There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics. —Mark Twain
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, intelligence is the final product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, and interpretation of available information. So, even though the term intelligence comprises something much more complex, we may safely accept the shorter definition that intelligence is just information after it has been properly evaluated.
In its advisory report to the US Government, the 1955 task force on Intelligence Activities of the second Herbert Hoover Commission stated that: “Intelligence deals with all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action.” A true expert gave a similar definition more than 2000 years ago. According to Sun Tzu, “the reason why the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievement surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge [intelligence].”
Though the definition of intelligence is very simple and straightforward, most authors dealing with the subject confuse it. Some of them consistently use the terms information and intelligence as synonyms, when it is obvious that they are not. Others even have used the term “raw intelligence” as a synonym for information, but, as we will see below, contrary to information (which might contain misinformation and disinformation), intelligence is a very elaborated product; there is nothing raw in it.
Meteorologists never say “tomorrow is going to rain,” but “there is a 25 percent of possibility for rain tomorrow.” In the same fashion, after evaluating a particular item of information, intelligence analysts never say “this is true,” but give an estimate of the possibility it may be true intelligence.
Now, how is information evaluated?
The evaluation of information, also known as appraisal or assessment, is the process by which a piece of information is analyzed in terms of credibility, reliability, pertinence and accuracy, in order to change it into intelligence. The evaluation of information is accomplished at several stages within the intelligence cycle  with progressively different contexts.
The evaluation or appraisal of a particular item of information is indicated by a conventional letter-number system.
Reliability of the Source:
A Completely reliable
B Usually reliable
C Fairly Reliable
D Not usually reliable
F Reliability cannot be judged
Accuracy of the Information:
1 Confirmed by other reliable sources
2 Probably true
3. Possibly true
6. Accuracy cannot be judged
The evaluation simultaneously takes into consideration both the reliability of the source based on its previous performance, and the credibility of the information itself. The process involves a check against intelligence already in hand and an educated guess as to the accuracy of the new information based on how well it dovetails with previous intelligence.
Though independent, the two aspects cannot be totally separated from each other. The authoritativeness of the source, which may not necessarily coincide with its reliability, can never be ignored, though it is sometimes overrated in the light of the credibility of the information — something that has to do with the expectations of the people involved in the evaluation process. But people, including intelligence analysts, tend to believe what they suspect or expect to be true, or what better fits their personal needs, so there is always an element of bias in any evaluation of information.
It must be emphasized that both evaluations must be entirely independent of each other, and they are indicated in accordance with the system shown above. Thus, information judged to be “probably true” received from a source considered to be “usually reliable” is designated as “B2.”
One must keep in mind that the question of what is authoritative and what is not is very relative. A highly authoritative source may produce credible information, but the intelligence officer must always ask himself the question “Why?” The higher the authoritativeness of the source, the higher the possibility that it may be biased or had been compromised and, therefore, the higher the danger of disinformation. Highly authoritative sources from totalitarian governments may not always tell the truth, to say the least, but highly authoritative sources from democratic countries may not be very reliable either. There is evidence that the CIA has been involved in recruiting scholars at the most prestigious American universities, and journalists in the most influential American media. Also, there is suspicion that the KGB, the Mossad, and even the Cuban intelligence services, among others, have done a good job penetrating American universities and media.
From the point of view of intelligence and espionage, a stolen document is often more valuable than a gratuitously conveyed secret one from whatever source, since it diminishes, though not totally eliminates, the risk of deliberately misleading information. The “why?” however, applies not only to the danger of planted disinformation. It must also be asked about the source, even of one whose bona fides is beyond question. The danger here is of an intelligence service believing what it wants to believe —a problem that has affected all the world’s intelligence services at one time or another. The problem of the bias of the evaluator is one that is unavoidable in intelligence; it extends even to information of fullest credibility from the most reliable sources.
Bias in evaluation can never be fully eliminated in an intelligence service and, more importantly, in high government circles. Moreover, creating evaluators to evaluate the evaluators can only compound it. Within the intelligence establishment, the only effective safeguard lies in the individual competence and quality of its members. Even more important is their intellectual honesty and personal courage to face pressures from above.
One must always bear in mind that no source can ever be regarded as infallible and no single bit of information can ever be regarded as totally accurate. Whatever the case, the chances for error, misinterpretation, misunderstanding and deceit are too high to blindly trust any information.
Super patriots, doctrinaire partisans, court historians, bureaucratic climbers, people of provincial outlook, enemy moles —all of them are potential dangers to sound information evaluation. Perspective, perspicacity, worldliness, a soundly philosophical outlook, the knowledge and sense of history, and perhaps a bit of skepticism and a sense of humor — these are the qualities of an intelligence analyst that minimize error in the interpretation and evaluation of information.
The 9/11, 2001, Events
All the initial information the American people received about the 9/11 events came from a single source: the American government. With the single exception of Congresswoman Cynthia MacKinney, who since the very beginning questioned the U.S. Government’s version of the events, nobody in the two branches of the Repucratic Party questioned it. The American mainstream media as a whole accepted the Government’s version of the events and became an obedient mouthpiece parroting it over and over ad nauseam. Actually, the only dissenting source of information about 9/11 has been the Internet and books published by minor independent presses.
