For many years, qualified CIA intelligence analysts continued doing their job guided by professionalism and high ethical standards, under the false assumption that they were working on behalf of the American people. But that assumption made their intelligence product totally unusable to the CFR conspirators working on behalf of Wall Street bankers and oil corporations. In 1951, CIA director General Walter Bedell Smith created the Office of National Estimates under the direction of Harvard Professor Walter Langer, who had been a senior intelligence analyst for the OSS. His team was the one in charge of producing the National Intelligence Estimates. When Dr. Langer retired, his successor, Yale Professor Sherman Kent, continued the tradition of professionalism and objectivity established by Langer of producing estimates telling it like it was, not like the politicians wanted. As expected, neither Langer nor Kent was popular among the CFR conspirators.
The problem was solved after the creation of Team B. Since then, departing from the same batch of raw data, CFR analysts produced a totally different kind of intelligence. This explains why senior CFR agents infiltrated in the U.S. government had no use for the CIA’s TEAM A’s intelligence analysis capabilities.
It is known that Henry Kissinger, a key CFR agent, preferred the intelligence produced by his own intelligence analysts. He profited from the reports he got from the CIA, but only after they had been re-processed and re-evaluated by his own CFR-controlled staff.
The CFR conspirators’ lack of interest in CIA A’s intelligence analysis capabilities explains why, since its very creation, the CIA has accumulated failure after failure in the area of intelligence, and nobody seemed to care. One reason for these failures is because nobody has paid any attention to intelligence produced by the CIA. Another reason is because, on purpose, the conspirators managed to force the CIA to accept tainted sources of information. A notable example of this is that after the end of WWII CIA’s almost exclusive source of intelligence from the Soviet Union and the Soviet controlled Eastern Europe was the Gehlen organization.
Most Americans ignore that, once Germany was defeated, conspirators’ agents in the CIA hired Hitler’s Chief of Eastern intelligence, General Reinhard Gehlen, and his whole organization, to spy on the Soviets. The CFR agents infiltrated in the CIA trusted Gehlen so much that he was given a free hand, acting with almost no supervision. It was not until 1963 that the West German government exposed a group of Gehlen’s agents as Soviet double agents, tried, and convicted for their treason. But CIA officers, following orders from above pressured the West Germans to allow Gehlen to escape untouched and he quietly dropped out of sight.
Nevertheless, as much as the CIA creators were not interested in CIA-produced intelligence, they made sure that the CIA Directors were trusted CFR members, and that the Deputy Director of plans (CIA’s Directorate of Plans eventually changed its name to Directorate of Clandestine Services, and now is called Directorate of Operations. This is the Directorate in charge of clandestine operations, including covert action), and his close senior collaborators were, if not CFR members, at least people they can trust —thus guaranteeing an absolute control over the armed branch of the CIA; the area that really mattered to them.
Actually, the other CIA A directorates were just a necessary cover to hide the true CIA B’s activities on behalf of its CFR creators and masters. However, working under the false impression that they were protecting the U.S. interests, CIA A’s officers at the other directorates were working hard trying to do an honest job. They didn’t realize that they had become a nuisance for the CFR agents working at the CIA B Directorate in charge of clandestine operations.
Most true patriots working at other CIA A areas, including intelligence, never suspected that the bad guys at covert action operations were working to attain different goals. Still, the accurate National Intelligence Estimates produced by CIA A’s intelligence analysts, eventually became, more than a nuisance, an irritant and a source of conflicts for the CFR conspirators.
Consequently, in 1973, CIA Director James Schlesinger, a CFR agent, in an effort to make the CIA intelligence analysts less independent and more responsible to the interests of U.S. Government B, terminated the Office of National Estimates and created the National Intelligence Council, a sort of official Team B more docile to the CFR master’s orders.
It worked on the CFR conspirators’ behalf, though, that most of he new generation of intelligence analysts who replaced the old-school ones belong to the new generation of ethically and morally challenged opportunistic people. These were the ones who, without any coercion whatsoever, immediately began producing Intelligence Estimates favorable to the interests of U.S. Government B, a.k.a. the Invisible Government of the United States, whose visible head is at the Council on Foreign Relations in Manhattan.
In an article appeared in The New Republic, Peter Beinart begins criticizing the CIA’s failure to alert the U.S. about the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with a revealing question: “How could the CIA have been so stupid?”
