

Observe, too, that this absolute right derived from Americans’ eligibility for service in the Militia is perfectly compatible with—indeed, is the very best way to effectuate—the so-called “individual right” “to keep and bear Arms” for personal self-defense on which advocates of “gun rights” such as the National Rifle Association dote. After all, as a practical matter, everyone who is required to possess firearms suitable for Militia service can also employ those firearms for self-protection should the need arise. And inasmuch as self-defense entails the enforcement of the law by the victim of an attack when no other aid is available, such use of a firearm fulfills the Militia purpose of “execut[ing] the Laws of the Union” and the laws of the States. Viewed in the proper constitutional context, the “individual right” of personal self-defense is simply inseparable from all Americans’ rights and duties pertaining to the Militia. Moreover, as an aspect of “execut[ing] the Laws” self-defense implies an absolute right derived from service in the Militia “to keep and bear Arms” useful for that purpose—which “Arms” will inevitably include numerous types of firearms perfectly adequate for self-defense even if they are not usually deemed suitable or recommended for “execut[ing other] Laws”, “suppress[ing] Insurrections”, or “repel[ling] Invasions”.

Now, inasmuch as the foregoing analysis has derived “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” solely from the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution, with no reliance upon the Second Amendment except as an emphatic reinforcement by reassertion of the “right” those Clauses guarantee on their own, it follows that the Second Amendment is really irrelevant to the fundamental issue of Americans’ “gun rights”. “[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms”—including the “individual right” “to keep and bear Arms” for personal self-defense—would exist even if the Second Amendment did not.

Indeed, read in its entirety (as every coherent sentence in the English language must be read if its true sense is to be understood), the Second Amendment itself confirms this conclusion. The Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The Amendment’s self-evident goal is “the security of a free State”. It declares that “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary” for that purpose. And it protects “the right of the people to keep and bears Arms” against “infringe[ment]” so that “the people” will always be properly equipped to provide “security” to their “free State” through their service in “[a] well regulated Militia”. For the Second Amendment, then, “a free State” is one endowed with “[a] well regulated Militia” in which suitably armed citizens participate collectively in an organized manner for their common defense, not an anarchy in which each happenstance inhabitant of the territory exercises on his own behalf an atomistic “individual right” “to keep and bear Arms” for the purpose of self-defense alone.

In all of this, the Second Amendment and the original Constitution are perfectly congruent. “[T]he security of a free State” to which the Amendment refers is the selfsame end to which the original Constitution aspires in its Preamble: namely, “to provide for the common defence * * * and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”. The “well regulated Militia” which the Amendment declares to be “necessary” for that purpose are “the Militia of the several States” which the original Constitution permanently incorporated into its federal system. And the “right of the people to keep and bear Arms” which the Amendment protects against “infringe[ment]” is no less guaranteed by the explicit power and duty of Congress “[t]o provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia”, along with the implicit disability of the States to disarm their Militia and thereby negate the powers of Congress and the President to “call[ ] forth the Militia” “to be employed in the Service of the United States”. Thus, by its own terms, the Second Amendment supplies nothing that the original Constitution lacks—because, as far as “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is concerned, the original Constitution lacks nothing.

III. Incautious reliance by self-styled champions of the Second Amendment on the “individual right” “to keep and bear Arms”—which some of them convinced the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), to derive from the Amendment’s last fourteen words (to the effective exclusion of the first thirteen)—has rendered the Second Amendment extremely relevant nowadays, but to We the People’s disarmanent.

At issue in Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), was the unconstitutionality of a Maryland statute which prohibits average citizens of that State from possessing every one of a long list of “assault firearms” and related “large-capacity magazines”. Anyone who gives even passing consideration to the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment, let alone the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution (and of the Constitution of Maryland, too), must conclude that these particular “Arms”, being quintessential “Militia” firearms in this day and age, are entitled to the very highest level of protection available under the Second Amendment. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). But, expecting to capitalize on Heller, the plaintiffs in Kolbe premissed their case exclusively on the “individual-right” theory that “assault firearms” are useful for personal self-defense.

Truth and justice being commodities of little value today, that these litigants’ assertions were correct availed them nothing. For, in a remarkably disingenuous display of legalistic jiu-jitsu, the Court of Appeals upheld the Maryland law on the supposed authority of Heller:

We conclude * * * that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are not protected by the Second Amendment. * * * [They] are among those arms that are “like” “M-16 rifles”—“weapons that are most useful in military service”—which the Heller Court singled out as being beyond the Second Amendment’s reach. * * * [W]e have no power to extend Second Amendment protection to the weapons of war that the Heller decision explicitly excluded from such coverage. [849 F.3d at 121.]

To be sure, this was a grotesque perversion of the actual holding in Heller—but a studied “misconstruction or abuse” which the loose reasoning and even looser rhetoric of Heller encouraged and facilitated.

Seeking to overturn the Court of Appeals’ decision, Mr. Kolbe et alia then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, once again in reliance on the “individual-right” theory alone.

Although the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution (and of the Constitution of Maryland as well) were “not specifically noticed * * * in the [parties’] records or briefs”, the Supreme Court could have taken them under consideration on its own initiative, “that the Constitution may not be violated from the carelessness or oversight of counsel in any particular.” See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 604 (1895) (separate opinion of Field, J.). And, on that basis, it could have disposed of the case in summary fashion with an order reading simply: “The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed on the authority of United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).” Instead, the Supreme Court denied the petition without commenting on the merits of the case. Although as a matter of law the mere denial of the petition imports nothing as to the merits, the practical result is that—at least in the Fourth Circuit and in any other court which finds the Court of Appeals’ sophistry congenial for the purpose of imposing radical “gun control”—any “Arms” which can plausibly be labeled “weapons of war” are entitled to no protection whatsoever under the Second Amendment. As to such “Arms” the Second Amendment is simply irrelevant.

Now, semi-automatic “assault rifles” of (say) the AR-15 and AK-47 patterns available in the free market undoubtedly are akin in their basic designs and most of their operations and features to the fully automatic versions of such firearms employed by regular armed forces throughout the world. But so are most modern semi-automatic pistols of military calibers. Indeed, many semi-automatic pistols now being sold in the free market to civilians in the United States are also issued to regular armed forces both here and abroad with no significant differences in their basic designs, operations, and features. And just about all modern semi-automatic pistols are supplied by the factories with “large-capacity magazines” as original equipment, and can accommodate even-larger-capacity aftermarket magazines. (Such aftermarket magazines are available for even the venerable Colt Model 1911 pistol and its contemporary clones.) So nothing prevents these pistols from being denounced by “gun-control” fanatics in legislatures and courts as “weapons of war” unprotected by the Second Amendment and therefore subject to sweeping prohibitions, notwithstanding that they are eminently suitable for personal self-defense by civilians in their own homes and in the streets of their cities and towns.

To be sure, Heller upheld the right of an average American to possess a semi-automatic handgun for the purpose of personal protection in his home. But, inasmuch as Heller was decided on the basis of the “individual-right” theory with no consideration of the “weapons-of-war” theory, in a future Heller-type case the Supreme Court could adopt the latter theory merely by “distinguishing” Heller on that basis, without having to “overrule” it formally. And, by denying the petition for a writ of certiorari in Kolbe, the Supreme Court has left the “weapons-of-war” theory fully loaded in the argumentative arsenal of every crackpot legislator and judge throughout the United States. Thus, one can expect “gun-control” fanatics to push that theory for all it is worth—first against private possession of semi-automatic “assault rifles” (those fanatics’ bête noire du jour), then against private possession of semi-automatic pistols and other “Arms” with “military” applications (such as highly accurate bolt-action rifles equipped with telescopic sights, which can be denounced as “sniper rifles”), wherever such possession is still legal. That, in the aftermath of the recent school shooting in Parkland, Florida, pundits in the mass media and assorted “useful idiots” in both of this country’s “two” major political parties are stridently demanding prohibition of the private possession of all semi-automatic firearms of whatever type indicates that no discernable limit to such anti-constitutional nullification of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” exists.

For decades past, “gun-control” fanatics have employed numerous strategies in their incessant war of legalistic aggression against “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, especially with respect to semi-automatic “assault rifles”. Yet during that time even those “Arms” were entitled to a measure of ersatz protection under a judicial “balancing test” which (in its strongest form) purported to “enforce” the Second Amendment by requiring the government to demonstrate that an “infringe[ment]” on “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” served a “compelling interest” through “the least-restrictive means” available. Unfortunately for litigants trying to shield themselves behind the “individual-right” theory, what constituted a “compelling interest” and a “least-restrictive means” was, like “beauty”, in the eyes of the beholders—that is, the typically hostile judges who decided such cases. And, like “pornography”, such judges knew a “compelling interest” and a “least-restrictive means” when they saw them, which they almost always professed to do. Nonetheless, even a kangaroo court’s employment of an anti-constitutional and politically biased “balancing test” was preferable to an out-and-out ruling that the Second Amendment did not apply at all. Now, however, once the label “weapons of war” is affixed to some class of firearms under the Kolbe doctrine, a court can ignore the Second Amendment entirely. Not even a “balancing test” need be applied to what otherwise would be recognized as an “infringe[ment]” on “the right of the people to keep and bear [such] Arms”, because no constitutional “right” exists with respect to them.

Even the NRA and other proponents of the “individual-right” theory seem to realize the extremely perilous nature of this situation. It is surely no accident, after all, that they have taken to calling semi-automatic rifles of the AR-15 pattern “modern sporting rifles”. Apparently they imagine that applying mere verbal lipstick to what “gun-control” fanatics among legislators, judges, and the mass media consider a pig will reprieve the poor animal from consignment to a slaughterhouse. Besides being unrealistic, this tactic is more than merely ironic, inasmuch as the NRA has consistently (and correctly) criticized the BATFE for using as a basis for its regulations a firearm’s supposed unsuitability for what that agency deems to be “sporting” purposes.

Although the proponents of the “individual-right” theory of the Second Amendment did not intend to create this rats’ nest, they are largely responsible for it. For if Richard Weaver was correct in his observation that all ideas have consequences, surely even they should have known that bad ideas inevitably beget catastrophes. Over the years, in support of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” they could have promoted the entirety of the Second Amendment, rather than just its last fourteen words. They could have promoted the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution. They could have promoted the entirety of the Second Amendment in tandem with the Militia Clauses, as the Constitution obviously intends. They could have litigated Heller on the latter basis, and might well have obtained from Justice Scalia a constitutionally coherent opinion which would have precluded—rather than provided grist for—the egregious decision in Kolbe. They could even have bravely bitten the bullet by denoting semi-automatic “assault rifles” as the “modern Militia rifles” those firearms undoubtedly are—or, better yet, by describing all firearms suitable for any type of Militia service (including personal self-defense) as “modern Militia arms”. But they wanted nothing to do with either the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment or the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution. As a result—perhaps innocently, perhaps inadvertently, but in any event inattentively to the inescapable consequences of their actions—they have provided “gun-control” fanatics with invaluable aid and comfort in those miscreants’ quest to make the Second Amendment irrelevant.

Now, having sown the wind, they must steel themselves to reap the whirlwind. Unfortunately, so must we all.

© 2018 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




The President Can Suppress School Shootings

INTRODUCTION

Whatever the facts may turn out to be, the recent school shooting in Parkland, Florida—and others which have preceded it throughout this country—are traumatic, tragic, and deplorable events. Effective action needs to be taken to prevent altogether, or at least to minimize the effects of, future happenings of this kind, whether in schools or other venues. All of this is self-evident. As always, though, the question remains: “What is to be done?”

Unfortunately, so far, the publicized reactions from the White House to the school shooting in Florida evidence confusion as to what should be done. Inasmuch as this school shooting is not the first such horrific event America has suffered (and probably will not be the last), the lack of a plausible plan of action, or even a coherent statement of general policy, forthcoming from that source  is disturbing.

As an old Italian folk-saying has it, “basta d’un pazzo per casa”—“one fool in the house is enough”. In the case of the White House, even one fool is too many, a plethora of fools intolerable.

Yet the White House’s failure to address the problem of school shootings in a courageous, a comprehensive—and especially a constitutional—manner amounts to foolishness in the extreme. Fortunately, as to other subjects, President Trump has shown himself to be a leader who does not suffer fools gladly (if at all), and who, when presented with a viable solution to a vexing problem, will act quickly and decisively on his own initiative.

Unfortunately, many people contend that it is not the President’s place to interject himself and the General Government into the essentially State and Local issue of school shootings. For example, Mr. Jake MacAulay recently published a commentary on NewsWithViews entitled “The Vitriolic Dialogue Of Federal Gun Restrictions Continues” (14 March 2018). In this piece Mr. MacAulay argues that

[c]urrently, the Trump administration, along with his unconstitutional Department of Education, are coming up with a plan unauthorized by the Constitution that will provide funding to states for improved background checks of gun buyers and fire arms training for teachers in government schools. In order to further his pandering of the gun lobby, Newsmax.com reported the President “has refused to increase the age restriction for so-called assault weapons. Instead, a new federal commission [on] school safety will examine the age issue, as well as a long list of other topics, as part of a longer term look at school safety and violence.”

So just where does the president, or Congress for that matter, get the authority to provide funding to state education infrastructures? The answer? Nowhere.  The Constitution grants no such authority and there is a specific reason for this.

Ask yourself the question, when has the federal government ever stopped or prevented a school shooting? How can the DC bureaucrats effectively keep nearly 100,000 schools safe?

Because they are the best equipped, our Founders intended the state and local government agencies to handle these types of circumstances. Your State and sheriffs’ departments are the only agencies that are constitutionally authorized to deal with prevention of tragedies inside of the respective states.

How do I know this? Because I have read the Constitution, and nowhere in Article 2 (which defines the powers of the president) is there any executive authority to administrate a Department of Education, or to appropriate funding to any agencies of the government or schools. Furthermore, Article 2 does not grant the president any authority to provide firearms training for teachers. He is to be the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces alone.

To put a finer point on it, you will find nowhere in Article I, Section 8, authority delegated to Congress to tax and spend for education or school firearms training.

The solution is to keep federal government entanglement out of state school systems and state law enforcement. Allowing the states to handle those critical areas will bring swifter, cost effective, and safer solutions because they are more equipped to deal with their own backyard.

Now, the present author is not aware of, and certainly would not uncritically defend or defer to,  whatever President Trump may have in mind for what Mr. MacAulay calls “a plan unauthorized by the Constitution that will provide funding to states for improved background checks of gun buyers and fire arms training for teachers in government schools.” On the other hand, although in the past Mr. MacAulay has posted many valuable commentaries on NewsWithViews, in this instance “Homer has nodded”. For, as what follows herein demonstrates, it is possible to present a proposal for a constitutional direction in which President Trump could and should proceed if he wants to apply the full powers of his office to a solution of the problem of school shootings.

ABSTRACT

1. Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution imposes upon the President the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”.

2. Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution delegates to Congress the power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union”.

3. Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution delegates to Congress the power “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress”.

4. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution delegates to Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence * * * of the United States”.

5. Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution provides that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law”.

6. School shootings are an egregious form of “domestic violence” which violates not only “the Laws of the Union” but also the laws of the several States, and imperils “the common Defence * * * of the United States”.

7. In its exercise of its authority under Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16, Congress has enacted 10 U.S.C. § 253, which provides that the President, “by using the militia * * * shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any * * * domestic violence” under conditions relevant to present-day school shootings.

8. “[T]he militia” which 10 U.S.C. § 253 empowers the President to “us[e]” includes all or any part of “the unorganized militia”, the composition of which Congress has defined in 10 U.S.C. §§ 246 and 247.

9. In every State, as so defined “the unorganized militia” includes large numbers of teachers, administrators, parents, and even some students.

10. Therefore, “by using the militia” to “take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any * * * domestic violence” in the particular form of school shootings, President Trump may call forth from “the unorganized militia” sufficient numbers of eligible teachers, administrators, parents, and even students—suitably organized, armed, disciplined, trained, and invested with specific governmental authority perforce of Presidential directives—to provide security for their schools.

11. In the course of “using the militia” to “take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any * * * domestic violence” in the particular form of school shootings, President Trump may “draw[ ] from the Treasury * * * in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law” whatever “Money” Congress may have made available for the purposes authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 253 out of the “Taxes” which Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 authorizes it “To lay and collect * * * to provide for the common Defence * * * of the United States”.

12. Such “us[e of] the militia” would enforce the General Government’s “gun-free schools” law in 18 U.S.C. § 922q in the one manner it which it undoubtedly needs to be enforced—that is, to prevent school shootings—under the President’s authority as “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”, pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 and Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16 of the Constitution.

13. Such “us[e of] the militia” would also enforce the Second Amendment, rather than derogating from it, as do proposals for radical “gun control” now being promoted in the mass media as panaceas for the problem of school shootings.

ANALYSIS

I. Self-evidently, school shootings deny their victims various rights, privileges, immunities, or protections guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and secured by the laws of both the General Government and the States. These rights include the “unalienable Right[ ]” to “Life” itself mentioned in the Declaration of Independence, secured against deprivation without due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and protected in every State by criminal and civil laws against murder, attempted murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, aggravated battery, wrongful death, and so on.

Indeed, the General Government’s own “gun-free schools” law itself is obviously intended—albeit on the basis of faulty reasoning—to protect students’, teachers’, and administrators’ rights to life (among other cognate rights). See Act of 29 November 1990, Pub. L. 101-647, title xvii-general provisions, § 1702 (“Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990”), 104 Stat. 4789, 4844; declared unconstitutional but then reënacted as amended in An Act Making omnibus consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1997, and for other purposes, Act of 30 September 1996, title vi—general provisions, § 657, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369; now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922q. In addition, many of the States have enacted their own “gun-free schools” or equivalent statutes for the same purpose. See, e.g., Code of Virginia § 18.2-308.1. Plainly, these laws are violated every time a school shooting occurs, even if no one is actually killed or injured.

Now, with some very limited exceptions, no careful student of the subject can be a proponent of  “gun-free zones” of any kind. Yet one must also recognize that in an imperfect world it sometimes takes a crooked stick to beat a mad dog; that, as the Supreme Court observed in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheaton) 204, 226 (1821), “[t]he science of government * * * is the science of experiment”; that “politics is the art of the possible”; and that “gun-free schools” laws are on the books throughout this country (no matter how poorly thought out and otherwise inadvisable they may be). So, with appropriate circumspection, advantage should be taken of such laws until something better comes along.

On the other hand, the plain fact of the matter is that, so far, even armed with “gun-free schools” laws both the General Government and the States have proven themselves incapable of effectively suppressing school shootings, as such horrors continue to take place. So something more is needed to ensure that these laws are effectively executed for that purpose.

After all, a realistic appraisal of the present situation must take into account that far too many average Americans (as well as public officials) are untutored in the basic constitutional principles and practices of what the Second Amendment calls “a free State”, are incessantly bombarded with slick propaganda from “gun-control” fanatics eager to ban so-called “assault rifles” (and, if the truth be told, all other types of firearms), and are more likely than not to be driven by raw emotion rather than swayed by logical reasoning. Such people will tend to sympathize with the apparently “commonsensical” (but actually nonsensical) notion that the availability of the inanimate instruments employed in some school shootings is to blame for the carnage, rather than the homicidal intentions or impulses of the perpetrators, along with the contrived circumstances of the “gun-free zones” which facilitate, and even ensure the success of, such attacks.

This being the case, it is probably counterproductive for champions of the Second Amendment to stress the principle that the Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear [semi-automatic] Arms [of quasi-military pattern]”, notwithstanding that in practice such “Arms” are all too often employed in school shootings. True enough, both the Second Amendment and the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution absolutely protect that right, as a matter of “the supreme Law of the Land”. See, e.g., the present author’s brief amici curiae in Kolbe v. Hogan, No. 17-127 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 23 August 2017), to be found at <www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kolbe-v-hogan/>. And, of even greater consequence, if ordinary Americans were prohibited from possessing semi-automatic rifles and other “Arms” suitable for service in “well regulated Militia”, then no one—including students in this country’s schools—could hope to live for very much longer in even the semblance of “a free State”, in light of the strongly neo-Bolshevist political tendencies at work almost everywhere throughout this country. Nonetheless, for citizens unfamiliar with these particulars of constitutional law, and therefore unaware of the fatal consequences to “a free State” that will inevitably ensue if these principles are disregarded, the more convincing—because eminently pragmatic—argument must be that security against school shootings can best be guaranteed by transforming totally “gun-free schools” into internally “gun-protected schools”. That is, “gun-free schools” laws must be supplemented by executive actions and perhaps new statutes that as much as possible render schools effectively “gun free” for potential school shooters, by suitably arming and training teachers, administrators, parents, and even some students so that in the gravest extreme they can protect themselves immediately with guns, there being no equally effective alternative. For, with respect to school shootings, one sorry experience after another has confirmed in innocent blood the wry observation that “when seconds count the police are just minutes away”.

II. The Constitution and at least one statute of the General Government (in addition to its own “gun-free schools” law) provide a ready means for President Trump to deal with this situation on his own initiative, without further assistance from Congress or the States than is already available to him.

A. Pursuant to Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 of the Constitution, the President-elect “solemnly swear[s] (or affirm[s]) that [he] will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Article II, Section 3 imposes on the President the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 designates him as the “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”. Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 empowers Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union”. The Second Amendment declares that “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”. And it should be self-evident that “the Laws [are not being] faithfully executed”, and “the security of a free State” is being imperiled, when schools—which should the agents for instilling in students the principles, and instructing them in the practices, of “a free State”—are suffered to remain “free-fire zones” for religious or ideological fanatics, drugged-up zombies, madmen, and agents provocateurs who obey no law other than the law of the jungle.

B. In pertinent part, 10 U.S.C. § 253 provides that

[t]he President, by using the militia * * * shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—

(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.

This is no novel piece of legislation, but derives from An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes, Act of 20 April 1871, chap. XXII, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14.

The application of this statute to school shootings in particular is straightforward:

(i) The statute imposes no limit on the definition of “domestic violence”. And school shootings constitute, by commonplace understanding, an extremely serious form of “domestic violence” in every instance. (In some cases they may involve “unlawful combination[s], or conspirac[ies]” as well.)

(ii) The statute imposes no limit, either, on what “militia” (or part thereof) the President may “us[e]”, so long as that “militia” is recognized as such by some law of Congress. Pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16 of the Constitution, for “employ[ment] in the Service of the United States” in aid of “execut[ing] the Laws of the Union” (among other responsibilities) Congress has assigned most Americans to “the unorganized militia”. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 246 and 247. For their own purposes, the States, too, have consigned most of their citizens to “the unorganized militia”. See, e.g., Code of Virginia §§ 44-1, 44-4, and 44-5. Although an “unorganized militia” cannot qualify as “[a] well regulated Militia” for all possible constitutional ends, nonetheless it is a “militia” by statutory definition, is capable of performing some basic functions “necessary to the security of a free State”, and therefore comes within the compass of the President’s statutory authority to “us[e] the militia” * * * to suppress * * * domestic violence”.

(iii) The statute imposes no limits on “the measures” the President may “consider[ ] necessary to suppress, in a State, any * * * domestic violence”—and clearly must include “using the militia” (which the statute allows) in order “to execute [whatever] Laws of the Union” may apply to the situation (which authority and responsibility the Constitution explicitly assigns to the Militia in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15).

(iv) History even as recent as what just happened in Parkland, Florida, should conclusively establish to the satisfaction of President Trump (or any other sentient and unbiased observer) that “the constituted authorities of th[e] State[s]” have time and again proven themselves “unable”, have “fail[ed]”, or have “refuse[d] to protect” students, teachers, and administrators (directly), as well as parents (indirectly), from school shootings, thus leaving that “part or class of [the States’] people * * * deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution, and secured by law”—the most obvious such “protection * * * secured by law” being the “protection” promised by “gun-free schools” laws against violent attacks with firearms in school. Apparently, too, “the constituted authorities” of the General Government with jurisdiction over the matter have done no better, or even worse, as the FBI’s shocking non-, mis-, or malfeasance prior to the Florida school shooting evidences. And, to make matters worse (if that be possible), the courts deny the victims of violent attacks any right to bring civil actions for monetary damages against such officials on account of their derelictions, because the judges’ misconceptions of “due process of law” supposedly do not “require the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors”. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 489 U.S. 189, 195-197 (1989).

(v) In particular, inadequately enforced “gun-free schools” laws deny equal protection of the law to teachers, administrators, students, and parents. In States not under the heels of “gun-control” fanatics in public office, when teachers, administrators, parents, and even some students who qualify for concealed-carry permits are outside of school they can protect themselves with firearms to the selfsame degree as all other citizens. See, e.g., Code of Virginia § 18.2-308.01. Yet, even in such States, when those very same teachers, administrators, parents, and students are inside “gun-free schools” the relevant laws deny them the right of self-defense with firearms, and all other students the right to be protected by those teachers, administrators, parents, and fellow students who but for those laws could be armed. See, e.g., Code of Virginia § 18.2-308.1.

The right of personal self-defense, however, is neither just a statutory nor simply a constitutional right, but instead is a natural right that precedes and is independent of and superior to all statutes and constitutions. As the Founding Fathers’ most influential legal mentor, Sir William Blackstone, explained, “[s]elf-defence, * * * as it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society.” Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Robert Bell, American Edition, 4 Volumes & Appendix, 1771-1773), Volume 3, at 4. Therefore, inasmuch as the right of self-defense in aid of one’s life cannot be “taken away by the law of society” at all, and inasmuch as when confronted by an armed assailant a victim’s best (if not only) defense is his own firearm, it is impossible to imagine on what legitimate grounds public officials, on the one hand, can enable all eligible citizens to effectuate that right through the concealed carry of firearms outside the schools, but, on the other hand, can deny that very same right to some of those very same citizens within “gun-free schools”, where experience teaches that the dangers from attempted mass shootings are almost always far greater than anywhere else.

The only minimally arguable justification for this discrimination would have to be that, in contrast to its lackadaisical performance elsewhere, within “gun-free schools” the government provides such sure and certain protection for students, teachers, administrators, and parents as to render totally unnecessary their self-defense or their defense of others with firearms. Common experience, however, proves that this is never the case, because administrators invariably instruct teachers and students in the face of actual or even threatened school shootings to take various self-protective actions (other than the use of firearms) in addition to their reliance on whatever “security” measures the government has put into place. And everyone knows that such “security” as the authorities do deign to arrange or recommend can fail—and in too many instances has failed, with catastrophic consequences. Of course, it might also turn out that allowing teachers, administrators, some students, and parents to “keep and bear Arms” under appropriately controlled conditions while in school would not suffice to forefend school shootings in enough cases to establish the utility of that measure. But inasmuch as “[t]he science of government * * * is the science of experiment”, and inasmuch as other experiments for securing schools against mass shootings have not succeeded, the experimental method would recommend that such an allowance at least be tried.

C. All of the legal preconditions for an experiment of that sort have already been satisfied. As explained above, the Constitution imposes on President Trump the duty to “take Care that the [General Government’s ‘gun-free schools’ law] be faithfully executed”. The Constitution invests the President with personal authority and endows him with sufficient means to do so, he being the “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when [they are] called into the actual Service of the United States”, and the Militia being empowered “to execute the Laws of the Union” under his command with neither exception nor limitation. And in 10 U.S.C. § 253 Congress has provided the President and the Militia with a sweeping statutory mandate eminently suitable for that purpose, and the constitutionality of which cannot be questioned.

III. In light of the foregoing, President Trump not only is undoubtedly constitutionally able, but also is arguably constitutionally required, to promulgate an Executive Order or other appropriate directive to execute 10 U.S.C. § 253 by calling forth selected individuals from “the unorganized militia”—appropriately organized, armed, disciplined, trained, and invested with specific governmental authority—to provide security against “domestic violence” in America’s schools. Initially, this would not encompass all teachers, administrators, students, parents, relevant experts, and other useful personnel eligible for such service in “the unorganized militia”, because in the exercise of prudence any necessarily experimental program should be put into operation only gradually, with careful evaluation of the success or need for amendment of each step in the process. Little beginnings, though, often—and in this case surely would—lead to big things.

At the outset, however, President Trump must realize that the degree of coöperation he can expect from the States (and even from personnel in his own Administration) will vary widely. The political establishments in some, probably too many, so-called “blue States” will intransigently oppose him—either because rogue public officials in those States are fanatically committed to one or another form of radical “gun control” that aims at complete disarmament of the populace, no matter its fatal effects on “the security of a free State” in schools and elsewhere; or because they simply hate the thought that, in contrast with their own serial failures, Mr. Trump might actually “Make America Great Again” pro tanto by significantly reducing the incidence of, or even altogether eliminating, school shootings in a thoroughly constitutional manner. And, of course, the hostile mass media will vehemently inveigh against him on the ridiculous grounds that anyone who seeks to revitalize the Militia for any purpose must be a dangerous “fascist”, even though both the Constitution and Congressional statutes explicitly provide for the President’s employment of the Militia “to execute the Laws of the Union” in aid of suppressing “domestic violence”, whether in schools or elsewhere.

President Trump must turn a deaf ear to these discordant voices, treating them with the dismissal and even disdain they deserve. For, rather than the subjects of a political “popularity contest”, school shootings are matters of life and death for “the children”—on whose behalf Mr. Trump’s antagonists have always shown themselves more inclined to affect hypocritically lachrymose concern than willing to swallow their pride, shut their mouths, roll up their sleeves, and set to work to alleviate the problem in a constitutional manner. If he grasps the nettle firmly, “the Deplorables” will support him. And that should prove to be enough.

Unfortunately, President Trump should also expect some misguided opposition from those among his supporters who honestly question the legality of the General Government’s “gun-free schools” law. By supposedly compromising the Second Amendment, such people will contend, his invocation of that law for any purpose will betray his erstwhile promises to “Make America Great Again”. This line of argument, however, is an error easily exposed. For, no matter how many unconstitutional applications of the General Government’s “gun-free schools” law can be imagined, it is certainly constitutional as a basis for the President to “take Care that [that law] be faithfully executed” for the specific purpose of rendering schools “gun free” in terms of illegal “domestic violence” with firearms, by suitably arming teachers, administrators, parents, and some students called forth from “the unorganized militia”. After all, if a statute can fairly be read to further any undoubtedly constitutional purpose, it must be deemed constitutional for that purpose, no matter how many plainly unconstitutional purposes some tendentious misreadings of its bare language might supposedly license. “The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy”, “‘to ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.’” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); and United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971), quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). Accord, e.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710-711 (1962).

A. As any competent experimental scientist will recommend, as his first step President Trump should call forth from “the unorganized militia” individuals qualified to survey the relevant historical and legal literature, conducting comprehensive re-investigations of what actually happened in previous school shootings, not just what some public officials have declared to be their “findings”, or the mass media have reported as “facts”, in those cases. Just as there remain good reasons to continue to question the official “findings” and journalistic “facts” in the public record of (say) the assassinations of President Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, so too do good reasons exist to doubt the completeness, accuracy, and even honesty of the “findings” and “facts” in the public records of school shootings. In this regard, three basic questions must be answered: Why was “security” nonexistent or inadequate in those instances? If adequate in principle, why did such “security” fail in practice? And would not arming and training teachers, administrators, parents, and even some students under the auspices of the Militia have done better?

B. Because of credible reports of many school shooters’ apparent involvement with physician-prescribed or -administered psychotropic drugs, President Trump should call forth from “the unorganized militia” individuals with the specialized expertise required to perform a thoroughgoing critical review of the FDA’s allowance and supervision of the general use (or, more likely, misuse and even abuse) of such medications. The primary issue would be whether these dangerous substances have been permitted to enter the stream of commerce without adequate administrative investigation and controls, without sufficient warnings to physicians and their patients (and in many cases their patients’ parents and school officials, too), and without notice to other authorities—particularly the FBI, the BATFE, and State agencies tasked with overseeing the purchase and possession of firearms—that the individuals taking these drugs potentially posed serious risks to themselves and others. The BATFE’s and various State agencies’ forms which collect information for “background checks” on commercial sales of firearms already require disclosure of prospective purchasers’ use of illegal drugs. Perhaps a very carefully crafted new line-item should be included to apprise regulators of a buyer’s use of “legitimate” psychotropic substances, too—thus allowing adequate time for investigation of the actual adverse effects of such use before the buyer’s personal possession (as opposed to ownership) of certain types of (or even any) firearms were approved—with, of course, adequate guarantees that buyers who used such drugs would not thereby find themselves listed on some sort of medical “Bill of Attainder”, and otherwise would receive every possible protection afforded by due process of law. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; art. I, § 10, cl. 1; and amends. V and XIV, § 1.

Even more thorny is the problem of under what procedures a firearm already legally possessed by an individual who uses legitimate psychotropic drugs could constitutionally be seized by the government if that individual credibly indicated to others that he might misuse his firearm to perpetrate a mass shooting or some other homicidal act. For—distinguishably from all other forms of “property” entitled only to the general guarantees against “unreasonable * * * seizures” in the Fourth Amendment and deprivation “without due process of law” in the Fifth Amendment and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution—“Arms” are “property” explicitly protected by the Second Amendment against all “infringe[ments]” on “the right of the people to keep and bear” them, because they have an unique relationship to “the security of a free State”. Compare and contrast, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (seizure of wages without prior notice and hearing); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (seizure of ordinary household appliances without prior notice and hearing).

C. Inasmuch as membership in “the unorganized militia” nowhere in the United States today requires individuals to undergo training which would specifically qualify them to provide any type of armed security in schools, President Trump should enlist experts from both the public and the private sectors to devise appropriate model training protocols for and programs of instruction.

From the public sector he should seek the assistance of outstanding personnel from well-accredited State police academies or like establishments. This would be especially appropriate, because preparing teachers, administrators, and some students in “the unorganized militia” to provide armed security in their schools would necessarily involve certain types of training already standardized for State and Local police forces—such as the legal principles and practices relating to the use of deadly force, to the detention of suspects, to identification and preservation of evidence at a crime scene, and so on.

Due to the unrestricted reach of 10 U.S.C. §§ 246 and 253 (as well as the limited exemptions allowed by 10 U.S.C. § 247), it could well be argued that, perforce of Article VI, Clause 2 (the so-called “Supremacy Clause”) of the Constitution, State law could not exempt personnel employed in police academies from service in “the unorganized militia”, and that therefore, just as any other citizens, such individuals could be called forth by the President for Militia duty “in[ ] the actual Service of the United States”. In any event, as a matter of coöperative federalism, the Governors in most “red States” certainly should be expected to direct such police personnel over whom they exercise jurisdiction to participate in the President’s program in the capacity of advisors, inasmuch as effective enforcement of the General Government’s “gun-free schools” law would redound to the States’ advantage, too, by indirectly enforcing the States’ own “gun-free schools” statutes.

From the private sector, President Trump should select top-flight instructors from the best firearms-training organizations (such as Academi, Gunsite Academy, Front Sight Firearms Training, the Massad Ayoob Group, the National Rifle Association, and Thunder Ranch). Besides enlisting individuals with varieties of expertise, experience, enlightenment, and infectious enthusiasm not generally expected to be found amongst personnel in police academies, this would give the lie to the disgraceful defamation now being broadcast in the mass media that the NRA, in particular, has “blood on its hands” because, supposedly motivated by the lowest of mercenary considerations, it puts a fictitious “individual right” of irresponsible Americans to possess dangerous semi-automatic rifles ahead of the safety of innocent students, teachers, administrators, and parents in this country’s schools.

In light of President Trump’s apparently warm relationship with the government of Israel, he might seek the assistance of anti-terrorism experts from that country, too. Their experience and insights should surely prove profitable. Their participation might also convince large numbers of persons within America’s Jewish community that, at least with respect to school shootings which indiscriminately target Jews as well as others, their traditionally disproportionate support for “gun control” is counterproductive.

These model training protocols and programs would supply the necessary predicates for the execution of the President’s Executive Orders, as well as for such new State and Congressional legislation as might be needed.

D. To facilitate passage of such legislation in the States, President Trump should call forth from “the unorganized militia” experienced legislative draftsmen to write model Militia laws tailored to each State’s particular statutory code. Admittedly, preparing the documents needed for comprehensive nationwide reform of this sort would be a tedious task, inasmuch as fifty separate model laws (along with supporting legal memoranda and other explanatory materials) would be required. And no guarantee could be had that all, or a majority, or even more than a few of the States would follow the President’s lead at first. In light of the seriousness of the situation, though, something would be better than nothing—especially if that “something” proved effective. For the success some States would achieve would assuredly generate uncompromising demands by citizens in other States for their recalcitrant political leaders either “to get on board” with Mr. Trump’s program or “to get out of Dodge”. It is hard to imagine how, even with knee-jerk support in the mass media, rogue public officials obsessed with “gun control” and obdurate in their opposition to employment of “the unorganized militia” could persist in obstruction of the President’s initiative when the hot breath of the voters scorched their necks.

Moreover, those States which adopted and faithfully implemented such model laws could be assured that no further intervention in their affairs on that score would be forthcoming from the General Government.

E. If rogue public officials in some States or Localities should attempt to thwart President Trump’s program—along the lines of the arrant “sanctuary-State” and “sanctuary-cities” obstructionism now being interposed against the General Government’s enforcement of its laws relating to illegal immigration—rather than coddling or negotiating with such miscreants he should peremptorily execute the General Government’s “gun-free schools” law by ordering the direct “federalization” of teachers, administrators, students, parents, and others in “the unorganized militia” in those areas, under the plenary authority vouchsafed to him by 10 U.S.C. § 253.

(a) To this, no disgruntled State or Local official could offer any legal objection, whether under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution or otherwise. For, as 10 U.S.C. § 253 provides, should President Trump determine that “domestic violence * * * so hinders the execution of the laws of [a] State, and of the United States within th[at] State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection”, he may “consider” that “the State * * * ha[s] denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.” Thus, 10 U.S.C. § 253 is “appropriate legislation” through which Congress has explicitly empowered the President to “enforce” in the first instance the requirement that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”, perforce of Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. See the origin of 10 U.S.C. § 253 in An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes, Act of 20 April 1871, chap. XXII, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14.

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment delegates to Congress a plenary supervisory power which it may wield in aid of Section 1 of that Amendment against the States perforce of Article VI, Clause 2 (“the Supremacy Clause”). Under that Clause, Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 10 U.S.C. § 253, and the General Government’s “gun-free schools” law are “the supreme Law of the Land” by which “the Judges in every State shall be bound * * * , any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” And, as required by Article VI, Clause 3, “the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers * * * of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support th[e] Constitution” in the foregoing regard, not to disregard let alone defy it.

(b) Of course, were all State and Local public officials constitutionally literate and politically responsible, no objection would ever be broached by any of them, because President Trump’s enforcement of the General Government’s “gun-free schools” law through application of 10 U.S.C. § 253 would entail as clear-cut a case of true federalism in action as could be imagined.

(i) Plainly enough, that statute is an exercise of Congress’s constitutional authority under Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 18 “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union”, and “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the * * * Power[ of Congress to call forth the Militia], and all other Powers vested by th[e] Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”—including the power and duty of the President, in his capacity as “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States”, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 and Article II, Section 3.

And although Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution makes clear that “the unorganized militia” are components of “the Militia of the several States” (not of some nonexistent “Militia of the United States”), the States can claim no right to exclusive control over them. For under Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16; Article II, Section 2, Clause 1; and Article VI, Clause 2, the States are constitutionally bound at all times to make their Militia (in whole or in part) available to “be employed in the Service of the United States” “to execute the Laws of the Union” under the President’s personal command. No exception to this requirement exists.

Moreover, for obvious reasons Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 empowers Congress alone, not the States willy-nilly, “[t]o provide * * * for governing such Part of the[ Militia of the several States] as may be employed in the Service of the United States”. At the present time, Congress has “provide[d]” no specific statute, code, or other set of rules “for governing” “the unorganized militia”, in whole or in “Part”. In 10 U.S.C. § 253, however, Congress has generally empowered “[t]he President, by using the militia * * * [to] take such measures as he considers necessary . . .” and so on, without limitation. In the absence of more specific Congressional directives, in order to “us[e] the militia” at all effectively in the execution of that statute the President himself would have to promulgate such “measures as he consider[ed] necessary” “for governing such Part of the[ Militia]” as he might call forth to “be employed in the Service of the United States”, and then would have to see to the enforcement of those “measures” in his capacity as “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into th[at] actual Service”, under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1. Indeed, because 10 U.S.C. § 253 could not at this time reasonably be enforced “by using the militia” without the President’s provision of rules adequate “for governing such Part of the[Militia]” when “employed in th[at] Service of the United States”, for the President not to promulgate such rules would be to shirk his duty under Article II, Section 3, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. The States, of course, would have no say as to either the substance of the “measures” the President “consider[ed] necessary” for governing “the unorganized militia”, or his applications of them.

(ii) Nonetheless, even when the Militia are called forth to “be employed in the Service of the United States”, Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution “reserv[es] to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress”. This, however, should pose no insurmountable obstacles to President Trump’s invocation of 10 U.S.C. § 253 to “us[e] the militia * * * to suppress, in a State, any * * * domestic violence” associated with school shootings.

First, in light of the peculiar nature of the security required “to suppress, in a State, any * * * [such] domestic violence”, it would likely be possible for President Trump to promulgate “measures” which did not require the formal “Appointment of Officers” for governing “such Part” of “the unorganized militia” as he called forth to execute 10 U.S.C. § 253. Although as a practical matter the President’s “measures” would certainly have to assign different rights and duties to different persons performing different tasks, they would not necessarily need to vest the powers and privileges of rank in anyone. On the other hand, neither the Constitution nor that statute imposes any prohibition of or limitation on “measures” promulgated by the President which would authorize the members of “the unorganized militia” to select “Officers” from amongst themselves in order to perform “the Service of the United States” for which they were called forth. After all, even “the unorganized militia” are official State institutions, recognized as such not only by the Constitution in general but also by State statutes in particular. See, e.g., Code of Virginia §§ §§ 44-1 and 44-4. Otherwise, they could not be called forth by Congress to perform any “militia” function whatsoever, as Congress’s power in that regard extends only to “the Militia of the several States”. That being so, the statutorily authorized actions of “the unorganized militia” (or any “Part” thereof) in any State—whether called forth either by the State herself for her own purposes or by Congress “to be employed in the Service of the United States”—constitute “State action” in the constitutional sense. For whenever anyone who, “by virtue of public position under a State government * * * acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State’s power, his act is that of the State.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880). Therefore, “the Appointment of [their] Officers” by those members of “the unorganized militia” President Trump called forth “to execute the Laws of the Union” perforce of the authority delegated to him by Congress under 10 U.S.C. § 253 would be sanctioned by the power reserved to the States in Article I, Section 8, Clause 16.