However, the U.S. Government, like all governments around the world, is made out of politicians, and politicians have never been a source of truthful information. Moreover, with a few and short exceptions, the U.S. Government ha been fully under the control of the CFR conspirators, whose goal is to destroy the U.S. and implement a totalitarian New World Order. Therefore, I will qualify the only source of the 9/11 information, that is, secret CFR agents in the US Government, with a D: Not usually reliable.
Now I will take a look at the accuracy of the information itself.
Probably the main characteristic of truthful information is that in the past similar information has proven to be true. Of course, there is a first time for everything, and the fact that a similar event has never happened prior to the present one is no sure indication that it cannot happen. But, in the analysis of historical events, we have the added advantage that we can add to the evaluation of the information the occurrence of similar events in which the information has proven to be true or not, after the one in question.
Consequently, the evaluation of the information itself in the case of historical events is a process involving a check against intelligence already in hand about similar events before and after the event in question. It also involves an educated guess as to the accuracy of the information related to the event based on how well it fits with this intelligence.
On July 28, 1945, a B-25 bomber crashed against floors 78, 79 and 80 of the Empire State building in New York city, at the time the tallest skyscraper in the city. But the firefighters manage to extinguish the fire. The building did not collapse.
On February 2004 a violent fire destroyed the top 30 floors of a skyscraper in Caracas, Venezuela, but the building did not collapse. On February, 2005, a fire destroyed 30 top floors of a skyscraper in Madrid, Spain. After a whole day fighting the fire, it was extinguished. The building did not collapse.
On November, 2010, a 28 floor apartment building in Shanghai, China, was totally consumed by fire, but the step structure was not affected and the building did not collapse. In April, 2012, a skyscraper still under construction for the Russian Federation in Moscow was severely affected by fire. The building did not collapse.
On June 16, 2017, a violent fire totally destroyed a 24-floor apartment building in London, but it did not collapse.
Secondly, never before or after 9/11/2001, a skyscraper has collapsed on its own footprint except as the result of controlled demolition. This is why companies who do controlled demolition are paid large amounts of money to do their job.
If buildings, particularly buildings with a steel structure, could usually fall on their own footprint when demolished, these companies would be superfluous — but they are not. But CFR agents in the U.S. Government, the press and the academia want us to believe that, exceptionally, on September 11 2001, not one, or two, but three skyscrapers with steel structure collapsed on their own footprint as the result of fires.
Therefore, extrapolating from other verifiable information, any serious intelligence analyst would conclude that the accuracy of the information itself provided by the CFR agents in the U.S. Government such as George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, could be fairly qualified as a 5, that is, improbable.
Consequently, an intelligence appraisal of the 9/11 events will produce a D5: that is, source not usually reliable, accuracy of the information improbable. For the same reasons, based on the evaluation of the information about the 9/11 events provided by the CFR agents in the U.S. Government, any intelligence service in the world can easily decode it as a sloppy, disingenuous attempt to pass disinformation disguised as true intelligence.
Moreover, the fact that the 9/11 events served as a God-given pretext to carry out policies decided way in advance is a true index that perhaps it actually was not a God-given but a CFR-given one. As some conspirators’ agents have shamelessly declared, “never put a good crisis to waste” —particularly an artificially created crisis.
If things have changed in relation to the 9/11 events, it is because of the Internet, a medium the CFR conspirators cannot fully control, and its ability to advertise critical books published by small, non-controlled publishing houses. Now, why do the CFR conspirators devote so much time to fixing the past? The answer is simple: because by giving credibility to past artificially created, non-existing threats they add credibility to present and future, artificially created, nonexistent ones.
Unfortunately, the true perpetrators of 9/11 are still at large. Hint: one of them claimed to be a Christian, but was always making the Devil’s sign with his hand. If you still don’t know who they are, you are either disinformed, a fool, a die-hard member of the Repucratic Party, or a globalist anti-American traitor.
My only hope is that the present action against the Saudi oil fields, most likely a false-flag operation, would not become another 9/11 to justify higher oil prices and a new unnecessary war.
© 2019 Servando Gonzales – All Rights Reserved
E-Mail Servando Gonzales: email@example.com
1. Quoted in Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence.’ Understanding Our Craft,” CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence.
The author of the article reminds the reader that intelligence is an elusive concept, and there are many different definitions of the term. In the same fashion, the concept of information, the raw material out of which intelligence is produced, is even more elusive, to the point that there is no agreement among scientists about its true nature. The fact explains why Claude Shannon, the creator of the information theory, decided to call it “communication theory” instead. See, Claude Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” Bell System Technical Journal No. 27 (July and October, 1948).
2 . Quoted in Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Signet, 1965) , p. 11.
3. Sun Tzu, The Art of War – translated by Samuel B. Griffin (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 144.
4. Intelligence Cycle: The process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to policymakers. There are usually five steps which constitute the intelligence cycle: planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and evaluation, and dissemination.
5 According to communication theory, the amount of information is directly proportional to the unexpectedness of the message. This also applies to the field of intelligence and espionage, but one must keep in mind that information is not true intelligence under it has been evaluated.
6. See, i.e, David Wise, The Politics of Lying (New York: Random House, 1973).
8. A 90-page Report, entitled “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century” published in September 2000 by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), an organization formed mostly by so-called “neocons” supporters of the Bush administration stated: In order to transform the U.S. military for the new challenges it will face, the process of transformation, “… even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event — like a new Pearl Harbor.” [emphasis added]