Though Beinart’s premises are wrong, his analysis of the apparent causes of such dismal failure is correct: in the last years the CIA has totally ignored the importance of HUMINT (Human intelligence, that is, information collected by agents in the field), in favor of relying almost exclusively on TECHINT (Technical intelligence, that is, intelligence based on information collected by satellites, radar, computers, and other gadgets). However, not knowing the true causes of the problem, Beinart’s suggestion to solve it is simplistic. According to him, the CIA needs to attract the best minds to the Company.
In his book SeeNoEvil, CIA’s former intelligence officer Robert Baer made a similar mistake. Like Beinart, Baer points to the CIA’s over-reliance on technological spying in detriment of human collection by agents in the field, but he fails to point to the true source of the problem. According to him, the CIA has become a bureaucratic, inept mess.
But both Beinart and Baer are dead wrong. Actually, one of the reasons why CIA A eventually turned from an asset into a liability for the conspirators was precisely because there were too many good minds at Langley. And good minds are too inquisitive. They discover connections, find oddities —things difficult to explain if one discards stupidity and incompetence—, strange, unexplainable things that sooner or later point to an unavoidable cause: treason.
People working at CIA A are not stupid, they are simply ignored. Proof of it is that, despite so many alleged “failures,” nobody at CIA A is fired, demoted, suspended, or even reassigned, and after every catastrophic intelligence “failure” the result is that the CIA budget is raised —though most of the money goes to CIA B’s covert action Directorate to finance covert action operations, not to increase intelligence collection and analysis. But the truly clever, though unethical guys work at CIA B. They always do exactly the job that benefits the interests of their true bosses. Unfortunately, however, their true bosses are not the American people —whose only role in this tragic charade is footing the bill.
What Beinart seems to ignore is that the trend that began in 1962 after the Cuban missile crisis for increasing TECHINT to the detriment of HUMINT was exactly what the people who control the CIA needed. So, the deterioration of CIA A’s information collection resources as a direct result of the reduction of HUMINT capabilities, which negatively affected its intelligence analysis and production capabilities, was not a mistake but the result of a carefully planned design, and the CFR conspirators who control the CIA had strong reasons for doing it.
Contrary to intelligence officers working in the field, TECHINT gadgets don’t question inconsistencies or suspect sheer treason from their colleagues and bosses. Moreover, gadgets are easier to manipulate than people. Retired gadgets don’t write embarrassing memoirs. They cannot be called to testify in Congress investigations. They don’t suffer from ethical, moral or patriotic inner conflicts. Contrary to the analysts working at Langley, herded inside physical and mental compartmented boundaries, intelligence officers collecting information in the field often get a glimpse at the whole picture —a picture that most of the time does not agree with the picture the CIA projects to the outside world. Therefore, the elimination of HUMINT in favor of TECHINT was the subtle and clever way the CFR conspirators used to restrict the vision of the best, but potentially problematic minds working at CIA A.
Moreover, intelligence officers working in the field develop a healthy skepticism about their profession. Very soon they discover that intelligence officers who reach retirement age are the ones who don’t trust anybody, including (or perhaps particularly) their own bosses, colleagues and intelligence service.
To be sure, a large percent of the people working for CIA A are honorable men and women. But, because of the characteristics of compartmentation and need-to- know inherent to this type of organization, they cannot see the whole picture. Moreover, most of the ones who have remained working for CIA A are not the best minds we can afford.
In the last decades, many good minds have left CIA A in droves. The fact was pointed out a few years ago in stark clarity by Linda Robinson and Kevin Whitelaw in their February 13, 2006, U.S. News & World Review article, “Seeking Spies: Why the CIA is Having Such Hard Time Keeping the Best.”
The reason why the people who control the CIA actually don’t want the best minds, is very simple: intelligence analysts who don’t know anything about the countries they are supposed to analyze, including their languages, are easier to manipulate than bright people with a thorough knowledge of the country, its culture, politics and language. To the CFR conspirators who use CIA B as a tool to advance their own, secret goals, CIA A is just as a convenient cover. But clever, educated employees only mean trouble. So, the CFR conspirators who control CIA B are not interested at all in having the best minds money can buy working in some areas of CIA A, particularly in the Directorate of Intelligence. Actually, allowing CIA A’s analysts to do a good job would be detrimental to the CFR conspirators’ best interests.
Eventually, some of these patriotic CIA A employees smelled a rat, and became whistle blowers, mostly by publishing books about the CIA’s mistakes or evil deeds. These are the cases of ex-CIA officers like Victor Marchetti, Ralph McGehee, Frank Snepp, and a few others. I don’t mention Philip Agee, a well known CIA critic, because I have the feeling that, far from being a true dissident, he has been all the time a double-agent working for the CFR conspirators who own the CIA.