Second, although Congress itself has not “prescribed” a general code of “discipline” for “training” “the unorganized militia”, it has necessarily delegated that authority to the President under 10 U.S.C. § 253—for otherwise the President would be unable effectively to “us[e] [that part of ]the militia * * * to suppress, in a State, any * * * domestic violence”, in the form of school shootings or anything else. And no statute may be so misconstrued in principle as to render it nugatory in practice. With respect to “training”, the plan proposed in the instant paper depends entirely on personnel called forth from “the unorganized militia” or seconded to it by some other State agencies (such as police academies), under the supervisory authority of the President as “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”. Therefore, in compliance with Article I, Section 8, Clause 16, this plan would retain for the States “the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress” through its delegation of that power of prescription to the President under 10 U.S.C. § 253.

F. Pursuant to that statute, President Trump may “us[e] the militia * * * [to] take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any * * * domestic violence”, without limitation as to either the sort of “domestic violence” which needs to be “suppress[ed]”, or the nature or extent of the “measures” necessary for that purpose. Presumably, such a sweeping mandate should suffice to enable him to call forth from “the unorganized militia” in any State whichever personnel he might require, on whatever terms and during whatever periods of time he might deem expedient, and to impose on those personnel whatever rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and duties he chose to stipulate, in order to deal with the “domestic violence” of school shootings in that State.

Nonetheless, because President Trump could rightly be concerned that the “measures” he promulgated in an Executive Order could be subject to outright repeal, vitiating amendments, or simple disregard in a subsequent Administration, he could also request Congress to enact new legislation which incorporated, expanded upon, and made permanent those “measures” with regard not only to school shootings but also to other widespread forms of “domestic violence” to which 10 U.S.C. § 253 should be applied. This could have two important additional effects: First, it could enable the President to call forth “the unorganized militia” in aid of State and Local police forces, Sheriffs’ departments, and other law-enforcement agencies now so handicapped by insufficiencies of personnel that they cannot effectively come to grips, not only with school shootings, but also with violent criminal enterprises organized in and funded through nationwide and even international networks. Second, such legislation could enable the President to call forth “the unorganized militia” to put paid to officially sanctioned “domestic violence” manifested most obnoxiously today in widespread “police brutality” (often of a maniacally homicidal character) which all too many incompetent and even corrupt State and Local law-enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and judges tolerate. Once called forth in “the unorganized militia” and vested with legal authority under the General Government’s laws, Local citizens theretofore long exposed to such depredations would surely show no mercy in eradicating them.

G. To be sure, most if not all of the “measures” President Trump promulgated in an Executive Order would presumably require adequate funding to be implemented. It is difficult to imagine, though, that somewhere within the General Government’s voluminous Statutes at Large Congress has not provided some “Appropriations made by Law” for some “Money” which the President could “draw[ ] from the Treasury” pursuant to Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution for the purpose of putting 10 U.S.C. § 253 into effect.Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, President Trump should expect that, through its minions, partisans, and useful idiots in the visible governments in the District of Columbia and the States’ capitals, the invisible government of “the Deep State” would bend its every malevolent effort to prevent his employment of “the unorganized militia” to suppress the “domestic violence” of school shootings. As has already befallen some of Mr. Trump’s attempts to “repel Invasions” by illegal aliens (for which purpose he should long ago have called forth “the unorganized militia” throughout this country), “the Deep State’s” seditious opposition to his calling f

H. orth “the unorganized militia” to deal with school shootings would most likely disguise itself initially in the garb of “judicial supremacy”—in particular, the purported power of a single rogue judge in a single trial court to issue a “nationwide injunction” which ties the President’s hands in every relevant instance, while the case slowly wends its tortuous way through a maze of writs, appeals, petitions, and so on, generating sheaves of orders, findings of fact and law, opinions, and other legalistic screeds as confusing to many lawyers as they are unintelligible to most laymen. For President Trump to acquiesce in such judicial imperialism would be inexcusable as a matter of law.

(i) As a general proposition (which need not be extensively elaborated here), “judicial supremacy” is (to borrow Bentham’s apt phrase) “nonsense on stilts”. See, e.g., my books How To Dethrone the Imperial Judiciary (San Antonio, Texas: Vision Forum Ministries, 2004), and By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., 2014, 2016), at 481-491. Indeed, by candid admission of its own repeated blunders with respect to constitutional questions, the Supreme Court has exposed “judicial supremacy” as incoherent. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-830 & note 1 (1991) (collecting cases). For, self-evidently, “no amount of repetition of * * * errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true”. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

(ii) Decisively, the breadth of President Trump’s authority to call forth “the unorganized militia” “to execute the Laws of the Union” pursuant to statutes enacted for that purpose has long been settled in his favor by the Constitution, the specific statute under consideration here (10 U.S.C. § 253), and even relevant precedent from the highest judicial authority.

First, the Constitution establishes three coördinate, co-equal branches in the General Government—the Legislative Branch (Congress), in Article I; the Executive Branch (the President), in Article II; and the Judicial Branch (the Supreme Court and other inferior courts which Congress may ordain and establish), in Article III, Section 1. Even the Supreme Court concedes that, by definition, a “coördinate” branch of government is “one [which] has no power to enforce its decisions upon the other [coördinate branch]”. Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260, 268 (1877).

Second, Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 of the Constitution requires the President-elect to “take the * * * Oath or Affirmation” that he “‘do[es] solemnly swear (or affirm) that [he] will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’‘ Plainly, this commitment requires him to “‘execute [his] Office to the best of [his own] Ability’”, not in intellectually slavish obedience to the opinion of some judge, whose “Ability” may be far inferior to his own. Moreover, together with Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, his “Oath or Affirmation” requires the President to “‘preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States”, and to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, against everyone, including rogue members of the Judiciary who misapply their “Abilit[ies]” in patent derogation of the Constitution and other “Laws”.

Third, Article II, Section 3 imposes upon the President the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. Judicial opinions, however, are not “Laws”—because in Article I, Section 1 the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers * * * granted [in the Constitution] shall be vested in a Congress of the United States”, not to any degree in the Judiciary. The “Laws” are what they themselves say they are; whereas judicial opinions are just that—the mere opinions of fallible judges about the “Laws”, which may be correct or incorrect. And, contrary to the illogical notions that “the judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the * * * Constitution”, and that therefore an “interpretation of the [Constitution] enunciated by th[e Supreme] Court * * * is the supreme law of the land”, an incorrect “exposition of the * * * Constitution” is doubtlessly entitled to no greater legal standing than any other falsehood. Pace Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).

Fourth, Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution empowers Congress (not the Judiciary) “to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union”. And through 10 U.S.C. § 253 Congress has delegated to the President (not the Judiciary) the power to “us[e] the militia” to “take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, * * * domestic violence”. That statute further authorizes the President (not the Judiciary) to determine whether “domestic violence”

(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or

(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

And, as the statute evidences, in the exercise of its power under Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Congress has determined that, “[i]n any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered [by everyone, including the Judiciary,] to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.” See the origin of 10 U.S.C. § 253 in An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes, Act of 20 April 1871, chap. XXII, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14. This obviates the otherwise relevant requirement set out in Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution that “[t]he United States * * * shall protect each of the[ States] * * * on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.”

Fifth, were the Constitution and 10 U.S.C. § 253 by themselves not enough to drive the point home, the Supreme Court has in principle already opined (correctly in this instance) that the President’s determinations under that statute must be accepted as conclusive by everyone else, including the Judiciary.

Pursuant to its constitutional power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia * * * to repel Invasions”, in 1795 Congress enacted legislation which provided in pertinent part

[t]hat whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth such number of the militia of the state, or states, most convenient the place of danger, or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to issue his orders for that purpose, to such officer or officers of the militia, as he shall think proper.

An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; and to repeal the act in force for those purposes, Act of 28 February 1795, Chap. XXXVI, § 1, 1 Stat. 424, 424.

Referring to the power so delegated by Congress to the President, the Supreme Court described it as

not a power which can be executed without a corresponding responsibility. It is, in its terms, a limited power, confined to cases of actual invasion, or of imminent danger of invasion. If it be a limited power, * * * by whom is the exigency to be judged of and decided? Is the president the sole and exclusive judge whether the exigency has arisen, or is it to be considered as an open question * * * ? We are all of opinion, that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the president, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons.

If we look at the language of the act of 1795, * * * [t]he power itself is confided to the executive of the Union, to him who is, by the constitution, “the commander in chief of the militia, when called into the actual service of the United States,” whose duty it is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and whose responsibility for an honest discharge of his official obligations is secured by the highest sanctions. He is necessarily constituted the judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance, and is bound to act according to his belief of the facts. If he does so act, and decides to call forth the militia, his orders for this purpose are in strict conformity with the provisions of the law; and it would seem to follow as a necessary consequence, that every act done by a subordinate officer, in obedience to such orders, is equally justifiable. The law contemplates that, under such circumstances, orders shall be given to carry the power into effect; and it cannot, therefore, be a correct inference, that any other person has a just right to disobey them. The law does not provide for any appeal from the judgment of the president, or for any right in subordinate officers to review his decision, and in effect defeat it. Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him, upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.

Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheaton) 19, 29-32 (1827) (Story, J., for the Court).

This legal analysis applies directly, and with decisive effect, to 10 U.S.C. § 253—

  • Congress enacted the Act of 1795 pursuant to its power in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 “[to] provide for calling forth the Militia to * * * repel Invasions”. That very same Clause also authorizes Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union”. The principles Martin v. Mott invoked are equally applicable to both of those purposes for which the Militia may be called forth.
  • The Act of 1795 empowered the President “to call forth such number of the militia * * * as he may judge necessary”, and “to issue his orders for that purpose, to such officer or officers of the militia, as he shall think proper”. In like wise, 10 U.S.C. § 253 delegates to the President the broad authority “by using the militia * * * [to] take such measures as he considers necessary”. Thus, the latter statute is entitled to the same construction Martin v. Mott applied to the former one—namely, that “the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the president, and * * * his decision is conclusive upon all other persons”; and “that, under such circumstances, orders shall be given to carry the power into effect”, and no “other person has a just right to disobey them.” Indeed, as applied to 10 U.S.C. § 253, the principles of Martin v. Mott should extend far beyond the facts of that case. For there the President’s power could be directed only at actual members of the Militia; whereas, under 10 U.S.C. § 253, “such measures as [the President] considers necessary” are not confined to members of the Militia alone, but instead may reach essentially anyone and everyone whose behavior is in any way implicated, for good or for bad, in the “domestic violence” those “measures” are designed “to suppress”.
  • Martin v. Mott held that the Act of 1795 “d[id] not provide for any appeal from the judgment of the president, or for any right in subordinate officers to review his decision, and in effect defeat it”—whether through their own unaided efforts or by importuning the Judiciary to interject itself into the matter on their behalf (which the Supreme Court refused to do in that case). Neither does 10 U.S.C. § 253 “provide for any [such] appeal” or “right * * * to review” for a member of “the unorganized militia”. Even the modern-day Supreme Court has recognized that the Judiciary may not interfere with the President’s enforcement of discipline within the Militia. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1973). And other persons affected by the President’s “measures” are no better off. For whereas under the Act of 1795 the President’s power extended only to actual members of the Militia, under 10 U.S.C. § 253 “such measures as [the President] considers necessary” are not confined to members of the Militia alone, but instead may reach essentially anyone and everyone whose behavior is in any way involved in the perpetration or suppression of “domestic violence”.
  • In reference to the Act of 1795, Martin v. Mott observed that “[w]henever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him, upon his own opinion of certain facts, * * * the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.” No less than that Act, 10 U.S.C. § 253 delegates an equally “discretionary power” to the President to “take such measures as he considers necessary”. That being so, the President’s exercise of that power cannot be second-guessed by the Judiciary for any reason whatsoever. For “[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (Marshall, C.J., for the Court). To be sure, because in the situation under consideration here the statutory purpose and permission for “such measures” do not extend beyond “suppress[ing] * * * domestic violence” in a constitutional manner, some judicially enforceable limits to the President’s actions might conceivably exist. For example, his “measures” may not contravene any applicable provisions of the Bill of Rights. Otherwise, though, the scope, substance, and application of those “measures” are “political questions” left to his judgment alone.
  • Finally, no matter how deeply “the Deep State’s” friends on the Bench despise President Trump and how desperately they desire to thwart him at every turn, unless and until the Supreme Court overrules Martin v. Mott the lower courts are required to adhere to its reasoning “no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be”. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982). And should any one of those judges refuse to do so, and should attempt to curtail the President’s use of 10 U.S.C. § 253 by means of a purported “injunction” or other specious order, the President should simply refuse to comply.

CONCLUSION

The present author is not an attorney working for the Department of Justice. He is not a $1,000-per-hour lawyer of the genre with which President Trump is undoubtedly familiar from his former private life. He does not speak or write on behalf of any “gun-rights” group currently trying to solve the problem of school shootings without violating the Second Amendment or other provisions of the Constitution. Rather, he is simply a semi-retired attorney living in the placid obscurity of the “Canoe Capital of Virginia”. But if he can parse the legal literature and propose a viable solution to that problem in the instant paper, why is the matter so difficult for the bright lights of the Bar now roaming the White House to understand?

President Trump cannot shelter behind his legal advisors’ inattentiveness, insouciance, inactivity, or incompetence in this regard. For, even if no one in his entourage assists him, he remains personally obligated to figure out what to do. After all, how can he honestly claim to be “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” with respect to the present-day crisis of school shootings if he neglects, fails, or refuses to investigate what the relevant “Laws” actually are and how they ought best to be applied?

This paper provides its author’s idea of a satisfactory answer to the question “What is to be done about school shootings?” The further query necessarily left unanswered, though, is “What will the President do?” Unfortunately, some of the approaches President Trump has suggested so far will surely prove counterproductive. For they fly in the face of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; the Second Amendment; Article I, § 8, Clauses 15 and 16; Article II, Section 2, Clause 1; and Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution. See, e.g., [Link-1] and [Link-2]. And they certainly take no advantage of his statutory authority under 10 U.S.C. § 253. Of course, perhaps Mr. Trump has just been incautiously “shooting from the hip” about school shootings and “gun control”, and on reflection will align his thinking with the Constitution and common sense—rather than with the last “pro-gun” (or “anti-gun”) lobbyists who happen to get his attention. See, e.g., [Link].

If, however, President Trump’s future actions demonstrate that he cannot make up his mind on these subjects in a fully constitutional fashion, then America will have very serious cause to lament “basta d’un pazzo per casa”.

© 2018 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




The Disservice Of Mandatory “National Service”

Normally, I refrain from commenting on articles by other contributors to NewsWithViews. But Frosty Wooldridge’s recent column—“Call for Mandatory National Service for All American Youth”—provides a valuable “teaching moment” which cannot be allowed to slip away. (To be fair to Mr. Wooldridge, many others—on both the “right” and the “left” of this country’s political spectrum—also are calling for some sort of “mandatory national service”. But, being published at NewsWithViews, his article provides the most accessible example.)

In his column, Mr. Wooldridge proposes the following:

In order to give America’s youth a head start on their lives and help them to figure out what line of work interests them, we need to incorporate a two-year mandatory service in either the military’s five branches of Marine Corps, Navy, Army, Air Force and Coast Guard, or civilian work in Ameri-Corps. Every red-blooded American at the age of 18 must enlist in the miliary or civilian work corps. If they opt for college, they must enter the military or civilian work corp immediately after college for two years.

They could fulfill their national commitment in a combat arms if they feel like a warrior. Or, if they lack the tenacity of combat arms, it takes 10 support personnel in supply, food, hospital, mechanics, etc. to facilitate that combat troop, but could still employ the discipline of serving in the military.

In the military, they learn job skills, duty, honor, country. They learn to respect our flag and our country. They learn how to conduct themselves in a free country.

Now, I agree with everything in Mr. Wooldridge’s column which appears both before and after this quotation—but with little in it. Rather, I submit that what he calls a “national commitment” not only is unnecessary—if the Constitution were properly enforced—but also would prove to be a dangerous departure from the principles and practices of “a free country” which every patriotic American (Mr. Wooldridge included) wants to uphold.

Basically, Mr. Wooldridge advocates a compulsory “draft” of all of America’s youth into one or another branch of what this country’s Founders would have denoted “the standing army”: namely, the Marine Corps, Navy, Army, and Air Force. (He includes the Coast Guard in his list, which in light of the Coast Guard’s origins and its present location in the Department of Homeland Security is technically incorrect, but which for purposes of argument can be accepted. Peculiarly, though, he does not include the National Guard, which plainly is more closely aligned with the Army and Air Force than is the Coast Guard with the Navy.)

In any event, I could point out simply that the Second Amendment does not maintain that “a standing army supported by an universal draft” is “necessary to the security of a free State”, but instead declares that “[a] well regulated Militia” composed of “the people” exercising their “right * * * to keep and bear Arms” is “necessary” to that end.. Inasmuch as the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are not “militia” in any way, shape, or form—but in fact and law are the very antitheses of (or at least unrelated to) “well regulated Militia”—the Second Amendment alone should tell anyone all he needs to know about  the disconnection between a compulsory “draft” for the regular Armed Forces and “a free country”.

Apparently, however, the Second Amendment—along with Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16, and Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the original Constitution—are not in and of themselves convincing enough, for either Mr. Wooldridge or other Americans now touting an universal “draft” for the regular Armed Forces or some civilian establishment such as Ameri-Corps. So an exposition more detailed than the Constitution provides on its face is needed.

I. A compulsory “national commitment” by this country’s youth in favor of the Armed Forces would in due course make almost every adult a member of one or another branch of “the standing army”—and not only pro tempore for just two years or so (as Mr. Wooldridge supposes). For it should be obvious that the necessary statute, drafted by the type of politicians now in office who dance to the discordant tune of the military-industrial complex, would commit “draftees” to possible (indeed, almost certain) future involuntary service in “the standing army” as at least “ready reserves” after that initial period. This would pour a self-reinforcing concrete foundation for the ultimate total “garrison state”. After a while, as more and more Americans were subjected to this open-ended commitment, the adult population and “the standing army” would become coextensive, the one with the other. To describe this as a classical—and wholly undesirable—“Prussian” outcome would hardly be an exaggeration.

Mr. Wooldridge and others who share his opinion apparently do not discern the danger in such an eventuality. “In the military,” he writes rather hopefully, “draftees” will “learn to respect our flag and our country. They [will] learn how to conduct themselves in a free country.” There are, of course, many ways other than involuntary induction into a “standing army” for Americans to “learn to respect our flag and our country”. Even the public schools could be made to instill such attitudes in their students, if organizations such as the National Education Association were stripped of the abusive powers they exercise under State compulsory public-sector collective bargaining statues. That would be a much simpler and more effective solution than imposing an universal “draft” on young Americans whose minds have already been warped out of shape by the cultural Marxism which infects what passes for secondary and higher “education” in this country.

Moreover, within their own limited spheres of authority, the Armed Forces are—and, in light of their purposes, have to be—the very antitheses of “a free country”. Their structures are based on hierarchical ranks and their operations on strict obedience by inferiors to orders from superiors. In “a free country”, however, “the chain of command” runs “from the bottom up” as much as possible; whereas, in the Armed Forces it runs “from the top down”, exclusively and inexorably.

Compulsory service in the Armed Forces will naturally tend (or at least be used) to inculcate in ignorant and impressionable youth a loyalty to (or at the minimum a disposition to sympathize with) the structures, operations, values, and traditions that make just about every “standing army” what it is. Some of these may be worthy of emulation in civil society. But others are at best necessary evils, which should be strictly confined to the barracks, the parade-ground, or the field of battle.

Most dangerous of all is the invariable practice of a “standing army” relentlessly to drill into its inductees a mind-set which tolerates, accepts, even advocates—and in any event obeys—“martial law”. My book By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” goes into great detail on the utter incompatibility between “martial law” and the “Republican Form of Government” which Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution requires the United States to “guarantee to every State in th[e] Union”. This country already suffers from too many ill-educated, ill-advised, or ill-disposed people touting “martial law” and kindred para-miliary police-state arrangements centered in the Departments of Defense and of Homeland Security to want to consign tens of millions of dumbed-down, emotionally immature, and easily manipulable youth to “boot camps” in which they will be indoctrinated in anti-Republican principles, and thus become inured to the imposition of anti-Republican practices on both themselves and their fellow citizens.

II. A “national commitment” to involuntary participation in Ameri-Corps or some equivalent institution would be even more undesirable than an universal “draft” into the regular Armed Forces. For whereas such a “draft” would be tied directly to the limited and generally acceptable purpose of “national defense”, compulsory participation in some ostensibly civilian establishment could be twisted to serve any scheme contemporary politicians might disingenuously promote in aid of their fantastical misconceptions of “the general welfare”. One need not be a priest of the Oracle of Delphi to predict that, in the present political climate, these schemes could—indeed, most likely would—aim at carving ever-expanding fissures into society with the jackhammers of cultural Marxism. At every level, from this country’s elementary and secondary public schools through its colleges and universities, America’s “educational” establishment is already serving that perverse purpose all too well. It would be folly to exacerbate this situation by dragooning America’s youth into two or more years’ worth of involuntary service in some civilian labor-camp, so as to perfect with work what has been so effectively begun with brainwashing.

III. The whole idea of what Mr. Wooldridge styles a “national commitment” is legally unsound. As I explain in Chapter 49 of my book The Sword and Sovereignty, an universal “draft” for “the standing army” is plainly unconstitutional. Such a “draft” for Ameri-Corp (or some equivalent institution) would be even worse. For in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 12 through 14, the Constitution does provide for “Armies” and “a Navy”. But nowhere does it authorize a national scheme of compulsory civilian labor in some “democratic” gulag or laogai. Quite the contrary: The Thirteenth Amendment declares that “no[ ] involuntary servitude, except as a  punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

IV. Moreover, at least on paper, in “the Militia of the several States” the Constitution already provides for compulsory service far less dangerous, far more comprehensive, and far more promotive of true American values than what the advocates of some new “national commitment” propose.

“The Militia of the several States” are obviously less dangerous than a “standing army”,  because they are no part of a “standing army”, but instead the constitutional counterweights to it or any other mechanism of oppression aspiring usurpers and tyrants might attempt to employ. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 46 (James Madison).

“The Militia of the several States” are obviously more useful—as well as more lawful—than some jury-rigged “national commitment”.

First, “the Militia of the several States” are based upon the complete, permanent, and competent organization of the entire community, starting with enrollment at sixteen years of age and continuing for the full active life of every eligible citizen. See, e.g., Chapters 35 and 36 in The Sword and Sovereignty.

Second, “the Militia of the several States” are capable of serving myriad purposes—from military, para-military, police, and emergency-response functions, to the suppression of political corruption and incompetence, the supervision of honest elections, the establishment and maintenance of a sound monetary system, and on and on, the limits of their application being only one’s imagination as to what may be needed for community self-defense and other forms of preparedness which fall within the broad parameters of “the security of a free State”. See, e.g., Chapters 41 and 42 in The Sword and Sovereignty.

Third, participation in “the Militia of the several States” would begin with mandatory  pre-militia training in middle schools for students from about thirteen years of age, in order to prepare them to enter the Militia at sixteen. They would be taught not only about the Militia’s origins, organization, and operations, but also (and of greater consequence) about the “necessary” rôle of “well regulated Militia” in providing “the security of a free State”. Exposed to in-depth expositions of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and a great deal more from America’s legal and historical heritage, students would be infused with, and become enthusiastic supporters of, the principles and practices of patriotism, social unity, and civic duty necessary to maintain “a Republican Form of Government” against all enemies, foreign and especially domestic. This education in Americanism would continue with ever-more-comprehensive courses in secondary schools and colleges, as part of the students’ on-going Militia duty. How such training would innoculate American youth against the socially destructive virus of cultural Marxism should be self-evident.

Fourth, preparation for and actual service in “the Militia of the several States” would take place primarily at the Local and State levels—with, of course, proper consideration being given to the authority and responsibility of the Militia to be called forth for employment in the service of the United States, as the Constitution provides in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 and 16, and Article II, Section 2, Clause 1. This would put into practice true federalism “from the bottom up” through Local communities organized in the Militia, not rigid centralization “from the top down” effected through the Armed Forces or some civilian bureaucracy lodged in the District of Columbia.

Fifth, although (as pointed out above) some species of compulsory “national commitment” in Ameri-Crops (or its equivalent) would constitute “involuntary servitude”, service in “the Militia of the several States” would not, because it rests on a civic duty recognized in American law throughout pre-constitutional times, under the Articles of Confederation, and by the Constitution and laws of the several States both before and after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. Certainly, the Thirteenth Amendment did not repeal the Second Amendment or Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16, and Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution. And because “well regulated Militia” are “necessary to the security of a free State”, service in such Militia cannot rationally be impugned as “involuntary servitude”, even though such service is compulsory. Otherwise, the no less compulsory service in the petit juries for which the Constitution provides in Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment would also fall afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment, which is a preposterous contention. The apparent reasons some deluded souls today condemn the Militia, but not petit juries, as examples of “involuntary servitude” are that these people: (i) are familiar with juries, but unfamiliar with the Militia, and (ii) fail to take into account that, although the Constitution nowhere even intimates that juries are “necessary to the security of a free State”, it does so declare with respect to the Militia.

V. That “the Militia of the several States” do not exist in their constitutionally proper form, and therefore do not exercise their constitutional mandated authority and responsibility, is the lacuna in contemporary social organization which lends a veneer of plausibility to calls for an universal “draft” in favor of the Armed Forces or a civilian establishment such as Ameri-Corps.

In the so-called Dick Act of 1903, expanded upon by the National Defense Act of 1916, Congress created out of whole cloth the modern dichotomy between what it termed “the organized militia” (“the National Guard” and “the Naval Militia”) and “the unorganized militia” (everyone else). See 10 U.S.C. § 246. The National Guard and the Naval Militia, however, are not “militia”. Rather, they are the “Troops, or Ships of War” which the Constitution permits the States to “keep * * * in time of Peace” “with[ ] the Consent of Congress”, perforce of Article I, Section 10, Clause 3. See Chapter 30 in The Sword and Sovereignty. So, in principle and for all practical purposes, no constitutional Militia exist within any of the several States today, because an “unorganized militia” is no “militia” at all. Indeed, in American experience the term “unorganized militia” is a self-contradiction. For during pre-constitutional times, which provide the legal-historical definitions of the constitutional terms “Militia of the several States” and “well regulated Militia”, every Colonial and State Militia was totally organized, enrolling every eligible member of the community. See, e.g., Chapters 34 through 36 in The Sword and Sovereignty.

The politicians (and their controllers behind the scenes) who foisted the duplicitous dichotomy of “organized” and “unorganized militia” on America in the early 1900s were proponents and practitioners of “the administrative state” at home and imperialism abroad. Their goal was two-fold:

First, they wanted to exclude the great mass of ordinary Americans, both politically and practically, from direct, self-conscious participation in self-governance “from the bottom up” through the Militia. Eliminating the Militia as the latter should be organized  strikes the Power of the Sword from ordinary Americans’ hands. Obviously, if “well regulated Militia” are “necessary to the security of a free State”, then “unregulated” (because “unorganized”) pseudo-militia can provide no aid to that “security”, but instead positively endanger it. With the Militia “unorganized”, effective community vigilance and resistance against usurpation and tyranny become at best problematic, at worst impossible.

In addition, Americans consigned to “the unorganized militia” cannot provide their own communities with timely and adequate self-defense, self-preparedness, and self-reliance against such recurrent dangers as natural disasters, pandemics, economic crises, massive influxes of illegal aliens, the depredations of large-scale criminal syndicates and gangs, sedition and other orchestrated social upheavals, and so on. Rather, they must fall back on assistance “from the top down” which, as this country’s woeful experiences with FEMA and other agencies of the General Government prove, is either too late or too little, or even counterproductive. For the most recent example, if the well-substantiated “tips” as to the homicidal intentions of the alleged perpetrator of the mass school-shooting in Florida had been delivered, not to the FBI, but instead to a properly organized Militia unit composed of Local citizens concerned for the safety of their own and their neighbors’ children, appropriate action would undoubtedly have been taken in time to forefend the crime.

Second, the authors of the fictional “organized militia” wanted to create a large reserve component for the regular Armed Forces which could be deployed overseas. It did not matter to them that in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 the Constitution delegates to Congress the power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia” for three purposes only—none of which allows for deployment of the Militia to fight in foreign wars; or, since World War II, in foreign military adventures which even Congress has realized could not be deemed “War[s]” in the constitutional sense, but had to be rationalized under such non- and even anti-constitutional rubrics as “police action”, “peacekeeping”, “responsibility to protect”, “nation building”, and so on.

Not surprisingly, karma being what it is, immediately before and during World War II the lack of an adequately prepared “home front” became a critical issue. So volunteer civil defense was pulled from the dustbin of history and hastily promoted, initially under the auspices of such great minds as Fiorello La Guardia and Eleanor Roosevelt. These and other bright bulbs of the Franklin Roosevelt era never thought, however, to shine any of their peculiar illumination on the obvious question of why nationwide civilian self-defense and preparedness organizations which could have assumed responsibility for securing “the home front” were not already in existence in the late 1930s, but had to be created from scratch in the confusion, and even outright hysteria, attendant upon the United States’ entry into the war.

Although they recognized that civilian self-defense and preparedness were of vital importance, none of these luminaries bothered to ask where in the Constitution one should look for the solution to the problem. Instead, everyone irresponsibly assumed that the Constitution provided no specific directives, but instead left it up to such dilletantes as La Guardia and Mrs. Roosevelt to figure out what to do (a task which, unfortunately if predictably, they proved largely incapable of performing). Neither, apparently, has anyone else who has subsequently investigated the matter adequately grappled with this strange state of affairs. For example, although Matthew Dallek, in Defenseless Under the Night: The Roosevelt Years and the Origins of Homeland Security (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), provides excruciating detailed information about this historical episode, his otherwise useful book’s index contains no entry whatsoever for “militia”.

After World War II, the Selective Service System prepared a multi-volume set to support its call for a permanent peacetime “draft” for the Armed Forces. Backgrounds of Selective Service, Military Obligation: The American Tradition, A Compilation of the Enactments of Compulsion From the Earliest Settlements of the Original Thirteen Colonies in 1607 Through the Articles of Confederation in 1789 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947). Intent upon proving that compulsory military service had a long pre-constitutional tradition, the Selective Service reprinted a large number of statutes from the Colonies and independent States which mandated such service. Its rather glaring error, though, was that these statutes dealt with the Militia, not with the regular armed forces of Britain or her American Colonies prior to 1776, not with the “Troops, or Ships of War” of the States thereafter—and certainly not with the powers of Congress, which did not even exist until the Constitution was ratified. If the Selective Service documented anything, it was that: (i) a comprehensive “draft” for America’s Armed Forces had no historical justification; and (ii) the relevant Congressional and State statutes dealing with the Militia in 1947 were plainly unconstitutional, a state of affairs which has not improved by one iota since then.

VI. So today, as the wag said, it is “déjà vue all over again”. This country is no less unprepared with respect to true “homeland security” now than it was immediately prior to World War II. America continues to groan under the misrule of a bloated “administrative state”, to which have been added the even more pernicious machinations of “the Deep State” and “the Shadow Government” behind the scenes. The contemporary political class and its controllers are just as desirous of keeping the people out of direct participation in self-government as were their predecessors in 1903. To that end, ordinary Americans—“the Deplorables”—remain consigned to “the unorganized militia”. The social degeneration which Mr. Wooldridge describes so well in his article is accelerating. And once again pundits on both “the right” and “the left” of the political divide propose the obviously wrong solution: namely, an universal “draft” for the benefit of the regular Armed Forces or (worse yet) some civilian agency with no constitutional provenance whatsoever.

“Drafting” Americans willy-nilly into the Armed Forces would not alleviate Local and State unpreparedness, but instead would simply contribute to increased centralization of power in the military-industrial complex. Does America need to be reminded of President Eisenhower’s warning on that score?  “Draftees” would serve with strangers wherever the Armed Forces assigned them, not in Local units made up of Local citizens from their own communities. Would this promote the social solidarity at the Local level where these people actually live and work which would be desperately needed in a real crisis? Undoubtedly, “draftees” would receive training that would fit them for deployment in foreign military adventures. In general, though, would such training be useful for dealing with the day-to-day exigencies Local communities face? And, specifically, is it plausible to expect that someone trained (say) as a machine gunner in the Marine Corps would (in Mr. Wooldridge’s words) “figure out what line of work [in civilian life] interests [him]” through such an experience? Finally, and perhaps of greatest importance in the long run, Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 identifies as the first constitutional responsibility of “the Militia of the several States” “to execute the Laws of the Union”. Would “draftees” be likely to learn anything about this in the Armed Forces? Or would they be indoctrinated in the supposed benefits of “martial law”?

To predict the usefulness of Ameri-Corps (or some similar establishment), one need recall only how well FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security, and other top-heavy civilian agencies have performed in responding to Local and State emergencies even with the fully panoply of the General Government’s resources behind them, let alone in preparing ordinary Americans to deal with such emergencies on their own. Why should yet another bureaucracy, operating from just as far away and on the same faulty principle of control “from the top down”, be expected to do any better?

Had “the Militia of the several States” been in proper constitutional form and operation from 1903 until today, these questions would be moot.

© 2018 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




Supreme Court, The 2nd Amendment And The NRA

As the readers of my columns on News With Views are aware, for more than the past decade I have attempted to awaken Americans who consider themselves “constitutionalists”, “patriots”, “friends of the Second Amendment”, and like-minded people to the importance of revitalizing “the Militia of the several States”. But my efforts have met with scant success. Whether the fault lies with the author of these missives or the audience to which they were directed may be debatable. The facts remain that, not only have vanishingly few Americans evinced any interest in this matter, but also all too many who have taken note of my work have reacted to it in a singularly negative, if not overtly hostile, fashion.

The latest manifestation of this dog-in-the-manger attitude is the refusal of the Petitioners in the pending case Kolbe v. Hogan, No. 17-127 (U.S. Supreme Court) to consent to my filing of a brief amici curiae on their behalf. The decision which is the subject of this petition—Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017)—is, in my estimation, the most egregious affront to the Second Amendment which has ever been handed down by any court in the United States. So my attempt to intervene in this case is not simply a quixotic, let alone an uninformed, effort on my part.

For those who are unfamiliar with procedure in the Supreme Court, a potential amicus curiae (“friend of the Court”) first seeks permission from the parties to file a brief, usually on behalf of one of the parties. If either party refuses consent, the amicus may file a motion for leave to file, requesting the Supreme Court to accept his brief notwithstanding that refusal.

Now, usually, parties who desire the Supreme Court to review their case through a petition for a writ or certiorari want to marshal as many amici briefs on their behalf as possible, in order to convince the Court that their petition not only has theoretical merit but also raises issues of general rather than merely passing concern. Indeed, in yesteryear, the all-too-close coördination of various amici with the parties they supported became something of an abusive “cottage industry”, which resulted in the Supreme Court’s issuance of its Rule 37.6, under which an amicus must certify that no counsel for any party has authored the amicus brief in whole or in part, and that no such counsel or any party has made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of such a brief. So, today, an amicus must be completely independent of the party whose position it supports, except to the extent under Rule 37.1 that the amicus brief brings to the Court’s attention matters which not only support that party but also apprise the Court of matters that the favored party will not emphasize in its petition but which nonetheless will be useful for the Court to consider.

In my brief amici curiae, as something of an expert on the Second Amendment I seek to inform the Court of critical matters related to the first thirteen words of the Amendment—to wit, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”—that (as my brief explained)

will “not * * * [be] brought to [the Court’s] attention by the parties”, but nevertheless “may be of considerable help to the Court.” Because these matters have  “not [been] specifically noticed in the objections taken in the records or briefs of counsel” for the parties in a satisfactory manner to date, and are unlikely to be raised hereafter, th[e Supreme] Court should take them under consideration by way of the Amici’s brief, “that the Constitution may not be violated from the carelessness or oversight of counsel in any particular.” See Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 604 (1895) (separate opinion of Field, J.).

Of course, one would expect that the Respondents (here, Hogan et alia) would balk at having such information brought to the Court’s attention—but that, on the other hand, the Petitioners (here, Kolbe et alia) would be grateful for whatever assistance they could obtain from an amici brief prepared by someone who knows his business. After all, at the petition stage, the strategy must be for the Petitioners to amass whatever support is available that could convince the Court to hear the case on the merits.

If the reader goes to the SCOTUSBLOG on the Internet, and searches for Kolbe v. Hogan in the compilation under “Petitions”, he will find, not only Kolbe’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, but also the amici briefs filed on the Petitioners’ behalf. These include briefs from such amici as the NRA and the Cato Institute. Of these briefs, mine is the only one as to which the Petitioners have denied their consent to file.

When the reader peruses these briefs, he will see that mine is the only one which focuses on the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment. The rest rely on what I should describe as the erroneous “law-school solution” to the problem raised in Kolbe—focusing on such really irrelevant matters as whether so-called “assault rifles” are in “common use” by average Americans for individual self-defense in the home, and such ultimately self-defeating arguments as whether “the right of the people to keep and bear [such] Arms” is subject to one or another anti-constitutional judicial “balancing test” (so-called “strict scrutiny” or “intermediate scrutiny”) under the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). None of these briefs, other than my own, points out that the actually controlling precedent is United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); and that, applied in tandem, both Miller and Heller demand reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision in a manner which absolutely guarantees—indeed, if the Second Amendment is properly construed, requires—average Americans’ possession of “assault rifles”.

Under these circumstances, one would expect that my amici brief would at least be welcomed sotto voce by the Petitioners, because they have nothing to lose, and everything to gain, from having the Supreme Court made aware of the arguments which that brief, and no one else, presents. But no—the Petitioners do not want my amici curiae brief even to be considered by the Court. Having kicked around in Supreme Court practice over the years—and not without some notable successes—I find Petitioners’ reluctance to further their own interests rather perplexing. This is a conclusion in which I expect those of my readers who study the various amici briefs to concur.

So the question I raise for my readers’ consideration is: “What is going on here?” Why do the Petitioners (and, for that matter, the other amici ostensibly on their side) treat the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment, not simply as irrelevant to their case, but also as so dangerous to mention that they refuse both to address them in their own briefs and to consent for my amici brief to bring them to the Supreme Court’s attention?

Do these people really believe that the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment are actually irrelevant to the last fourteen words, even though they all are included in the very same sentence? If this the way English grammar works? Is this the way constitutional interpretation works (or ought to work)?

At this point, the matter is in the hands of the Supreme Court. But, in the long run, the problem goes beyond what happens to my amici curiae brief or even to the petition for a writ of certiorari in Kolbe itself. Kolbe, after all, will not represent the final battle over radical “gun control” in this country. The struggle to secure “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” will continue, unabated, until all of the twenty seven words of the Second Amendment are either upheld in their entirety or so disregarded, discounted, or diluted by ridiculous decisions of the Judiciary that the Amendment is reduced to the palest shadow of what the Founders intended it to be.

To be sure, readers of this commentary who are not members of the Supreme Court Bar are not in a position to influence the Court. But many of them are capable of bringing this matter to the attention of leaders of the NRA—who, more than anyone else, are responsible for floating the mistaken notion that the Second Amendment’s overriding concern is to enable average Americans to possess “Arms” for the purpose of individual self-defense. Not simply the words of the Amendment, but especially the pre-constitutional history which informs them, teach that community self-defense is that concern. See my book The Sword and Sovereignty: The Constitutional Principles of “the Militia of the Several States” (CD-Rom Edition, 2012).

So I urge my readers—in particular, those who are members of the NRA—to contact that organization and encourage its leadership to reevaluate its position. At no time in this country’s history could such reconsideration be more vital.

© 2017 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved

E-Mail Edwin Vieira: edwinvieira@gmail.com




Legal Audacity Is The Answer To Political Aggression

Since his inauguration, President Trump has assumed an all-too-reactive and -defensive posture vis-à-vis his political enemies. He seems quite unable to foresee, let alone to forestall, forfend, or even fashion an adequate response to his opponents’ next moves, no matter how pellucidly predictable they may be. Rather, he suffers his antagonists to strike at will, whenever and wherever an opportunity to make mischief presents itself. For example—

  • They float knowingly false “leaks”, defamatory stories, and innuendoes in the big “mainstream media”, not simply to ridicule and embarrass him personally (along with members of his Administration and even his immediate family), but also (and of greater consequence) to undermine his prestige and standing as President amongst the American people.
  • They file frivolous lawsuits aimed at providing rogue judges with legalistic rationalizations to deny, defeat, frustrate, and impede the exercise of his undoubted statutory (and as the agent of Congress, constitutional) Presidential powers, while he meekly acquiesces in the courts’ assertion of “judicial supremacy”.
  • They impugn both him and his Administration with spurious scandals, tying up the Office of President in interminable “investigations”, in comparison with which the Salem witch-trials appear as models of rational deportment and due process.
  • They charge him personally, as well as leading members of his Administration, with specious violations of plainly inapplicable criminal laws.
  • They agitate for his removal from the Office of President through “Impeachment for, and Conviction of, * * * high Crimes and Misdemeanors”under Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, or on the grounds that he is otherwise “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office” under Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.
  • In various public fora they openly threaten him with assassination, and contend that his homicidal elimination—and that of other officeholders who take his part—would be justified. And
  • They unleash fanatical “anti-fascists” and other maniacal thugs from the neo-Bolshevist Rotenfrontkämpferbund verbally to harass and even physically to assault his supporters in the streets and on college campuses.

All of this is obviously intended to instill in Mr. Trump confusion, uncertainty, indecision, self-doubt, and pessimism sufficient to dissuade and disable him from effectively exercising the authority of the Office of President with which the Constitution and other laws of the United States invest him.

These goings-on have been so concatenated, coördinated, and concerted in character as to indicate the operation of a common plan. And this plan is plain enough. Mr. Trump’s enemies are not engaged simply in an extreme version of “monkey business as usual” in the District of Columbia’s political zoo. Neither are they primarily concerned with figuratively handing Mr. Trump his Presidential head on a platter, as a warning to other potential interlopers who might presume to trespass on the territory the “good old boy” hierarchs of the Democratic and Republican parties have long reserved unto themselves. Nor is their chief purpose to destroy Mr. Trump as an individual (although they apparently do detest him). Rather, their target is the Office of President itself insofar as anyone elected to that position might dare to exercise its powers in the interest of the Deplorables and other patriotic Americans. By intimidating Mr. Trump into reneging upon the plans for reform which he has promised Americans, and into becoming its compliant puppet or political eunuch (if he cannot be eliminated in some other way), the Deep State is perfecting “the small solution” for serial “régime change” in this country—the specific operation of “Presidential emasculation”, as opposed to a seditious overthrow of the General Government as a whole—which can be applied to each and every future President who sides with the Deplorables against the Deep State. The point is to demonstrate to the Deplorables that, even if somehow against all odds they can succeed in putting their own man into the Office of President, they still cannot prevail. Ever.

In response to this political aggression, to date Mr. Trump seems strangely satisfied with publishing “tweets”, as if he were merely the victim of some college fraternity’s juvenile hazing, to which he imagined that what he considered to be snappy verbal comebacks in the most juvenile of the Internet’s juvenile fora could provide sufficient answers. Although this may be a method for him to “go over the head” of “the mainstream media” by addressing the American people directly, it will hardly prove to be effective, even if Mr. Trump pillories the Deep State in no uncertain terms, because mere harsh phrases bounce off the Deep State’s case-hardened carapace as readily as cold water flows off a duck’s oily back. No, indeed—if he intends to break the Deep State’s bones before it breaks his own neck, Mr. Trump must employ sticks and stones, not just words. So, as always, the question becomes, “Now what?”

A set of acts so concatenated, coördinated, and concerted in character as to indicate the operation of a common plan aimed at an illegal goal through the use of illegal (and, in some cases, even legal) means is properly termed a conspiracy, and the perpetrators are properly denoted conspirators. This is not “conspiracy theory”, but conspiracy law (or the law of conspiracy). The political aggression against President Trump has been so notorious that the various “law-enforcement” and “intelligence” agencies of the General Government—with their vaunted methods of surveillance, infiltration, computerized analysis of data, and so on—should be able to identify not only the illegal means being employed but also the primary malefactors employing them, including both the miscreants brazenly operating in the open and (of far greater consequence) the instigators, financiers, and other string-pullers manipulating events from behind the scenes. (If not, Mr. Trump can invoke for that purpose the sweeping powers statutorily delegated to him under 10 U.S.C. §§ 252 and 253.) Moreover, one need not hire a $1,000-an-hour big-city attorney to find at least one statute which applies in this situation.

Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 241 provides in pertinent part that

[i]f two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States * * *

[t]hey shall be fined * * * or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section * * * , they shall be fined * * * or imprisoned * * * for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

Observe that this statute protects “any person * * * in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States” in any respect. Moreover, for it to come into play, no actual deprivation of “any [such] right or privilege secured” need have occurred. A conspiracy aimed at any such deprivation, together with the commission of some overt act in furtherance thereof, suffices. As well it should: “For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause to be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense of the gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices. And it is characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its discovery, and adding to the importance of punishing it when discovered.” United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).

As to deprivations of certain rights or privileges, private parties can be charged even without the involvement of rogue public officials in their wrongdoing, See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-760 (opinion of the Court), 775-784 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (1966). But private individuals are certainly liable as to deprivations of any and all such rights or privileges when they collude with such officials. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, 795, 798 (1966). And in this case rightly so: For various puppet masters and their mouthpieces in private station are doubtlessly as much instigators, initiators, promoters, and planners of, and otherwise accessories to, the attacks against President Trump as are their co-conspirators among rogue officials and employees in the Deep State’s governmental apparatus. So, inasmuch as rogue public officials “participate[ ] in every phase of the * * * venture”, and “[i]t [i]s a joint activity, from start to finish”, “[t]hose [private parties] who t[ake] advantage of the foul purpose must suffer the consequences of that participation”, even to the extent of being punished as principals. Compare id. at 795 with 18 U.S.C. § 2.

Now apply 18 U.S.C. § 241 specifically to the President:

If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate [Mr. Trump] in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States [specifically in his capacity as the President of the United States] * * *

[t]hey shall be fined * * * or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section * * * , they shall be fined * * * or imprisoned * * * for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

(Inclusion of the part of this statute referring to the death penalty is not an exercise in hyperbole, either. For example, was Mr. Seth Rich’s murder one of the “results from the acts committed in violation of this section”? Only a thoroughgoing and uncompromising criminal investigation—not a Vince Fosteresque whitewashing of the case—can determine what the facts, and who the culprits, really are.)

As President, Mr. Trump is entitled to numerous “right[s] or privilege[s] secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States” in relation to that office. And “two or more persons” are now engaged in a complex of acts incontestably intended “to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate [him] in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in [his] free exercise or enjoyment of [those very] right[s] or privilege[s]”. Indeed, those “persons” are bending their every evil effort in every “State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District”, not only to nullify or frustrate Mr. Trump’s exercise of “the executive Power” vested in him by the Constitution, but even to deprive him altogether of the right to “hold his Office during the Term of four Years” to which he has been elected pursuant to the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Therefore, Mr. Trump could enforce 18 U.S.C. § 241 against those individuals right now—and, besides having a personal interest in the matter, is bound in legal duty to do so. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 and, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4.

One must wonder, then, why Mr. Trump has refrained from invoking that statute. If the present author—a simple resident of “the Canoe Capital of Virginia”—can figure it out, why have Mr. Trump’s high-profile lawyers not so advised him? Or, if they have, for what is he waiting? Why does he foolishly persist in fighting this battle on his enemies’ terms, on the ground they have chosen, with the worst of them sheltered from legal retaliation in some sort of political sanctuary, when the indictment of a few—or, better yet, a few dozen—of the conspirators would transform the situation radically in his, and the Deplorables’, favor?

The answer is not to be found in some quirk of legal procedure. No “independent counsel” need be installed to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 241. The Department of Justice already employs numerous ordinary prosecutors presumably fit for that purpose. And if none can be found there after all, Mr. Trump can invoke 10 U.S.C. §§ 252 and 253 in order to enlist the experienced and reliable people he needs.

So what is wanting? Apparently, only l’audace, encore l’audace, toujours l’audace.

© 2017 Edwin Vieira – All Rights Reserved




What Trump’s Nominee Should Have Said

During the hearings on the confirmation of President Trump’s nominee to the Supreme Court, Circuit Judge Neil Gorsuch, Senator Dianne Feinstein asked two questions of great interest to me, because they dealt with the Second Amendment in its relation to so-called “assault rifles” (that is, rifles available for use by civilians which are similar in most of their features to the rifles carried by the regular Armed Forces, except for being only semi-automatic, rather than fully automatic, in their mechanisms of fire). Unfortunately, these questions and their answers proved once again that hearings of this kind tend to be pointless charades, because the nominees inevitably craft their answers in such artful fashion as to say as little as possible that would pin down their true positions on the matters under investigation. I should think that such a lack of candor towards the very institution—the Senate of the United States—in which the Constitution vests the authority to give “Advice and Consent” with respect to nominations of “Judges of the supreme Court” suggests that a nominee is deficient in the sort of “good Behaviour” which a “Judge[ ] * * * of the supreme * * * Court[ ]” must demonstrate during his tenure on the Court, and therefore that such a nominee is arguably of questionable fitness for that position. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; art. III, § 1. For if a nominee conducts himself  in a manner as slippery as transmission-fluid when under oath in his testimony to the Senate—and, by extension, to the American people—one might justifiably expect him to be no less slippery in the opinions he will enunciate once safely ensconced on the Bench.

So in this commentary I shall provide some “alternative history”, in the form of the answers to these questions which should have been given by a completely candid and thoroughly knowledgeable nominee who was actually intent on enforcing the Constitution in general and the Second Amendment in particular, and who was sufficiently forthright to make that intent known, the consequences to his ambition be damned. (As to the actual colloquies between Senator Feinstein and Judge Gorsuch, I shall rely on the text reported by Kelsey Harkness, “Gorsuch Faces Questions About Supreme Court and Guns” (21 March 2017), at <dailysignal.com>.)

QUESTION AND ANSWER I, AS GIVEN.

Senator Feinstein: In D[istrict of] C[olumbia] v. Heller, [554 U.S. 570 (2008)], the majority opinion written by Justice Scalia recognized that * * * “Of course the Second Amendment was not unlimited” * * * . Justice Scalia also wrote that, “Weapons that are more useful in military service, M-16 rifles and the like, may be banned without infringing on the Second Amendment.” Do you agree with that statement that under the Second Amendment weapons that are most useful in military service * * * may be banned?

Judge Gorsuch: Heller makes clear the standard that we judges are supposed to apply. The question is whether it is a gun in common use for self-defense, and that may be subject to reasonable regulation. That’s the test as I understand it.

ANSWER I, AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN.

Judge Candorfull: I disagree, for the following reasons:

  • First, the assumption in the question that Heller actually held that “[w]eapons that are most useful in military service, M-16 rifles and the like, may be banned” without infringing on the Second Amendment is incorrect. No “[w]eapons that are most useful in military service, M-16 rifles and the like” were involved in Heller. And the use to which the firearm actually involved in Heller—a handgun—was to be put was personal protection in the home, not “military service” of any sort. So what Justice Scalia incautiously wrote concerning “M-16 rifles and the like” was mere dicta, with no legal force as any sort of “precedent” which could set any “standard” the Judiciary needs to apply.
  • Second, the Second Amendment’s stated goal is not an individual’s personal protection in the home with a handgun, but instead “the security of a free State”. The Amendment declares “[a] well regulated Militia” to be “necessary” for that purpose. And to guarantee that such a Militia always exists in every one of the several States, it commands that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Howsoever that “right” embraces “Arms” convenient for an individual’s self-defense in his home, it unquestionably protects all “Arms” useful for “the people[’s]” collective defense of “a free State” through the efforts of “well regulated Militia”. That is the Amendment’s central concern—quite explicit and perfectly understandable.

As to what particular types of “Arms” it protects, the Second Amendment must be construed “in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted”. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). Throughout the 1700s, all Americans knew that “a well regulated militia[ is] composed of the body of the people, trained to arms”. Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776) art. 13. Every “well regulated Militia” was a military or para-military establishment, in which the “arms” at issue were equivalent to (and sometimes even better than) the “arms” carried by members of the regular Armed Forces who performed similar duties. See, e.g.,The Selective Service System, Military Obligation: The American Tradition, Special Monograph No. 1 (1947). Today, the “arms” most suitable for that purpose in the hands of ordinary civilians would be at least semi-automatic “assault rifles”. Thus it follows, not only that such rifles cannot be “banned”, but in addition that they deserve a very high, if not the highest level of protection available under the Second Amendment.

  • Third, as to the question of “common use for self-defense”, it must be recalled that during the pre-constitutional era, when the principles of “[a] well regulated Militia” embodied in the Constitution were established, all of the “arms” militiamen (that is, common citizens) possessed were of the kind in common use, because just about all firearms then available were suitable for Militia service, as well as for individual self-defense. In various localities, surplus British army muskets were common, and captured French army muskets not common (or vice versa); or smooth-bored muskets were more common than rifled muskets (or vice versa); or the only common firearms were whatever militiamen happened to have at hand. But these differences the Militia statutes accepted as consistent with “well regulated Militia”. So all of those firearms were, as a matter of law, in common use because they all were being used for a common purpose. Therefore, because “assault rifles” in the hands of individuals eligible for Militia service (which includes the vast majority of able-bodied adult citizens) would arguably be the most suitable firearms for contemporary “well regulated Militia”, they would be in common use for that purpose, no matter how many Americans happened to possess them. And that purpose being the central concern of the Second Amendment, possession of such rifles would be protected to the highest degree possible.
  • Fourth and last, as to “reasonable regulation”, some people put forward all sorts of reasons why possession of “[w]eapons that are most useful in military service, M-16 rifles and the like”—or even possession of all firearms—should be restricted to members of the Armed Forces and professional para-militarized police forces. If one accepted those reasons as being to some degree rational (as opposed to being obvious manifestations of mental illness), then someone’s “reasonable regulation” could always be found sufficient to reduce “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” to a nullity. The constitutional standard, however, is not just anyone’s theory of “reasonable regulation”. Instead, the Second Amendment uniquely defines the one and only “reasonable regulation” in this field: namely, that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”—of whatever kinds serve the Amendment’s central purpose—“shall not be infringed”. The central purpose of the Amendment is to ensure “the security of a free State”. In “a free State” the people are sovereign. The sovereign is the supreme political power. In the final analysis, then, political power in “a free State” reduces to the collective ability of the citizenry to wield overwhelming force against any threats to the security of their community—which under modern conditions can be summed up in the aphorism “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” suitable for community self-defense in each citizen’s own hands. Any proposed regulation which would prohibit a law-abiding citizen from possession of any firearm useful in his hands for provision of “the security of a free State” would be unreasonable, by constitutional definition.

QUESTION AND ANSWER II, AS GIVEN.

Senator Feinstein: Do you agree with [Chief] Judge Wilkinson [in his concurring opinion in Kolbe v. Hogan, No. 14-1945 (4th Cir., 21 February 2017)] that the Second Amendment is ambiguous? Should the ambiguity be decided by the court or legislatures?

Judge Gorsuch: I would begin by saying, I hold Judge Wilkinson in high regard. He’s a very fine man and a very fine judge.

*     *     *     *     *

The Supreme Court of the United States isn’t final because it is infallible * * * , it is infallible because it is final. And Judge Wilkinson had his view, and the Supreme Court has spoken. And Heller is the law of the land * * * .

ANSWER II, AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN.

Judge Candorfull: Judge Wilkinson actually wrote that he was “unable to draw from the profound ambiguities of the Second Amendment an invitation to courts to preempt this most volatile of political subjects and arrogate to themselves decisions that have historically been assigned to other, more democratic, actors”—that is, legislators and executive officials. I cannot condone that observation, for the following reasons:

  • First, if the Second Amendment did suffer from such “profound ambiguities” that the Judiciary were incapable of construing it in such a manner as to clarify and thus obviate those “ambiguities”, it would not be a “law” at all, because all actual “laws” must be understandable. Moreover, if the Amendment did harbor a debilitating set of “profound ambiguities”, how would “other, more democratic, actors” be any better qualified than judges to ferret out some unknowable meaning from such a supposed pastiche of confusion and uncertainty?

In this regard it should be noted that the Maryland statute which banned “assault rifles”, and which the Court of Appeals sustained in Kolbe, specifically excluded from its coverage “the M1 Garand”. See Code of Maryland, Criminal Law § 4-301(b), and Public Safety, § 5-101(r)(2)(xxxvii). This, of course, is the very rifle which no less an authority than General George S. Patton praised as “the greatest battle implement ever devised”. See Julian S. Hatcher, The Book of the Garand (Buford, Georgia: Canton Street Press, Reprint Edition of the 1948 Edition, 2012), at 153. That Maryland’s legislators could be this myopic about such an iconic rifle refutes Chief Judge Wilkinson’s view that “other, more democratic, actors” are competent to draw respectable conclusions about the scope of the Second Amendment.

  • Second, inasmuch as the Second Amendment limits the powers of both the General Government and the States, if it contained any “ambiguities” at all then those “ambiguities” should be resolved in favor of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, not in aid of obvious infringements on that “right”. If legislators or executive officials were authorized to determine the extent of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, then by constitutional hypothesis that “right” would be no “right” at all, but only a defeasible license to be limited or even set aside entirely at the legislators’ or officials’ discretion. Legislative or executive inroads on the supposed “right” would be nothing more than “political questions” which are not for the Judiciary even to entertain, let alone to decide. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).

We know, however, that where the Second Amendment—or any provision of the Bill of Rights—is concerned, Judge Wilkinson’s appeal to “other, more democratic, actors” is quite out of place. For even what he calls “this most volatile of political subjects” cannot escape constitutional constraints on legislative and executive action. As the Supreme Court held in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943), “[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s * * * fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.” I could go further and assert that “[o]ne’s * * * fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote” even at the level of the Supreme Court. For, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his concurring opinion in Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-492 (1939), “the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we [Justices of the Supreme Court] have said about it.”

  • Third, as I explained in my answer to the first question, no one who reads the Second Amendment in its entirety, and who has studied the history which informs it, can believe that it is ambiguous to any degree, let alone that it suffers from “profound ambiguities” with respect to “the right of the people to keep and bear [those] Arms” within the particular category “assault rifles”. Indeed, a criticism of that kind should call into question either the competence or the bias of whoever offered it.
  • Fourth, the reason some people profess to find “ambiguities” in the Second Amendment is not because of the Amendment itself, but instead because of Heller. All three of the opinions in that case (one by the majority, two by the dissenters) are ambiguous, because not one of them construes the Amendment, or its relationship with the original Constitution, properly. Indeed, by its disregard of the controlling nature of the Amendment’s first thirteen words, even the majority opinion violates the very first rule of constitutional adjudication, that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause of the constitution is intended to be without effect”, and that “effect must be given to each word of the Constitution”. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) and Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 87 (1900). Accord, e.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 572-573 (1933); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 261 (1898). Moreover, the majority opinion did not take into sufficient account the Court’s earlier—and entirely unambiguous, even pellucid—opinion in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).

Heller certainly proves that the Supreme Court is far from infallible when it comes to deciding questions arising under the Second Amendment—something well known to students of jurisprudence with respect to all sorts of other constitutional questions with which the Court has unsuccessfully struggled in the past. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-830 & note 1 (1991). And if Heller is “the law of the case” as to the parties and the issue actually before the Court there, it is not “the law of the land” in the sense of being the final word on the Second Amendment for all other parties and issues. Or even as to the issue it did decide: For it is subject to being overruled, disavowed, qualified, questioned, critically explained, or otherwise distinguished at any time by the Court. That Judge Wilkinson relied upon a seriously skewed interpretation of Heller in Kolbe v. Hogan does not render the Circuit Court’s decision in that case immune from criticism. One cannot arrive at a correct construction of the Second Amendment by misreading an opinion of the Supreme Court which is itself incomplete and misleading.

  • Fifth and last, if one wants to avoid “the profound ambiguities” which Judge Wilkinson imagines lurk in the Second Amendment, he should consult: (i) Article I, § 8, cls. 12 through 16 and Article II, § 2, cl. 1 of the original Constitution; (ii) Article VI, [¶ 4] of the Articles of Confederation; and (iii) the pre-constitutional Militia statutes of the Colonies and independent States which establish what “[a] well regulated Militia” is. When all of these materials are treated as parts of a single coherent constitutional structure, the meaning of the Second Amendment becomes obvious.

© 2017 by Edwin Vieira, Jr.




President Trump On “Law Enforcement”

One of the major concerns I have had with Donald Trump as a candidate, and continue to have with President Trump in the White House, is the all-too-often ambiguous, even amorphous, character of his pronouncements on important policies. To be sure, this defect might be only apparent—the unfortunate result of combining Mr. Trump’s penchant for truncated statements with my own inability to extrapolate from the few words he does provide a deeper meaning which he may intend for them to convey. (I readily admit that I must be counted among the ever-diminishing set of Americans who consider twitterite and fakebookish discourse truly deplorable means for attempting to communicate ideas with depth any greater than that of a cookie sheet.) On the other hand, perhaps Mr. Trump and his advisors are at fault for not offering more specificity in what they cause to be published below the White House’s by-line.

For a prime example of the latter demerit, most recently my attention was piqued when I came across the White House’s internet post entitled “Standing Up For Our Law Enforcement Community”. See [Link]. Unfortunately, this is an essay without a compelling theme reflective of Mr. Trump’s promise to “make America great again”. Rather than locating itself in a recognizably American historical and legal context, providing a critical overview of contemporary problems, and proposing a long-term political strategy consistent with fundamental constitutional principles, it offers little more than slogans—the main one being that “[t]he Trump Administration will be a law and order administration”. Inasmuch as the first and foremost duty of every President under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, this glittering generality imparts to the reader precious little of actual substance. For the question remains: “What body of ‘law’ and what kind of ‘order’ will the Trump Administration enforce?” Oh, I realize (perhaps “hope” is the more accurate verb) that somewhere over the political rainbow there must be more in the minds of the author(s) of this post than the few paragraphs it contains. My concern, though, is: “What more?”

  1. Although its title refers to “our law enforcement community”, the White House’s post nowhere even suggests that the latter “community” includes in any way, shape, or form “the Militia of the several States”, the one and only “community” to which the Constitution explicitly assigns the authority and responsibility “to execute the Laws of the Union” (and of their own States as well). See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; art. I, § 8, cl. 15; and amends. II and X. One must wonder, therefore, what extra-constitutional, non-constitutional, or even (Heaven forefend) anti-constitutional notion of “standing up for our law enforcement community” the White House has in mind, when it leaves out of consideration any rôle for the Militia.

This oversight is especially ominous in light of the neo-Bolshevist “color revolution” which “leftists” have launched throughout this country in order not simply to demoralize, demonize, and delegitimize, but ultimately to destroy entirely the Trump Administration—in service, not of “the working class”, but of predatory globalist multi-billionaires for whom “the working class” no longer counts for anything, any more than does any other conglomeration of “useful idiots” and “transmission belts” who and which can be aggregated and energized under the divisive banners of contemporary “identity politics”. Mr. Trump and his advisors will prove to be extraordinarily naïve, amateurish, and even feckless if they fail to realize that, absent timely revitalization of the Militia, not just the present Administration but also America as a whole will all too soon be submerged in very hot and deep political waters from which their extrication will be exceedingly difficult. And no, I am not referring to the National Guard—which is no “militia” at all (in the constitutional sense), but instead consists of the “Troops, or Ships of War” which the States may “keep * * * in time of Peace” “with[ ] the Consent of Congress” under Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution (that is, a component of “the standing army”). Rather, “the Militia of the several States” consist of all of WE THE PEOPLE—or at least that part of them which the Declaration of Independence styled “the good People”—who today constitute “the Whites” versus “the Reds” (in line with the dichotomy in the original Bolshevist “color revolution”). In keeping with the Declaration of Independence’s excoriation of King George III for “ha[ving] affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power”, “the good People” of the present time must impress upon the Trump Administration the imprudence of deploying the National Guard or any other component of the regular Armed Forces to deal with this matter under some variety of “martial law” (in the sense most Americans give to that term). Rather, reliance must be had on the Militia, as the true constitutional recourse against the domestic lawlessness of any contemporary “color revolution”. See Parts 6 and 7, below.

  1. The White House’s post asserts that “[o]ne of the fundamental rights of every American is to live in a safe community * * * free of crime and violence”. It does not, however, answer (or even ask) the question: “‘Safe’ at what cost?” The Constitution does. One of the goals it sets out in its Preamble is to “ensure domestic Tranquility”, which obviously describes the situation which obtains in “a safe community * * * free of crime and violence”. Another goal identified in that same place is to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”. And the Preamble links these two goals with the unqualified conjunction “and”, thereby demanding that both of them are to be achieved simultaneously, not one to be sacrificed for the supposed benefit of the other. For self-evident to the Founders (just as it should be to contemporary Americans) is that this country can never secure the full measure of “domestic Tranquility” without maximizing “the Blessings of Liberty”, and vice versa.
  2. So it is troubling that the White House’s post takes the one-sided position that “[t]he dangerous anti-police atmosphere in America is wrong. The Trump Administration will end it.” For this fails to recognize that two quite different types of “anti-police” activism exist in this country today. One of them intends to undermine “domestic Tranquility” by sabotaging the legitimate work of law-enforcement agencies in every way possible, and therefore should be exposed and eradicated; whereas the other desires to protect “the Blessings of Liberty” against threats emanating from rogue law-enforcement personnel, and therefore should be praised and promoted.

The “anti-police atmosphere” antagonistic to “domestic Tranquility” is being propagated by groups intent upon engendering divisions and mutual antagonisms within society, and especially turning as many Americans as possible against their own governments at every level of the federal system, so as to create the chaotic conditions propitious for waging a successful neo-Bolshevist “color revolution”. The strategy at work is quite simple: Because, of all governmental agencies, police forces interact with the citizenry on the closest day-to-day basis, most common Americans tend to treat them, rightly or wrongly, as particularly representative of “the government” as a whole. If ordinary people can be inveigled to turn against the police in particular, they will naturally turn as well against the government in general. If they do so in large enough numbers, society will become effectively ungovernable, and thus ripe for all sorts of political upheavals. So the White House’s post is correct to emphasize that “[o]ur job is not to make life more comfortable for the rioter, the looter, or the violent disrupter”—because, although most of these street criminals are little more than “useful idiots”, they (along with the other “disrupters” who know precisely what they are about) constitute the first wave of cannon fodder in the initial offensive in the neo-Bolsheviks’ “color revolution”. If they cannot be checked at the outset, their aggression will only increase in its scope and intensify in its destructive effects.

On the other hand, the contemporary “anti-police atmosphere” favorable to “the Blessings of Liberty” is the result of many Americans’ fully justifiable complaints about intolerable levels of patently lawless, yet all-too-often unpunished, behavior by rogue law-enforcement personnel occurring across the length and breadth of this country. Of course, in a free society operating under “the rule of law” (and especially the constraints of “the rule of constitutional law”), any misconduct by law-enforcement agencies should be denounced as excessive, and every malefactor in their ranks should be held maximally accountable for his misconduct. After all, when an officer of the law breaks some law, he violates not only that particular law which he has a general duty to obey in his capacity as an ordinary citizen, but also the very principle of law-enforcement itself which he (unlike an ordinary citizen) is specially sworn to uphold. So, when a representative of the law breaks the law and gets away with his misbehavior under color of the law, his actions inevitably generate disrespect for all law among everyone else. Today, though, the level of police misconduct throughout America is, not simply excessive, but even extremely so, primarily because of the manner in which it tends to be mishandled. All too typically, such misconduct as comes to public attention is explained away by spokesmen for “police unions”, then excused by departmental “internal affairs” investigators and accommodating prosecutors who “find” that the perpetrators’ actions were in accord with various “policies” and “guidelines” (as if those magic words could set at naught constitutional commands). And later on, civil lawsuits brought by the victims are dismissed or otherwise frustrated on the grounds that the perpetrators are privileged to avoid personal liability perforce of fantastic “immunity” defenses of one sort or another concocted by the kangaroo courts under color of “judicial supremacy”.

In light of these circumstances, how can the Trump Administration fulfill the promise that it “will end [the anti-police atmosphere in America]”—but as to both aspects of that “atmosphere”? The White House’s post is not wrong to point out that “[o]ur country needs more law enforcement, more community engagement, and more effective policing”. The proper manner in which to meet these needs, though, remains the question. Not surprisingly, the Constitution supplies the answer.

The Constitution of the United States provides no explicit mandate or permission for the professional police or like law-enforcement agencies found throughout this country today. The only institutions within the federal system to which the Constitution assigns the authority and responsibility “to execute the Laws of the Union” are “the Militia of the several States”; and the only individual officeholder to which the Constitution assigns the authority and responsibility to “take Care that the Law be faithfully executed” is the President, to whom it also entrusts the status of “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 15 and 16; art. II, § 3; and art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Self-evidently, “execut[ing] the Laws of the Union” and “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” involve quintessential “law-enforcement” and “police” functions. Similarly, because “the Militia of the several States” are the States’ own governmental institutions, with permanent place in the federal system, and because the Constitution, through the Second Amendment, declares that only “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”, “law-enforcement” or “police” functions which relate to the provision of “security” under State and Local law must devolve upon “the Militia of the several States” in each of the States, and upon each of the Governors of “the several States” in their capacities as commanders in chief of their own States’ Militia. Moreover, inasmuch as each of “the Militia of the several States” must be “[a] well regulated Militia” and “[a] well regulated Militia” must be composed of the body of the people, in the final analysis the American people themselves, properly organized in “well regulated Militia”, should assume primary responsibility for the performance of all “law-enforcement” and “police” functions. This, of course, is no constitutional accident. For in a constitutional republic in which the people themselves exercise sovereignty (as described below), who but the people themselves can be entrusted with the task of policing the people themselves?

So if, as the White House’s post opines, “[o]ur country needs more law enforcement”, the true constitutional source of the additional manpower should be the Militia. Being composed of every able-bodied adult from sixteen years of age upwards (until justly exempted on the basis of superannuation), the Militia could supply far more individuals already qualified, or capable of being trained, to perform any and every “law-enforcement” and “police” function which both the Union and the several States might require. (Actually, if the job were to be done with scrupulous attention to the Constitution, all present-day  police forces and other law-enforcement agencies at the State and Local levels should be integrated within the Militia largely in their present forms, augmented by such other specially trained units and reserve formations as the circumstances in various States and Localities might warrant.) If “[o]ur country needs * * * more community engagement [in ‘law enforcement’]”, in what more efficacious and safe manner could this goal be met than by enlisting the whole community in each community in the effort? No “anti-police atmosphere” could ever arise were the people themselves the police and the police the people. And if “[o]ur country needs * * * more effective policing”, how could this be better guaranteed than by drawing participants in “police” functions from the most extensive pool of talent extant in any community: namely, essentially the entire adult community itself? Not only that: When in the form and with the authority of “well regulated Militia” the people in Local communities will police themselves, law enforcement will necessarily become more effective than it is or ever could be now, because then the people with the greatest personal incentives to maintain proper “law and order” will be directly in charge. No longer will the people in any Locality be subject to a police force of élitist professionals who (as is all too often the case today) envision themselves as aloof from, superior to, and even the antagonists of the very community which they are supposed to protect and serve.

  1. The White House’s post assures its readers that “[s]upporting law enforcement means supporting our citizens’ ability to protect themselves”. On the one hand, this statement is a mere truism—because, as America’s Founders well knew, “[s]elf-defence * * * , as it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society”. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Robert Bell, American Edition, 4 Volumes & Appendix, 1771-1773), Volume 3, at 4. Whether performed by the individual or by the community, self-defense is the most important, being in the final analysis the indispensable, form of “law enforcement”. On the other hand, unfortunately, the post’s statement sets legal and political priorities in reverse, even perverse, order—because actually enabling citizens to protect themselves individually and collectively must always come before “[s]upporting law enforcement” in the form of modern-day professional police forces. After all, self-defense presupposes the absence of timely and effective assistance from even honest and competent law-enforcement agencies; whereas, in all too many instances today, through their execution of constitutionally questionable “gun-control” laws rogue law-enforcement personnel across this country hinder or entirely frustrate ordinary citizens’ ability to execute “the primary law of nature” for their own individual and societal protection.

Self-evidently, “the security of a free State” depends upon the ability of its constituent citizens to defend both themselves as individuals and their “free State” as a collective—and the Second Amendment declares that, for these purposes, “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary”, not subordinate to various law-enforcement establishments not only less inclusive than such a Militia but also lacking a Militia’s constitutional credentials. Thus, the only way in which the statement “[s]upporting law enforcement means supporting our citizens’ ability to protect themselves” can be read in a fully constitutional manner is for the Militia to become the primary institutions of “law enforcement” at every level of the federal system. This is plainly possible even at the level of the General Government, because the Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union”, without exception. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. And because “the Militia of the several States” are the States’ own governmental institutions, the States can assign to them whatever “law-enforcement” responsibilities may be “necessary to the security of a free State” in those jurisdictions, when the Militia are not “called into the actual Service of the United States”. Compare U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 and art. I, § 8, cl. 16 with amends. II and X.

To be sure, the White House’s post goes on to promise that “[w]e [i.e., the Trump Administration] will uphold Americans’ Second Amendment rights at every level of our judicial system”.The apparent exclusive concern with “our judicial system” is perplexing, however. Does President Trump believe that “our judicial system” wields exclusive authority under the false doctrine of “judicial supremacy” to determine with finality what “Americans’ Second Amendment rights” are? Or is that the province of the Constitution, which the Legislative and Executive Branches of the General Government, the States, and ultimately WE THE PEOPLE must interpret and apply for themselves when “our judicial system” neglects, fails, or refuses to protect those rights?

Even those Americans who are satisfied with the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Heller and McDonald cases, and who assume that President Trump will succeed in appointing to the Court new Justices who will scrupulously adhere to those precedents, must realize that, because of the practical vicissitudes of litigation, many if not most rulings of consequence to be rendered by the inferior courts of the United States and the States’ courts with respect to the Second Amendment will never be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as these lower courts are now overpopulated with opponents of the Second Amendment, reliance on “our judicial system” will result in numerous judicial screeds as much at odds with “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” as Circuit Judge James A. Wynn, Jr.’s grotesquely unconstitutional concurring opinion in United States v. Robinson, No. 14-4902 (4th Cir., 23 January 2017). Under these circumstances, can President Trump—or the American people—trust “our judicial system” to guarantee “the security of a free State” as the Second Amendment understands it? Or should President Trump work to empower Americans to exercise “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” in “well regulated Militia”, impervious to modern-day “gun control”? These questions answer themselves, the first in the negative, the second in the affirmative.

  1. The White House’s post describes President Trump as “dedicated to enforcing our border laws, ending sanctuary cities, and stemming the tide of lawlessness associated with illegal immigration”. These ends are admirable; but the means by which the President and his advisors believe that he can actually accomplish them remain as opaque as they are conjectural. I need not repeat here what I have written about these matters in my NewsWithViews commentaries “How the President Can Secure the Borders” (18 August 2015), “A Trumped-up Controversy” (20 February 2016), and “No Sanctuaries in ‘Sanctuary Cities’” (3 December 2016). What does deserve renewed emphasis, though, is the indispensable constitutional rôle which the Militia can and must play in the fulfillment of these tasks, under President Trump’s assertion of leadership as “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”, in order to fulfill his duty to “take Care that the Laws [pertaining to immigration] be faithfully executed”. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 and art. II, § 3.

Not just the present tidal wave of patently illegal immigration, but also since the late 1960s the excessive extent of ostensibly legal immigration by aliens unwilling or unable to assimilate themselves within an uniquely American culture, amount to actual hostile invasions of this country. I do not employ the term “invasions” in a loosely metaphorical sense, either. For these incursions are not simply historical accidents, akin to the serial “barbarian invasions” that first splintered, then helped to shatter entirely, the Roman Empire. Rather, they are part and parcel of modern neo-Bolshevism’s long-operative strategy to deny Americans the right vouchsafed to them by the Declaration of Independence to retain “among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal status to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them”; to demolish the United States as a functioning polity; and to drag “the good People” of this country into a “new world order” administered by supra-national mega-banks and -corporations serving the selfish interests of a globalist kleptocracy composed of multi-billionaires. This amounts to a new twist on Leninism/Trotskyism—because “the revolution’s” contemporary financiers are so sure of themselves that they no longer feel the need to operate largely behind the scenes (in the manner of, say, Alexander Helphand), but instead brazenly flaunt their rôles as “the revolution’s” mentors and even directors out in the open, in the person of such as George Soros.

The neo-Bolsheviks’ tactics emphasize enlarging the fissures already in existence throughout American society, and engendering as many new ones as possible, so as to be able to employ “identify politics” in service of a divide-and-conquer approach of multifaceted “class warfare”. The old Leninist/Trotskyist dichotomy of “classes” has been expanded from the original purely economic Marxist categories of “the proletariat” and “the bourgeoisie” to embrace divisions delineated by race, religion, sex (or even worse, “gender”), economic status, political allegiances to such deceptive conceptions as “left” and “right”, rural versus urban attitudes and lifestyles, and so on—until American society now finds itself on the verge of being permanently Balkanized into a chaotic jumble of squabbling sects unified only by their joint participation in an orgy of mutual antagonisms and recriminations. Already, “mainstream” political discourse accepts without demur this country’s bifurcation into “blue States” and “red States” (although, to conform to the relevant historical antecedent, the colors should be reversed; and, better yet, “white” substituted for “blue”). Plainly enough, this situation by itself is incompatible—indeed, at war—with attainment of the Preamble’s goals “to form a more perfect Union” and “insure domestic Tranquility”.

The contemporary agitation from various quarters for “open borders” attempts to hornswoggle gullible Americans into condemning as “xenophobic”, “racist”, or otherwise contemptibly “discriminatory” the laws of the Union which control immigration, so as to make it politically impossible for this country to repel the invasions of aliens now assaulting it. “Hornswoggle” is the properly descriptive verb, too, because no such thing as “open borders” can exist under the Declaration of Independence. For if other nations can systematically dump their unwanted populations into the United States, or if individual foreigners in unlimited numbers can impose themselves on this country, then Americans will no longer “assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them”. Neither can “open borders” exist under the Constitution. For, as the Preamble attests, WE THE PEOPLE “ordain[ed] and establish[ed] th[e] Constitution” in order to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”—not to aliens whom THE PEOPLE refuse to accept into their community in the first place, or to some future posterity of those undesired aliens who succeed in insinuating themselves into the United States.

More than a century ago, the Supreme Court rejected the argument for “open borders” pressed upon it by radical attorney Clarence Darrow, that “[n]o power is delegated by the Constitution to the general government over alien friends with reference to their admission into the United States”, with the rejoinder that “[r]epeated decisions of this court have determined that Congress has the power to exclude aliens from the United States; to prescribe the terms and conditions on which they may come in; to establish regulations for sending out of the country such aliens as have entered in violation of law, and to commit the enforcement of such conditions and regulations to executive officers; that the deportation of an alien who is found to be here in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and that the provisions of the Constitution securing the right of trial by jury have no application.” United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 287 (argument of counsel), 289-290 (opinion of the Court) (1904). And inasmuch as the Constitution recognizes no alleged “right” of “alien friends” to immigrate into the United States, it surely denies any such “right” to “alien enemies”, whether openly declared as such, or clandestine in their purposes, or merely potentially dangerous because of their beliefs or associations.

The Bill of Rights provides no exceptions to this rule. At issue in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), was a statute which declared ineligible to obtain admission into the United States aliens who advocated the “doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship”. Mandel, a self-described “revolutionary Marxist” who openly espoused “the economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world communism”, was denied a visa to participate in lectures and conferences sponsored by various American universities and think-tanks. Joined by several American “university professors * * * who [had] invited [him] to speak”, Mandel brought suit on the grounds that denial of his visa violated the complainants’ rights under the First Amendment, denied them the equal protection of the laws, and deprived them of procedural due process. Id. at 754-760. The Supreme Court overruled these contentions:

It is clear that Mandel personally, as an unadmitted and nonresident alien, had no constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904). * * *

*     *     *     *     *

This case, therefore, comes down to the narrow issue whether the First Amendment confers upon the * * * professors, because they wish to hear, speak, and debate with Mandel in person, the ability to determine that Mandel should be permitted to enter the country, or, in other words, to compel * * * Mandel’s admission.

*     *     *     *     *

Recognition that First Amendment rights are implicated, however, is not dispositive of our inquiry here. * * * The Court without exception has sustained Congress’ “plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.” * * * “[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” the admission of aliens.

*     *     *     *     *

We are not inclined in the present context to reconsider this line of cases. Indeed, the [complainants] * * * recognize the force of these many precedents. * * * [T]hey concede that Congress could enact a blanket prohibition against all aliens falling into the class defined by [the statute], and that First Amendment rights could not override that decision. * * * But they contend that by providing a waiver procedure, Congress clearly intended that persons ineligible under the broad provision of the [statute] would be temporarily admitted * * * . They argue that the Executive’s implementation of this congressional mandate * * * must be limited by the First Amendment rights of persons like [the complainants]. * * *

[The complainants’] First Amendment argument would prove too much. In almost every instance of an alien excludable under [the statute], there are probably those who would wish to meet and speak with him. * * * Were we to endorse the proposition that governmental power to withhold a waiver must yield whenever a bona fide claim is made that American citizens wish to meet and talk with an alien excludable under [the statute], one of two unsatisfactory results would necessarily ensue. Either every claim would prevail, in which case the plenary discretionary authority Congress granted to the Executive becomes a nullity, or courts in each case would be required to weigh the strength of the audience’s interest against that of the Government in refusing a waiver * * * , according to some as yet undetermined standard. * * * Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the waiver decision has, properly, been placed in the hands of the Executive.

*     *     *     *     *

In summary, plenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established. In the case of an alien excludable under [the statute], Congress has delegated conditional exercise of this power to the Executive. We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.

Id. at 762, 765-766, and 767-770.

It should be obvious that, if this reasoning is valid with respect to “the freedom of speech” guaranteed by the First Amendment, then it applies with equal force to all of the other rights that Amendment covers—such that exclusion of aliens on the basis of their religion, or of the predominant religion of their countries of origin, or of the observation that many of them misbehave under color of their religion in countries which incautiously admit them as immigrants, is no less valid. As the Court observed in United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904),

[i]t is, of course, true that if an alien is not permitted to enter this country, or, having entered contrary to law, is expelled, he is in fact cut off from worshiping or speaking or publishing or petitioning in the country, but that is merely because of his exclusion therefrom. He does not become one of the people to whom these things are secured by our Constitution by an attempt to enter forbidden by law. To appeal to the Constitution is to concede that this is a land governed by that supreme law, and as under it the power to exclude has been determined to exist, those who are excluded cannot assert the rights in general obtaining in a land to which they do not belong as citizens or otherwise.

Therefore, “[t]he Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores”. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 note 5 (1953). As the Court explained in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990),

[t]he Preamble [to the Constitution] declares that the Constitution is ordained and established by “the people of the United States.” The Second Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,” and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are retained and reserved to “the people.” * * * While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that “the people” * * * refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of the community.

Pace the Court, however, “this textual exegesis” is certainly far more than merely “suggest[ive]”. For no one could possibly believe that aliens may demand entry into this country while exercising a purported “right” under color of the Second Amendment “to keep and bear Arms” in their hands, or (more specifically) that armed Moslem jihadists intent upon imposing Sharia by means of the “‘[p]olitical power [which] grows out of the barrel of a gun’” may demand entry under color of the Second and Tenth Amendments combined. Compare Mao Tse-tung, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking, China: Foreign Languages Press, 1966) at 61, with Arthur L. Corbin, “Legal Analysis and Terminology”, 29 Yale Law Journal 163 (1919), at 168-169 (definition of a legal “power”).

Going further, the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez pointed out that previous cases which have applied principles of equal protection and due process to aliens “establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.” 494 U.S. at 271. “‘In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules which would be unacceptable if applied to citizens’”. Id. at 273, quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).

In the light of these precedents, the recent decision in Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir., 9 February 2017), purporting to uphold a temporary stay of President Trump’s recent Executive Order on immigration, is (to borrow Bentham’s deprecatory phrase) “nonsense on stilts”. Yet in the latter decision this country witnesses what the White House’s post calls “our judicial system” being intentionally misused by “useful idiots” within the political hierarchies of the States of Washington and Minnesota in order to frustrate the constitutional authority of Congress and the Executive! How should President Trump respond? Recently, the noted journalist and author Seth Lipsky asked me whether Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution applies to this problem; so I shall take that provision as an example of what President Trump and his legal advisors should consider—

The Constitution commands that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion”. Art. IV, § 4. Which implies, of course, that no State can claim a license either (i) to set aside her own “Republican Form of Government” or expose her own citizens to an “Invasion”, or (ii) to obstruct the United States in their execution of their constitutional power and duty to “guarantee * * * a Republican Form of Government” within that State’s territory and “protect” that State’s citizens “against Invasion” by whatever means may be available to the General Government. And without any necessity for any State subject to an “Invasion” to agree to the United States’ exercise of their constitutional duty to deal with that affliction—for, unlike the second clause of Article IV, Section 4, which requires an “Application of the Legislature [of a State], or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)”, before the United States may “protect” a State “against domestic Violence”, the first clause imposes no such restriction.