There were others, like Arthur Darling and Sherman Kent, who, without going all the way to becoming dissidents, at some point may have felt that something was wrong with the CIA, but most likely never discovered the true causes for it.
Darling was a historian who worked for the CIA from 1952 to 1954, and authored The Central Intelligence Agency: an Instrument of Government to 1950, the first official history of the CIA. The sole fact, however, that he subtitled the book “an instrument of government,” shows that Darling never understood the true cause of the CIA’s problems. Nevertheless, he wrote a very critical study of the early CIA in which he exposed Allen Dulles’ hatchet job on Admiral Hillenkoetter. But, as soon as Dulles was appointed CIA Director in 1953, he censored it by restricting the access to the document. Darling’s study was not published until 1990.
The case of Sherman Kent is quite similar. Kent was the Assistant Director of National Estimates, the department that produced the National Intelligence Estimate of 19th September, 1962 —the now notorious “September Estimate”—, that predicted, based on previous intelligence, the extremely low possibility that the Soviets would place strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. But, just a few days later, the alleged discovery of strategic nuclear missiles on Cuban soil proved the Estimate was wrong. It is known that, despite all alleged evidence to the contrary, Kent never recanted, to the point that he commented to a colleague that it was Khrushchev, not himself, the one who had being wrong.
Notice that I have used the word “alleged” twice, because, contrary to the hundreds of articles, academic papers and books (most of them written by CFR agents or CFR-controlled authors) “proving” how the Soviets deployed strategic nuclear missiles on Cuban soil in 1962, this claim is simply not true. Actually, the presence of strategic nuclear missiles and their nuclear warheads in Cuba in 1962 has never been proved.
In synthesis, the CIA’s most acerbic critics have been the true honorable American patriots at CIA A, not the ones who praise CIA B’s “successes” like messing in other countries internal affairs, overthrowing and assassinating foreign leaders, water boarding, maintaining secret prisons and performing “renditions,” in support of the CFR conspirators’ treasonous agenda. Almost since the very creation of the CIA, the CFR conspirators in control of U.S. Government B have been waging a secret war against the American patriots working in CIA A. Despite the fact that most, if not all, of the treasonous and illegal actions committed against the American people and the peoples of the world have been carried out by CFR secret agents in CIA B, the ones generally maligned in the CFR-controlled mainstream media are the true patriots in CIA A. But there are recent alternative views to that picture.
In his book Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA, professor Melvin Goodman, a former intelligence analyst working for CIA A, wrote a whole chapter, “Intelligence: The Importance of Success,” in which he unknowingly shows how most of the alleged CIA intelligence failures actually have not been attributable to CIA A, who alerted timely about the outcomes, but to CFR agents in U.S. Government B who paid no attention to the alerts.
The bottom line is that the CFR conspirators never gave a rat’s ass about the intelligence produced by intelligence analysts working on CIA A. Actually, they have aways taken steps to ignore and neutralize them.
© 2020 Servando Gonzales – All Rights Reserved
E-Mail Servando Gonzales: email@example.com
1. See, Phillip Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: The Spy as Bureaucrat, Fantasist and Whore (London: Pan Books, 1986), p. 338.
2. Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 273, also Mary Ellen Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection (Fairfax, Virginia: George Mason University Press, 1990), pp. 145-147, 153-154.
3. For a good description of how this process took place, and even a list of names of some of the newcomers, see Melvin A, Goodman, Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA (Lanham, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 16-20.
4. Peter Beinart, “How could the CIA have been so stupid?,”The New Republic, No- vember 12, 2001, p. 6.
5. Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2003).
6. See, i.e., Theodore Draper, “Is the CIA Necessary,” The New York Review of Books, August 14, 1997.
7. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Dell, 1974).
8. Ralph McGehee, Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA (New York: Sheridan Square, 1983).
9. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval (Harmondsworht, Middx: Penguin, 1980.
10. Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: an Instrument of Government to 1950 (The Pennsylvania State University press: University Park, Penn., 1990).
11. Ibid., pp. xx-xxi, xxv.
12. See, Raymond L. Garthoff, “U.S. Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in Blight and Welch, (eds.), Intelligence in the Cuba Missile Crisis (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 21.
13. For a different, truly revisionist view of the story, see my book The Nuclear Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Oakland, California: Spooks Books, 2002).
14. Rendition: CIA’s euphemism for kidnapping suspects and illegally moving them to countries where they can be tortured or killed. 50. See Melvin A. Goodman, Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 63-88.