Now, even were contemporary neo-Bolsheviks, other subversives of various persuasions, and assorted “useful idiots” not working tirelessly to promote irreconcilable social divisions through “Invasion[s]” of aliens indisposed to assimilate (or, worse yet, predisposed not to assimilate) to traditional American culture, such immigration would inevitably destroy “a Republican Form of Government” in each of the several States. What the Constitution describes as “a Republican Form of Government” is “one constructed on th[e] principle, that the Supreme Power resides in the body of the people”. Compare U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 with Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 419, 457 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.). If, however, the United States no longer consist of one “people”, substantially united in political understanding and purpose, maintenance of “a Republican Form of Government” in any of the several States is impossible. Inasmuch as, whether by conscious design or merely by its unintended consequence, unlimited immigration precludes such unity, it fatally threatens “a Republican Form of Government” in every State. Which (among other reasons) is why the Constitution provides that “[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing [i.e., as of 1788] shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight”—thereby recognizing the plenary power of Congress to “prohibit[ ]” any and all such “Migration or Importation” in those States after that date, and in all other States at any time. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. And that is why (among other reasons) the Constitution delegates to Congress the allied powers “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization” (as to “Migration”), “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations * * * and with the Indian Tribes” (as to “Importation”), “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union[ and] repel Invasions”, and “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers”. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 4, 3, 15, and 18. For through the exercise of these powers by Congress and the execution by the President of the statutes Congress enacts pursuant to them, “[t]he United States” can “guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government” by “protect[ing] each of them against Invasion” by aliens.

Moreover, the Second Amendment refers to “the security of a free State”, as to which it declares that “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary”. The term “a free State” is a general conception, to which (in the estimation of the Founders) all of “the several States” conformed at the time (1791) and were expected always to conform thereafter (along with such other States as later entered the Union). The term “free State” is perhaps best understood by consideration of the German noun “Freistaat” (literally, “free state”), the primary meaning of which is “republic”, with the adjectival form, “freistaatlich”, meaning “republican”. Thus, the term “a free State” in the Second Amendment should be equated with the term “a Republican Form of Government” in the original Constitution, such that “a free State” denotes a polity “constructed on th[e] principle, that the Supreme Power resides in the body of the people”. And, plainly enough, no “free State”can enjoy “security” when it is exposed to incessant “Invasion[s]” by aliens. So, just as “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”, such a Militia is necessary to the security of a “Republican Form of Government” free from the fear, let alone the actuality, of “Invasion”. This should be obvious, because the essence of both “a free State” and “a Republican Form of Government” is that “the Supreme Power resides in the body of the people”, and “a well regulated militia[ is] composed of the body of the people”. See Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776) art. 13 (emphases supplied). In particular, then, by executing “the Laws of the Union” so as to “repel Invasions” of illegal aliens when other components of the Constitution’s federal system prove themselves inadequate or even inimical to that task, the Militia can guarantee (as can no other institutions) that “the Supreme Power [always] resides in the body of the [American] people” who themselves make up the Militia, rather than being gradually usurped by foreign interlopers with no conceivable claim to any portion of that “Power”. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.

Inasmuch as issues arising under Article IV, Section 4 typically involve “political questions” as to which the Judiciary is constitutionally incompetent to afford relief to parties challenging the actions of Congress and the Executive, President Trump can—and should—simply disregard aberrant decisions such as Washington v. Trump (while, of course, providing the public with a complete explanation for his actions). See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 Howard) 1 (1849). And both he and Congress enjoy other, even more potent means to deal with rogue judges. See, e.g., my book How To Dethrone the Imperial Judiciary (San Antonio, Texas: Vision Forum Ministries, 2004). Whether the President’s legal advisors will properly instruct him—and steady his nerves—on these matters remains uncertain, though.

  1. The White House’s post concludes with the truism that “[i]t is the first duty of government to keep the innocent safe”, and emphasizes the application of this duty to “especially those Americans who have not known safe neighborhoods for a very long time”. This is all well and good, as far as it goes. Yet it does not go nearly far enough. For the most serious threat to the safety of “the good People” throughout this country is not simply everyday “street crime” (as bad as that may be), but instead the crescent neo-Bolshevist “color revolution” for which the streets constitute merely one theater of operations.

The architects of America’s emergent “color revolution” have honed their theory of “régime change” to a razor’s edge, and tested it in various places around the world with some notable success. Throughout this country its practitioners in the Rotenfrontkämpferbund are numerous, well organized, adequately funded, and fanatic (if not lunatic) in their willingness to apply whatever measures of rhetorical and even physical violence they deem expedient to smash all opposition to their demands. The big “mainstream media”, choruses of puffed-up political pundits, and gaggles of goofy “celebrities” apologize for, encourage, and even glamorize these tactics. And rogue public officials at every level of the federal system openly lend their support to the revolutionaries. The goal of this “color revolution” is to render America effectively ungovernable during President Trump’s tenure, by impugning the legitimacy of any and every law, governmental policy, and action of his Administration that contradicts a single jot or tittle of the neo-Bolsheviks’ agenda—enforcing these incessant complaints with massive orchestrated disruptions of the political, legal, and social order, thereby creating a new order based upon chaos, on the strength of which the neo-Bolsheviks hope to usurp the power of “a state within the state”, with President Trump reduced to an impotent, ridiculous “bubblehead”.

At first glance, “the color revolution’s” reliance on strong-arm tactics appears to impale this country on the horns of a dilemma (which, no doubt, is the neo-Bolsheviks’ intention). On the one hand, “the good People” cannot be left to the mercy of neo-Bolshevist thugs, unable to protect themselves unless they turn to the kind of ad hoc self-help that smacks of vigilantism—for that will reduce this country to an ungovernable condition, inasmuch as “order” imposed without “law” (other than “the law of the jungle”) is not “government” at all. Yet, on the other hand, true constitutionalists must stand firm against the all-too-natural inclination of ordinary citizens assaulted by massive social unrest to “tighten the screws” by employing police-state tactics up to and including “martial law”—for that will render this country ungovernable, too, inasmuch as “martial law” is not a form of government permissible under the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The only sure and certain way to avoid both of these mutually undesirable alternatives is to revitalize the Militia, thereby returning to “the good People” the ability, together with the absolute legal authority, to protect themselves. See my book By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” (Ashland, Ohio: Bookmasters, Inc., Revised & Expanded Second Edition, 2014, 2016), especially at 531-676.

After all, as America’s sovereigns WE THE PEOPLE are “the government”—both as its source and as its ultimate executors, as well as its beneficiaries. Public officials can do nothing—at least legitimately—without THE PEOPLE’S approval and coöperation, both passive and active. So if (as the White House’s post opines) “keep[ing] the innocent safe” is “the first duty of government”, then it is the first duty of THE PEOPLE themselves—who, having the greatest incentive to remain safe, will surely be most assiduous in fulfilling it. And because “keep[ing] the innocent safe” is obviously a defining characteristic of what the Second Amendment calls “the security of a free State”, then the revitalization of “well regulated Militia”—composed of THE PEOPLE themselves—is “necessary” to that end.

  1. President Trump must also take into account that the open neo-Bolshevist “color revolution” is not the only, or even the most dangerous, subversive force deployed against his Administration, as well as against himself personally. He must also reckon with what students of these matters denote as “the Deep State”—namely, the clandestine rogue apparatus lodged within the bowels of the “military-industrial” and especially the “national-security” complexes, which considers itself the real “state within the state”, ruling over this country as a law unto itself alone. See, e.g., Paul Craig Roberts, “The Trump Presidency: RIP”, Paul Craig Roberts Institute for Political Economy (16 February 2017); and my commentary “An Ominous Start” (1 January 2017) at <edwinvieira.com>, pages 6-7.

In the long run, it does not much matter whether the Deep State is proceeding independently along the same lines as the neo-Bolsheviks, or whether it is loosely allied with them, or whether it is a full partner in their operations, or even whether it is actually in control of the whole shebang—for the immediate goal of both the Deep State and the neo-Bolsheviks is the same: to wit, the utter destruction both of the Trump Administration and of Mr. Trump himself, with their ultimate purpose being the defeat of WE THE PEOPLE’S reassertion of constitutional authority over this country. (Although, as Mark Twain quipped, history does not repeat itself, it often rhymes, the closest historical couplet in this case being, of course, the tacit alliance between the “left-fascist” Stalin and the “right-fascist” Hitler, through which the German Communist Rotenfrontkämpferbund effectively colluded with its supposed opponent, the Nazi Sturmabteilung, to overthrow the social-democratic Weimar Republic and set the stage for the Second World War. See, e.g., Viktor Suvorov, The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II [Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2013]).

Whatever the relationship between the fascistic “right” of the Deep State and the equally fascistic “left” of American neo-Bolshevism may be, the Deep State has already revealed its own hand, in spades, in the recent “Flynn-flammery” it has apparently imposed on President Trump. See, e.g., Richard Pollock, “EXCLUSIVE: How The Nation’s Spooks Played The Game ‘Kill Mike Flynn’”, The Daily Caller (15 February 2017); Jay Syrmopoulos, “Open Warfare Declared In DC As Deep State ‘Goes Nuclear’–Trump ‘Will Die In Jail’”, The Freethoughtproject (15 February 2017); Pepe Escobar, “The Swamp Strikes Back”, Offguardian (16 February 2017); and Joachim Hagopian, “Reasons Why Michael Flynn Was Fatality #1 in the Trump Presidency”, LewRockwell.com (17 February 2017).1 The only adequate response to this dire threat is for President Trump to bring to bear against the Deep State the full power of constitutional “law enforcement”, and sweep all of the renegades out of the “military-industrial” and “national-security” complexes with an iron broom. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2383 through 2385 (the emergent problem) with 10 U.S.C. §§ 332 and 333 (a necessary part of the solution).

  1. In the final analysis, if the Trump Administration intends to “stand[ ] up for our law enforcement community” in the fullest constitutional sense of that promise, it must first recognize of whom “our law enforcement community” actually consists—namely, WE THE PEOPLE themselves—and then realize that “standing up” for that “community” demands the revitalization of those constitutional institutions in which WE THE PEOPLE personally participate, to the point of exercising actual day-to-day decision and direction. If President Trump does nothing else during his tenure in office, he must leave America with the permanent legacy of “well regulated Militia” in every one of the several States, able to “execute the Laws of the Union” in “the actual Service of the United States” against all enemies, whether foreign interlopers or (especially) domestic subversives. And he must begin to do so immediately. For his—and America’s—enemies will not afford him the luxury of being able to “play for time”. Today is his time. Tomorrow will be too late. Procrastination was apparently President Kennedy’s undoing. See, e.g., JFK and the Unspeakable. Why He Died and Why It Matters (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2008; reprinted, New York, New York: Touchstone, 2010). President Trump would be well advised to take that lesson to heart.

[1]. Some supporters of President Trump have floated the alternative explanation that Flynn’s resignation was actually part of the normal course of events within the Administration. See “Dr. Steve Pieczenik Says Michael Flynn Was Purposefully Removed, The Left Are Intellectual Frustrated Children”, iBankCoin (16 February 2017). This thesis is exceedingly difficult to credit, however. For it would have been both unnecessary and highly counterproductive for the Administration to subscribe to a narrative based on Flynn’s telephonic indiscretion and later dishonesty in describing his behavior, together with allegations of “leaks” by person or persons unknown inside but hostile to the Administration, when a simple press-release stating that Flynn had resigned to make way for a better-qualified replacement would have sufficed—without providing the big “mainstream media” with additional ammunition for their on-going barrage that President Trump is a crony, a stooge, a dupe, or otherwise an “asset” of Russian President Vladimir Putin.




An ominous start? Pt. 2 of 2

Even though an incorrect decision may be the so-called “law of the case” as to the parties actually before the Supreme Court in a particular instance (and unchallengeable by them because no means of appeal is available), it can never constitute infallible legal dogma as to everyone else in all future instances. After all, Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”—with no mention of decisions of the Supreme Court (or any other judicial tribunal) as being included within “the supreme Law”. Obviously, no such decision can ever qualify as “[t]his Constitution”, one of “the Laws of the United States”, or a “Treat[y] made * * * under the Authority of the United States”. For the Supreme Court itself is a mere creature of and subordinate to “[t]his Constitution”, not its creator or its superior. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. The Court’s decisions are not “Laws of the United States”, because “[a]ll legislative Powers * * * granted [by the Constitution] shall be vested in a Congress of the United States”, not in any judicial tribunal. See U.S. Const. art, I, § 1. And all “Treaties” derive exclusively from the President’s “Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur”, not from any part of the “[t]he Judicial Power of the United States * * * vested in [the] supreme Court”. Contrast U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 with art. III, § 1.

So far, this commentary has focused on Mrs. Clinton’s catalogue of alleged misbehavior, because her shady affairs have received an overwhelming amount of perfervid attention in the domestic and even international media. Yet, in the long run, Mr. Trump must deal with several even more pressing concerns if America is to accept his “Oath or Affirmation” as genuine:

First, on various occasions he has demonstrated a willingness to question what actually happened on 9/11. This indicates his suspicion—which every thinking American shares—that the real culprits have not yet been identified, or if identified not yet brought to justice. See, e.g., Kevin Robert Ryan, Another Nineteen: Investigating Legitimate 9/11 Suspects (Microbloom, 2013). In light of the horrendous harms to persons and property perpetrated on 9/11—and especially the consequences of those crimes with respect to the elaboration of a national para-military police-state apparatus in this country, the systematic curtailment of Americans’ basic civil liberties, and the launching of highly questionable military adventures overseas during the Bush Administration and Mr. Obama’s residence in the White House, all in patent defiance of the Constitution—a refusal by Mr. Trump to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” through an honest and thoroughgoing investigation of the 9/11 Event would provide compelling evidence that he never intended to “take the * * * Oath or Affirmation” of the President truthfully as to that matter, either.

Second, prior to his inauguration Mr. Trump put himself on record as promising that, in his Administration, “[w]e [namely, the government of the United States] will stop looking to topple regimes and overthrow governments”. See [Link] (01 December 2016). This evidenced his belief—again, in which every thinking American along with the rest of the civilized world concurs—that rogue officials within the Bush Administration and among Mr. Obama’s entourage have engaged in such willful, wanton, and reckless aggression on more than one occasion. Again, in patent defiance of the Constitution, as everyone knows or ought to know that “the genius and character of our institutions are peaceful, and the power to declare war was not conferred upon Congress”—or anyone else—“for purposes of aggression or aggrandizement”. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 Howard) 603, 614 (1850). In addition, everyone conversant with these matters knows that the CIA and the Pentagon should be the first rocks Mr. Trump ought to turn over in a search for the chief culprits. So if Mr. Trump now refuses to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” by allowing the miscreants who have been involved in “toppl[ing] regimes and overthrow[ing] governments” to escape justice, it would hardly be amiss to conclude that he never intended to “take the * * * Oath or Affirmation” of the President truthfully as to that matter, as well.

Moreover, Mr. Trump’s failure to take appropriate action as to this particular would demonstrate such imprudence as to draw into question, not only his personal capability (as opposed to his legal eligibility) to serve, but also his likelihood to survive, as President. For, rather than risk the frustration of their complots, the rogue officials who have engaged in “toppl[ing foreign] regimes and overthrow[ing foreign] governments” in the past and who undoubtedly intend to persevere in like endeavors in the future would hardly shrink from “toppl[ing]” and “overthrow[ing]” the Trump Administration—if not in the dramatic fashion their predecessors cut short President Kennedy’s tenure then in some other, but no less effective, manner—if Mr. Trump refused to give them the criminal leeway they desired. See, e.g., JFK and the Unspeakable. Why He Died and Why It Matters (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2008; reprinted, New York, New York: Touchstone, 2010).

Indeed, they have already set out on this nefarious course, by floating in the media the fantastic assertions that “Russian hacking” exerted a decisive improper influence in favor of Mr. Trump’s election, that Mr. Trump himself is subject to blackmail by Russia, and that he is even a “dupe” or “useful idiot” working (albeit perhaps unconsciously) in Russia’s interests—by means of those canards casting a pall over the legitimacy of his Administration at its very inception. Although some observers fear that these and like tar brushes may have painted Mr. Trump into a corner, in reality they have provided him with an uniquely propitious opportunity to sweep out the responsible agencies with an iron broom. For if such charges are actually nothing more than “old grey mares”—that is, false narratives concocted by rogue operatives in “the intelligence community”—then the officials responsible for propagating them are arguably engaged in an attempt to overthrow the legitimate government of the United States through a coup d’état to be waged by Mr. Trump’s enemies in Congress and the bureaucracy, in the ever-hostile “mainstream media”, and in a gaggle of subversive NGOs intent upon applying within the United States their extensive experience in rigging “régime change” in various foreign countries. Inasmuch as the plotters of this coup must be aware that it could never be brought to completion absent the application of force at some stage (for instance, through the fomentation of violent civil disturbances on a massive scale), and therefore must already have included such operations in their plans, they have exposed themselves to serious charges. See 18 U.S.C. § 2384. Mr. Trump certainly enjoys both the authority and the ability to turn the tables on these conspirators. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 332 and 333. But whether he can muster the gumption to do so remains to be seen.

Third, prior to his election, Mr. Trump expressed skepticism—also embraced by millions of Americans whose heads are not buried in the sand—as to whether Barack Obama was ever actually “eligible to the Office of President” as “a natural born Citizen”. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. Mr. Trump knew or should have known then, and knows or should know now, that inter alia:

(i) No report of an official, full-scale inquiry into Mr. Obama’s purported eligibility has ever been made public (or perhaps even conducted behind closed doors)—whether by Congress when it had the opportunities to do so, as I first explained in my NewsWithViews commentary “In the Shadow of Nemesis” (8 December 2008); or by law-enforcement agencies such as the FBI; or by the courts of either the United States or any State.

(ii) Mr. Obama’s parentage and the place of his birth, and their effects on his citizenship, continue to be the subjects of controversy.

(iii) The provenance and authenticity of Mr. Obama’s “birth certificate” (or whatever name should be attached to the document his minions caused to be publicized with his apparent approval) have been impugned through the research commissioned by former Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio, without adequate rebuttal from Mr. Obama’s camp.

(iv) Mr. Obama’s status as a citizen of Indonesia, resulting from his mother’s reported second marriage to an Indonesian and his subsequent translation to and sojourn in that land as a child, is still opaque.

(v) Whether, upon his return to the United States from Indonesia, Mr. Obama took the steps required at the time to reassert or to secure American citizenship has yet to be established in any public forum.

(vi) Whether, during Mr. Obama’s years in colleges and law school in this country, he claimed benefits or otherwise identified himself as a “foreign” student remains undetermined, because he has refused to release the relevant records.

(vii) Challenges have been leveled against the authenticity of both Mr. Obama’s purported registration with the Selective Service and his supposed Social Security card. And

(viii) Widely publicized statements emanating from Mr. Obama himself, from Michelle Obama, and from certain of Mr. Obama’s relatives over the years have cast doubts upon his citizenship.

The necessity for Mr. Trump to pry open this can of worms cannot be overstated—

(a) Although America has finally awakened from the long national nightmare of Mr. Obama’s residence in the White House, his “legacy” will continue to fester. If unmasked as ineligible for the office he pretended to hold, however, every measure he inflicted on this country while impersonating “the President” could and should be set aside as void ab initio. This would not unavoidably result in an hopelessly chaotic situation, if (for example) in good time and in a systematic fashion certain of the “Bills which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate” during the period of Mr. Obama’s imposture Congress saw fit to “be presented [anew] to [Mr. Trump as] the [real] President of the United States” for him to “sign” or to “return * * * with his Objections”. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Also, equivalent corrective steps could be taken to deal with those of Mr. Obama’s purported “executive” actions which Mr. Trump did not desire to adopt anew under his own authority; as well as with many judicial decisions predicated upon Mr. Obama’s unconstitutional handiwork, through (say) the Trump Administration’s invocation of the doctrine of Hazel-Atlas Glass Company v. Hartford-Empire Company, 322 U.S. 238 (1944). And if these measures did raise problems both complex and costly to resolve, the blame would not lie on Mr. Trump, but instead on the parties in official positions who refused to address the question of Mr. Obama’s ineligibility when it first arose.

(b) Exposure of Mr. Obama’s imposture (if such it was) would strike a crippling blow at the neo-Bolshevik “color revolution” now being organized by the Marxist intelligentsia in the suites of NGOs funded by renegade billionaires for the purpose of defaming, frustrating, sabotaging, and finally demolishing the Trump Administration. Deprived of Mr. Obama as its figurehead, neo-Bolshevism in this country would collapse in the confusion of internal struggles for power which would render it an impotent political force for years to come, if not destroy it altogether. Most important,

(c) Proof of Mr. Obama’s ineligibility would preserve the United States from the “precedent” of once having acquiesced in an usurper’s seizure of the White House. To be sure, purported “precedents” which violate the Constitution de facto do not change the Constitution de jure. For the Constitution of the United States is not cut from the same ill-woven cloth as the “constitution” of England, which throughout history has been altered by one successful “precedent” after another (even though many of them were patent usurpations). Nonetheless, it is one thing to suffer a thoroughly corrupt political figure (such as Mrs. Clinton is alleged to be) to escape prosecution—for that does not set a “precedent” which can immunize all such individuals in the future. It is one thing to cover up a “false flag” operation in which rogue officials in some “intelligence agencies” have participated (such as many Americans believe the 9/11 Event to have been)—for that, too, does not set a “precedent” which can exonerate all such miscreants in years to come. And it is even only one thing to countenance wars of aggression fomented by renegades within America’s “military-industrial complex” and “national-security” apparatus (such as this country’s on-going military adventures in the Middle East)—for that does not set a “precedent” capable of overruling the fundamental principle of the Nuremberg Tribunal. See Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), Volume 1, Article 6, at 5. But usurpation of “the Office of President” for eight years by someone not eligible for that office in the first place, while almost everyone else in public life looked the other way and worked hand-in-glove with the usurper, is another thing altogether.

For if that is taken as an effectively binding “precedent” because it remains uncorrected when the evidence cries out for its correction, then Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 of the Constitution becomes a dead letter. And with it the Constitution as a whole—because, his tenure in the White House being utterly lawless in its inception, a faux “President” labors under no duty to, and surely will not, “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, the Constitution first and foremost among them.

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In sum, as President Mr. Trump is not free simply to ignore these matters, if “the Deplorables” (and all other sensible Americans, for that matter) are to take his “Oath or Affirmation” seriously. Should he fail in this regard, then rather than becoming “great again” this country will soon find that its condition warrants the lugubrious prognosis put forward as a general rule of civilizational devolution by Oswald Spengler in his study Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Although this title is usually translated as The Decline of the West, the German noun Untergang can also be rendered, more ominously, as “downfall”, “ruin”, or “destruction”—which in this country’s case will be a fitting epitaph.

© 2017 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




An ominous start? Pt. 1 of 2

According to seemingly reliable reports in the media, President Trump may have determined that his Administration will not conduct a criminal investigation of Hillary Clinton (and presumably of the Clinton Foundation and those associated with it as well).

The reasons that were bruted for this decision prior to Mr. Trump’s inauguration should give one pause. First, various pundits contended that investigation of Mrs. Clinton would run afoul of some supposed “political tradition” in this country which discountenances prosecution of the loser of an election by the winner—when in fact Mrs. Clinton would be investigated, not because she lost the Presidential election, or even because of her dangerously aberrant political views, but instead because she has allegedly engaged in serious misbehavior, quite unconnected to the election, for which any other such perpetrator would surely be prosecuted sine die. Second, one of Mr. Trump’s aides mouthed the psychobabble that foregoing prosecution of Mrs. Clinton could “help her heal”—when “escape” would be the more accurate verb. Third, Mr. Trump himself announced: (i) that “I don’t think we have to delve back in the past”—notwithstanding that every criminal investigation does so; (ii) that prosecution of Mrs. Clinton “would be very, very divisive for the country”—as if affording her immunity from prosecution would not be; and (iii) that “I don’t want to hurt them [i.e., the Clintons]…they’re good people”—leaving to worrisome conjecture what Mr. Trump’s definition of “good people” might be. And most recently, when asked by a reporter whether no further investigations of Mrs. Clinton would be conducted, President Trump responded, “I certainly hope so”.

The most obviously justified criticism of Mr. Trump’s apparent willingness to allow Mrs. Clinton and others associated with her “to skate”, unscathed by honest and competent inquiries into their shadowy dealings, is that it proves once again how in the contemporary United States one body of law (or absence of law) specially privileges and protects the super-rich, the politically well-connected, and other big wheels, top noises, and string-pullers, while a quite different body of law bears down on everyone else. Any constitutionalist should be concerned, though, that something far more serious is involved here.

Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 of the Constitution provides that “[b]efore he [i.e., the President-elect] enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’” The text of this “Oath or Affirmation”sets out, not a possibly inaccurate prediction cast in terms of the simple futurity of temporal sequence (“I shall”), but instead a strict promise of fidelity cast in terms of the emphatic futurity of a solemn assurance (“I will”). Moreover, “taking the * * * Oath or Affirmation” is the condition precedent sine qua non to “enter[ing] on the Execution of [the] Office [of President]”. Self-evidently, if it is not “take[n]” at all, a President-elect cannot “enter on the Execution of [that] Office”. No less plain is that a President-elect cannot “enter on the Execution of [that] Office” if he “take[s] the * * * Oath or Affirmation” falsely. For a false “Oath or Affirmation” is, by definition, fraudulent. And fraud vitiates and renders inoperative any and every act which it has facilitated. To be sure, the falsity of a representation as to the “Oath or Affirmation” might not be evident when it was uttered, because a rogue President-elect would be careful to engage in fraudulent concealment of his true state of mind when he deceitfully “t[ook] the * * * Oath or Affirmation”. That, however, is not the situation here.

Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution sets forth the chief duty of the President, that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. Observe that the phrase “faithfully executed” in this provision echoes the phrase “faithfully execute” in the “Oath or Affirmation”. Thus, his “Oath or Affirmation” requires the President, “to the best of [his] Ability, to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution” by fulfilling the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, without any exception (because the Constitution allows for none).

It requires no extended argument to establish that, now installed in “the Office of President”, Mr. Trump disposes of every right and power necessary, sufficient, and convenient to ensure that “the Laws [shall] be faithfully executed” with respect to Mrs. Clinton and her associates. And no airy notion that she were in some sense and to some degree a “good person” could relieve Mr. Trump of the duty “faithfully [to] execute[ ]” “the Laws” as to her. (Indeed, as a “good person”, Mrs. Clinton herself should welcome the opportunity in an official forum to be absolved of the malodorous charges her record of “public service” seems to substantiate in many Americans’ estimation.)

To be sure, as is every American, Mrs. Clinton and her associates are entitled to the presumption of innocence. But, based upon what is already known about their behavior, this country is entitled to see them properly investigated, indicted, and prosecuted, in order to test that presumption in the crucible of a public trial, before a jury of their peers, pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 and Amendments Five and Six of the Constitution surely, and Article III, Clause 1 possibly. Mr. Trump has, however, left the world with the distinct impression that he does not intend to press for investigations into Mrs. Clinton’s questionable affairs. As a matter of constitutional law (as well as common sense), the reasons he has advanced for this disinclination are unconvincing, if not patently specious. Therefore, if before his inauguration he actually did not, and following his inauguration still does not, intend under color of “the Office of President” to “take Care that the [applicable] Laws be faithfully executed” as to her, then he did not “take the * * * Oath or Affirmation” truthfully—and as a result did not “enter on the Execution of [the] Office [of President]” at all. If so, America finds herself confronted with yet another Presidency constitutionally questionable from its supposed inception.

Admittedly, this concern rests upon something of a fine legal point—although not one so fine as to be indiscernible on the face of the Constitution. In any event, the Constitution is festooned with fine points intended to impede and even impale rogue public officials in their malicious course. These points can serve their purposes, however, only if they are forcefully driven home, without any compunction, whenever suitable occasions arise. Few crimes are worse than the systematic prostitution, perversion, and betrayal of public office for private political and financial gain. But surely one of them is for someone to attempt to “enter on the Execution of [the] Office [of President]” knowingly and willfully intent upon allowing anyone who has notoriously engaged in such misbehavior to escape punishment.

Unfortunately, the running of various statutes of limitations might preclude prosecution of Mrs. Clinton and her associates with respect to some of their alleged misbehavior—although statutes of limitations can be removed or extended by legislation. See, e.g., Chase Securities Corporation v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885). Where statutes of limitations would impose a bar, though, it would still behoove the Trump Administration to investigate these matters thoroughly and report its findings completely to the public. See Lee Duigon’s recent NewsWithViews commentary “A Speech Mr. Trump Ought To Make” (17 November 2016).

As a complicating factor, it is not inconceivable that Mr. Trump might seek to finesse this apparently distasteful political situation in a legalistic fashion by purporting to extend some sort of blanket “pardon” to Mrs. Clinton and her associates. Any such “pardon” which issued before indictments had specified the crimes the members of the Clinton cabal had allegedly committed would be constitutionally problematic, however.

The nature and extent of the “Power” of the President under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution “to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment” is not defined in the Constitution—and therefore the specifics as to those matters must be derived from the similar power of the King in pre-constitutional Anglo-American law. “As this power has been exercised, from time immemorial, by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close relationship; we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon”. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 150, 160 (1833). Under the laws of England applicable to the Colonies prior to the Declaration of Independence—

* * * What is required to make a good Pardon of Felony in general: It seems to be laid down as a general Rule in many Books, that where-ever it may be reasonably intended that the King, when he granted such Pardon, was not fully apprised both of the Heinousness of the Crime, and also how far the Party stands convicted thereof upon Record, the Pardon is void, as being gained by Imposition upon the King. * * *
* * * It hath been holden, That anciently a Pardon of all Felonies, included all Treasons, as well as Felonies whatsoever, and might be pleaded to an Indictment for them: And it seems to be taken for granted, in many Books, that a Pardon of all Felonies in general, without describing any one particular Felony, may even at this Day, if the Party be neither attainted nor indicted, be pleaded in Bar of any Felony whatsoever, coming within the general Limitations of the Pardon, except Murder or Rape, and that the only Reason why it cannot also be pleaded to Murder of Rape, is because [a] Statute * * * requires an express Mention of them. But I find this point no where solemnly debated; neither doth it seem easy to reconcile it with the general Rules concerning Pardons, agreed to be good in other Cases; for if a Felony cannot be well pardoned where it may be reasonably intended that the King, when he granted the Pardon was not fully apprised of the State of the Case, much less doth it seem reasonable that it should be pardoned where it may well be intended that he was not apprised of it at all. And if a Felony whereof a Person be attainted cannot be well pardoned, even tho’ it appear that the King was informed of all the Circumstances of the Fact, unless it also appear that he was informed of the Attainder, mu ch less doth it seem reasonable that a Felony should be well pardoned where it doth not appear that he knew any Thing of it: For by this Means, where the King in Truth intends only to pardon one Felony, which may be very proper for his Mercy, he may by Consequence pardon the greatest Number of the most heinous Crimes, the least of which, had he been apprised of it, he would not have pardoned. And for these Reasons, as I suppose, general Pardons are commonly made by Act of Parliament; and have been of late Years very rarely granted by the Crown, without a particular Description of the Offence intended to be pardoned. * * * And therefore where the Books speak of Pardons of all Felonies in general as good, perhaps it may be reasonable for the most part to intend that they either speak of a Pardon by Parliament, or that they suppose that the particular Crime is mentioned in the Pardon, tho’ they do not express it.

William Hawkins, A Treatise of The Pleas of the Crown (London, England: E. and R. Nutt, and R. Gosling, Third Edition, 1739), Book II, Chapter 37, §§ 8 and 9, at 382-384 (marginal notes omitted). It should be kept in mind that, in contradistinction to Parliament, Congress has no power to issue “general Pardons” (or even any “Pardon” whatsoever), or to delegate such a nonexistent power to the President.

So, inasmuch as the details of much of Mrs. Clinton’s own alleged wrongdoing, let alone the suspected wrongdoing of numerous others associated with her, will remain shrouded in mystery until proper investigations have been conducted, it passes understanding how Mr. Trump could, with constitutional propriety, issue “general Pardons” to any members of the Clinton cabal.

To be sure, some decisions of the Supreme Court have seemingly expanded the Presidential “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons” beyond the boundaries outlined above. The mere existence of such decisions, though, poses no insurmountable bar to the analysis presented here. For a decision of the Supreme Court on a point of constitutional law is not necessarily valid simply because the Court has handed it down. First, as was self-evident in principle well before the Constitution was even first imagined, “the law, and the opinion of the judge are not always convertible terms, or one and the same thing; since it sometimes may happen that the judge will mistake the law”. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: American Edition, Robert Bell, 1771), Volume 1, at 71. Second, in practice under the Constitution the Supreme Court itself has admitted that it has often erred in its constructions of that document. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-830 & note 1 (1991).

Therefore, no decision of the Supreme Court can be taken at face value as an infallible authority as to what the Constitution means.

Rather, the Constitution determines whether a decision of the Supreme Court is correct or incorrect. And in the final analysis only WE THE PEOPLE can render the Constitution’s meaning certain, because WE THE PEOPLE “ordain[ed] and establish[ed] th[e] Constitution” in the first place; and (as the Supreme Court itself has admitted) “[t]he power to enact carries with it final authority to declare the meaning of the legislation”. Compare the Preamble to the Constitution with Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 484 (1949). For part two click below.

© 2017 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




A monetary litmus test for Mr. Trump Pt. 2

Second, if the Board of Governors and the Federal Reserve regional banks are to be “abolish[ed]”, so too must Federal Reserve Notes disappear. For “Federal reserve notes, to be issued at the discretion of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the purpose of making advances to Federal reserve banks * * * and for no other purpose, are authorized”; and only “[t]he Board of Governors * * * shall have the right * * * to grant in whole or in part, or to reject entirely the application of any Federal Reserve bank for Federal Reserve notes”. 12 U.S.C. §§ 411 and 414. (Conversely, if Federal Reserve Notes are to be retained, the Board and the Federal Reserve regional banks must continue in operation as the mutually complementary sources of those Notes.) Federal Reserve Notes, however, make up the great bulk of the circulating currency of the United States. The questions then arise: If Federal Reserve Notes were “abolish[ed]” as the necessary consequence of “abolish[ing]” those components of the Federal Reserve System which could be “abolish[ed]” (that is, the Board of Governors and the Federal Reserve regional banks), then what currency would most Americans use in their day-to-day commercial and other private transactions? And in what currency would taxes and other public dues, and various governmental expenditures, be paid at every level of the federal system?

D. Some individuals argue that, in order to reinstate sound money in this country’s economy, it would not be necessary to “abolish the Fed”, as long as Congress repealed the statute which provides that “United States coins and currencies (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues”. 31 U.S.C. § 5103. Were this provision stricken from the United States Code, these people contend, anyone could use any currency for the payment of debts; and everyone (in the exercise of rationality) would sooner or later take advantage of that freedom to choose currencies more stable than Federal Reserve Notes. The ensuing competition among currencies would work a reversal of Gresham’s Law, in the long run driving Federal Reserve Notes out of general circulation. This notion, unfortunately, is ill informed.

In law and fact, today no one is required to employ only Federal Reserve Notes as “legal tender” in any private contract. Anyone can contract for payment in any legitimate currency, including gold and silver, to the absolute exclusion of Federal Reserve Notes. Confusion arises on this score because many Americans seem to be possessed by the notion that Congress has outlawed so-called “gold-clause contracts”. Indeed, Congress did so in 1933. But that prohibition has been set aside with respect to private obligations issued after 27 October 1977. See 31 U.S.C. § 5118(a) and (d). And the States cannot disable themselves from entering into enforceable “gold-clause contracts”. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. (But the government of the United States has statutorily crippled itself in that regard. See 31 U.S.C. 5118(b) and (c).)

The problem with competition among currencies for private parties and the States is that, in order to take advantage of economically sound and constitutional currencies as alternatives to Federal Reserve Notes, Americans must have at hand mechanisms which will enable them to employ those currencies efficiently in their day-to-day transactions within the free market and with the States’ governments. Such mechanisms do not now exist to any worthwhile extent. The “member banks” in the Federal Reserve System, for example, do not provide their customers with the option of opening “gold accounts” or “silver accounts” through which ownership of aliquots of precious metals can be transferred from one account-holder to another by checks, electronic transfers, and so on, in the same manner as Federal Reserve Note balances. Until the “member banks” do provide that option, or States in significant numbers establish gold and silver depository-banks of their own (as Texas is doing), no real competition between gold and silver, on the one hand, and Federal Reserve Notes, on the other hand, can take place.

E. In the absence of gold and silver currencies circulating side-by-side with Federal Reserve Notes in open and fair competition, Americans are compelled by circumstances to depend upon those Notes (and bank-deposits payable therein) as their only practical currency. So, if the Federal Reserve System should collapse, and Federal Reserve Notes should become next to worthless through hyperinflation, America’s economy would tumble into the black pit of chaos. The Globalist International is, of course, preparing for that eventuality—and may even be plotting to bring it about during the first years of the Trump Administration. However such chaos may arise, when it does the Globalist International, through the International Monetary Fund or some other monetary machinery of “the new world order”, will impose upon this country a new fiat currency—controlled, of course, by the Globalist International. This will shackle Americans more tightly to “the new world order” than ever they have or could have been chained through the Federal Reserve System.

In order to avoid this dire fate, the Trump Administration must set competition among currencies in motion well before the present economic crisis degenerates into a full-blown monetary and banking catastrophe which prevents such competition from even starting. With the benefit of contemporary computer technology, it would be easy enough, through a gradual process mediated by the free market, to establish economically sound and constitutional alternative currencies of gold and silver as viable competitors against Federal Reserve Notes. In the short term, the introduction of such alternative currencies would to a large degree obviate, or at least mitigate, the immediate danger that a collapse of the banking system could (almost surely would) leave Americans with no functioning currency at all, until the Globalist International proffered one at the cost of this country’s sovereignty. In the long run, the introduction of such alternative currencies would bring the full force of the free market to bear against the Federal Reserve System, leading to its gradual self-abolition, as the “member banks” found themselves compelled by economic pressures beyond the Globalist International’s ability to resist to replace Federal Reserve Notes with the alternative currencies as their customers’ preferred media of exchange. And requiring the “member banks” to establish gold and silver accounts for their private customers and perhaps the States as well would not run afoul of the statutory prohibition in 31 U.S.C. § 5118(b) that “[t]he United States Government may not pay out any gold coin”, for the self-evident reason that neither the private “member banks”, nor the States, nor even the private Federal Reserve regional banks are “[t]he United States Government”.

F. My NewsWithViews commentary “Presidential Questions” describes how a patriotic President could use 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) to compel the banks in the Federal Reserve System to make sound and constitutional alternative currencies available to their customers. (The same statute could also be employed, for example, to require the banks to abide by the principles of the Glass-Steagall Act; to punish financial gambling by compelling the banks to write off many of the fantastic “derivatives” on their books as the unenforceable wagers they really are; to impose accountability on the extremely dangerous profession of central banking by passing through from the banks as institutions to their officials as individuals the responsibility to make up the losses their customers may suffer from the banks’ negligence or intentional wrongdoing; and even to prohibit the banks from advancing the agenda of “gun controllers” through discrimination against businesses that deal in the firearms necessary to secure “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” which the Second Amendment declares “shall not be infringed”.)

That, in the present economic and political circumstances confronting this country, 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) should be bent to those and other worthwhile purposes needs no elaborate explanation. It suffices to remind the readers of this commentary that, at the height of the monetary and banking crisis of the 1930s, Congress extended to President Franklin D. Roosevelt the authority now to be found in that statute, which mandates that,

[i]n order to provide for the safer and more effective operation of the National Banking System and the Federal Reserve System, to preserve for the people the full benefits of the currency provided for by the Congress through the National Banking System and the Federal Reserve System, and to relieve interstate commerce of the burdens and obstructions resulting from the receipt on an unsound or unsafe basis of deposits subject to withdrawal by check, during such emergency period as the President of the United States by proclamation may prescribe, no member bank of the Federal Reserve System shall transact any banking business except to such extent and subject to such regulations, limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President. Any individual, partnership, corporation, or association, or any director, officer or employee thereof, violating any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or, if a natural person, may, in addition to such fine, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding ten years. Each day that any such violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense.

What deserves emphasis is that, if President Trump hopes to defend his Administration successfully against dirty dealings, defiance, domination, and even destruction by the Globalist International, he must rein in the Federal Reserve System by employing in a determined, definitive, and decisive manner the very tools Congress provided to President Roosevelt. For no better tools are available. And he must act right now, not later on. The Globalist International will afford him no other option. He must, as it were, bite the bullet today, or else bite the dust tomorrow. All that is needed is for President Trump “by proclamation [to] prescribe” an “emergency period”, and to extend his “approval” to the necessary and sufficient “regulations, limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed by [his] Secretary of the Treasury”. Neither Congress nor the Judiciary need be called upon to take any action.

First, President Trump must seize the initiative—acting, rather than reacting. He cannot wait for the present economic crisis to burst forth in a cataclysm for which the “mainstream media” will unfairly but unrelentingly hold him personally accountable. Rather, he must unstintingly and unsparingly assign the blame for the hard times ahead to the individuals and institutions actually responsible for these troubles. The American people are entitled to know the malefactors’ names, to see their faces, and to review the rap-sheets that record their wrongdoing.

Second, President Trump must announce, in no uncertain terms, that his Administration will no longer tolerate privileged sanctuaries from which bankers and their cronies on Wall Street can launch future campaigns of financial aggression and looting against the American people, and then within which they can shelter from their impoverished victims’ legal and political retaliation, retribution, and justifiable demands for restitution. Under the Trump Administration, no banks, bankers, or Wall Street financial casinos and speculators can be deemed “too big to fail” or (especially) “too big to jail”. Or “too big to be subjected to constant and close surveillance” in order to deter failures born of negligence and to punish criminal offenses—for if average Americans who pose no conceivable threat to this country’s economy can be exposed to the NSA’s interminable probing into every last one of their innocuous e-mails, surely the operations of the bankers and speculators who have already gutted this nation’s economy through their incompetence and crooked deals, and absent strict supervision can be expected to continue to blunder and cheat, deserve no less microscopic examination.

Third, through the contemporary equivalent of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “fireside chats”, President Trump must go over the heads of the “mainstream media” to explain in detail to the American people what he is doing, why he is doing it, and especially the source of his authority for those actions.

Fourth, one may expect the bankers to whine that President Trump’s employment of legislation as draconian as 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) will disregard—indeed, will put paid to—the vaunted “independence” of the Federal Reserve System. That “independence”, however, is purely mythical. Under the Constitution, Congress could have licensed the Federal Reserve System to devise and put into effect “monetary policy” only if Congress enjoyed the power to set the terms of “monetary policy” itself. And Congress could not have delegated this power, in whole or in part, to the Federal Reserve System in such a manner that it could never rescind that delegation, in whole or in part, whenever and to whatever degree it saw fit. So the Federal Reserve System could never claim “independence” from Congress—or from the President, exercising the authority Congress extended to him in 12 U.S.C. § 95(a). Moreover, even if under color of some aberrant legal theory Congress could have purported to delegate its authority over “monetary policy” completely and irrevocably to the private banks in the cartel—a notion at war with the principles enunciated in the Supreme Court’s decision in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-537 (1935) (“[s]uch a delegation of legislative power [to private cartels] is unknown to our law and * * * utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress”)—in fact it has never done so. Quite the contrary: Section 30 of the original Federal Reserve Act wisely provided that “[t]he right [of Congress] to amend, alter, or repeal this Act is hereby expressly reserved”. An Act To provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes, Act of 23 December 1913, CHAP. 6, 38 Stat. 251, 275. And the terms of 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) make it pellucid that the latter statute is an amazingly foresightful exercise of the authority Congress so reserved.

Fifth and last, President Trump must premonish the bankers that, if they refuse to coöperate to their utmost in implementing “such regulations, limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President”, then one and all they will be held personally accountable under the statutory directive that “[e]ach day that any such violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense”. The bankers might rightly consider this the very zenith of bad news; but neither they nor their megaphones in the “mainstream media” would be able to dismiss it as “fake news”.

If President Trump passes this litmus test, then in the fashion of the Big Bad Wolf the Globalist International can huff and puff and threaten to blow America’s economic house down to its heart’s content. But, with 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) as a Sword of Damocles hanging over the bankers’ heads, Mr. Trump and “the Deplorables” whose welfare he has promised to champion can weather that storm of bluff and bluster, and lay the indispensable monetary groundwork to “make America great again”

Click here for part —–> 1, 2,

© 2017 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




A monetary litmus test for Mr. Trump Pt. 1

PART 1 of 2

Recently, various analysts and commentators in the alternative media have darkly speculated that, rather than presenting a real opportunity to “make America great again”, Donald Trump’s ascendency to the Oval Office actually provides the Globalist International with the perfect opportunity to take a giant stride in the direction of a “new world order” in which America will be reduced to a mere satrapy in a grandiose scheme of totalitarian “global governance”. Their negative appreciations of the situation and prognostications generally follow these lines:

(i) The world is now confronted by an ever-intensifying economic crisis which is insoluble within and through the present international arrangements of fiat currencies, fractional-reserve central banking and allied financial dealings, politically orchestrated “free trade”, and so on.

(ii) When this crisis finally explodes in a worldwide catastrophe—whether in the form of an economic contraction in comparison to which the Great Depression of the 1930s will appear as a period of prosperity, of the hyperinflation of major currencies such as the Federal Reserve Note which will dwarf the Weimar inflation of 1923, or of one followed by the other—entirely new arrangements will have to be made.

(iii) The onset of such a catastrophe could be the result of chance. Or it could be brought about by the Globalist International, which now controls all of the world’s major financial institutions through the engineered collapse of which the cataclysm could be triggered at almost any time.

(iv) In either event, although in fairness Mr. Trump cannot possibly be blamed for any of the circumstances which are leading up to and will cause the catastrophe—for which, self-evidently, the Globalist International should be condemned as fully responsible, its political puppets having been in power throughout most of the Western world since the end of World War II—the Trump Administration will be held at fault. Not only that, but the surge of national populism which elected Mr. Trump will be discredited. And the mass of Americans who supported him will be left disconsolate, depressed, and politically disarmed in the face of the Globalists’ taunt that “we told you so”—leading to the ascendancy of the Globalist International’s candidates in the next Congressional and Presidential elections; and then to the enactment of legislation, ratification of treaties, and signing of “executive orders” and other decrees necessary and sufficient to secure the final victory of globalism over Americanism.

(v) Some analysts and commentators even go so far as to impugn Mr. Trump as actually nothing less than a “Manchurian Candidate” deviously put up by the Globalist International in order to preside over the catastrophe as its own front-man. Others argue that, although the Globalist International was truly surprised by Mr. Trump’s election, it immediately realized that it could turn his Presidency to its own advantage by accelerating the arrival of the inevitable catastrophe during the next few years, and will set about to do so soon after Mr. Trump is inaugurated. The latter scenario, of course, depends upon the accuracy of the Globalist International’s apparent assessment that, being only an amateur in the fields of Ponzi economics and criminal politics, Mr. Trump will prove unable to foresee, let alone to thwart, the Globalist International’s machinations.

To be sure, if Mr. Trump is a “Manchurian Candidate” after all, that is the end of the matter. America is likely doomed, unless “the Deplorables” realize—and take decisive action based on their realization—that (in the words of the Declaration of Independence) “a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object [has finally] evince[d] a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism”; and therefore “it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security”. At that juncture “in the Course of human events”, though, all bets will be off. For no one can predict whether “the good People” of America will prove able to secure for themselves, “among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them”, but which the Globalist International is intent upon wrenching from them.

Without far more evidence than anyone has adduced to date, I am unwilling to entertain the “Manchurian Candidate” thesis, or to conclude that a “Declaration of Independence situation” now confronts this country with the desperate choice to do or to die. Yet I am no less disinclined simply to abide events, merely hoping for the best. The political-scientific method is to apply a litmus test to determine what Mr. Trump’s political pH actually is with respect to the economic crisis. Such a test is mandatory, because this is THE problem which his Administration must solve, or go under, taking the United States with it.

In every major country throughout the world, the main source of the Globalist International’s power has been, and remains, its stranglehold over money and banking—embodied, in the United States, in the Federal Reserve System. The present economic crisis has arisen, not only because (as sound economic theory teaches and repeated experience has confirmed) the Federal Reserve System—indeed, all central banks—are unworkable in principle, but also because in practice the Globalist International has systematically employed that System—indeed, all central banks under its thumb—to loot most of the people of every country in which such banks have operated, for the benefit of minuscule minorities of those country’s populations, and will continue to do so until some irresistible force puts an end to its depredations. Moreover, perforce of the Federal Reserve System’s monopolistic position and claimed “independence” from political supervision let alone control, the Globalist International has been, and remains, able to threaten every American President and Congress with the specter of financial and then general economic chaos and attendant social upheavals should the government fail to satisfy the bankers’ incessant and insatiable demands for all sorts of abusive special privileges—from the prohibition of “gold-clause contracts” and the seizure of private citizens’ gold during the Roosevelt Administration, to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act’s safeguards during the Clinton Administration, to the first big ($700 billion) “bail out” of financial institutions supposedly “too big to fail” during the Bush Administration, to the “too big to jail” policy which effectively immunized those institutions during Mr. Obama’s residence in the White House, to whatever the bankers’ menaces can pry out of the Trump Administration in the future. Therefore, in order to deal with the economic crisis—and to disarm the Globalist International of its most potent weapon—the Trump Administration must bring the Federal Reserve System to heel, immediately if not sooner. Whether Mr. Trump can muster the foresight, the insight, the prudence, and the courage to do so will be his critical litmus test. The question, then, is “What should he do?”

A. Some people imagine that President Trump can improve the performance of the Federal Reserve System by appointing new members to the System’s Board of Governors. Inasmuch as the theory of central banking under which the Federal Reserve System operates is hopelessly flawed, this suggestion is no less ridiculous then the expectation that a new set of chemists could improve the performance of a laboratory even though they were still required to conduct their experiments according to the erroneous precepts of the Phlogiston Theory.

B. Numerous voices have called for an “audit” of the Federal Reserve System. What the speakers have in mind would not be an “audit” in the commonplace sense of that term, looking to ferret out run-of-the-mill institutional waste, fraud, and abuse—such as whether the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee have spent inordinate amounts on plush oriental carpets for their offices, or on lush lunches catered by posh French restaurants in the District of Columbia. Rather, the purpose would be to examine why those bodies have settled on certain “monetary policies” rather than others, and what the consequences of those policies have been—apparently with the “auditors’” goal being to establish that the Federal Reserve System has been incompetent, ineffective, counterproductive, or in some other way deficient as an instrument of “monetary governance”. That such an “audit” would serve that end is, however, a naïve hope.

First, the necessity for such an “audit” is not apparent. “The Chairman of the Board [of Governors already] shall appear before the Congress at semi-annual hearings”, at which “[t]he Board shall * * * submit a written report * * * , containing a discussion of the conduct of monetary policy and economic developments and prospects for the future, taking into account past and prospective developments in employment, unemployment, production, investment, real income, productivity, exchange rates, international trade and payments, and prices”. 12 U.S.C. § 225b(a) and (b). In addition, the Board is already required to “place on its home internet website * * * a repository of information made available to the public for * * * not less than 6 months following the date of release of the relevant information”, including various reports, annual financial statements, and “such other information as the Board reasonably believes is necessary or helpful to the public in understanding the accounting, financial reporting, and internal controls of the Board and the Federal reserve banks”. 12 U.S.C. § 225b(c). Do these requirements not amount, in their own ways, to a rather extensive on-going “audit”?

Second, even an arguably more comprehensive “audit” of the Federal Reserve System would prove next to nothing, in light of the broad statutory language with which Congress has seen fit to license the Board and the Open Market Committee to “maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to maintain effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”. 12 U.S.C. § 225a. One need not be overly cynical to conclude that a mandate of this verbal elasticity could and would be stretched so as to rationalize any and every “monetary policy” which the Board and the Committee might have imagined to be advisable under the ever-changing economic situations to which they have been required to respond. What “smoking gun” of gross impropriety, then, could an “audit” of how the Board and the Committee have implemented this statute be expected to disclose? For each and every decision of “monetary policy” there might be (likely would be) a dozen or more ostensibly plausible reasons “pro” and an equal number “con”, as well as equal numbers of entirely different conclusions which the Board and the Committee could have justified with seemingly valid arguments. Thus, such an “audit” would simply provoke endless disputations over the efficacy or inefficacy of this or that policy—all of the debate larded to the gagging-point with the sort of Keynesian claptrap, complex econometric obfuscations, and bureaucratic gobbledygook extolling the Board’s and the Committee’s “expertise” which would leave the general public thoroughly befuddled. Certainly less expensive, and probably no less useful, than such an “audit” would be to conduct an on-going seance aimed at “channeling” the opinions of former officials of the Federal Reserve System who have passed on to the afterlife—for their spirits at least could inform the public as to how they have been rewarded, or (more likely) punished, for their implementations of the central bank’s “monetary policies” during their earthly incarnations. Perhaps the rumored success Hillary Clinton has claimed in “channeling” Eleanor Roosevelt would qualify her as the medium best suited to deliver these messages.

C. Not a few individuals want to dispense with an “audit” and instead simply “abolish the Fed”. To be sure, “abolish[ing] the Fed” in some manner will ultimately be necessary at some point on the road towards eventually imposing sound economic as well as thoroughly constitutional principles on “monetary policy” in both the District of Columbia and the several States. But the slogan “Abolish the Fed!”, with its implications of totality and immediacy, cannot be taken seriously.

First, contrary to popular usage, there is no monolithic “Fed” to “abolish”. The Federal Reserve System is a complex cartel, the three main components of which are: (i) the Board of Governors; (ii) twelve private Federal Reserve regional banks; and (iii) numerous private “member banks” (including National and State banks) scattered throughout America. Whatever the final fate of the Board and the regional banks, the “member banks” cannot be “abolish[ed]” outright without depriving this country of necessary banking services. Foe part two click below.

Click here for part —–> 12,

© 2017 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




The wisdom of the electoral college

Since the recent Presidential election, the media have overflowed with rather rancorous debates about the legitimacy of the Electoral College, in contrast to a simple count of the overall national votes for the two major candidates, Donald Trump (who, it seems, has won a majority of the Electoral College) and Hillary Clinton (who, it appears, has won a majority of the popular vote). These debates have usually assumed the simplistic form of one side’s contending that, as a supposed “democracy”, America should elect the President by majority vote; while the other side counters that the United States is a “republic” in which majoritarianism is not always desirable, let alone controlling. Both of these arguments miss a crucial point which derives from the federal system in general, and the duties of the States and the powers of the President within that system in particular.

In The Federalist No. 39, James Madison explained that

[t]he executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society.

Here, Madison recognized the importance of the States’ continuing positions as semi-sovereignties within the Constitution’s federal system. As such, although they do not retain all of the rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of full and independent sovereignties, they continue to enjoy many of those legal attributes as component parts of that system. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. X.

Arguably the most important of these rights, powers, privileges, and immunities—and under the Constitution a duty as well—is for each of the States to maintain an armed force suitable to the “Republican Form of Government” which the Constitution requires each of them to preserve, and all of them, acting in the capacity of the United States, to “guarantee” to one another. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. For sovereignty is the quintessence of political power; and all “‘[p]olitical power grows out of the barrel of a gun’”. Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking, China: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), at 61. This armed force is what the Second Amendment identifies as “[a] well regulated Militia”, which it declares to be “necessary to the security of a free State”. Each of the States must maintain “[a] well regulated Militia” in order to remain “a free State”, and thus to preserve for herself (as well as for her sister States) “a Republican Form of Government”. Moreover, each of the States must maintain “[a] well regulated Militia” in order to secure for Congress the forces the Constitution empowers it “[t]o provide for calling forth * * * to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.

Now, the Constitution invests the President with the status of “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Furthermore, except to “engage in War” when “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”, the States have at their own disposal no permanent armed forces other than their Militia; for they may not “keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace” “without the Consent of Congress”.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. And today, through the mutual “Consent of Congress” and the States, those “Troops, or Ships of War” are organized in the National Guard and the so-called Naval Militia, which in certain circumstances can be brought under the President’s authority as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”. Compare U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 with, e.g., 32 U.S.C. § 101(3) through (7). Thus it is entirely fitting—indeed, one would think compulsory—for the President to be elected by a process which to the greatest practical degree maximizes the influence of “the States in their political characters”, as opposed to a simple majority vote within the nation as a whole which more or less disregards or even negates that influence.

For the Constitution plainly contemplates situations in which the States’ “‘[p]olitical power [which] grows out of the barrel of a gun” will be exercised by the President directly. One may question whether the Electoral College is, in abstract theory, the very best means to this end imaginable; but, in practice, it is undoubtedly one efficacious means, and the means the Constitution specifies.

Thus, the arguments put forward by those in Mrs. Clinton’s camp against the political wisdom of the Electoral College and in favor of raw majoritarianism as the best way to select the President are basically at odds with federalism in theory and constitutionalism in practice—and should be rejected on that ground alone.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




No sanctuaries in “sanctuary cities”

In his recent NewsWithViews commentary, “Sanctuary Cities and the PATCO Strike Analogy” (21 November 2016), Jonathan Emord recommends that

[u]pon assuming office, President Trump should announce that Sanctuary Cities violate federal law and that any state official who impedes federal law enforcement officials endeavoring to enforce the nation’s immigration law will be arrested and prosecuted. * * * While it is beyond federal law to permit the arrest of state and local officials who enact sanctuary city laws and policies, it is not beyond federal law (indeed, it is entirely consistent with federal law and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution) to arrest and prosecute any such official who actually physically obstructs ICE agents from investigating, arresting, and prosecuting illegal aliens.
One wonders, though, whether “actual[ ] physical[ ] obstruct[ion]” is the only basis on which rogue State and Local officials who devise and promote “sanctuary city laws and policies” can be prosecuted.

For example, Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324(a)(1) provides (in pertinent part) that

(A) Any person who—

* * * * *

(iii) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or means of transportation;
(iv) encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law; or (v) (I) engages in any conspiracy to commit any of the preceding acts; or (II) aids or abets the commission of any of the preceding acts,
shall be punished as provided in subparagraph (B).

(B) A person who violates subparagraph (A) shall, for each alien in respect to whom such a violation occurs—

* * * * *

(ii) in the case of a violation of subparagraph * * * [(A)](iii), (iv), or (v)(II), be fined under title 18, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both;
(iii) in the case of a violation of subparagraph * * * [(A)](iii), (iv), or (v) during and in relation to which the person causes serious bodily injury * * * to, or places in jeopardy the life of, any person, be fined under title 18, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; and
(iv) in the case of a violation of subparagraph * * * [(A)](iii), (iv), or (v) resulting in the death of any person, be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, fined under title 18, or both.
Now, it seems beyond question that—

I. This statute applies to “[a]ny person”, without exception, including State and Local public officials.

II. This statute applies even to a situation in which no more than a single illegal alien (“an alien” and “each alien”) is involved.

III. By hypothesis, the purported State and Local laws, regulations, and policies under which “sanctuary cities” operate are designed and put into practice specifically to “conceal[ ], harbor[ ], or shield[ ] from detection” “alien[s who] ha[ve] come to, entered, or remain[ed] in the United States in violation of law”.

IV. Self-evidently, the very existence of “sanctuary cities” “encourages or induces * * * alien[s] to come to, enter, or reside in the United States * * * in violation of law”. And therefore,

V. Those rogue public officials who set up and administer their jurisdictions as “sanctuary cities”, along with everyone who aids and abets them in doing so, are in each instance “engage[d] in a[ ] conspiracy” to violate § 1324(a)(1)(A)—and “for each alien in respect to whom such a violation occurs” should suffer the punishments § 1324(a)(1)(B) prescribes.

Nothing in § 1324(a)(1)(A) requires, as a condition of a prosecution, that “[a]ny person” (in Mr. Emord’s words) must “actually physically obstruct[ ] ICE agents from investigating, arresting, and prosecuting illegal aliens”.

Rather, inasmuch as purported laws, regulations, and policies are the indispensable legalistic camouflage by means of which rogue State and Local officials create and administer “sanctuary cities” for the very purposes of “conceal[ing], harbor[ing], or shield[ing] from detection” “alien[s who] ha[ve] come to, entered, or remain[ed ] in the United States in violation of law”, those officials’ creation and application of such laws, regulations, and policies for such purposes—coupled with the discovery in each jurisdiction of just a single illegal alien who has taken advantage of the “sanctuary” those provisions purport to provide—should constitute evidence sufficient for such officials’ convictions. And nothing in the criminal laws of the United States provides a specific immunity from prosecution for rogue State and Local officials who violate statutes which on their faces apply to “[a]ny person” without exception.

If Mr. Trump is serious about enforcing the laws pertaining to illegal immigration against the worst (or at least the most notorious and insufferable) scoff laws of all, perhaps proving that there are no sanctuaries in “sanctuary cities” is the way to start.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




Mr. Trump’s second amendment

Notwithstanding the rioters in the streets of major American cities who are attempting to create the chaotic conditions for a neo-Bolshevik take-over of the United States through a “purple color revolution” of the George Soros/Gene Sharp pattern, tens of millions of Americans are provisionally pleased with the election of Donald Trump to the Presidency. Only “provisionally pleased”, though, because even among his most ardent supporters no one can be certain of what he actually intends to do, or will in fact do, once he has been inaugurated.

The most important duty of any and every President is to fulfill the “Oath or Affirmation” that he “do[es] solemnly swear (or affirm) that [he] will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States”. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. To this end, he must rigorously perform his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, the Constitution being first and foremost among those “Laws”. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. On his official website, Mr. Trump assures us that he will champion what he describes as “Second Amendment Rights”. Unfortunately, a careful reading of this declaration demonstrates deficiencies in his understanding of those “Rights” and their proper applications.

At this early stage, Mr. Trump can be excused for his somewhat naïve views on the Second Amendment, which he has apparently drawn from simplistic talking-points put out by the National Rifle Association. In the long run, though, he will need to develop a better comprehension of the Second Amendment (as well as other provisions of the Constitution related thereto) than he has exhibited to date, if he really intends as to fulfill his Presidential duty to “take Care that [the Second Amendment] be faithfully executed”.

1. Mr. Trump states that “[t]he Second Amendment is clear. The right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed upon. Period.” It would have been preferable for him, in invoking the clarity of the Second Amendment, not to have added a word which does not appear there (“upon”). It would have been even more preferable for him to have quoted, not just the Amendment’s last fourteen words, but also the thirteen words which precede them: namely, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”. For those words encapsulate the true purpose of the Amendment, enabling anyone who cares to study American pre-constitutional law and history to comprehend the full meaning of the Amendment’s last fourteen words.

As I have written a little book on that subject—appropriately entitled Thirteen Words—I shall not burden the readers of this commentary with a repetition of what appears there. Neither shall I inundate my readers here with the huge amount of relevant pre-constitutional law and history which appears in my much more extensive work, The Sword and Sovereignty. At this juncture it is enough to point out that, although Mr. Trump is quite correct in asserting that “[t]he Second Amendment guarantees a fundamental right that belongs to all law-abiding Americans” and that “[t]he Constitution doesn’t create that right—it ensures that the government can’t take it away”, he slips into dangerous error when he posits that “the Second Amendment’s purpose is to guarantee our right to defend ourselves and our families. This is about self-defense, plain and simple.” The defense of individuals and their families—solely as individuals and families—is but a very small part of the constitutional picture. The Second Amendment’s true purpose is to guarantee Americans the right—and to insure for them the ability to perform the duty—to defend their communities, to the end of securing “a free State” at every level of the federal system throughout this country. Ultimately, the Second Amendment provides for the perpetuation of those “well regulated Militia” which it declares to be “necessary to the security of a free State”. Mere individuals and families—as isolated individuals and families—cannot possibly succeed through individual self-defense in thwarting the kinds of threats most likely to endanger “the security of a free State”.

Mr. Trump reminds his supporters that “[i]t’s been said that the Second Amendment is America’s first freedom”. (Actually, this is a slogan of the NRA, which even publishes a magazine under the title “The First Freedom”.) “That’s because”, Mr. Trump explains, “the Right to Keep and Bear Arms protects all our other rights.” Now, if Mr. Trump means that the Second Amendment “protects all our other rights”—from the Declaration of Independence through the Constitution and laws of the United States and the several States—because it secures “well regulated Militia” as integral and permanent parts of the federal system, with governmental authority in the hands of We the People themselves, he stands on solid constitutional ground.

I have written another little book on that very subject, entitled Three Rights, which those who are interested in the matter can consult at their leisure. But if Mr. Trump means that individual self-defense, exercised by isolated individuals, can “protect[ ] all our other rights”, he totters on quicksand. Exactly how can mere individuals and their families, armed for the sole purpose of self-defense as individuals and families—but without the necessary organization, training, discipline, and specifically governmental authority—possibly “protect[ ] all our other rights” (or any of them, for that matter) against usurpers and aspiring tyrants who can deploy well organized and highly armed bands of myrmidons to suppress those rights under the deceptive color of law? To be sure, usurpers and aspiring tyrants would much rather work their evil wills against unarmed Americans; but in the long run the suppression of recalcitrant but isolated individuals here and there would amount to a mere inconvenience, compared to what would be necessary, were it possible at all, to suppress “well regulated Militia” throughout the length and breadth of this country.

2. Mr. Trump correctly emphasizes that “[w]e need to get serious about prosecuting violent criminals”, particularly because “law-abiding gun owners” are “the ones who anti-gun politicians and the media blame when criminals misuse guns”. This, of course, is self-evident. If there were very few “criminals [who] misuse[d] guns”, because the certainty of harsh punishments deterred them from doing so, there would be little grist for the mills of “gun controllers” on that score.

Of more concern is Mr. Trump’s suggestion of

another important way to fight crime—empower law-abiding gun owners to defend themselves. Law enforcement is great, they do a tremendous job, but they can’t be everywhere all of the time. Our personal protection is ultimately up to us. That’s why I am a gun owner, that’s why I have a concealed carry permit, and that’s why tens of millions of Americans have concealed carry permits as well. It’s just common sense.

Unfortunately, Mr. Trump fails to employ some basic constitutional sense in his analysis of this situation.

Pace Mr. Trump, present-day “law enforcement” suffers from many serious deficiencies which demand correction. Even were that less of a problem than it is, unless Americans desired to live in a veritable police state they should not want professional police forces—composed as they generally are of individuals who envision themselves as separate and distinct from, and even superior to, the mere “civilians” whom they are supposed, but often neglect or fail, to “protect and serve”—to be “everywhere all of the time”. This country already suffers from too much of a burgeoning police state, since the 9-11 Event rationalized seemingly endless inroads on the Bill of Rights.

Yet Mr. Trump is correct to observe that, because the inadequate “law enforcement” from which America suffers today cannot “be everywhere at once”, “[o]ur personal protection is ultimately up to us”, particularly (I should add) if Americans really want to maintain “the security of a free State” rather than groan under the oppression of a police state. The Founding Fathers knew this perfectly well. They were also aware that “personal protection”, let alone protection of the community, could not be achieved by individuals acting alone, without the benefit of specific governmental authority beyond the natural law of self-defense (and various old common-law doctrines of citizens’ arrest which expose to all sorts of nasty legal tangles modern-day individuals who attempt to act in reliance upon them). That is why the Founders explicitly enumerated, as the very first constitutional authority and responsibility of the Militia, the power “to execute the Laws of the Union” (and of their own States as well, the Militia being “the Militia of the several States”). U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 and art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

Revitalization of the Militia would make tens (and even hundreds) of thousands of additional personnel available to perform various law-enforcement functions—personnel drawn directly from the body of the people themselves in their own Local communities, whose sympathies were fully aligned with those communities’ best interests, rather than the contrary interests of aloof politicians and bureaucrats in distant State capitals or (worse yet) the District of Columbia. Even in such hothouses of violent street crime as America’s major cities—all too many of which impose strict “gun controls” on ordinary Americans while proving thoroughly incapable of cracking down on lawbreakers even with professional police forces at their disposal—the very presence of the Militia on the streets would impose a wide-ranging deterrent effect on criminal elements. (I cannot expand here upon how service in the Militia would also re-educate and discipline youth now entangled in street gangs and other anti-social activities because the present-day system of faux “public education” has utterly failed to civilize and socialize them. But that beneficial effect should be obvious to anyone who considered the matter.)

Even more important, revitalization of the Militia would enable a truly patriotic and constitutionalist President to fulfill his duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” against political criminals throughout the federal system, especially in the District of Columbia. As an example, I commend to my readers’ close attention my commentary “The 9-11 Event, the President, and the Militia”, to be found at www.edwinvieira.com.

3. Mr. Trump correctly points out that many of “the tragic mass murders that occurred in the past several years” can be traced to the fact that “[o]ur mental health system is broken”, and that “this matter[s] to law-abiding gun owners * * * because they get blamed by anti-gun politicians, gun control groups and the media for the acts of deranged madmen”. Although this is true as a generality, it misses two specific points:

First, the genesis of many of these “tragic mass murders” can be traced to mind-altering drugs produced by the pharmaceutical industry and prescribed by mental-health professionals which and who are seemingly oblivious to the dangers involved in pushing these substances as panaceas for patients with real mental-health problems, when all too often these drugs may exacerbate those problems by rendering many of those people (as Mr. Trump rightly worries) “violent, a danger to themselves or others”. Much needs to be done to investigate the effects of these drugs and to control their use (if such use is allowed at all)—work that the FDA has refused to undertake in anything like a satisfactory manner.

Second, in the wrong hands the mantra of “mental health” can provide fertile rationalizations for the kinds of “gun control” which Mr. Trump doubtlessly opposes. If the present-day clique of “mental-health professionals” who support “gun control” were allowed to define “mental illness” for the purpose of disarming Americans who supposedly suffered from what these practitioners might claim were forms of “mental illness”, few (if any) common Americans would be allowed to remain armed. Americans cannot afford to relinquish “the security of a free State” to those “mental-health professionals” who are intent on camouflaging their “politically correct” ideologies in the garb and jargon of medical science.

4. Mr. Trump also correctly points out that “[g]un and magazine bans are a total failure. * * * Law-abiding people should be allowed to own the firearms of their choice. The government has no business dictating what types of firearms good, honest people are allowed to own.” Actually, to ensure “the security of a free State” governments should require “good, honest people [other than conscientious objectors] * * * to own” at least the types of firearms—including, in particular, what Mr. Trump describes as “‘assault weapons’, ‘military-style weapons’, and ‘high capacity magazines’”—which are peculiarly suited for service in the Militia. Indeed, this is within both the explicit power of Congress “to provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia” when they are “employed in the Service of the United States”, and the reserved power of the States when the Militia are employed in specifically State service. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 15 and 16; and amends. II and X. Obviously, if Congress and the States provided for arming the Militia in the manner in which the Militia should be armed, every law-abiding and able-bodied American from sixteen years of age upwards who was not a conscientious objector would be armed and properly trained with the very firearms that “gun controllers” were most intent on outlawing, as well as many of those Americans potentially being in possession of every other type of firearm which could possibly be useful for the performance of any conceivable type of Militia duty.

5. Mr. Trump correctly observes that “we don’t need to * * * expand a broken system [of background checks]”—particularly, I presume, in the manner in which rogue public officials in States such as Washington are now employing wildly excessive “background checks” as a means of harassing law-abiding American gun owners. What he apparently does not understand is that, were the Militia revitalized, this country would benefit from a far more comprehensive and rigorous arrangement of “background checks” than could possibly be obtained through the present-day system derived from the flawed “Brady Bill” or anything akin to it. Inasmuch as every able-bodied adult living in each Locality would be required to serve in some capacity in the Militia, the Militia would be able to identify everyone who should be disallowed from possessing firearms—including criminals, illegal aliens, those with real mental-health problems, and so on. We the People themselves would conduct essentially permanent, on-going “background checks” on themselves in order to ensure “the security of a free State” for themselves, in aid of the Constitution’s purpose to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”. U.S. Const. preamble. If We the People cannot be entrusted with this responsibility, no one can.

6. Mr. Trump supports a “national right to carry” law, because (as he quite correctly states) “[t]he right of self-defense doesn’t stop at the end of your driveway”. One may doubt that such a law could be enacted pursuant to Congress’s power “[t]o regulate Commerce * * * among the several States” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; or under Article IV, Section 1 or 2 of the Constitution. But it surely could be enacted under Congress’s power “to provide for * * * arming * * * the Militia” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 and the Supremacy Clause in Article VI, Clause 2. And as this right (and duty) would be a matter of internal discipline within the Militia, “gun controllers” within the Judiciary would be powerless to interfere with its enforcement. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1973).

7. Finally, Mr. Trump rightly excoriates as “ridiculous” the present regulations “[b]anning our military from carrying firearms on bases and at recruiting stations”. As the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”, he could put paid to such regulations immediately upon his inauguration. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. In addition, he would do well to discipline those misguided officers of the Armed Forces responsible for this utterly absurd state of affairs.

In sum, it seems that with respect to the Second Amendment Mr. Trump’s heart is in the right place, and his intuition is basically sound. Now he simply needs to think through these matters in a more rigorously constitutional fashion, and then to act upon the insights that such a study will surely impart to him.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




“Gender” rules and despotic power

An outcry has arisen from numbers of Americans in opposition to the recent spate of “guidelines” emanating from the District of Columbia to the effect that it has now become impermissible to discriminate against men who believe (or at least profess) that they are women, or women who believe (or at least profess) that they are men, in the use of various facilities heretofore segregated according to individuals’ biologically determined sexes. Some Americans denounce these “guidelines” as serious affronts to basic rights of personal privacy, while others hoot them down as mere bureaucratic pandering to the LGBT lobby. Unfortunately, none of these criticisms, valid as they may be, come to grips with the fundamental problem. Bad enough is that the actual enforcement of these “guidelines” will turn society upside-down simply to advance trendy notions about the supposed plasticity of “gender” which bureaucrats deem to be “politically correct” (that is, “correct” in the sense of advancing the corrosive agenda of cultural Marxism). Beyond that particular perverse end, though, these “guidelines” embody a generality far worse in its capability to inflict harm upon society: namely, a claim to omnipotent governmental power which transcends anything ever before witnessed throughout American history. To see why this is so, some of that history must be consulted.

In July of 1775, the Continental Congress issued “[a] declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North America, * * * setting forth the causes and necessity of their taking up arms.” Therein, Congress observed that

government was instituted to promote the welfare of mankind, and ought to be administered for the attainment of that end. The legislature of Great Britain, however, stimulated by an inordinate passion for a power, not only unjustifiable, but which they know to be peculiarly reprobated by the very constitution of that kingdom, and desperate of success in any mode of contest, where regard should be had to truth, law, or right, have at length, deserting these, attempted to effect their cruel and impolitic purpose of enslaving these Colonies by violence, and have thereby rendered it necessary for us to close with their last appeal from Reason to Arms.—Yet, however blinded that assembly may be, by their intemperate rage for unlimited domination, so to slight justice and the opinion of mankind, we esteem ourselves bound, by obligations of respect to the rest of the world, to make known the justice of our cause. * * * * *

But why should we enumerate our injuries in detail? By one statute it is declared, that parliament can “of right make laws to bind us IN ALL CASES WHATSOEVER.” What is to defend us against so enormous, so unlimited a power? [Journals of the Continental Congress, Volume 2, at 140-141, 146.]

Taken literally, this was something of an exaggeration. For Parliament had never claimed a “right [to] make laws to bind [Americans] IN ALL CASES WHATSOEVER”—with emphasis on the word “all”. To be sure, assertions by Parliament to almost limitless power were really nothing new at that time. As Sir William Blackstone explained,

[T]HE power and jurisdiction of parliament * * * is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds. * * * It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, revising, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms . All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new model the succession to the crown * * * . It can alter the established religion of the land * * * . It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves * * * . It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call it’s power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. True it is, that what the parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo. [Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Robert Bell, American Edition, 1771), Volume 1,at 160-161.]

Yet even in this panegyric passage, Blackstone recognized that Parliament could not do everything without exception, but only “every thing that is not naturally impossible”. So it was that the Swiss political theorist of that era, Jean-Louis de Lolme, could write in his analysis of England’s government (perhaps somewhat tongue in cheek, but to the point nonetheless) that “parliament can do everything but make a woman a man and a man a woman”. “Everything but …”. That is to say, even the vaunted “omnipotence” of Parliament was constrained absolutely by the natural order of things.

The Declaration of Independence enumerated an host of grievances against King George III and his Ministers in Parliament. But amongst these were not to be found the charges that those villains had attempted to “make a woman a man and a man a woman”, or to impose upon Americans some other equally “naturally impossible” decree.

But how times change! Today, bureaucrats in the District of Columbia assert an “absolute despotic power” far beyond even what the King and his Parliament claimed in the Founding Era—namely, a power to do precisely what is “naturally impossible”, by purporting in effect to “make a woman a man and a man a woman” simply by saying that a woman must sometimes be treated as a man and a man sometimes treated as a woman. Now Americans are told that they must behave as if they lived, not even in a parallel universe, in which the natural, scientifically irrefutable, reality of the two biologically determined sexes were faithfully reflected in its equivalent reality, but instead in an orthogonal universe, the utter unreality of which is displaced a full ninety degrees from the natural reality in which Americans (and everyone else on planet Earth) have lived heretofore. Worse yet, these aberrant directives have been promulgated, not by a legislature with some law-making authority in principle, but instead by bureaucrats possessed of no claim to law-making power whatsoever.

If the political class in contemporary America is capable of this, of what is it incapable, now and in the future? Apparently nothing. For reality resides within definite boundaries; but unreality knows no limits, extending as far as imagination or insanity will carry it. And that, of course, is the point of the exercise of purporting to “make a woman a man and a man a woman” by bureaucratic dictate, is it not? To impress upon Americans that, if the political class gets away with this enormity—if WE THE PEOPLE swallow this idiocy, and roll over and play dead for this outrage—then literally anything in the realm even of “naturally impossible” usurpation and tyranny is not only possible, but even probable, if not certain. As the old expression has it, “If they do this in the green wood, what will they do in the dry?”

A cynic might find it comforting to disparage this development simply as a relatively minor, albeit exasperating, example of the proverbial lunatics’ gaining temporary control over their asylum. And perhaps one should not be overly concerned if a few lunatics do run amok from time to time, provided that they remain confined within their own asylum’s walls. Until help from the outside arrives, the asylum’s staff may be at some risk, but not the rest of society.

In stark contrast, though, the threat which confronts America today is that veritable mobs of certifiable lunatics have seized control over the most important economic, social, and especially governmental institutions outside of the asylums to which they should be committed—and plainly intend to exercise that control to the detriment, degradation, and even destruction of the rest of society.

So what is to be done? The first step in the right direction is to recognize what is at stake. Political lunacy does not wax and wain with the cycle of the moon. Once entrenched in governmental institutions, it tends to expand and intensify its influence at every opportunity—unless and until it is finally confronted and rooted out by political sanity. Whether political sanity sufficient to perform that task still exists in this country, though, remains the question.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




No second American revolution is necessary

Only in rare instances have I prepared a commentary for NewsWithViews in response to something which someone else has been published elsewhere. But a recent column by John W. Whitehead, entitled “There Will Be No Second American Revolution: The Futility of an Armed Revolt” (18 July 2016), has received such generally favorable attention on the Internet that it seemed meet for me to fashion a few dissenting remarks for the record. As Mr. Whitehead’s article is fairly long, I cannot address all of the points he makes. Therefore I encourage my readers to review his article for themselves. After they do so, they can judge whether the following critique is just.

Mr. Whitehead’s article begins by rehashing in great detail (for he is a keen student of these matters) the rapid development and deployment of a national para-militarized police-state apparatus in this country during the recent past. His description of events contains little that most perceptive observers have not already noticed. But Mr. Whitehead draws from these dismal facts the distressing conclusion that “[t]he powers-that-be want us to feel vulnerable. * * * Most of all, the powers-that-be want us to feel powerless to protect ourselves and reliant on and grateful for the dubious protection provided by the American police state. Their strategy is working.”

Of course, I cannot say whom Mr. Whitehead includes among “us”. But I do know that countless Americans do not believe that any “protection [can or will be] provided by the American police state”. So, with respect to those Americans, the “strategy [of the powers-that-be] is [not] working”, and will never work. Ironically, though, Mr. Whitehead’s article itself provides rather striking evidence that the “strategy [of the powers-that-be] is working” at least as to him and those whom he influences. For no perceptive analyst can plod through that piece without concluding that Mr. Whitehead believes—and wants to convince his readers—that Americans not only are “vulnerable” but even are utterly defenseless against the overwhelming power of “the American police state”.

On that point, Mr. Whitehead waxes emphatic: “There will be no second American Revolution. There is no place in our nation for the kind of armed revolution our forefathers mounted against a tyrannical Great Britain.” Of course, that is precisely what many people at the time said about the first “American Revolution”, only to be proven wrong by its outcome. So, as a lawyer by trade, Mr. Whitehead should not feel too secure in the face of the adverse precedent which he himself cites. In any event, Mr. Whitehead presents a rather disquieting argument:

The message being sent to the citizenry [by the powers-that-be] is clear: there will be no revolution, armed or otherwise.

Anyone who believes that they can wage—and win—an armed revolt against the American police state has not been paying attention. Those who wage violence against the government and their fellow citizens are playing right into the government’s hands. Violence cannot and will not be the answer to what ails America.

Whether instigated by the government or the citizenry, violence will only lead to more violence. It does not matter how much firepower you have. The government has more firepower.
* * * * *
* * * [B]y generally making peaceful revolution all but impossible, the government has engineered an environment in which domestic violence has become inevitable.
What we are now experiencing is a civil war, devised and instigated in part by the U.S. government.
The outcome for this particular conflict is already foregone: the police state wins.
The objective: compliance and control.
The strategy: * * * when all hell breaks loose, clamp down on the nation for the good of the people and the security of the nation.

An underlying difficulty with these pronouncements is that “the government” to which Mr. Whitehead loosely refers is not, in fact and law, “the government” at all. (As a lawyer, he should know as much, and try to craft his language accordingly.) From the constitutional perspective, “the government” is that set of actions by individuals in public office which is consistent with their lawful powers and disabilities. No “government” in this country is empowered to set up a police state, to “devise[ ] and instigate[ ]” a “civil war” amongst its own people, to enforce “compliance and control”, or to “clamp down on the nation” for any reason. To be sure, rogue public officials may attempt to engage in such usurpation and tyranny—but in the perpetration of such misbehavior they are acting not in the capacity of “the government”, but in the capacity of lawbreakers.

Even leaving aside Mr. Whitehead’s imprecision as to what constitutes “the government” in this country, what must one conclude is “the bottom line” of his argument? That the powers-that-be intend to foment widespread violence as their excuse for the “final solution” of thoroughly subjugating the American people, and then oppressing them without limit! So, according to Mr. Whitehead himself, there will be a “second American Revolution” after all—instigated, interestingly enough, by the police state’s provocations, just as the first “American Revolution” was to a great degree instigated by provocations emanating from “a tyrannical Great Britain”. Indeed, America is already in the midst of this “civil war”. But, this time, the patriots are fated to lose the “American Revolution”, no matter what. All of us have already been defeated before the battle has even been joined, and therefore should sheepishly accept our fate, no matter how dire it may be.

Rather than acquiesce in Mr. Whitehead’s unpleasant fantasy, I must point out that “no matter what” is the critical factor in any analysis of this kind. And I suspect that he (in his own words) “has not been paying attention” to recent developments. As a lawyer, he should consider the evidence for the defense, as well as for the prosecution, before he makes his plea to the jury.

The fact is that Americans—indeed, people throughout the civilized world—are waking up to what the powers-that-be are planning for and doing to them. Here at home, what I might label “the Trump Phenomenon”, even with all of its obvious faults, demonstrates a widespread, profound, and intransigeant disgust among ordinary Americans with careerist politicians, bureaucrats, police-state operatives, propagandists in “the mainstream media”, and the shadowy “powers-that-be”(especially in the big banks and Wall Street’s financial casinos) who pull the strings from behind the screen. So if the powers-that-be imagine that they can easily impose a full-blown police state on a population of millions of people increasingly aware of and fed up with their corruption and criminality, they are playing with fire.

Once the powers-that-be have lifted the lid of Pandora’s Box through what Mr. Whitehead describes as “a civil war, devised and instigated in part by the U.S. government”, how could they know, let alone how could they be sure of their ability to control, what might leap out? For example, can anyone unerringly predict how individual Americans, in thousands of different situations across this country, will react when agents of the police state start seizing firearms, persecuting dissenters for “sedition” and “anti-government hate speech”, and rounding up leaders of opposition movements for incarceration in secret prisons and camps? Easily foreseeable, though, is that many of these and other targets of police-state repression will know perfectly well that they have nothing to lose by resisting, and will act on that understanding of their plight. So, even were Mr. Whitehead correct in his assertion that “[v]iolence cannot and will not be the answer to what ails America” in general, the victims of police-state oppression will doubtlessly believe that violence is their only recourse in particular. After all, would not armed resistance, no matter how desperate, be preferable to consignment to slow death in a forced-labor camp, let alone to simply being murdered out of hand by the police state’s psychopathic storm troopers? Can the powers-that-be really expect to prevail against millions of people, spread across an entire continent, who not only despise them but also have nothing to lose by resisting their aggression? Would even Mr. Whitehead himself simply “go along quietly” when they came for him?

Mr. Whitehead is, of course, correct to observe that the burgeoning “American police state” disposes of many “boots on the ground”, possessed of a great deal of raw “firepower”. Nonetheless, in a nationwide crisis in which (as he predicts) widespread “domestic violence has become inevitable”, could the powers-that-be depend upon these forces? Might not a significant part of them change sides and support the people, or set itself up as some sort of third force looking out solely for its own interests? Moreover, even in the absence of defections, could the powers-that-be really expect that their armed forces could subjugate the entirety of the United States, when the parts of those forces wielding the most “firepower” have been unable to defeat gaggles of rag-tag troglodytes in Afghanistan, or pick-up teams of hired terrorists such as “Al-Qaeda” or “ISIS” running loose in the sand boxes of the Middle East?

To be fair to Mr. Whitehead, he does not recommend that we all should simply start unreservedly to “love Big Brother”. Rather, he proposes a kind of subterranean revolution:

If there is any hope of reclaiming our government and restoring our freedoms, it will require a different kind of coup: nonviolent, strategic and grassroots, starting locally and trickling upwards. Such revolutions are slow and painstaking. They are political, in part, but not through any established parties or politicians.
Most of all, * * * for any chance of success, such a revolution will require more than a change of politics: it will require a change of heart among the American people, a reawakening of the American spirit, and a citizenry that cares about their freedoms more than their fantasy games.
To this, a skeptic might object that such a program would likely entail efforts spread out over ten, twenty, or fifty years at least—when the real issue is what Americans should do right now that might pay dividends right now, or at least in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Furthermore, to be effective for “reclaiming our government and restoring our freedoms”, such “change” and “reawakening” will presumably need to manifest themselves at some definite point in time in some sort of open collective action with manifest political goals. And just what will the supremely powerful, irresistible “American police state” be doing while the denizens of this country are changing their hearts and reawakening their spirit for the very purpose of overthrowing the powers-that-be? Well, Mr. Whitehead himself informs his readers that “[t]he message being sent to the citizenry [by the powers-that-be] is clear: there will be no revolution, armed or otherwise.” So, according to his very own analysis, his own proposal of “a different kind of coup”—the course of action which he describes as the only one with “any chance of success”—is a hopeless pipedream. Nothing can be done—not now, not ever.

Well, not really. The fundamental fault in Mr. Whitehead’s proposal is not just that it is utterly unrealistic in terms of the time necessary to put it into practice, or that it offers no strategy for dealing with the predictable reactions of the powers-that-be. In addition to those demerits, it contains no suggestion as to what institutions Americans should employ for “reclaiming our government and restoring our freedoms” once the requisite “change of heart” and “reawakening of the American spirit” have occurred. Had Mr. Whitehead given thought to those institutions, he might have realized that the most important steps for “reclaiming our government and restoring our freedoms” need not be put off until the distant future, but might be taken in the present.

Now, I do not predict, let alone advocate, and for various prudential reasons would not welcome a “second American Revolution”. I believe—and, as my readers are well aware, have consistently emphasized over the years (and shall point out once again here)—that America’s present malaise can be cured without recourse to “revolution” or any sort of widespread violence or other political or social upheaval. The Constitution already provides the necessary and sufficient means for dealing peacefully yet decisively and permanently with the problem which so discomforts Mr. Whitehead.

The critical danger confronting America is a burgeoning domestic police state. No one doubts that. One may debate how close to complete domination of the populace this apparatus has come to date. I submit that it is still far from achieving such control—or commentaries such as this would already be prohibited from publication, on the Internet or anywhere else. The opposite—indeed, the antagonist—of “a police state” is “a free State”. Therefore, if “a police state” is to be suppressed while there is still time, “a free State” must be supported immediately if not sooner. What institution does the Constitution declare to be “necessary to the security of a free State”? Do I really need to recite all of the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment?

The question to which I should appreciate a straight answer from someone is: “Why do people such as Mr. Whitehead persist in disregarding the Constitution on this point, when it is as vital as it is obvious?” Why, through their studied silence, do the members of what Joseph Schumpeter aptly described as “the chattering class” deny or cast doubt upon the truth and the urgency of those thirteen words when “a free State” in America is under open, incessant attack from the architects and practitioners of “a police state”? What betokens such silence from people whose inclination (if not actual business) it is to talk, and that volubly, about every other issue? Is their implicit message that Americans are to disbelieve whatever the Constitution says? Or that the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment were wrong in 1791? Or that they are wrong now? Or that they are simply out of date, and needful of being reinterpreted into irrelevance or oblivion according to the perverse precepts of “the living Constitution”?

Most perplexing to me is why “the chattering class” seems incapable of comprehending that under the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution no dichotomy can possibly exist between the American people, on the one side, and “the government”, on the other. WE THE PEOPLE are not outside of “the government” and subject to its unfettered control. Rather, WE THE PEOPLE are the very source of “the government”, and are (or should be) direct participants in “the government”, day in and day out, through the most puissant force of “government” imaginable: the entire community exercising the Power of the Sword through the Militia. So, were the Militia functioning as they should, no one would be worried about “the government’s” setting up a national para-militarized police state, because—pursuant to the constitutional authority and responsibility of the Militia “to execute the Laws of the Union” (and of their own States as well)—the Militia would perform or supervise all “police” functions at every level of the federal system. WE THE PEOPLE would no longer distrust, let alone fear, the police, because WE THE PEOPLE would be the police.

If revitalization of the Militia might figuratively be characterized as a “second American Revolution”, it would be a “revolution” without any necessity for what Mr. Whitehead decries as “an armed revolt”. For it would hardly amount to any sort of “revolt” for Americans to revitalize the very institutions of government which, from the foundation of this country, the Constitution has declared to be “necessary to the security of a free State”. The “revolt”, if any there were, would be on the part of rogue public officials who attempted to prevent WE THE PEOPLE from asserting their supreme governmental authority through the Militia.

In the title of his article, Mr. Whitehead applies the word “futility” to “an armed revolt”. He would have done better to recognize the “futility” of disregarding how the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment unerringly point the way towards dealing once and for all with “the American police state”. For if by definition “a police state” cannot exist within “a free State”; and if “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”; then “a police state” cannot exist in the presence of “[a] well regulated Militia”. Where “[a] well regulated Militia” exists, the only individuals confronted with “futility” are those who attempt to set up “a police state”.

All that remains to be considered, then, is the practical question of whether an attempt to revitalize the Militia would inevitably prove futile under present political, social, and cultural conditions. Nay-sayers will assert that it would be difficult, probably impossible, to revitalize the Militia today. But I suspect that, to perform this task, there are enough Americans left who still subscribe to the old saying: “The difficult we do immediately; the impossible takes a little longer.” In any event, why not try? Is the alternative acceptable? In fact, there are many ways to go about revitalizing the Militia, step by step from the bottom up in one State after another—as well as from the top down, if the right individual were the President of the United States.

On the other hand, is the program Mr. Whitehead proposes devoid of difficulty? And even if, after who knows how long, his program were to succeed in bringing about “a change of heart among the American people, a reawakening of the American spirit, and a citizenry that cares more about their freedoms than their fantasy games”, the Militia would still have to be revitalized if “the security of a free State” were to be guaranteed from that point on.

Finally, Mr. Whitehead and those who follow his lead should ponder whether the process of promoting, and then implementing, revitalization of the Militia could itself be the catalyst for “a change of heart among the American people, a reawakening of the American spirit, and a citizenry that cares more about their freedoms than their fantasy games”. For it would be impossible for anyone who participated in revitalization of the Militia not to realize that the Militia embody the original “American spirit” of “a citizenry that cares more about their freedoms than [anything else]”—and not to absorb that spirit in its full strength through that participation. So, if Mr. Whitehead desires to “reclaim[ ] our government and restor[e] our freedoms” through “a different kind of coup: nonviolent, strategic and grassroots, starting locally and trickling upwards”—then he needs to begin thinking seriously about revitalization of the Militia.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




Which “gun culture” should Americans defend?

As a long-time member of the National Rifle Association who tries to take the organization seriously, I find myself increasingly nonplussed by its naïveté. The source of my most recent encounter with this defect is the “President’s Column” by Allan D. Cors, in the July 2016 edition of the NRA’s American Rifleman magazine. The column is entitled, accurately enough, “Clinton, Pelosi and Schumer Form a Triumvirate Against Liberty”. The basic flaw appears in the body of the piece, wherein the NRA, in the person of Mr. Cors, once again makes the elementary blunder of electing to fight, on its enemies’ own chosen ground, what seems to be shaping up as a (if not the) decisive battle against “gun control”.

1. Mr. Cors first predicts that, once elected President, Mrs. Clinton will “drastically alter the makeup of the Supreme Court to render meaningless the right to keep and bear arms”, presumably by reversals of the Court’s decisions in the recent Heller and McDonald cases. His foresight is doubtlessly accurate. His hindsight, however, lacks insight. For he fails to recognize that the majority opinions in Heller and McDonald, if not entirely “meaningless” with respect to “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, surely confused the matter in a very significant manner, by vivisecting the Second Amendment—amputating its last fourteen words from the first thirteen. Indeed, the only Justice who participated in those cases and exhibited even a tenuous grasp of the constitutional principle that the Second Amendment, just as any other coherent sentence in the English language, must be read and understood in its entirety, not verbally sliced into mutually independent parts, was Justice Stevens, who dissented in both cases. To be sure, Justice Stevens proved that he had no idea what the Second Amendment, taken as a whole, actually means. But at least he had a better initial chance of figuring out that meaning than did the Justices who predicated their opinions on the self-evident fallacy that the last fourteen words of the Amendment could be construed and applied, not only in disregard of, but even in opposition to, its first thirteen words.

Mr. Cors’ more dangerous nearsightedness is his failure to see that, whoever the President may be, the composition of the Supreme Court inevitably changes from time to time; and with those changes are likely to come unanticipated revisions of its opinions on various subjects. (One has only to recall how President Reagan’s appointee, Justice Souter, proved to be anything but a true “Reaganite” after his confirmation; or how President Bush’s appointee, Chief Justice Roberts, has turned out to be something of a weak reed, too.) If the history of the Judiciary teaches Americans anything, it is that the edifice of the Court’s “precedents” (what the Justices call “our cases”) stands upon the unpredictable, ever-shifting, and therefore unstable sand of the then-sitting Justices’ personalities, ideologies, and recondite agenda. And when a little cabal of men and women can claim, without refutation and rebuke, that their mere opinions about the laws—especially “the supreme Law of the Land”, the Constitution itself—are the laws, the meanings of which no one other than they themselves can declare, and everyone else is bound to accept as constitutional gospel of near-Papal infallibility, Americans live under a veritable “government of men (and women)”, not a “government of laws” which stand above the mere opinions of a handful of individuals who have managed through the wiles of political favoritism and intrigue to be appointed to the Bench.

Of course, if the NRA (or anyone else) acquiesces in the crackpot theory of “judicial supremacy”, then “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is “meaningless” in an objective sense, because that “meaning” can and will fluctuate from one of “our cases” to another, as ever-changing majorities of the Justices impose their subjective notions on the Constitution. Heller and McDonald being considered good “case law” today, the opposite tomorrow. If, however, the NRA (and everyone else committed to the true purpose of the Second Amendment) paid due attention to the Amendment’s first thirteen words, no one would ever have to worry about the composition of the Supreme Court (or of any other court, for that matter), because no decision of any court could change the relation of “the Militia of the several States” to “the people”, and therefore could deny the absolute right and constitutional duty of “the people to keep and bear Arms” in “well regulated Militia”—including especially the particular “Arms” against which the Clintons, Pelosis, and Schumers of this world incessantly rail. In “well regulated Militia”, “the people” would have untrammeled access to every conceivable “Arm[ ]” which could serve any purpose in the Militia. And if any court attempted to interfere with that access, the Militia, in the defense and exercise of their own constitutional authority in both the original Constitution and the Second Amendment, could say (in Andrew Jackson’s words), “Justice So-and-so has rendered his opinion; now let him enforce it.”

2. Mr. Cors then expresses his quite justifiable concern that Mrs. Clinton considers the NRA as “the enemy” which she intends to “dismantl[e]” as soon as she moves into the White House. In light of his position in the NRA, Mr. Cors may be excused for perhaps hyperbolically praising the organization as being “one force in our still-free nation that stands in her way”—although the NRA (as I have pointed out in other of my NewsWithViews commentaries) could be such a decisive force, if it were to champion the Second Amendment as a whole. But he certainly stands on solid ground when he observes that he (and the rest of us as well) “have never seen such a measure of hatred for the freedom of individual Americans” as from the likes of Mrs. Clinton, Representative Pelosi, Senator Schumer, and “a large segment of [the Democratic P]arty’s apparatus”. “[T]hese people”, Mr. Cors correctly charges, “not only hate guns, but they hate us for being free to possess and use them.” One might go even further, and indict “these people” for their hatred of almost everything about “a free State” which patriotic Americans cherish and deserve to enjoy, secure against constant attacks from the apparatus of both of the “two” major political parties. What, though, one is entitled to ask Mr. Cors, does the Constitution declare to be “necessary to the security of a free State” against the aggression and depredations of “these people”? The so-called “individual right to keep and bear arms” on which the NRA dotes, or “[a] well regulated Militia” in each of the several States for which “the supreme Law of the Land” explicitly provides, and which would marshal the power of the entire community behind each individual’s right—and constitutional duty (except for conscientious objectors)—to possess “Arms” of all kinds?

3. Mr. Cors is certainly on target when he attacks Mrs. Clinton’s intent to prosecute an “all-out war on what she calls ‘the gun culture’”. But he misses even the backstop when he defines “the gun culture” as “includ[ing] everything we do: recreational shooting, hunting, self-defense, defense of homes, and collecting, studying, designing and trading in firearms”. What about what “we do [not] do” today, but should do? What about Americans’ participation in the “well regulated Militia” which the Constitution declares to be “necessary to the security of a free State”—that is, “the gun culture” which the Constitution itself prescribes? Why in Mr. Cors’ list is this, and this alone, conspicuous by its absence as part of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, when it is the aspect of that right which would encompass and guarantee everything else that stirs Mr. Cors’ concern?

For example, what should be Americans’ priority, “hunting” or “a free State”? Could not the people in “a free State” decide, for sound ecological reasons, that hunting should be closely controlled? Indeed, is not hunting of all sorts already regulated throughout this country for such reasons, usually with the NRA’s approval? I put forward this example because all too often I come across hunters who are perfectly willing to abide “gun control” aimed at those nasty “black rifles”, so long as they can continue to possess their .375 H&H Magnum bolt-action rifles with which to hunt elk, big-horned sheep, and other large or dangerous game.

At stake here is not “the gun culture” as the NRA narrowly defines it, but the continued survival of this country as “a free State” through “the gun culture” as the Constitution defines it. After “gun controllers” succeed in banning “the black rifles”, the .375 H&H Magnums with their telescopic sights will soon follow (being denounced as “long-range sniper rifles”), along with collections of most if not all other firearms (being seized and destroyed in order to enable everyone to feel “safe” from “gun violence”). For Mrs. Clinton and her co-thinkers have repeatedly expressed their intent to follow the example of pervasive “gun control” already imposed in Great Britain and Australia. In the long run, nothing of Mr. Cors’ “gun culture” can be preserved against that threat, unless the Constitution’s “gun culture” is defended.

4. Finally, Mr. Cors points out the encouraging statistic that “[t]here are 100 million firearm owners in th[is] nation”, and emphasizes that “[e]ach of us must reach out to friends, family, colleagues—all voters—with our honest message about saving the rights that guarantee our liberty”. To be sure. Yet the question remains: “What is that message to be?” Everyone possessed of more than two milligrams of functional cerebral cortex already knows that “these people” whom Mr. Cors rightly excoriates pose a threat to Americans’ liberties several orders of magnitude more serious than the Founders of this country faced from King George III. So the essential message cannot be the NRA’s merely political exhortation, which focuses on defeating a particularly unworthy candidate for the Presidency in the next election.

For the danger which “these people” and their ilk represent will persist, election after election, until effective institutional barriers are finally erected against it. The essential message must be the Constitution’s message, which focuses, not on political personalities, but on governmental institutions: namely, that “well regulated Militia”, and nothing less than “well regulated Militia”, are “necessary to the security of a free State”, everywhere throughout the United States. It is over the revitalization of these institutions that the final battle of “gun control” must be fought and won. Or else.

The NRA could still prove, or disprove, that (in Mr. Cors’ words) it really is the “one force in our still-free nation that stands in [Mrs. Clinton’s] way” in the short term, and (of more consequence) against her perverse vision of “gun control” in the long run. I both entertain the hope—and suffer from the fear—that he is correct.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




Is Obama going to create crisis to suspend the November election?

No Perpetual “Emergency” Presidency

Constitutionalists, patriots, and other friends of freedom in ever-increasing numbers are expressing their fears that the present resident of the White House, Barack Obama, intends, under color of some real or contrived “emergency”, to suspend the National elections this November, declare “martial law”, and expand the ambit of his usurpatory rule from that of an arguably faux yet only temporary President to that of an authentic and permanent dictator, in service of some absurdity such as a supposed necessity to maintain “the continuity of government”. In light of the possibility of a nationwide calamity in the near future (especially likely in the economic realm), and of Mr. Obama’s own personality and past pattern of misbehavior under color of public office, these concerns cannot be easily dismissed as mere delusions springing from paranoiac imaginations. Nonetheless, from the constitutional perspective, they are entirely devoid of foundation.

No need exists to repeat here the extensive analysis in my book By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law”, which explains that so-called “emergency powers” are bunkum, and “martial law” (as most Americans understand it) bunkum to the second power. The only “martial” institutions to which the Constitution delegates the responsibility and authority “to execute the Laws of the Union”, whether in an “emergency” or otherwise, are “the Militia of the several States”. But “the Militia of the several States” consist of the body of WE THE PEOPLE of the United States. And the very last thing Mr. Obama would ever want to admit in a public forum is that WE THE PEOPLE enjoy the unique constitutional power, in “martial” institutions especially, to “execute the Laws of the Union” against anyone and everyone who might dare to transgress those “Laws”—himself included. So, putting to one side “emergency powers” and “martial law” as the irrelevant anti-constitutional fantasies they are, the only question which needs to be answered is: “Does the Constitution provide any means by which Mr. Obama can perpetuate his residency in the White House in the guise of ‘President of the United States’ on any excuse whatsoever?” The answer is “No”.

1. Even if Mr. Obama were “a natural born Citizen * * * eligible to the Office of President” under Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 (which in the absence of sufficient evidence remains an open question), Section 1 of the Twenty-second Amendment precludes him from being “elected to the office of the President more than twice”. Of course, the premiss of the instant analysis is that no Presidential election at all would occur in November of 2016; and therefore he could not possibly become even a faux “President elect” under color of the Twelfth Amendment. That being so, perforce of Section 1 of the Twentieth Amendment his present, possibly faux “term[ as] the President * * * [would] end at noon on the 20th day of January”, 2017. By dint of that same Section, the present, but also arguably faux term of Mr. Joseph Biden as “Vice President [would] end” at the very same time.

2. In the normal course of events, someone other than Mr. Obama would be chosen as President elect in the 2016 elections, and would take the “Oath or Affirmation” of “the Office of President” on 20 January 2017, pursuant to Article II, Section 1, Clause 7. But, were no National elections conducted in November, no one would be chosen President elect or Vice President elect. Under those circumstances, Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment would take effect:

If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.
Plainly enough, however, under this Section and Section 1 of the Twenty-second Amendment, Congress could not arrange matters such that Mr. Obama could continue to “act as President”, because the general terms of the latter provision—namely, that “[n]o person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice”—must encompass “elect[ion]” by any means. For the purpose of the Amendment is absolutely to preclude repetition by anyone else of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s effective “life tenure” in the “the office of the President”, even were America’s electorate to desire that result. So, significantly, unlike many other Amendments the Twenty-second does not empower Congress “to enforce this article by appropriate legislation” at all, let alone in a manner which contradicts its obvious purpose. Contrast Amendment XIII, Section 2; Amendment XIV, Section 5; Amendment XV, Section 2; Amendment XIX; Amendment XXIII, Section 2; Amendment XXIV, Section 2; and Amendment XXVI, Section 2. And inasmuch as the Twenty-second Amendment follows the Twentieth, it must limit the power of Congress granted in the latter Amendment in such wise as to fulfill the purpose of the former Amendment.

3. An apparent problem would be that, were no National elections held in November of 2016, there would be no Members elect to the House of Representatives at all, and no Members elect to one third of the Senate. Under Section 1 of the Twentieth Amendment, “the terms of Senators and Representatives” already in office in 2016 “shall end” “at noon on the 3d day of January, [2017,] of the years in which such terms would have ended if this [Amendment] had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin”. Were no National elections held, no such “successors” whose “terms shall then begin” would be available to fill those positions in Congress. Indeed, with no House of Representatives at all from 3 January forward, no Congress would exist, inasmuch as (by definition in Article I, Section 1) “a Congress of the United States * * * shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives”, in which (pursuant to Article I, Section 5, Clause 1) “a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business”. With two thirds of the Senate still in office, “a Majority” of that body would exist; but with no Representatives having been elected, “a Majority” (or any other part) of the House would not.

This problem would be only apparent and not a permanent debility, however. For, if the States’ governments continued in existence (as presumably they would), “[w]hen vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies” (Article I, Section 2, Clause 4); and “[w]hen vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies” (Seventeenth Amendment). So, even were no National elections held in November of 2016, the States’ “Executive Authorit[ies]” could take the necessary and sufficient steps to ensure that the constitutionally required Representatives and Senators were appointed in time to take office on 3 January 2017. Thus, Congress could be reconstructed before the possibly faux terms of Mr. Obama and Mr. Biden as President and Vice President ended on 20 January.

4. Were Congress so reconstructed, the House of Representatives could select its Speaker, and the Senate could select its President pro tempore, before 20 January. That having been done, Title 3, United States Code, Section 19, would come into play:

(a)(1) If, by reason of * * * failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act as President. * * *
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a Speaker is to begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as President pro tempore and as Senator, act as President.
(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection (b) of this section shall continue to act until the expiration of the then current Presidential term [with certain exceptions not relevant here].

This commentary need not recite the further possibilities for other officials to be installed as the “Acting President” if neither the Speaker of the House nor the President pro tempore could perform that function. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(d) and (e).

The final, indisputable point is that even if Barack Obama is actually the President of the United States (rather than an imposter) at this juncture in the course of human events, perforce of the Constitution and the relevant statute he cannot continue in that status past 20 January 2017, no matter what supposed “emergency”, real or contrived, might arise and be put forward to rationalize cancellation of the National elections in November of this year. As far as he is concerned, America’s National nightmare of the last eight years’ duration will end on that day. Americans must hope and pray that Providence will then preserve them from something even worse.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




A serious question for the NRA Pt. 1

As regular readers of my commentaries know, from time to time I have written about the National Rifle Association’s curious misreading of the Second Amendment—to wit, that the Amendment’s first thirteen words (“[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”) have no significance with respect to the interpretation and application of the Amendment’s last fourteen words (“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”). According to the NRA, the Second Amendment secures “the individual right to keep and bear arms”, to which “[a] well regulated Militia” is irrelevant.

I must describe the NRA’s fixation as a most curious misreading of the Second Amendment because, if “the individual right to keep and bear arms” is irrelevant to “[a] well regulated Militia”, then by dint of the NRA’s own linguistic logic “the individual right to keep and bear arms” must be equally irrelevant to “the security of a free State” to which the Amendment declares that such a Militia is “necessary”. If so, then the NRA’s reading of the Amendment is at odds with its contention that “the individual right to keep and bear arms” guarantees Americans the wherewithal to preserve “the Blessings of Liberty” promised by the Constitution in its Preamble. For, if “the individual right to keep and bear arms” is as irrelevant to “the security of a free State” as it supposedly is to “[a] well regulated Militia”, it passes understanding that it could guarantee any aspect of “a free State”, including especially the “Liberty” of that State’s citizens.

This apparent conundrum is, of course, not the product of the Constitution. For, according to the most basic rules of constitutional interpretation, the NRA’s construction of the Second Amendment is impossible. In general, “[i]t cannot be presumed, that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect”. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). And “[i]n expounding the Constitution * * * , every word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added”. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Peters) 550, 570-571 (1840). Moreover, with respect in particular to the clause “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”, “[i]t cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution did not use this expression with deliberation or failed to appreciate its plain significance”. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 587-588 (1938). See also, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151-152 (1926); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 87 (1900); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 260-261 (1898); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 44 (1957) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

My emphasis on this peculiar situation is not simply a matter of constitutional pedantry devoid of practical consequences. For, by widely disseminating its misreading of the Second Amendment among the general public, the NRA lends credibility to a most dangerous misconception—to wit, that Americans can secure for themselves “the Blessings of Liberty” by purely individual actions alone, when every page in the book of American political and legal theory and history teaches that popular sovereignty, popular self-government, and the “Blessings of Liberty” that go with them necessarily entail, and can be achieved and maintained only through, collective endeavors by WE THE PEOPLE as a whole. No one who studies America’s Colonial Charters, the Declaration of Independence, the constitutions of the independent States, the Articles of Confederation, the original Constitution, and even the Second Amendment can come to any other conclusion.

I have tried, on more than one occasion, to call this matter to the attention of the NRA, for the purpose of encouraging the organization to reassess its position and become a proponent of revitalization of “the Militia of the several States”, as the only sure and certain means to provide for “the security of a free State” throughout this country. To date, however, these efforts have proven unsuccessful.

Perhaps my failures are exclusively my fault. But, then again, perhaps not. Inasmuch as my own estimation of cause and effect might be considered biased, I shall put it to my readers to judge for themselves. Below, I reproduce (with some minor redactions) a letter which I wrote several months ago to certain members of the NRA’s Board of Directors, explaining why the NRA should promote revitalization of the Militia, and soliciting their support to that end. To date, I have received not a single response. The question which perplexes me is, “Why not?” Is revitalization of the Militia a matter which is not to be taken seriously? Or am I, personally, not to be taken seriously? Or is the NRA’s championship of the Second Amendment not to be taken seriously?

It may be that some of the readers of this commentary will conclude that what I have recommended in the letter reproduced below makes sense, and that the NRA should pay some little attention to it. If so, they might consider contacting the NRA, and asking “Why not?” At some point, an answer needs to be had.

[LETTER TO NRA DIRECTORS]

25 January 2016

National Rifle Association Directors * * *
c/o NRA Office of the Secretary
11250 Waples Mill Road
Fairfax, Virginia 22030

Re: The NRA’s necessary rôle in revitalization of “the Militia of the several States”

Dear NRA Directors * * * :

As a long-time member of the National Rifle Association * * * , I write in order to urge each of you, as members of the NRA’s Board of Directors, to bring to the Board’s attention the necessity for the NRA to recognize the urgency of the declaration in the Second Amendment that “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State” at this critical juncture in the course of human events, and for that reason to become the leading participant in a nationwide movement to revitalize what the Constitution denotes as “the Militia of the several States”. I believe that it is particularly fitting for, as well as incumbent upon, me to make this request, as I have written several books on this subject—including Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume One, The Nation in Arms (2007); Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume Two, The Sword and Sovereignty (2012); Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume Three, By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” (2014 and 2016); Three Rights (2013); and Thirteen Words (2013)—as well as numerous commentaries originally published at the website since 2005 and now widely dispersed across the internet.

I have undertaken these efforts neither for my own entertainment nor with any realistic hope of financial gain from a lucrative publishing enterprise. Instead, my goal has been simply to elucidate the truth of the matter, to educate my fellow countrymen about it, to encourage them to become personally involved in the revitalization of “the Militia of the several States”, and to effect as much political and legislative movement in that direction within the States as possible as soon as possible—or, as I like to put it, immediately, if not sooner. I realize, however, that I cannot accomplish this goal simply by disseminating my work in “the free marketplace of ideas” without a significant measure of assistance from others better situated than I am to reach large numbers of Americans with this message. Therefore, this letter.

A. The revitalization of “the Militia of the several States” is critical for our country’s survival.

The first thirteen words of the Second Amendment—“[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”—constitute more than a merely hortatory pronouncement, hoary with the dust of a bygone era, that today has no practical relevance to the Amendment’s last fourteen words. Rather, those words constitute: (i) a finding of historical fact—to wit, that Americans secured “a free State” for themselves by virtue of their organization in “well regulated Militia”; (ii) a conclusion of constitutional law—to wit, that such Militia must always exist within every State in the Union, just as Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 and 16 and Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution presume that they will; and (iii) an admonition which the Founders of this country drew from both political theory and their own experiences—to wit, that “a free State” cannot long exist anywhere within this country without “well regulated Militia” everywhere throughout this country.

In the “well regulated” form which the Constitution requires, however, “the Militia of the several States” are nowhere to be found in America today:

• The National Guard and the Naval Militia in which some Americans are enrolled are not “militia” of any sort. Rather, they are the “Troops, or Ships of War” which the States may “keep * * * in time of Peace” “with[ ] the Consent of Congress”, pursuant to Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution. This (among other things) explains why they are not based upon near-universal compulsory membership, and why they can be called upon to perform services for the United States beyond the three specified in Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 for which alone Congress may “provide for calling forth the Militia”.

• The so-called “unorganized militia” to which most Americans are consigned by statute—in 10 U.S.C. § 311(b)(2) and, for example, Code of Virginia §§ 44-1 and 44-4—is no constitutional Militia, either. For no part of any constitutional Militia can be “unorganized”. Indeed, Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution of the United States empowers Congress “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia”—not for leaving the Militia “unorganiz[ed]”. And Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Virginia defines “a well regulated militia” as being “composed of the body of the people, trained to arms”—which, plainly enough, an “unorganized” Militia can never be, unless “the people” can somehow be “trained to arms” without being organized to that end.

• Finally, the various “private militia” which have sprung up across this country (including * * * in Virginia) in recent years are not constitutional Militia, because they are not “regulated” at all pursuant to statute, and therefore cannot claim (let alone assert) any specifically governmental authority. Under the First Amendment, they may adopt the title “militia” with as much freedom as they may style themselves “the Palace Guard of the Grand Duchess of Gerolstein”. But in either case the self-description is fanciful; and as far as the description “militia” is concerned, it is feckless for the purpose for which they put it forth.
This is a truly impossible situation for a country which, in its fundamental law, holds up “[a] well regulated Militia” as “being necessary to the security of a free State”. The notion that “private militia” could provide “the security of a free State” is delusive, because “private militia” can exist only in, and themselves require protection by, “a free State”. The notion that the States’ “Troops, or Ships of War” could provide “the security of a free State” is dangerous, because “a free State” must always closely control a “standing army”, which it can hardly expect to do if “the standing army” is the sole source of its “security”. And the notion that an “unorganized militia” could provide “the security of a free State” is disastrous, because an “unorganized militia” is effectively not in existence at all, and therefore cannot possibly supply what is “necessary” for anyone’s “security”. So, confronted by numerous dire threats, from international “terrorism” to domestic economic collapse, our country risks not simply a nationwide crisis, but even a national débâcle, should this situation fail to be corrected immediately, if not sooner.

B. For this country to survive in its traditional form, Americans must revitalize their Militia, because “well regulated Militia” are the “necessary”—indeed, the natural, the inevitable, and the indispensable—institutions through which the Power of the Sword is organized and employed for “the security of a free State”.

In any truly “free State”—that is, in any polity in which the people have absorbed the political principles of popular sovereignty, and therefore desire and strive to govern themselves—the people will instinctually, intuitively, and eventually intellectually recognize the importance of the Militia to that end. If incompetent or disloyal political leaders fail, neglect, or refuse to provide a program for establishment of the Militia according to law, patriots will undertake to make up for that deficiency on their own.

Unfortunately, just because the Militia are inevitable in principle does not guarantee that their advent will be timely in practice. Patriotic Americans may finally attempt to revitalize the Militia only when their efforts prove to be too little and too late. After all (as I can testify from personal experience), in the contemporary United States the few private individuals who and ad hoc groups which openly favor revitalization of the Militia along constitutional lines lack the numbers, the influence among the general public, and especially the financial wherewithal to hope to be successful in the very near term in even a single State. For part two click below.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




A serious question for the NRA Pt. 2

Nevertheless, reasons to be optimistic exist. One of them is that, just as this country is being confronted by ever-increasing dangers to its “security” as “a free State”, certain NRA programs are beginning to take on the character of proper training for the Militia. In general, I could list all of the basic courses in which I participate as a certified NRA firearms instructor. More specifically, I could refer to such newer courses as the “Survival Class”, the “Tactical Carbine Class”, and the “Long Range School”. [See “NRA Outdoors Offers Various Classes for 2016”, American Rifleman (January 2016), at 102.] As more and more of such courses are offered, a rough program of basic Militia training will take shape “by accretion”, as it were, of one small piece of the requisite structure at a time. The NRA’s development of these courses may not be—most likely is not—intentionally motivated by a concern for revitalizing the Militia. But that result will not be inadvertent, accidental, or merely coincidental, either. For any organization which seriously defends “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” will more or less automatically promote some of the training which can prepare “the people” for participation in “well regulated Militia”.

The problem is that the NRA is advancing only by fits and starts, and only for a relatively small number of Americans, the true and full agenda of the Second Amendment (as well as of the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution)—namely, the exercise of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” for the ultimate purpose of their service, both as their right and as their duty, in “well regulated Militia”. There appears to be no conscious appreciation among either the organization’s leaders or its members of “the big constitutional picture”, in terms of either what the NRA is actually accomplishing (albeit perhaps unconsciously), or what more needs to be done, with respect to the prospect of revitalizing the Militia. Indeed, as far as I have been able to determine, nothing in the NRA’s current literature links any of its programs in any manner and in the least degree to “well regulated Militia”, even in principle let alone in practice. If the public perception naturally to be drawn from this observation is correct, as far as the NRA is concerned the Second Amendment contains only fourteen words, not twenty-seven.

This is doubly unfortunate. First, as every student of the subject knows, “‘[i]n expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added. * * * Every word appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been fully understood’”. Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 572-573 (1933). So, as a result of its truncated emphasis on the last fourteen words of the Second Amendment, the NRA forfeits credibility in the all-important “marketplace of ideas”. As Richard Weaver once famously observed, “ideas have consequences”. And, as should be obvious to all, incorrect ideas about critical matters all too often beget catastrophes. Second, because of its unwarrantable bisection of the Amendment, the NRA’s programs are advancing too slowly, in comparison to the acceleration of the dangers now impinging upon this country, to be expected to thwart or even significantly militate against those dangers. The NRA should be aiming at the election of public officials who are dedicated to promotion of “the security of a free State” through revitalization of the Militia, and through such officials at the passage of legislation for that purpose in the several States. Absent such action, the NRA will remain far less effective than it otherwise could and should be, not only to its own detriment but also (and more importantly) to the detriment of this country as a whole.

C. What, then, should be done? Simply put, the NRA must assume the constitutionally proper leadership rôle with respect to the Second Amendment.

1. To accomplish this, the organization’s hierarchy—primarily its Board of Directors—must initially recognize that the NRA is in an anomalous, but also a peculiarly advantageous, position.

The NRA’s position is anomalous, because: First, it is merely a private group. Second, there would be no need for the NRA at all, had “the Militia of the several States” been in existence to their full constitutional extent since (say) the end of World War II. Third, and of most consequence, the NRA’s interpretation of the Second Amendment is of limited accuracy, relevance, and practicality. The so-called “individual right” theory of the Amendment is only marginally correct. “[T]he security of a free State” as a whole (as opposed to the security of individuals as such) cannot be had without a thoroughgoing organization of the populace in institutions which exercise governmental authority. “[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms” narrowly defined for the purpose of enabling isolated individuals to defend themselves against common criminals will prove of little use against any large-scale tyranny worthy of the name, let alone against natural disasters, epidemics or pandemics, catastrophic industrial accidents, failures of the systems necessary to maintain the operations of a technologically advanced society (such as a breakdown of the national electrical grid), an economic collapse engendered through a failure of the Federal Reserve System, or any other catastrophic eventualities in response to which properly organized, armed, disciplined, and trained Militia could and should be deployed in every State and Locality throughout this country.

The NRA’s position is advantageous, though, because: First, no constitutionally adequate Militia exists anywhere within the United States today—so the ground is clear for up-to-date and comprehensive revitalization everywhere. Second, Article II of the NRA’s own Bylaws states (in pertinent part) that

[t]he purposes and objective of the National Rifle Association * * * are: 1. To protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, especially with respect to the inalienable right of the individual American citizen guaranteed by such Constitution to acquire, possess, collect, exhibit, transport, carry, transfer ownership of, and enjoy the right to use arms, in order that the people may always be in a position to exercise their legitimate individual rights of self defense and defense of family, person, and property, as well as to serve in the appropriate militia for the common defense of the Republic and the individual liberty of its citizens; 2. To promote public safety, law and order, and the national defense; 3. To train members of law enforcement agencies, the armed forces, the militia, and people of good repute in marksmanship and in the safe handling and efficient use of small arms[.]
Observe that points 1 and 3 specifically refer to the Militia. And point 2 refers to “public safety, law and order, and the national defense”, which are the explicit constitutional responsibilities of the Militia (and only the Militia) under Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution, which empowers Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”. Thus, according to this bylaw, the NRA should be an ardent advocate, assistant, and even architect of “the Militia of the several States”, so as fully (in the bylaw’s own words) “[t]o protect and defend the Constitution of the United States”, in keeping specifically with the declaration of the Second Amendment that “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”. Third, starting with the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice (1901) and the Civilian Marksmanship Program (1903), the NRA has had a long and successful relationship with the General Government—proving that the NRA has served, and can continue to serve, some important governmental purposes notwithstanding that it is a private group. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316, 407-423 (1819). Moreover, relationships of this kind can be extended to the States as well—and should be, inasmuch as the Militia are “the Militia of the several States” (not “of the United States”). Fourth, throughout the process of revitalizing the Militia the NRA will be ready and able to provide public officials and the nascent Militia with expert guidance and assistance available from no other private organization (and, from what I have been able to glean from the relevant literature, from no governmental organization anywhere within the federal system, either).

2. In addition to the foregoing, the Board should recognize that, if the NRA marshals the moral integrity, historical hindsight, practical political foresight, and legal insight of its officers, members, and many friends amongst the general public, it can assume the leadership of a national political campaign to revitalize the Militia, and by doing so can contribute decisively to the salvation of this country as “a free State”. Indeed, the NRA is probably the only organization even arguably capable of doing so at the present time.

None of us is unaware that the NRA has been criticized as being too soft, too pliable, too apt to play politics, and generally too willing to compromise with respect to “gun control”. Even if such detractions are to some extent justifiable, America does not enjoy the luxury of unlimited time during which “to reinvent the wheel” where revitalization of the Militia is concerned. In my book Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume One, The Nation in Arms (2007), I proposed that patriotic citizens should form numerous local associations, not affiliated with or dependent upon any national organization, for that purpose. Yet, almost a decade later, vanishingly few people have responded to my recommendations; and the growing-season still left to this country may not prove long enough to plant and harvest such a crop from seed. Anticipating that this may prove to be the case, we need to utilize whatever resources are already at hand, and the performance of which may be capable of improvement. For better or worse, arguably that boils down to a single organization: the NRA.

The NRA disposes of the appropriate historical pedigree, the structure, the staff, the programs, and the experience to undertake the task. Based upon its successes in electoral politics, its network of effective lobbyists, its ability to access and influence even the generally antagonistic mass media, its large number of members, its highly qualified instructors, its financial resources, and its good repute among most sensible Americans, the NRA can form the center of a mass movement aimed at a goal much more important than securing the so-called “individual right to keep and bear arms” on which it focuses its attention today. For no merely “individual right to keep and bear arms”, exercised by individuals as individuals in mutual isolation, can defend Americans from tyranny, let alone protect it from many other dangers far more likely than full-blown tyranny to strike this country in the short term. Only revitalized Militia—composed, to be sure, of individuals, but of individuals acting in unison, and imbued with governmental authority of the highest order—can provide that protection across the board.

That the NRA has survived, and even grown significantly in strength and stature over the past several years, in the face of relentless and strident attacks from “gun-control” fanatics, their political allies, their transmission belts in the mass media, and hordes of useful idiots among the intelligentsia, proves that the organization cannot easily be swayed from its chosen course, let alone silenced. Such attacks, of course, would become ever more desperate and savage if the NRA should begin to promote revitalization the Militia. For the “gun-control” fanatics understand perfectly well that what is ultimately at stake is not a merely “individual right to keep and bear arms”—the existence of which even today only marginally inconveniences the political dominance of the factions, special interests, and other dark forces on behalf of which those fanatics bluster—but instead the amalgamation of all individuals capable of exercising such basically anarchic “individual rights” into fully organized “well regulated Militia” authorized to execute the laws of the Union and of their own States, the appearance of which would change the balance of political power in this country drastically, decisively, and permanently in favor of We the People. But the more extreme the opposition which “gun-control” fanatics mounted, the more conclusive would be the proof of the value of revitalizing the Militia.

D. Finally, is all of this too much to ask of the NRA?

Indeed, can it be asked? Does the organization have the sense and the courage to undertake such a daunting task? I believe so. I believe that the NRA is capable of understanding why, in the final analysis, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” can be guaranteed only if “the people” are organized in “well regulated Militia”. I believe that the NRA can commit itself to the defense of “a free State” in the one and only manner in which the Constitution tells us “a free State” must be defended. And if cold ratiocination will not serve as the decisive motivating factor, then fear will. It is said that nothing focuses a man’s mind more than his impending hanging. Surely the same must be true for a country faced with its own imminent destruction.

Yet, for anything worthwhile to happen, someone capable of exerting influence within the NRA needs to convince the organizational hierarchy; then the hierarchy needs to convince the organization’s own members; then the organization and its members and other adherents need to convince the sensible portion of the remaining population. The NRA’s Directors—such as yourselves—are in the best position, and bear the greatest responsibility, to begin this process:

• You can raise the question of why, when the Second Amendment contains twenty-seven words, the NRA focuses on only the last fourteen of them.

• You can raise the question of how the NRA can claim to be a true defender of “a free State” when it neglects what the Second Amendment itself declares in its first thirteen words to be “necessary to the security of a free State”. And

• You can demand answers to these questions in the most important of organizational fora—from your own fellow Directors and the rest of the NRA’s hierarchy in its headquarters.

If not you, then who? If not now, then when? When it is too late?

I enclose for your perusal a copy of my book The Sword and Sovereignty. This, I admit, is something of a formidable work which no one could reasonably be expected to read, let alone to digest, at a single sitting. Having it readily at hand will, however, provide you with some little evidence of the seriousness of the historical and constitutional arguments in favor of revitalization of the Militia. In addition, I should be willing to discuss this matter with you, either individually or in a group, at your convenience—whether to make a fully structured presentation on the subject or just to answer your questions informally.

Thanking you for your attention to this matter, I remain

Your servant,

Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




Trump—triumph or tragedy? Pt. 1

Contrary to the contentions of those misguided (or deviously Machiavellian) Americans now agitating for a “Convention of the States” in order to amend the Constitution in some unpredictable fashion, the ridiculous and intolerable situation which confronts this country today is not the product of “the supreme Law of the Land”. No, indeed. It is the result of decades of disregard and even disdain for, and thoroughgoing disobedience to, the Constitution in both the District of Columbia and the States, by a totally dysfunctional, if not outright disloyal, professional “political class” and the vicious, predatory factions in the Establishment for which the “political class” works. But, obviously, in keeping with traditional methods of political reform, the stranglehold which the greasy fingers of this cabal press into Americans’ throats can be broken only upon the emergence of viable candidates for high public office whom the Establishment does not control. Increasing numbers of patriotic Americans, disgusted with the present noxious state of affairs, and desperate for change which is worth believing in and struggling for, are asking whether Donald Trump is such a candidate. Will his emergence on the political scene usher in a time of triumph, or the final act of an American tragedy?

To be sure, because there are no probabilities of unique events, the past never provides perfect parallels for the future. (As the expression coined by advertisers in the automotive trade has it, “your mileage may differ”.) Yet, just as the enjoyment of a deceptive prosperity in 1928 predictably collapsed into the anguish of a real depression in 1932, today’s data indicate to every perceptive observer that an economic, social, and political crisis of substantial magnitude cannot be averted in this country (and the rest of the world as well) during the foreseeable future. Indeed, in light of the unbearable burden of America’s public and private debt (most of which is not only entirely unfunded now, but also quite incapable of ever being funded); the incompetence, corruption, and criminality of the Federal Reserve’s banking-cartel and Wall Street’s financial casinos; the disappearance of high value-added jobs (as in manufacturing) through off-shoring and globalist “trade deals”; the impoverishment of the middle class and destitution of the poor; the utter unsoundness of this nation’s currency; and especially the Establishment’s perverse principle that the very worst criminals in the Axis of Financial Fraud which runs from New York City to the District of Columbia are both “too big to fail” and “too big to jail”—due to all of this, in comparison to the approaching national calamity the Great Depression of the 1930s will appear to have been a period of economic rationality, social tranquillity, and political stability. And, most ominously for Mr. Trump, in this benighted era in which the President is viewed by all too many as “the Decider” whose actions determine the course of events for better or worse in every sphere of human endeavor, whoever happens to be the President from 2017 through 2020 will be held economically, politically, and ideologically accountable for whatever transpires, be it good or especially be it ill. (One might discount these concerns by pointing out that, were Hillary Clinton elected President, she would face the same Hooverite danger of incumbency in the midst of an economic collapse. Unlike Mr. Trump, however, Mrs. Clinton would benefit from the inestimable advantage of having the big “mainstream media” as ardent propagandists indoctrinating Americans with the party line that only the fascistic, socialistic, or other policies of political racketeering which her Administration promoted could eventually restore prosperity.)

So, if Mr. Trump is not fully prepared—well before the fact—to tell Americans exactly how he plans to deal, expeditiously and effectively, with the hard times that are surely on their way, if he is elected his Administration will be blamed for the collapse, even more than Herbert Hoover was pilloried for the Great Depression. Not only that: Having run on a fundamentally anti-Establishment platform, Mr. Trump and all of his political and ideological supporters—be they constitutionalists, advocates of federalism and limited government, Tea Party-ites, or simply average Americans who hope that by electing an “outsider” they can finally escape from domination by the “two” major political parties and the string-pullers in the Establishment who control them from behind the screen—will find themselves decisively defeated, defamed, discouraged, and dumped into the dustbin of history. The Establishment will emerge triumphant, more puissant, irresponsible, rapacious, and vindictive than ever before.

So, what is to be done—by Mr. Trump certainly, and indeed by any candidate for “the Office of President” who aspires to be a true political “outsider” both in words and especially in deeds? For one thing, he must not make Herbert Hoover’s mistake of attempting to deal with an economic cataclysm by employing the very same discourse, analyses, tactics, policies, and types of persons as advisors which and who were responsible for the crisis. First and foremost, as the essence of his electoral campaign he must stop talking about evanescent “issues” concocted largely by his opponents and disseminated through “the mainstream media” as part of their incessant dissemination of disinformation, but instead must apprise Americans as to what the real score is at the opening of this, the fourth quarter; then set out his unique plan for the rest of the game.

A. First on Mr. Trump’s agenda must be to lay before this country a candid and accurate assessment, in detail, of the present situation—what it entails, how it came about, and why it will inexorably play out to this country’s destruction if the right steps are not taken in due course. He must be as unsparingly honest and coldly clinical as a physician who warns his patient that the patient suffers from a disease which will have fatal consequences unless radical treatments are employed as soon as possible. And, just as such a physician would do, he must explain that the necessity for these treatments derives from the source, nature, and inevitable effects of the disease. Of course, Mr. Trump would not be the first to describe the hard times now bearing down upon us, or to explain the origins of the danger. I, for one, have been writing about this subject since even long before my earliest commentaries for NewsWithViews, such as “‘Homeland Security’—For What and For Whom?” (8 March 2005) and “Are Monetary and Banking Crises Inevitable in the Near Future?” (17 March 2005). Other noteworthy prophets of the obvious include Paul Craig Roberts and Michael Hudson on economics, John Whitehead on this country’s burgeoning para-military police state, and Frosty Wooldridge on the disastrous effects of unlimited immigration. Mr. Trump, though, enjoys the decided advantage that, as a candidate for the office of President with the savvy and financial wherewithal to generate his own mass publicity, he cannot be dismissed as a nonperson by “the mainstream media”. Although the big media may go all out for character assassination, they can neither impose anonymity on him nor consign what he says to the oblivion of Orwell’s “memory hole”.

From his self-made “bully pulpit”, Mr. Trump needs to emphasize that the present situation is not the product of disembodied “trends” or “historical forces” for which no one in particular, or for which everyone in general, is responsible. The situation confronting America today has resulted from specifically human actions. And (as everyone conversant with Austrian economics knows) all human actions are the products of some identifiable individuals’ purposeful behavior, or misbehavior. Therefore, Mr. Trump needs to expose and excoriate the actual culprits in the Establishment out of whose witches’ cauldron the contemporary septic mess has overflowed. Consequences must be connected with actions—actions must be associated with names—and to names must be assigned moral and political responsibility, if not outright criminal culpability, for past, present, and future events. I, for one, am not responsible for America’s plight; and I presume that vanishing few of my readers are, either. But some identifiable individuals are at fault here. And this country is entitled to know their names, what they have done, and why—and, most to the point in a political campaign for the highest office in the land, what the leading candidate intends to do about it all. Obviously, the rogues’ gallery must include at least the dominant figures and operatives of the “two” major political parties, as well as all of the factions and other special interests, both domestic and foreign, for which those “two” parties are partisans, fronts, transmission belts, stooges, and gaggles of useful idiots (if not outright co-conspirators). These individuals, after all, have exercised actual control over America’s political, economic, social, and cultural institutions for decades upon decades. If those institutions have gone to blazes, it is not illogical or unfair to conclude that the men and women in charge of them lit the matches.

Of course, exposure of this dirty linen will confront Americans with the hard reality that their country’s body politic, and the economic, social, and cultural institutions over which it presides, are riven with irreconcilable conflicts. Yet for America to come to grips with such divisions is not without historical precedent—although in the past that problem was usually recognized for what it was, not swept under the rug as it tends to be today. For the prime instance, when “the REPRESENTATIVES of the UNITED STATES” promulgated the Declaration of Independence, they did so “in the Name, and by the Authority of the good People of the[ ] Colonies”. Not all of the people, but only “the good People”—because the Founders were well aware that Americans in their day were far from being united. Some were “good People” who favored independence; some were attentistes who sat on the political fence, abiding events; and some were Tories who supported King George III. From the Patriots’ point of view, whatever the Tories’ personal merits as individuals, as a group they were to be accounted “bad people”, with whom no political reconciliation or compromise was possible.

In the late 1700s, much more in the economic, social, and cultural realms united Patriots and Tories than divided them. The decisive fracture appeared along a political fault-line: namely, whether “the good People” were entitled to enjoy the plenitude of “the rights of Englishmen”, or were to be consigned to a second-class status at the mercy of the British Imperial Government. “[W]hy should we enumerate our injuries in detail?” asked the Continental Congress in 1775. “By one statute it is declared, that parliament can ‘of right make laws to bind us IN ALL CASES WHATSOEVER.’ What is to defend us against so enormous, so unlimited a power? * * * We saw the misery to which such despotism would reduce us.” A declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North America, now met in General Congress at Philadelphia, setting forth the causes and necessity of their taking up arms (Thursday, 6 July 1775), Journals of the Continental Congress, Volume 2, at 146-147.

Today, an arguably worse situation exists. For, with the advent of “multiculturalism” as the Establishment’s strategy of social control through engineered social dissolution, almost everything has become a source of divisions which the Establishment exploits for the purpose of accreting to itself powers even more “enormous” and “unlimited” than any to which the British Parliament aspired in Colonial times. Yet, in confirmation of the old axiom that le plus ça change le plus c’est la même chose, in contemporary America the primary division between “the good People” on the one hand, and “the bad people” among or allied with the Establishment on the other hand, appears in the same stark political terms. Just as in the late 1700s, “the good People” of the contemporary United States demand only that to which they are entitled: namely, “the rights of Americans”, which “the bad people” are bending every effort to strip from them.

In reliance upon the Declaration of Independence, “the good People” want to maintain “among the powers of the earth, the[ir] separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them”—not to be swept up into some supra-national “new world order”. They want the public officials who administer the “Governments” this country’s Founders “instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,” to exercise only “just powers”; at every turn of the political wheel to seek out and conform to, not to disregard and dispense with, “the consent of the governed”; to acknowledge “[t]hat whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it”; and always to remember, in fear and trembling, that “when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce the[ People] under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government”. In short, “the good People” want to remain sovereigns in their own land, not subjects, serfs, or slaves of a global imperium run by and for the benefit of gigantic corporations devoid of souls, hearts, or consciences, that scorn “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” and violate them with impunity.

As this country’s sovereigns, “the good People” want, deserve, and have an absolute legal right to enjoy the benefits of the Constitution their forefathers “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” “in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”. In contrast—

• The Establishment intends to dissolve “a more perfect Union” in this country in order to absorb Americans within a global “new world order” in which their national identity disappears.
• The Establishment intends to “[dis]establish Justice” by creating a dichotomy of legal status between its members and minions, on the one hand, and average Americans, on the other. For the Establishment, one sort of “justice” will prevail, and quite another one for everyone else. Private special interests will be the beneficiaries, not only of “bail outs”, “bail ins”, and other subsidies under color of the excuse that they are “too big to fail”, but also of abusive “trade deals” that enable supra-national corporations to usurp the constitutional authority of Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce”, thereby permanently alienating Americans’ ability to control their own economic destiny. And those corporate interests, along with the rogue public officials who do their bidding, will be “too big to jail”—the worse their offenses, the more complete their immunities.

• The Establishment intends to undermine “domestic Tranquility” by sowing the dragons’ teeth of disharmony, dissension, discord, and division throughout society, in pursuit of its strategy of divide et impera. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the aid and comfort the Establishment extends to invasions of America by illegal aliens who refuse to assimilate but instead assert a right to impose divisive “multiculturalism” on everyone else, with the inevitable result that every thread of traditional Americanism will be ripped from this country’s social fabric.

• The Establishment intends to pervert “the Army and Navy of the United States”—after the Militia, the primary national instruments for “the common defence”—into hordes of witless myrmidons deployed for aggressive military adventures overseas, in violation of the constitutional principle that “the genius and character of our institutions are peaceful, and the power to declare war was not conferred upon Congress for the purposes of aggression or aggrandizement”. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 Howard) 603, 614 (1850).

• The Establishment intends to supplant “the general Welfare” with “corporate welfare”, so that special interests among 1% of the population can amass unlimited wealth at the expense of the remaining 99%. And, worst of all,

• The Establishment intends to render utterly “[in]secure the Blessings of Liberty”, by empowering a para-militarized police state to oppress average Americans at every turn, in a manner far more egregious than anything King George III and his Ministers could ever have contemplated, let alone attempted.

Indeed, the Establishment is well on its way to accomplishing each and every one of these goals. For Part two click below.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




Trump—triumph or tragedy? Pt. 2

Under these circumstances, no common ground can be found, no dialogue conducted, no compromise reached between “the good People” and their candidate for “the Office of President”, on the one side, and the Establishment and its candidate, on the other—any more than common ground, dialogue, and compromise are possible between justice and injustice, “the general Welfare” and the avarice of special interests, or what the Second Amendment calls “the security of a free State” as opposed to the oppression of a police state. One side or the other must prevail. In this struggle, as General MacArthur said: “There is no substitute for victory.”

B. Mr. Trump (or any authentic political “outsider”) can depend only on “the good People”; and “the good People” can depend only on him. But to gain their confidence, Mr. Trump must take “the good People” into his confidence, with confidence that, knowing what he intends to do and why and how he intends to do it, they will rally to him through every vicissitude which awaits them.

1. He must convince “the good People” that he is committed to fighting the battle, both before and especially after his election, on their, not their enemies’, terms. At the minimum, that requires bringing into his campaign, and eventually into his Administration, a set of advisors not drawn from the ranks of the professional political courtiers who have carried water for prior Administrations. The sorry records of those Administrations provide conclusive evidence that these individuals’ misguided conceptions of “public service” have been the primary causes of, and therefore will never provide the solutions for, America’s woes.

2. Mr. Trump must emphasize that no one can “make America great again” unless and until “the good People” steel themselves to yank this country by its bootstraps out of the very deep hole into which past generations of incompetent and disloyal politicians have cast it. In line with the old adage that “a pessimist in an optimist who knows the facts”, he must warn “the good People” that a great deal of economic pain and social unrest will be unavoidable in the short term—and that stern measures must be implemented, prodigious efforts expended and costs incurred, and agonizing sacrifices endured in the near term—if the necessary reforms are to be achieved in the long run. That he is the one Presidential candidate ready and willing to take charge and shoulder responsibility is not enough. For he can succeed only if “the good People” are prepared to do their part to the utmost of their abilities. He can be no more than the obstetrician for America’s renaissance; “the good People” must give birth to it.

3. Glittering generalities, “sound bites”, and slogans will not suffice. Rather, Mr. Trump must set out with specificity the nonnegotiable reforms his Administration will implement. Here, I can touch on only a few of these, and only in a limited fashion:

(a) In furtherance of the President’s oath of office—that he “will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States”—Mr. Trump must promise to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. Without that as the guiding principle and constant practice of his Administration, nothing of permanent value will be achieved.

(b) In fulfillment of the Declaration of Independence, he must assure “the good People” that he will bend his every effort to preserve this country’s national sovereignty, integrity, and identity—not only by securing its borders against invasions of illegal aliens, but also by rooting out those internal subversives who are employing “multiculturalism” as a battering-ram to break down America’s political and social cohesion, preliminary to the submergence of “the good People” in a supra-national “new world order” which will eradicate “the separate and equal station” “among the powers of the earth * * * to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them”.

That “the political class” and its mouthpieces in “the mainstream media” have attacked Mr. Trump with the ferocity of mad dogs because of his rather mild pronouncements to date on the issue of illegal immigration demonstrates how critical the elimination of America’s national independence and integrity is to the Establishment’s achievement of its long-range goals—and therefore how vital the preservation of that independence and integrity is to “the good People’s” permanent interests. I characterize Mr. Trump’s pronouncements as “rather mild”, because he has yet to point out that, perforce of both general constitutional principles and specific statutes, a patriotic President is entitled to, and can, stop alien invasions in their tracks. See my NewsWithViews commentaries “How the President Can Secure the Borders” (18 August 2015) and “A Trumped-Up Controversy” (20 February 2016).

(c) Because “representative government” cannot function if Americans do not know what their ostensible “representatives” are actually doing, and why they are doing it, Mr. Trump must promise “the good People” that he will put paid to the present-day fetish of governmental secrecy and lies (which depend upon secrecy for their efficacy). His Administration must open the public records to public inspection to the fullest extent consistent with the constitutional definition of “national security”—that is, the security of the nation, not the security of “the political class” and its string-pullers in the Establishment.

For a prime example, Americans must be afforded access to all of the public (and, to the extent possible, private) records concerning the 9/11 event; and those records must be subjected to the most wide-ranging critical analyses, letting the chips fall where they may. In addition to that, novel methods for elucidation of the truth must be employed. Being something of a scientist myself, I favor actual experiments. Every theory which can be disproved through experiment must be discarded. So, as a scientific first step in testing prior Administrations’ theories of what happened on 9/11, Mr. Trump should promise that his Administration will build an exact replica of World Trade Center Building 7 as it existed on that fateful day—set it on fire—and see whether or not it collapses into its own footprint at near free-fall speed, as did the original. If it does not, certain conclusions can be drawn, on the basis of which further actions can be taken. In light of the serious consequences which this country has already suffered, and will continue to endure, because of the Establishment’s theories of 9/11, whatever such an experiment may cost will hardly be excessive.

(d) Mr. Trump should explain to “the good People” that, by setting aside all constitutionally unwarranted governmental secrecy, his Administration will be able to enforce the Bill of Rights and other constitutional and statutory guarantees of Americans’ freedoms in a rigorous fashion against rogue public officials and their co-conspirators in the private sector. The Constitution’s goal to “establish Justice” can never be fulfilled except perforce of the principle that no one is “too big to jail”. For far too long “the political class” has been able to sweep its serial malfeasances under the rug, either through the wrongdoers’ suppression of the evidence of their wrongdoing, or by grants of “immunity” to one set of wrongdoers by another set of wrongdoers when wrongdoing slips into the light of day. The time has come to employ a firmer broom in more trustworthy hands. For, as the old saying has it, “a new broom sweeps clean”—and an iron broom sweeps cleaner yet. Such a thoroughgoing housecleaning is especially needed with respect to those rogue officials whose “long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object” has “evince[d] a design to reduce [Americans] under absolute Despotism”. As the apt slogan of the Navy’s “Silent Service” had it in World War II, “find them, chase them, sink them”.

(e) Of all possible wrongdoing by rogue public officials, nothing could be worse than fomenting international warfare. Not only because modern warfare is hideously homicidal and egregiously expensive, but especially because the prosecution of wars abroad inevitably encourages the imposition of despotism at home. “[T]he common defence” is the constitutional standard. Therefore, Mr. Trump must assure Americans that he will end America’s involvement in aggressive military adventures overseas. Moreover, he must guarantee that he will see all of those rogue public officials who and the private special interests which have fomented or otherwise been responsible for or otherwise complicitous in such adventures brought to justice, through execution of those “Laws of the Union” which enforce the principles of the Nuremberg tribunal. See Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), Volume I, arts. 6(a), 7, 8, and 9, at 5-6. See also my NewsWithViews commentary “A New Nuremberg Moment” (6 September 2013). After all, these crimes—steeped in conspiracy and aggression—have resulted in hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of needless deaths and injuries; destruction of the political integrity, social stability, and economic viability of whole countries; and huge wastage of resources by “military-industrial complexes” in both the United States and the other nations which have foolishly participated in these operations. And they continue even today, unabated in their savagery. See, e.g., Felicity Arbuthnot, “US Apocalypse in Mosul in the Guise of Bombing ISIS”. For such wrongdoing there can be neither excuse, nor exoneration, nor expunction from the pages of history.

Mr. Trump recently announced his “foreign policy” with a rousing speech. Yet it lacked the clarity and wisdom of George Washington’s Farewell Address with respect to foreign affairs, alliances, and the like. (Indeed, Mr. Trump could not go wrong by adopting as his guiding principles all of the tenets of that document.) Much of his speech was, as the wag once said, “déjà vue all over again”. To be sure, Mr. Trump’s reliance on the principle of, shall we say, “strength at home, businesslike diplomacy abroad” is a workmanlike approach, along the lines of Theodore Roosevelt’s precept, “speak softly and carry a big stick”. Nonetheless, I wonder how anyone can imagine, on the one hand, that this country cannot control its own borders to the extent of repelling an invasion of illegal aliens from a nation as militarily impotent as Mexico, but, on the other hand, that it can deploy to the very frontiers of Russia and China sufficient forces to awe those powerful nations into sheepish compliance with policies dictated from the District of Columbia at odds with their own compelling national interests. Indeed, one need look only to the débâcles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya to understand the limits the real world imposes on the hubris and fantasies of American military interventionists. (The only saving grace here is that Mr. Trump evidently desires to avoid a major war, whereas Hillary Clinton would likely prove a worse warmonger, and more feckless a war-fighter, than even George W. Bush.)

Finally, Mr. Trump’s promise to crush ISIS militarily rests on the naïve premiss that ISIS is some truly “foreign” force. He would do better first to investigate whether ISIS is in large measure the product of the devious intentions or simple-minded incompetence of the CIA and the Pentagon—and that therefore the initial step in the process of eradicating ISIS must be a thoroughgoing housecleaning of those agencies. (A parallel investigation should be conducted to determine the extent to which certain of America’s ostensible “allies” are at fault in this matter, too.) Mr. Trump might also want to inquire, for example, why the NSA, the DIA, the CIA, the FBI, FINCEN, the IRS-CID, and other intelligence and law-enforcement agencies at home and abroad have not been able (or willing) to employ their extensive networks of surveillance to ferret out the sources of and routes for ISIS’s funding. After all, although logistics is not everything, everything depends on logistics. How does ISIS raise its revenue and pay its bills? Who are ISIS’s bankers, money-launderers, and so on? And why have they not been exposed, and steps taken to eradicate their operations? Inquiring minds surely want to know.

(f) As far as “domestic policy” is concerned , it will be essential for a Trump Administration to restore the two great powers of government—the Power of the Sword and the Power of the Purse—to “the good People’s” own hands. For no one else is sufficiently trustworthy to exercise them.

(i) Restoration of the Power of the Sword will require revitalization of the Militia, about which I have written extensively elsewhere. Only by “call[ing] forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union” will “the good People” finally be able to deal with those combinations too powerful to be suppressed by ordinary means, the continued toleration of which threatens to destroy this country within the lifetimes of most of the readers of this commentary. In particular, see my NewsWithViews commentary “Donald Trump and the Militia” (20 February 2016).

Revitalization of the Militia will also be necessary to enable “the good People” to deal in a constitutional fashion with the social unrest which will arise out of the economic dislocations and hard times this country will have to endure as part of the price of rebuilding the national economy. See, e.g., my book By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law”.

(ii) Restoration of the Power of the Purse will require bridling the banks—first and foremost, by compelling them to provide Americans with a constitutional and economically sound monetary unit to compete with, and eventually supplant, the Federal Reserve Note as this nation’s primary currency. See, e.g., my NewsWithViews commentaries “A Cross of Gold” (10 May 2011) and “Presidential Questions” (9 May 2015). It will also necessitate coming to grips with the problem of the unpayable national debt—not by imposing “austerity” on “the good People”, but by recognizing that much of this debt has been incurred unconstitutionally (in terms of international law, is so-called “odious debt”), and is therefore unenforceable. See, e.g., my NewsWithViews commentary “A Cross of Debt” (10 February 2012). As a successful entrepreneur, Mr. Trump surely understands that long-term business-relations, whether of a corporation or an entire country, cannot be conducted on the basis of the uncertain value of an unstable “rubber” currency, and that sometimes a declaration of bankruptcy and concomitant cancellation of some and restructuring of other debts is unavoidable.

(g) In even the short run, little will be accomplished unless and until a Trump Administration breaks the electoral stranglehold of the “two” major political parties and the string-pullers behind them. This will require radically diminishing, if not eliminating altogether, the ability of organized wealth to maintain the oligopoly of those parties, to suppress or capture legitimate political movements, and thereby perpetually to misdirect the course of elections. That a handful of multi-billionaires, primarily through the mega-corporations they own and the myriad special-interest groups they spawn and finance, are suffered to dominate political affairs in this country, setting “the good People” at defiance in election after election, directly contradicts any rational conception of “representative government” and “the general Welfare”. Not only is that state of affairs unsound in principle, but also it has turned out disastrously in practice. For all too long, these individuals and institutions have controlled the composition of Congress, the Presidency, and the Judiciary, as well as much of State and Local government—the consequence being the mess in which this country now finds itself at every level of the federal system. The simplistic theory that “corporate money” can be equated with “free speech” in the political realm has been tested by experiment, and found woefully wanting. (To be sure, it might be argued that the corruption and degeneration of American politics have been the products, not of the injection of wealth per se into politics, but only of the faulty ideas that such injection has promoted, and that if the wealthy were to marshal their resources on behalf of good ideas this country would benefit. Yet there is no denying that, only as a consequence of the massive amounts of irresponsible wealth behind them could the bad ideas prevalent today have become dominant in the political arena. And in politics one must be extremely risk-averse, because the risks of error are too great to be accepted.)

The exclusion of “corporate money” from politics may appear to be a problematic goal, because of the false notion promulgated by the Supreme Court that corporations are “persons” with constitutional rights equivalent to those of real flesh-and-blood individuals. The “personhood” of corporations, however, is merely a sorry legal fiction. Actually, it is a piece of pseudo-legalistic balderdash, coming as it does from a Court with the effrontery to claim that actual human beings who happen to be unborn are not constitutional “persons”. In any event, no need exists for a constitutional amendment to recognize the self-evident truth that corporations have no inherent rights, but rather are merely the creatures of statutes, with only such legal relations (rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and so on) as those statutes grant, and which other statutes can deny, to them. Whatever it may have opined on this subject in the past, the Supreme Court has a long history of changing its mind on constitutional questions. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-830 & note 1 (1991). So it is not too much to expect that the Court can be persuaded to reverse itself on this issue, too. And if the Justices refuse to come to their constitutional senses, they can be shown the door; for their tenure is solely “during good Behaviour”, which subversion of the political process in favor of faux “persons” can never be.

Admittedly, the foregoing may constitute no more than a “wish list” for a true Presidential “outsider” who has yet to appear. For only the future will tell whether Mr. Trump is such a man. Yet one must always live in hope. If an obscure commentator such as this author, living in the remote “Canoe Capital of Virginia”, can figure out some of what needs to be done, then so can an eminent real-estate shark from the Big Apple.

Ultimately, though, the critical question is not “Can Trump do it?” or even “Will Trump do it?”, but instead “If Trump tries to do it, will ‘the good People’ do their part?” Will they demand his nomination, secure his election, and then stand behind his Administration?

As it always does, time will tell. Some Americans may yet imagine that this country can still play for time. But, as the old saying has it, time brings all things, bad as well as good. And anyone who can tell time knows that “the good People” are running out of time. It really may be “now or never”. If “the good People” do not triumph by electing a true “outsider” to “the Office of President” this November, America’s fate may be sealed, once and for all, in the worst tragedy of modern times.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




Standing guard or standing down?

I always approach each edition of the National Rifle Association’s magazine, American Rifleman, with some little trepidation, because of the disturbing content that all too often crops up in its editorials. The latest edition (May 2016) has once again proven that I am not merely a victim of intellectual paranoia.

In his regular column, “Standing Guard”, the NRA’s Executive Vice President, Wayne LaPierre, advises his readers that “When it Comes to Gun Rights, 2016 Election Is About the Court, Too”. The thrust of the column is Mr. LaPierre’s reiteration of the necessity for the NRA’s supporters to “elect a president who believes and will fight for the Second Amendment”, as well as to “elect a [Charles] Schumer-proof United States Senate and maintain the current Second Amendment majority”. As I have explained in an earlier NewsWithViews commentary entitled “NRA, Second Amendment, and ‘We the People’”, reliance on elections alone (even if they are conducted honestly) is an inadequate means to “fight for the Second Amendment”. For instance, no candidate for “the Office of President” who fails to champion revitalization of the Militia is actually “fight[ing] for the second Amendment” to the full extent the Constitution requires. After all, how can a candidate for that office expect to fulfill his constitutional authority and responsibility as “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”, when for all practical purposes “the Militia of the several States” are moribund throughout this country? Is not such a candidate’s “Job One” to correct that situation? The answer being obvious, I shall not rehash that matter here.

More disquieting in Mr. LaPierre’s column is his critique of certain statements made by the Justices who dissented from the Supreme Court’s decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago—namely, Justices Stevens, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg. To be sure, their pronouncements certainly warrant scathing criticism, if not raucous ridicule. Unfortunately, Mr. LaPierre’s rejoinders are not much less faulty—perhaps, are even more indefensible, coming as they do from an ostensible proponent of the Second Amendment. He is not so much “standing guard” over the Amendment, as standing down from that purpose.

A. Mr. Lapierre quotes Justice Stevens in Heller as contending that:

The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States to maintain a well regulated militia … there is no indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution.

Now, no one who reads all twenty-seven words of the Second Amendment—not just the last fourteen, which the NRA emphasizes to the virtual exclusion of the first thirteen (a mistake, curiously enough, which Justice Stevens did not make)—can doubt that Justice Stevens was perfectly correct (albeit, I suspect, only accidentally so) to assert that “[t]he Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States to maintain a well regulated militia”. Nonetheless, he missed the essential point: that, if the people have a right “to maintain a well regulated militia” in each State, then there must actually be, in each State, “[a] well regulated Militia”, organized according to constitutional principles drawn from pre-constitutional American history, in which Militia “the people” as a whole actually participate. The “right of the people” thus imposes a corresponding duty, not only on each of “the several States”, but also on the General Government (primarily, through Congress), to ensure that such Militia are fully enrolled, organized, armed, disciplined, and governed at all times. That “right of the people” is also a duty of “the people” to serve in such Militia, because constitutional Militia are establishments with near-universal compulsory membership. They are the only organizations the Constitution recognizes which are based upon a general “draft”. Full support for these assertions can be found in my book Constitutional “Homeland Security”, Volume Two, The Sword and Sovereignty (Front Royal, Virginia: CD-ROM Edition, 2012), and therefore need not be repeated here.

What Justice Stevens did not understand (or refused to acknowledge) is that, as Article 13 of Virginia’s Declaration of Rights (1776) made clear, “a well regulated militia” is “composed of the body of the people, trained to arms”. That means that every able-bodied adult American (other than conscientious objectors) not only must be suitably armed as an individual, but also must be trained to use his arms effectively in a collective effort in aid of the community’s self-defense. Of course, the guarantee that each and every eligible individual always possesses arms suitable for some kind of Militia service will also ensure that such arms are available at all times for every such individual’s personal self-defense. So, pace Justice Stevens, by “protect[ing] the right of the people * * * to maintain * * * well regulated militia”, “the Framers” did indeed “enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution”, for individuals acting as individuals in their own personal defense as well as for individuals acting collectively in defense of the community.

We know this with apodictic certainty because the very first constitutional authority and responsibility of the Militia is “to execute the Laws of the Union”, as well as the laws of their own States. And self-defense—whether exercised on behalf of the community as a whole or of a single individual—is the execution of the very highest of all human laws. As Sir William Blackstone (no mean student of the common law) explained with respect to the “defence of one’s self”:

the law * * * makes it lawful in [an individual] to do himself that immediate justice, to which he is prompted by nature, and which no prudential motives are strong enough to restrain. It considers that the future process of law is by no means an adequate remedy for injuries accompanied with force; since it is impossible to say, to what wanton lengths of rapine or cruelty outrages of this sort might be carried, unless it were permitted a man immediately to oppose one violence with another. Self-defense, therefore, as it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society.
Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Robert Bell, 1772), Volume 3, at 3-4.

Self-evidently, then, individual self-defense is, in fact and law, a microcosmic example of the macrocosmic right and duty of the Militia to execute “the primary law of nature” (and vice versa). This should be obvious, too, from the Second Amendment. For “the security of a free State” could hardly exist if individuals were unable to protect themselves, as individuals, from lone aggressors to the selfsame extent that they were able to protect themselves, as a community, from concerted attacks by large numbers of domestic or foreign aggressors (and vice versa). “A well regulated Militia” defends the community. The community, however, is composed of individuals. So, in defending the community, the members of the Militia are defending themselves as individuals, too. And even when an individual is simply defending himself against a single attacker in an isolated confrontation, he is also defending the community, because he is executing the very highest law of the community against the aggressor under circumstances in which no one else can come to his aid.

It is understandable that someone such as Justice Stevens could be hopelessly confused on this score. What, though, is to be said of Mr. LaPierre, who attacks Justice Stevens’ statement as “that arrogant defamation of liberty—utterly denigrating the individual right to keep and bear arms”. Is it conceivable that for Justice Stevens to link “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” with the Militia is an “arrogant defamation of liberty”, when the Second Amendment itself identifies “[a] well regulated Militia” as “necessary to the security of a free State”? Do individuals in “a free State” not enjoy “liberty”? And, if they do (as is incontestably the case), is not “[a] well regulated Militia * * * necessary to the security” of their “liberty”? Or is the Constitution wrong on that point? One wonders whether Mr. LaPierre has ever pondered such questions.

B. Mr. LaPierre then quotes Justice Breyer’s dissent in McDonald:

“[T]he Framers did not write the Second Amendment in order to protect a private right of armed self-defense.” And “By its terms, the Second Amendment does not apply to the States; read properly, it does not even apply to individuals outside of the militia context.”
Justice Breyer fumed. “After all, the Amendment’s militia-related purpose is primarily to protect the States from federal regulation, not to protect individuals.”

Of course, Mr. LaPierre is fully justified in treating these statements as rank gibberish—

First, as explained above, the Second Amendment certainly does “protect a private right of armed self-defense”. Can even Justice Breyer believe that a member of the Militia, required by law to possess a firearm in his own home at all times, does not enjoy a “private right” to employ that firearm for personal self-defense, in addition to his right and duty as a member of the Militia to execute the law against whoever attacks him?

Second, to what vanishingly small set of citizens does the Second Amendment not apply, because the constituent individuals are “outside of the Militia context”? “A well regulated Militia” includes all able-bodied adults from, typically, 16 years of age on up. Only individuals convicted of the most serious crimes, and those who (although otherwise able-bodied) suffer from some disabling mental disease or defect, are excluded. (Conscientious objectors are not required to possess firearms, but must perform some other Militia service.)

Third, the right—and duty—of “the people to keep and bear Arms” so as to be able to serve in “well regulated Militia” must apply first and foremost to and in their own States, because the Militia are “the Militia of the several States”, not “the Militia of the United States”. Do not the States themselves enjoy a right and labor under a duty to provide in their own territories what the Constitution declares to be “necessary to the security of a free State” everywhere without exception throughout the Union? Is their “security” as “free State[s]” to be left to the mercies of errant public officials in the General Government? What if insouciant, incompetent, or disloyal officials of that government fail, neglect, or refuse to provide the requisite measures of “security”? Must “free State[s]” then collapse throughout the United States, with no recourse in self-help?

To be sure, Congress labors under the constitutional duty “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia” for the purposes of “execut[ing] the Laws of the Union, suppress[ing] Insurrections and repel[ling] Invasions”. But what has it done to date (actually, since 1903)? It has consigned almost all Americans to the constitutionally oxymoronic “unorganized militia”, leaving them unprepared to perform any Militia service in defense of either their communities or themselves as individuals. Were the right and duty of “the people” to serve in “well regulated Militia” fully enforced by the States, though, Congress’s default would not matter to a critical degree, because Militia properly “well regulated” by their own States would be prepared to fulfill all of the responsibilities “necessary to the security of a free State”, including the three the Constitution specifies.

Fourth, the General Government’s only regulatory authority in the premises is to organize, arm, discipline, and train the Militia, and to govern such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, for one or more of the three explicit constitutional purposes quoted above, and for nothing else. The Constitution authorizes no other regulation—and most emphatically no regulation which directly violates “the supreme Law of the Land” by purporting to “unorganize” or “disarm” the Militia. Furthermore, an unconstitutional regulation of the Militia which harms the States necessarily harms “the body of the people” who make up the Militia, and therefore harms the vast majority of the able-bodied adult individuals who make up society. So, pace Justice Breyer, if the Second Amendment provides any protection at all, it assuredly “protect[s] individuals”.

But if Justice Breyer is all wet, does Mr. Lapierre stand on drier ground? Does Mr. LaPierre imagine that “the people” have no right to require their own States to maintain the very—indeed, the only—institutions which the Constitution declares to be “necessary to the security of a free State”? Are the States to be suffered to behave as other than “free State[s]” by simply dispensing with their Militia? One would hope not. Yet is this not the terminus to which acceptance of “the individual right to keep and bear arms”, so precious to Mr. LaPierre, now leads this country?

C. Mr. LaPierre then scoffs at what he calls Justice Stevens’ “off-the-wall dissent” in McDonald:

Stevens wrote, “[T]he experience of other advanced democracies, including those that share our British heritage, undercuts the notion that an expansive right to keep and bear arms is intrinsic to ordered liberty. …
“[I]t is silly—indeed, arrogant—to think we have nothing to learn from the billions of people beyond our borders.”
Mr. LaPierre rightly derides this claptrap.

The laws of foreign nations are both irrelevant and impertinent with respect to how America’s Constitution should be construed and applied. As to foreign nations in general, I have written a book to that effect. How To Dethrone the Imperial Judiciary (San Antonio, Texas: Vision Forum Ministries, 2004). As to Great Britain in particular, immediately pre-constitutional American history provides a veritable library, culminating in the record of General Gage’s attempt to impose “gun control” on the Colonists in Lexington and Concord in 1775—the event memorialized, for example, as part of “A Declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North America, now met in General Congress at Philadelphia, setting forth the causes and necessity of their taking up arms” (Thursday, 6 July 1775), Journals of the Continental Congress, Volume 2, at 150-151. (In this regard, Mr. LaPierre would do well to recall that Americans resisted British tyranny on 19 April 1775, not by anarchic exercises of some imaginary “individual right to keep and bear arms”, but by turning out in a collective fashion as Local units of the Militia of Massachusetts.)

Pace Justice Stevens, Americans’ first task must be to learn, not from foreign sources but from their own Constitution, what “liberty” means—and especially what institutions and practices are required to preserve it. The most important precept (because the Constitution singles it out) is that “[a] well regulated Militia”—not an imaginary “individual right to keep and bear arms”—is “necessary to the security of a free State”. Having learned that much, Americans can compare the state of “liberty” in their own country (in which a large proportion of the citizenry remains armed), with the general nonexistence of “liberty” in foreign nations (in which disarmament of the populace is the usual state of affairs). What America’s Founding Fathers understood as “liberty” under “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” may be slipping into an increasingly perilous condition in this country; but it is largely defunct almost everywhere else. What (in Justice Stevens’ words) “we have * * * to learn about liberty from the billions of people beyond our borders” is that the deterioration of “liberty” here and its elimination there are not mere accidents of history. They derive from disregard of the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment in this country, and from the absence of the entire text of that Amendment in the organic laws of other countries.

D. Finally, Mr. LaPierre rightly chides Justice Ginsburg for once saying that she “would not look to the U.S. Constitution if [she] were drafting a constitution * * * . [She] might look to the Constitution of South Africa[.]” “You might ask,” writes Mr. LaPierre, “why would a U.S. Supreme Court justice prefer another constitution to that which was forged in Philadelphia more than 200 years ago?” The explanation as to Justice Ginsburg, no doubt, is that she subscribes to a legal and political ideology incompatible with—indeed, diametrically opposed to—the principles of America’s Constitution, and therefore “prefer[s] another constitution” of her own imagining. What, though, is the explanation as to Mr. LaPierre?

Exactly what constitution, informed by what legal and political ideology, does he prefer? Apparently, it is a constitution with no firm grounding in pre-constitutional American legal history, a constitution to be construed on the basis of an ideology which licenses its exponents to dissect the Second Amendment, to disregard if not discard the Amendment’s first thirteen words, to disrespect the judgment of the Founders that “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”, and to discourage the members of the NRA, as well as those sympathetic to it throughout this country, from associating themselves with the Militia in thought, word, and deed, except when they deny that the Militia have any significant relationship to “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”.

Misinterpretations of the Constitution with such an undercurrent of animosity towards the Militia could be expected to be broadcast by a certain “poverty” law center, notorious for its rabid opposition to the Second Amendment. Why they keep emanating from the NRA, however, passes understanding. Perhaps it really is true that whom the gods would destroy they first make mad. Unfortunately, if allowed to fester much longer this particular madness will destroy, not only the NRA, but the rest of us as well.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




Donald Trump and the Militia

Please understand that I am not a “tub-thumper”, an enthusiast, or an apologist for Donald Trump. But his electrifying emergence on the scene represents a sea-change in American politics far more consequential than his own pyrotechnic personality, bold campaign-style, and receipt of popular enthusiasm suggest. He is, as it were, the surfer who—perhaps by accident, perhaps by insight, but in any event in a timely fashion—has caught the first of the really big waves rolling towards shore. The significant aspect of the present situation is not the surfer, however, but the wave: namely, the upsurge of popular disgust for the “two”-party political vessel in which this country is sailing on a collision-course into the rocks of despair. This first big wave threatens all of the ships riding at anchor in the Establishment’s harbor. So the Establishment needs to throw up a breakwater, in a manner both fast and furious.

As anyone with 20-20 political vision can see, America’s domestic enemies have taken off their velvet gloves to reveal the iron fists underneath, by employing against Trump directly, and America ultimately, the modern Bolshevistic strategy of socio-political destabilization through so-called “non-violent direct action”, “weathermen” tactics, and “color revolutions”—all in line with the old Leninist/Stalinist slogan, “there are no fortresses which Bolsheviks cannot storm”. Please refrain from chiding me that the contemporary Establishment is not, to one degree or another, made up largely of Bolsheviks. The opposite is obviously true. Some are retreaded Trotskyites (who call themselves “neoconservatives”). Others are watered-down Mensheviks (who call themselves “social democrats” or “moderate socialists”). Others are the equivalent of NEP-men (better known here as “corporate socialists”, because they rely on governmental intervention in the economy to guarantee profits for themselves, while offloading losses onto the backs of the general public). And all of them are doctrinaire Leninists, inasmuch as they subscribe to his notion that “[t]he scientific term ‘dictatorship’ means nothing more nor less than authority untrammeled by any laws, absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever, and based directly on force”. Vladimir I. Lenin, “A Contribution to the History of the Question of the Dictatorship, A Note” [1920], in Collected Works (Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Progress Publishers, 4th English Edition, 1966), Volume 31, at 353. None of these people gives a tinker’s dam for the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution—indeed, they believe themselves to be “untrammeled by any laws”. And all of them enthusiastically promote the present-day global “war on terrorism”, under color of which a para-militarized police-state apparatus, “absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever, and based directly on force”, is being built up within this country in order to wage a domestic “war of terrorism” against the American people. See my book By Tyranny Out of Necessity: The Bastardy of “Martial Law” for the particulars on this.

If I may base my appreciation of the present situation upon an historical parallel drawn from Germany’s dolorous experience under the Weimar government in the 1920s and 1930s (which is probably familiar to most readers of this commentary), the advent of these bare-knuckled mass assaults on this country amounts to our own home-grown Bolsheviks’ declaration of ein Kampf um die Macht auf Leben und Tod (a struggle for power to the death). They will employ their Rotfrontkämpferbund (Red Front fighters’ league) to try to derail Trump’s nomination, through die Herrschaft des Pöbels auf der Straße (mobocracy in the street). If he is nominated, they will use der Bund to try to deny him election. If he is elected notwithstanding all of their efforts before November, they will then turn der Bund loose to stifle any major reforms which he attempts to put through after his inauguration, whether with or especially without Congress, the Judiciary, and the bureaucracy behind him. And please spare me the innuendo that, by drawing upon this parallel, I am somehow suggesting that Trump is a modern American “Hitler” figure. Rather, my intuition tells me that Trump is the sort of individual, perhaps rough-hewn but basically honest, who might have saved Germany from Hitlerism, as well as from Bolshevism, had the good Germans who came forward in der Wiederstand (the resistance-movement) after 1933 been more prescient and better organized before then.

One may ask why America’s Bolsheviks have decided to come out of the closet to exhibit their true coloration by unleashing mobocracy in the street, when they can (and surely will) employ every kind of old-fashioned fraud familiar in American politics to steal the election. The answer is that they anticipate their inability to put into practice Stalin’s apperçu that who votes is less important than who counts the votes, and are prudently preparing for the worst possible eventuality—namely, that in these unsettled times even widespread electoral fraud may not deprive Trump of victory if the polling-places are inundated by a true “revolt of the masses”. Moreover, even the most effective techniques of electoral fraud will be useless after the election. No further elections of consequence will be held during the first two years in which Trump holds “the Office of President”. If he cannot be stifled during that period, perhaps “the Trump phenomenon” will prove its worth in successful Presidential actions, and then will demonstrate its longevity and strength in the next elections—with the Bolsheviks suffering defeat after defeat. Between elections, the Bolsheviks will not be able to rely exclusively upon their co-conspirators, fellow travelers, dupes, useful idiots, and assorted fools in Congress, the Judiciary, and the bureaucracy to stand up to Trump. For the righteous anger of legions of patriotic Americans lined up behind him will give all of them pause. To put iron in their cronies’ backbones, the Bolsheviks will need to provide them with muscle in the streets: namely, hordes of well-funded, well-drilled “protesters” and “dissenters” deployed to shout down, or violently shut down, every popular manifestation of support for Trump.

So, as President, Trump—and all of the patriotic Americans in his camp—will desperately need the Militia:

(i) to awaken, energize, authorize, mobilize, organize, equip, train, and deploy on his behalf those whom the Declaration of Independence styles “the good People”;

(ii) to protect Trump himself—because no part of the present governmental apparatus at any level of the federal system can be trusted to do so;
(iii) to put through fundamental reforms that can be accomplished by the President alone (“to execute the Laws of the Union”, including both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, perforce of Article I, § 8, cl. 15 and such statutes as 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f); 10 U.S.C. §§ 332 and 333; and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242), in particular against entrenched, recalcitrant, hostile, and disloyal bureaucrats and subversive private factions and other NGOs and special-interest groups; and especially
(iv) to leave puissant governmental institutions for “the good People” to use on their own at the State and Local levels in the event of an unavoidable and utterly destabilizing national crisis, probably centered in banking and haute finance, which breaks out during his Presidency.
With respect to points (ii) and (iii) in particular, one might recall the wisdom of General William Tecumseh Sherman who, when importuned to make himself a candidate for the White House, replied that “I would account myself a fool, a madman, an ass, to embark anew, at sixty-five years of age, in a career that may, at any moment, become tempest-tossed by the perfidy, the defalcation, the dishonesty or neglect of any of a hundred thousand subordinates utterly unknown to the President of the United States.” Quoted in Burke Davis, Sherman’s March (New York, New York: Vantage Books, 1988), at 298.

Inasmuch as der Rotfrontkämpferbund is now being deployed, a counterrevolutionary “white” force must be mobilized to oppose and defeat it. If loyal Americans want to avoid witnessing the rise of some extreme “right-wing” (actually, “right-socialistic”) “brown” force such as die Sturmabteilung (by default the main counterweight to the Communist street-gangs in Weimar Germany during her time of troubles)—which many desperate Americans will demand, and not a few will surely join, if they are offered no other powerful alternative—something else must be provided for them. This force must be raised from among “the good People”, there being no other source with the necessary loyalty, legal authority, self-interest, and sheer numbers requisite for the task at hand. Especially, it must be a force with explicit and unequivocal authority under the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, an establishment within the government, not a force the provenance of which can be traced only to some private political party, movement, or group.

Therefore, if Trump actually intends to be a constitutional “Commander in Chief” in the fullest sense in both law and fact—and, Heaven knows, if he does not intend as much then he should emulate General Sherman by not seeking “the Office of President” at all—he needs to promote the exercise of that high authority against America’s domestic enemies, through exhortation for and mobilization of what the Constitution itself declares to be uniquely “necessary to the security of a free State”, and to which it explicitly assigns the authority and responsibility “to execute the Laws of the Union”—and he must do this, in both words and deeds, immediately if not sooner. This is no time to play for time; for, as the old saying has it, time brings all things, bad as well as good. During his campaign, he must advocate revitalization of the Militia; and, after his election, he must take every action necessary and proper to that end. I suspect that, if he does grasp that nettle, he will be able to say of the contemporary Establishment what General Sherman said of the old Confederacy: “pierce the shell, and it’s all hollow inside”.

On the other hand, if—Heaven forfend!—Hillary Clinton should seize “the Office of President”, either by her own devices or (more likely) with the aid of anti-Trump back-stabbers in the Republican Party or some third-party “spoiler” candidate (from such as the Libertarian Party, which disastrously split the conservative vote in favor of a dyed-in-the-wool Clintonite in the last gubernatorial election in Virginia), she and the Bolsheviks behind her will not sit on their hands. Instead, emboldened by their triumph in scotching Trump, they will turn out der Rotfrontkämpferbund to advance their revolutionary agenda by deploying das Faustrecht (mob rule by the fist) against all of the “constitutionalist”, “patriotic”, “conservative”, “traditionalist”, and other politically, economically, and culturally “right-wing” groups in the country: First, to intimidate them and anyone who even tangentially supports them. Second, to turn the undecided citizenry against them when they try to defend themselves (denouncing even their verbal self-defense as “incitement to violence”). And third, to unleash para-militarized police-state oppression, some species of “martial law” jury-rigged under color of “emergency powers”, Vyshinsky-type prosecutors, and the kangaroo courts to suppress whichever Americans try to stand up for their natural and constitutional rights. This, the Bolsheviks expect, will bring about die Endlösung (the final solution) of the problems of popular sovereignty and popular self-government which so vex all totalitarians.

Be forewarned. One need not be a dabbler in the occult to foretell the future in this respect. Neither need one be much of a student of modern history to fear the accuracy in these times of the old adages that “no one learns anything from history other than that no one ever learns anything from history”, and that “we grow too soon old and too late smart”. (Personally, too, I appreciate the wisdom of the observation that “no man is ever taken for a prophet in his own country”. For I have long been struggling to educate Americans about the Militia—and, most recently, about the utter illegality of “martial law”—with about as much success as if I had been trying to sell a twelve-step program in humility and reticence to the Kardashians.)

Nonetheless, I believe that Mao Tse-tung was correct (albeit perhaps only accidentally or hypocritically so) when he wrote that “[t]he people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history”, that “[t]he masses have boundless creative power”, and that

[a]ll reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful.
Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking, China: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), at 118, 118, and 72. Thus, to turn the Bolsheviks’ own slogan to the purpose of America’s salvation: “There are no fortresses which ‘the good People’ cannot storm.”

In the final analysis, it is critically important that Trump should turn to “the good People”, trust “the good People”, empower “the good People”, and rely upon “the good People”. Not only for his own sake (which in the great scheme of things amounts to little), but also for their sake first and foremost (which amounts to everything). As modern Presidential campaigns illustrate, this country is steeped in its own bastard version of das Führerprinzip (the leader principle). As early as 1933, America had her “Chief” (Roosevelt), just as Germany had her Führer (Hitler), Italy her Duce (Mussolini), and Russia her Vozhd’ (Stalin), to be followed not long afterwards by Red China with her “Great Helmsman” (Mao). Today, all too many Americans view a President as someone whose purpose is to advance the agenda of their political party or special-interest group, not someone who should act unselfishly with and through WE THE PEOPLE so that THE PEOPLE themselves can become permanently the masters of their own destiny. Such approval of, or at least acquiescence in, rule from “the top down” must in short order prove fatal to popular self-government.

In principle, it denies the precept of the Declaration that “Governments * * * instituted among Men[ ] deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed”—not from acceptance by “the governed” of “the leader’s” mere assertions of authority. In practice, it generates increasingly uncritical support for “the leader’s” program, then increasingly blind obedience to his dictates. Until society arrives at the terminal stage of suicidal political regimentation: Führer befehl, wir folgen (leader command, we follow).

Just as the strength of any pyramid resides at its base, not at its apex, so, too, with popular sovereignty—and with the Power of the Sword in WE THE PEOPLE’S hands for the purpose of “execut[ing] the Laws of the Union” through the Militia. In a constitutional republic, true authority and legitimate power never descend from “the top down”, but always arise—indeed, can be generated and exercised only—from “the bottom up”. Trump’s greatest achievement (were he capable of any truly great achievement) would be to put this truth into action. By one segment of the population he will be damned if he does; and, by another segment, damned if he does not; so he may as well be taken for a goat rather than a sheep. That goes for the rest of us, too.

© 2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




A Trumped-up controversy

Not so long ago, Donald Trump drew unto himself a great deal of ire from certain circles for suggesting that, in light of the international dangers posed by Islamic terrorists, this country should consider prohibiting further immigration by Muslims. Much of this abuse seemed to assume that some sort of “right” to migrate to the United States exists for foreigners in general, or Muslims in particular—or at least for those foreigners or Muslims against whom some specific criminal or other serious charges cannot be levied as the bases for their disqualifications for entry.

At this moment, I am merely an observer, rather than an avowed supporter, of Mr. Trump. For what sort of a card in the deck of Presidential candidates he may be has yet to become clear. Some astute, if cynical, political commentators suggest that he may be being put up as the Establishment’s Manchurian Candidate—that is, a one-eyed Jack which shows only the deceptive side of its face to the general public’s view. Other commentators warn that he may be being set up by subterranean forces as a sure loser in the general election to Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, or some equally deplorable donkey from the Establishment’s political stable—that is, as a Joker. Still others hope that a benevolent Providence has raised up Mr. Trump as America’s Ace in the Hole for the decisive hand which History has dealt at this critical juncture in the course of human events. My personal concern is whether, even if Mr. Trump himself is “for real” and goes on to win nomination and the general election, he is likely as President to prove to be America’s trump card—or merely a card which will be trumped by some other card the Establishment plans to deal from the bottom of the political deck. That is, specifically, whether Mr. Trump is perhaps being put up, or more likely being put up with, by the crafty Forces of Darkness in order to be set up in the White House as the new Herbert Hoover when the national economy crashes in 2017 or 2018.

Whatever sort of card Mr. Trump may turn out to be, one thing is certain: He was quite correct as to the power, the right, and in some circumstances the duty of the United States to exclude aliens—any and all aliens—from entering this country. That point is so clearly and firmly established that one must wonder whether the only commodity the supply of which never runs out amongst all too many Americans today is double-rectified, industrial-strength ignorance where basic questions of constitutional law are concerned.

Consider the internet report by Paul Bedard, in the Washington Examiner, “THE MAP: ‘Sanctuary Cities’ cross the 300 mark with Dallas, Philly” (2 February 2016), which informs its readers that these “sanctuary cities” are refusing to assist in, or perhaps even to allow, enforcement of America’s immigration and naturalization laws against illegal aliens welcomed within their territories. Now, it should be obvious that the very concept of any such “sanctuary” is unconstitutional, root and branch. The Tenth Amendment does provide that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” But powers over immigration are explicitly and exclusively “delegated to the United States by the Constitution”. Specifically, Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 extends to Congress the power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”—which plainly excludes variegated rules on that subject generated by the States or their political subdivisions on some ad hoc bases. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Furthermore, Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 states that “[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight”—which plainly permits Congress to “prohibi[t]” such “Migration or Importation” after 1808 in “the States now existing” (that is, as of ratification of the Constitution in 1788) and at all times in all other States, and that absolutely and unconditionally (because the Constitution sets out no limitation with respect to this matter). “Migration” plainly refers back to Congress’s power with respect to “Naturalization”, under Article I, Section 8, Clause 4; whereas “Importation” refers back to Congress’s power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”, under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3. Taken together, all of these provisions authorize Congress to exclude from entry into this country any and all aliens, at any time, for any reason.

As the Supreme Court emphasized in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-604, 606, 609 (1889):

That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think is open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power. * * *

While under our Constitution and form of government the great mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory.

To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting through its national character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. The government, possessing the powers which are to be exercised for protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth; and its determination, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are necessarily conclusion upon all its departments and officers. If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners * * * who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when war does not exist, and the same authority which adjudges the necessity in one case must also determine it in another. In both cases its determination is conclusive * * * .

The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one. The powers of government are delegated in trust to the United States, and are incapable of transfer to any other parties. They cannot be abandoned or surrendered. Nor can their exercise be hampered, when need for the public good, by any consideration of private interest.
Accord, Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289-290 (1904); Bagajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).

Simply put, “the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress[.]” Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-531 (1954). Period. See also Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheaton) 259, 269 (1817); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898). No room exists for the States or their Localities to adopt rules as to aliens either more, or less, stringent than those which Congress has enacted. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Exclamation point.

As of today, Congress has enacted numerous laws on this subject—none of them as severe as they could be, but which nonetheless render certain aliens subject to exclusion, illegal if they enter this country in defiance of those laws, and liable to deportation and other punishments when apprehended. Furthermore, Congress has specifically authorized the President to deal in a draconian fashion with illegal (or any other form of) entry by aliens into this country:

Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. * * *
8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). And, in fulfillment of his constitutional duty under Article II, Section 3, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, the President could, and should, rigorously enforce this statute now that it has become crystal-clear that “the interests of the United States” require the statute’s enforcement—indeed, that the very salvation of this country so demands. See also my NewsWithViews commentary “How The President Can Secure The Borders” (18 August 2015).

Thus, the factions which are trying to deny to Americans the ability, originally secured by the Declaration of Independence, to maintain “among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them” as a sovereign nation capable of preserving its own identity and integrity by controlling its own borders—and which are trying to effect the same result against the nations of Europe, too—have not a legal leg, foot, or even toe upon which to stand when they purport to provide “sanctuary” or other aid to illegal aliens. Neither have they any credible basis for criticizing Mr. Trump when he says that he, as President, would deal with immigration, legal as well as illegal, in a particularly uncompromising manner.

Moreover, because the States are at the present time being invaded in fact by “vast hordes of [illegal aliens] crowding in upon us”, they could exercise their own explicitly reserved constitutional power and duty under Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 to protect their independence and integrity by, if necessary, “engag[ing] in War, [when] actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”—at the very least by militantly prohibiting their own political subdivisions from aiding and abetting such an invasion through the provision of “sanctuaries” for or other assistance to the invaders. But what sort of legally and politically inane, if not insane, behavior does America witness today? On the one side, half-witted State and Local officials are purporting to exercise powers absolutely denied to them, in the interest of facilitating alien invasions of their own territories (and, by extension, of the United States as a whole), such as by establishing “sanctuary cities”. While, on the other side, the very same nitwits refuse to exercise their undoubtedly reserved constitutional authority: (i) to “make * * * gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts” perforce of Article I, Section Clause, Clause 1, so as to begin the process of restoring to this country an economically sound and constitutional monetary system; and (ii) to revitalize “the Militia of the several States”, which the Second Amendment declares to be “necessary to the security of a free State” in every respect! Will sheltering illegal aliens prevent or mitigate the coming collapse of this country’s monetary and banking systems—or will the financial drain those aliens will impose on overburdened social services and underfunded “safety nets” accelerate and exacerbate it? Will the illegal aliens being sheltered today contribute to the stabilization and then to the reconstruction of society in the wake of that collapse tomorrow, as only revitalized Militia will be capable of doing—or will they increase and intensify the widespread lawlessness which will surely accompany a major economic crisis? These questions answer themselves.

The present rage for “sanctuary cities” may have as one source the giddy altruism and agonizing self-flagellation, coupled with the constitutional illiteracy, of naive “liberals” eager to eradicate so-called “white privilege” (or to pay court to some other half-baked but “politically correct” notion fashionable at the moment). That, however, is only a very small—and the least consequential—part of the explanation for what is going on.

The Establishment—the ultimate purposes of which are far from being either “liberal” or even benign—employs excessive immigration of all sorts as a battering ram against traditional America. By importing or infiltrating huge numbers of aliens who are either incapable of assimilating in principle or unwilling to assimilate in practice, and thus salting mutually incompatible and even overtly antagonistic enclaves of such people throughout this country, the Establishment divides the total population into hostile competing factions and selfish special interests each of which it hopes it can separately manipulate—politically, economically, ideologically, and socially—so as in the end to rule them all. (This, of course will ultimately disadvantage most “liberals” as well as everyone else, which is why those “liberals” who parrot the Establishment’s line and follow its lead as to immigration are rightly derided as “useful idiots”—“useful” with respect to the Establishment, but “idiots” with respect to their own interests.)

One needs vision far less acute than 20-20 to see that, as the result of the Establishment’s actions, political, economic, ideological, and social divisions, confusions, misunderstandings, and conflicts persist just about everywhere in this country, and even prevail to the exclusion of social cohesion in many places. The most pernicious manifestation of this orchestrated disunity even has a name: “multiculturalism”. Whether this is the product of calculation—engineered and propagated by the exponents of “cultural Marxism” or other subversive schools of thought—or is the unintended consequence of monumental hubris and stupidity on the part of Establishment and its hangers-on, the destructive result is the same.

No nation has ever been created or long held together through the imposition of anarchic “diversity” from the top down through a calculated policy hatched by its ruling class (or for that matter from the bottom up, as the result of a series of adventitious “barbarian invasions”). Just as the very concept of a “nation” presupposes defined and enforceable geographical borders, so too does it presume the existence of unity with respect to certain fundamental legal principles, economic practices, political procedures, and social conventions which define that nation and its constituent people. In America, “multiculturalism” might be acceptable with respect to social relations which more or less were matters of indifference—but only if citizenship were strictly conditioned upon “uniculturalism” in vital particulars, by requiring each legal immigrant (and native citizen, for that matter) to demonstrate his understanding of and loyalty to the traditional, theoretically sound, and time-tested tenets of Americanism: namely, national independence (the Declaration of Independence); limited government (the Constitution); nonintervention in foreign conflicts (“the common defence”); free markets beneficial to all (“the general Welfare”); personal freedom (“the Blessings of Liberty” in general and the Bill of Rights in particular); the centripetal force of a single national language (English, in which those fundamental laws, as well as all of America’s statutes and judicial decisions, are written); and, perhaps most important of all, each individual’s duty to the community to be ever-ready to retain and protect good government, and to throw off bad government in the persons of rogue public officials, if necessary through being called forth to serve in the Militia.

But no—the Establishment has promoted the subversion, even the open denigration, of Americanism at every turn, particularly these days with respect to “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, the unfettered exercise of which is essential to the maintenance of what the Second Amendment calls “well regulated Militia”. The one and only culture the vaunted “inclusiveness” of contemporary “multiculturalism” scrupulously excludes is Americanism. The Establishment treats only Americanism as an unacceptable component of the “diversity” on which it dotes.

No doubt some people will dismiss the foregoing as a xenophobic analysis. Having never perused Frosty Wooldridge’s columns at NewsWithViews, they will wax eloquent about how, according to one theory or another, an ever-swelling influx of aliens, even those unquestionably illegal, will actually benefit the national economy, and even enrich ordinary Americans’ lives with all sorts of exotic and wonderful foreign colors, sounds, smells, and flavors, as it were. One assaulted by such rosy descriptions and predictions would do well, though, to recall the warning voiced by the Trojan priest Laocoon, urging his imprudent countrymen not to haul the Wooden Horse within the walls of Troy: “Quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes”—“whatever it is, I fear the Greeks, even bearing gifts”. I, for one, sense that Mr. Trump understands this, even if perhaps he has never read Virgil’s Aeneid.

2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




Gun control and the no-fly list Pt. 1

GUN CONTROL AND THE NO-FLY LIST
In the political realm, as elsewhere, evil never sleeps. And apparently there is no enormity which the present rogue régime in the Disgrace of Columbia, and equally rogue régimes in certain States, are not capable of, and not intent upon, committing with the expectation that sheepish Americans will remain somnolent and submissive until it is too late for them to recognize the danger and set about resisting it. The latest piece of “in-your-face” effrontery is an extension of these régimes’ never-ending push for systematic “gun control” aimed at the thoroughgoing disarmament of Americans—the goal so pithily and provocatively expressed in Senator Dianne Feinstein’s words: “Mr. and Mrs. America, turn them all in.” In his recent televised address following the mass shooting in San Bernardino, California, the present resident in the White House, Barack Obama, asked “What could possibly be the argument for allowing a terrorist suspect to buy a semiautomatic weapon?” and urged that “Congress should act to make sure no one on a no-fly list is able to buy a gun.” Shortly thereafter, Governor Dannel Malloy of Connecticut announced that he would sign an “executive order” directing the Connecticut State Police, not only to prevent individuals on “the no-fly list” from buying firearms or ammunition in the future, but also to revoke those individuals’ permits for firearms they already possess. These actions are open to the obvious questions: “What is Mr. Obama’s definition of a ‘terrorist’?”, “Under what theory of constitutional due process can a mere ‘suspect’ be denied a right explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution?”, and “How can a mere ‘executive order’ override the Second Amendment?” But, assuming for the purposes of argument that in some conceivable circumstances an individual suspected of “terrorism” could be denied “the right * * * to keep and bear Arms” (as, for example, because he were under arrest preliminary to being arraigned under a constitutionally valid criminal charge), what could possibly be the justification for employing a “bill of attainder” to deny that right to all “suspects” whom some nameless, faceless bureaucrats had included in some “list”, based on perhaps utterly fanciful definitions of “terrorism” known only to them? For the undeniable constitutional fact is that “the no-fly list” (and any other “list” of that genre) is an unconstitutional “Bill of Attainder”.

In general, an “attainder” is an act which extinguishes some or all of an individual’s civil rights. A “bill of attainder” is a legislative act which imposes a sentence of death upon an individual without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. And a “bill of pains of penalties” is a legislative act which imposes a sentence less severe than death upon an individual without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. In Article III, Section 3, Clause 2, the Constitution allows for an “Attainder” in only one instance: “The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.” But in Article III, Section 3, Clause 1, the Constitution requires that “[n]o person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.” So an “Attainder of Treason” cannot come about through a “bill of attainder”, because it requires a prior conviction based upon extraordinary evidence in the course of ordinary judicial proceedings. Otherwise, the Constitution absolutely outlaws all “Bill[s] of Attainder”, whether issued by Congress or the States. As to Congress, Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 provides that “[n]o Bill of Attainder * * * shall be passed.” As to the States, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 provides that “[n]o State shall * * * pass any Bill of Attainder[.]” These prohibitions apply to both “bills of attainder” and “bills of pains and penalties”. See Ex parte Garland, 74 U.S. (4 Wallace) 333 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) 277 (1867); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).

As I have explained in detail in previous articles for NewsWithViews—to wit, “Death Squads” and “Where Is the Outrage?”, which dealt with “official assassinations” of individuals on the Obama régime’s supremely secretive “hit list”—no public official in any branch of the General Government may enact, enforce, or otherwise give effect to any “Bill of Attainder” (or “bill of pains and penalties”). To complete the analysis, it is easy enough to prove that no public official in any State may enact or enforce a “Bill of Attainder”, whether that “Bill” purports to derive from the State herself or from the General Government. As already noted, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution prohibits all “Bill[s] of Attainder” emanating from a State: “No State shall * * * pass any Bill of Attainder[.]”. To be sure, a State is not the political jurisdiction which has “pass[ed]” “the no-fly list”. But (as in Connecticut) a State might attempt to enforce that “list” against individuals who sought to acquire, or who already possessed, firearms. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, however, that “[n]o State shall * * * enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”. “[A]ny law”, not just a purported “law” of the State. According to rogue officials in the General Government, “the no-fly list” is an actual “law” or an official action “with the force of law”. The prohibition against “Bill[s] of Attainder” is one of the constitutional “immunities of citizens of the United States”. Therefore, no State may “enforce” “the no-fly list” for any purpose.

Of course, “the no-fly list” does not explicitly describe itself as a “Bill of Attainder”. In constitutional analysis, though, mere labels mean nothing. See, e.g., Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795-796 (1988); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-269 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). Substance, not form, controls. “The no-fly list” is plainly an unconstitutional “Bill of Attainder”, because inclusion of an individual automatically denies him the ability to travel by airplane, without any judicial determination that such a disability is justified by some plainly constitutional law. Oh, I know that some apologists argue that flying on commercial airlines is supposedly not a “right”, but instead is a “privilege” which somehow can be extinguished at public officials’ discretion. This is a specious contention. The right to travel, even by air, has both constitutional and statutory foundations. Compare, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868), with 49 U.S.C. § 40103. The airlines are common carriers, highly regulated by law, to the services of which all Americans have a claim in common law and various statutes. And the freedom of average Americans to contract with the airlines for passage is part of both parties’ constitutional “liberty” and “property” protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. To be sure, “freedom of contract” can in some instances be subjected to constitutional regulations, as (for example) by exertion of Congress’s power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States”. But no power of Congress may be exercised through a “Bill of Attainder”. In any event, the hypothetical “right/privilege distinction” has no bearing whatsoever on the matter at issue here, which is the invocation of “the no-fly list” for the purpose of denying individuals an explicit constitutional right: namely, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, whether that be to purchase “Arms” in the first instance or simply to retain possession of “Arms” previously acquired by whatever lawful means.

Use of “the no-fly list” as a basis for disqualifying an individual from the purchase or possession of a firearm is quite different from the use, say, of criminal records in a typical “background check” performed by a firearms dealer as the precondition for a sale. Individuals on lists of criminal convictions maintained by the FBI and various State law-enforcement agencies have been indicted, tried, and convicted of serious infractions of the law in the normal course of judicial process. One may debate whether or not the commission of a particular crime by a particular individual is a constitutionally sound basis for denial to him of “the right * * * to keep and bear Arms” (or denials of the right to vote or to hold public office, which often are disabilities that stem from a criminal conviction). But the principle is valid in at least some cases. In contrast, an individual on “the no-fly list” has not been indicted, tried, or convicted of anything. He may be suspected of something—but, even then, the degree of suspicion is not sufficient to warrant his arrest. So the principle involved in “the no-fly list” is invalid in all cases. Criminal records are not “Bill[s] of Attainder”, because a particular legal disability (say, denial of the right to purchase or possess a firearm) arises from the prior presumably justifiable criminal conviction, not from the later listing of the individual as having been convicted . Whereas “the no-fly list” is a “Bill of Attainder”, because whatever legal disabilities it rationalizes arise merely from an individual’s inclusion in that “list”, coupled with a vague implicit prediction that he might misbehave in the future, but with no need for any prior, or subsequent, conviction in a court of law for actual criminal misbehavior.

One need not be the victim of paranoia, only the possessor of a modicum of political insight and foresight, to conclude that the proposal by Mr. Obama that Congress should enact a new species of “gun control” based upon “the no-fly list”, together with the nearly simultaneous announcement by the Governor of Connecticut that he will impose “gun control” in that State perforce of “the no-fly list” through the fiat of an “executive order”, are parts of an integrated complot to test the waters of public opinion in order to determine if Americans will sit silent and still for such a scheme. This is a variant of the well known Leninist tactic of “salami slicing”: here, by installing the most obvious, pervasive, and obnoxious form of “gun control”—actual prohibition of purchase and possession of “Arms”—slowly and steadily, individual by individual, State by State, and then nationwide only after most Americans have been sufficiently “softened up”. And one can rest assured that, if the Governor of Connecticut succeeds in using an “executive order” to apply “the no-fly list” to purchases and possession of firearms in that State, then all too soon Mr. Obama will announce that he, too, can employ an “executive order” for that purpose throughout the United States, without the need for any new statute from Congress.

Perhaps it is merely accidental, albeit ironic, that “gun-control” fanatics have selected Connecticut—which calls herself “the Constitution State”—as their “test bed” for this operation, simply because the upper echelons of that State’s governmental apparatus happen to be infested with home-grown Stalinists and other totalitarians. Or, more ominously, perhaps their choice of “the Constitution State” is intended to demonstrate their belief that they can get away with anything, no matter how plainly contradictory of the Constitution it may be, because common Americans (especially in Connecticut) are just too stupid and cowardly to do anything about it.

Now, in my NewsWithViews commentaries cited above, I have written about “official assassinations” and “Bill[s] of Attainder”—without, I have noticed, any significant result. This may be because vanishingly few Americans imagine that they may become the victims of such an atrocity. As far as they are concerned, such a fate is likely to be visited only upon little brown people in far-away lands, who probably deserve it anyway, because they have the audacity to object to interference by rogue American officials in the internal affairs of what they foolishly imagine are their very own countries, when everyone knows that American officials have an overarching license to interfere in the internal affairs of any country, even to the extent of overthrowing its government, massacring its citizens, destroying its infrastructure, and poisoning its lands with depleted uranium.

But I suggest that a program aimed at the total domestic disarmament of America tomorrow would be arguably worse than the one which allows “official assassinations” today, because no one can imagine that such assassinations might ever be conducted against the general populace throughout the United States, or even that the present resident of the White House would dare openly to claim a prerogative to kill just anyone and everyone whom his minions had inscribed on some “list” of proscribed individuals.

The total domestic disarmament of America, in contrast, aims at no less than the assassination of “a free State” for everyone within the United States—because just about everyone could be, and in the predictable course of events no doubt would become, a target. Once the “gun-control” fanatics finally succeeded in disarming all, or even most, Americans, the number of political murders and other enormities could, and would, be raised to whatever level the tyrants wanted, without fear of effective (or perhaps any) resistance on the victims’ part—just as has occurred during the last century in country after country in which systematic “gun control” has been imposed. For part two click below.

2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




Gun control and the no-fly list Pt. 2

Moreover, the salami-slicing tactic of gradually insinuating “gun control” throughout America by the attainder of individuals is not limited to the use of the present “no-fly list”. That is merely the first slice, and certainly one too thin for achieving the ultimate purpose of the exercise. In the nature of things, once the principle has been established, “gun control” by attainder can and will employ any and every “list”, based upon any and every imaginable theory of ineligibility—whether the listed individuals are denounced as “terrorists”, or extremists”, or “subversives, or “dissidents”, or by some other opprobrious epithet (including, no doubt, anyone who dares to deny the supposed power of “the government” to employ the tactic of “listing” itself). Everyone with access to the Internet knows that today’s “homeland-security” bureaucrats at every level of the federal system, and the subversive private organizations with which they regularly interact, entertain all sorts of truly crackpot notions as to who qualifies as an “extremist”, or a potential “domestic terrorist”, or a “home-grown terrorist”—including those Americans who identify themselves as “patriots” (because they love their country), as “constitutionalists” (because they believe in the rule of law), or as opponents of a “new world order” (because they defend the Declaration of Independence). Everyone is entitled, as well, to suspect that the “homeland-security” establishment is even now compiling extensive “lists” of Americans whom some bureaucrats and private organizations want to shoe-horn into such categories. Rogue politicians and bureaucrats may deny that these “lists” exist. But no sensible individual believes any such imposture, in light of the long-standing false denials by the FBI and the TSA that “the no-fly list” existed. See Laura K. Donohue, The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 254.

In addition, one can expect that “gun-control” fanatics will run to the red lines their engines of deceitful propaganda and hysterical agitation, not simply (as they always have done in the past) to demonize as a run-of-the-mill “extremist” anyone who supports “the right * * * to keep and bear Arms”, but also to denounce as an extraordinarily clear and present danger to society everyone who holds “fundamentalist” views about the Second Amendment, who manifests “intolerance” of “gun control”, or who expresses “hatred” for “gun controllers”—and to demand that such people be denied that right precisely because of their zealous promotion of it and their uncompromising opposition to its detractors. In a stupendous display of ideological jiu jitsu, the big “mainstream media” and their allies across the Internet will transform an individual’s support for “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” into an excuse for denying that very individual that very right for that very reason. And this tsunami of “politically correct” invective will rationalize the creation of what amounts to “no-gun lists” for suspected “domestic terrorists”, to be enforced through “executive orders” according to the precedents soon to be set by Connecticut’s Governor Malloy and others of his ilk. All of which is already beginning to move forward in high gear (just as if it had been planned well ahead of time).

Interestingly enough, the ACLU has, with some success, been attacking “the no-fly list” in the General Government’s courts. Unfortunately, its approach to the problem has been faulty. In an Internet article from the ACLU entitled “Until the No Fly List Is Fixed, It Shouldn’t Be Used to Restrict People’s Freedoms” (7 December 2015), Hina Shamsi, the Director of the ACLU’s National Security Project, reports that the organization is litigating a case in which it demands that the General Government provide individuals with notice of their inclusion in “the no-fly list”, a statement of the reasons for that inclusion, and an opportunity for a hearing on the matter before a neutral decision-maker. The self-evident confusion here, however, is that the courts enjoy no power to “fix” a “Bill of Attainder” by applying ex post some remedial processes in order to mitigate its rigors while still allowing its existence and operation to continue. Rather, the duty of the courts is to strike down in law and render ineffective in fact each and every “Bill of Attainder” in its entirety right then and there. The Constitution’s prohibitions of “Bill[s] of Attainder” do not say that a “Bill” is permissible if it (or some court reviewing it) provides notice, reasons, and a hearing for a listed individual. The Constitution absolutely prohibits all “Bill[s] of Attainder”, no matter what purported procedural “safeguards” they may originally contain or may have grafted onto them in the course of litigation. The reason for this is obvious: The harms which a “Bill of Attainder” causes—namely, the supposed legal disabilities it imposes on the individuals it lists—occur as soon as the “Bill” comes into existence. The rights of listed individuals are lost or otherwise compromised at that moment, according to the very definition of a “Bill of Attainder”. True enough, procedural “safeguards” might allow for those rights to be regained at a later date, but always at substantial costs in time, effort, and expense imposed on the targets of the “Bill”. Moreover, as the ACLU’s own litigation demonstrates, the burden of seeking to set up procedural “safeguards”, so that the effect of a “Bill of Attainder” is not as bad as it might otherwise be, always rests squarely on the victims’ shoulders. This is an intolerable imposition, inasmuch as, being absolutely unconstitutional, a “Bill of Attainder” is utterly void ab initio. A “Bill of Attainder” can no more be transformed into a constitutional creation by a court’s application of ex post procedural “safeguards” than Frankenstein’s Monster can be transformed into Miss America by a make-up artist’s generous application of lipstick, rouge, and eye-liner.

Reliance on the ACLU’s strategy would have especially perverse effects in a situation in which “the no-fly list” were employed, as Governor Malloy threatens to employ it, for the purpose of stripping individuals of the possession of firearms they already own. Consider the following scenario: Having discovered that Jones is included in “the no-fly list”, the Connecticut State Police descend on his home, armed with some jury-rigged administrative process based upon Malloy’s “executive order”, which purports to empower them to seize Jones’ firearms and ammunition sine die. If he is not shot to death by a gun-crazy SWAT team executing the raid, Jones must then initiate some sort of judicial proceeding in order to recover his property. While he is doing so (if his financial situation enables him to hire a competent attorney), the police destroy or otherwise dispose of his firearms and ammunition as supposed “contraband” or “forfeited” property (perhaps by turning those items over to some rogue agency of the General Government, which then black-markets the material to Mexican drug cartels or to “moderate” jihadi terrorists in the Middle East). So, even if Jones eventually does prevail in court, the most he can obtain from the official malefactors of the State of Connecticut is monetary damages, not his firearms. In overall effect, he will be completely disarmed until he can purchase new arms—which, in the case of so-called “assault rifles”, Connecticut’s new law (recently upheld on typically specious grounds by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) makes difficult. So, at least for a while—and perhaps for quite a while at that—Jones’ “right * * * to keep and bear Arms” will be palpably “infringed”. That this scenario could be extended throughout the State of Connecticut (and any other State, for that matter), limited only by how extensive were the various “lists” rogue agencies of the General Government had compiled, shows how dangerous to “the security of a free State” the situation could become.

Of course, patriots need not worry about the involvement of the ACLU in such a situation, because that organization is unlikely to challenge rogue public officials’ use of “the no-fly list” (or any other “list” of that genre) to disarm common Americans. As Hina Shamsi reports in the article cited above, according to the ACLU “[t]here is no constitutional bar to reasonable regulation of guns, and the No Fly List could serve as one tool for it, but only with major reform.” In this, she seems to be following sotto voce Justice Breyer’s anti-constitutional dissenting opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. Contrary to both her and Justice Breyer, though, there most assuredly is a “constitutional bar to reasonable regulation of guns”, as the two of them understand “reasonable regulation”—that is, any “regulation of guns” which rogue public officials deem “reasonable” (including, one supposes, outright confiscation). The Second Amendment declares what constitutes the only “reasonable regulation of guns”: namely, that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”, where the term “Arms” includes any and every type of “Arms” and related accoutrements which could serve any conceivable purpose in “[a] well regulated Militia”. And “the No Fly List could [not] serve as [any] tool for [the reasonable regulation of guns]”, because “the no-fly list” is a “Bill of Attainder”, which is absolutely unconstitutional and void, no matter what sort of “major reform” might arguably be applied to it.

But what about the National Rifle Association in this brouhaha? Disappointingly, although not unpredictably, the NRA approaches this problem from the same wrong direction as the ACLU. In an Internet article from POLITICO entitled “Administration keeps up media barrage on terror fight” (8 December 2015), Josh Gerstein quotes an NRA spokeswoman as saying that “[t]he NRA’s only objective is to ensure that law-abiding American citizens who are wrongly on the list are afforded their constitutional right to due process.” If this reference to “due process” means that “the no-fly list” should be declared an unconstitutional “Bill of Attainder”, root and branch and at one fell swoop, well and good. But it probably means “due process” only in the sense the ACLU understands “due process” in this situation: namely, as requiring notice, reasons, and a hearing which might serve to remove individuals from the “list” in the course of litigation, on a tedious and uncertain case-by-case basis.

So, what should be done? If litigation simply had to be pursued, the logical parties to initiate it would be firearms dealers in Connecticut, who would file suit as soon as Governor Malloy issued his threatened “executive order”. The theory of their case would be straightforward: The dealers are licensed by the General Government (specifically, by the BATFE). Although the products of governmental regulations (the constitutionality of which need not be explored here), their licenses constitute valuable “property”, entitled to constitutional protection. These licenses grant statutory rights to the dealers to enter into contracts with citizens for the purchase and sale of firearms and ammunition. The dealers and their customers also have constitutional “liberty” and “property” rights of contract recognized by the Constitution. All of these rights, whatever their sources, are “civil rights” under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1988(b) and (c). The employment by public officials in Connecticut of “the no-fly list” (or any other such “list”) in order to preclude the dealers from selling arms to an entire class of individuals, none of whom has ever been judicially determined to be lawfully disabled from purchasing firearms or ammunition, is unconstitutional on its face, under both Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment thereto, and for that reason deprives the dealers of their “civil rights”, along with the economic benefits which would accrue to them from their unrestricted exercise and enjoyment of those rights. Those deprivations entitle them (in judicial jargon, afford them “standing”) to sue Malloy, the Connecticut State Police, and any other public officials involved in the use of “the no-fly list”, seeking a declaratory judgement, injunctive relief, monetary damages, and attorneys’ fees.

To be sure, a suit of this sort would inevitably encounter practical difficulties—not the least of which would be the various claims of “official immunity” the defendants would interpose. Nonetheless, perhaps such a strategy will appeal to the NRA, which, in the manner of a compulsive gambler, apparently cannot restrain itself from betting the Second Amendment’s farm, time and again, on yet another spin of the roulette wheel of litigation.

Yet the NRA would be wise to recall that in roulette the odds always strongly favor the house, even if the croupier does not apply a greasy finger to the wheel. But when it comes to “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, are contemporary judges as honest as the croupiers in the average casino? After all, on the basis of its past performances, who can trust the General Government’s Judiciary in general—especially within the Second Circuit? Or, for that matter, who can trust the Supreme Court in particular, which is but a single Justice’s vote away from endorsing Justice Breyer’s “reasonable regulation” theory of the Second Amendment?

Of course, there is another route by which to secure the benefits of the Second Amendment with respect, not just to individuals’ rights to self-defense (upon which the NRA is fixated), but also to “the security of a free State” for this country as a whole (which is the Amendment’s true goal). Having written more than enough about that elsewhere, I shall refrain from repeating myself here.

2016 Edwin Vieira, Jr. – All Rights Reserved




Edwin Vieira Jr Archive 2005 – 2015